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Introduction
Peer F. Bundgaard
The purpose of the present volume is to investigate the multifarious aspects of the
relation between an artwork (visual, literary, or musical), its objective properties, the
meaningful experience of it, and the cognitive skills and acts involved in the latter.
Each of these aspects is a genuine and irreducible part of what I here will call the
“aesthetic complex,” and each of them thus constitutes an autonomous domain of
research or an object of scholarly interest: that certain visual or cognitive capacities
are activated in the interaction with aesthetic objects; that the experience of aesthetic
objects has a particular phenomenology, either because it is accompanied by an
appreciative judgment (or a rewarding feeling) or because it is about a specific kind
of object (artful objects); that artful objects have properties that plain objects—
natural as well as cultural—do not have; and, finally, that aesthetic objects manifest
or represent a meaning in that they give shape to or embody an artistic meaning
intention. The psychology, the phenomenology, the ontology, and the semiotics of
the artwork each aims to lay down the above characteristics in each their domain,
with each their methods.
The contributors to this volume are philosophers, psychologists, literary critics,
and semioticians. As such, they address only one or just a couple of the above-
mentioned aspects. Each chapter will show, however, that the inquiry into one of
the essential aspects of the aesthetic complex naturally raises research questions
related to one of the other essential aspects. It is thus difficult to consider meaning-
making in art without considering those structures and properties in artworks that
embody that meaning or produce that meaning effect. Similarly, it is difficult to
lay bare the essential properties of artworks (or of artful representation) without
analyzing them in light of those properties of the human cognitive system or of the
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visual brain that make man particularly responsive to such qualities. In short, even
though scholars, for obvious reasons, distribute their efforts selectively and focus
their attention on one of the aspects of the aesthetic complex, these domains of
inquiry are complementary.
With this volume we therefore hope not only to give the reader access to recent
research within the ontology, the phenomenology, and the semiotics of the artwork,
but also to manifest the complementarity of work done in each of these domains.
In the remainder of this Introduction, I shall first go into some more details with
regards to the different aspects of what I have called the “aesthetic complex” and
next give a short introduction to each of the chapters of the volume.
As the subtitle of this volume suggests—What are Artworks, and How Do We
Experience them?—one can distinguish two correlates in the aesthetic complex: a
subjective correlate, encompassing whatever relevant properties of the experiencing
subject or whatever relevant goings-on in the cognitive system; and an objective
correlate, concerning whatever relevant properties of the object likely to elicit a
characteristic subjective response.
The emergence of Aesthetics as a philosophical discipline is coextensive with
the discovery of the sensitive subject as the pivotal element of aesthetic experience.
The object of inquiry becomes—already from Alexander Baumgarten’s Aesthetics
(1750) and definitely with Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790)—the
subjective correlate of the aesthetic complex, i.e., the cognitive dynamics activated
in the viewer when perceiving artworks or when experiencing things considered
beautiful, valuable, or of aesthetic interest. When Kant characterizes beauty in his
Third Critique, he defines it not as a property of an object but as a feeling that is
the outcome of a certain “harmony of the faculties,” a specific balance between
certain cognitive centers (Imagination and Reason). Or, to use present day terms, a
characteristic way of processing information that differs both in function and content
from the way non-aesthetic information is processed.
In the same vein, Kant pinpoints another essential aspect of aesthetic experience
that is exclusively subjective (not in the “relativistic” sense, but instead pertaining
to the experiencing subject): the mental set in which the object is attended to, which
is “disinterested” in that it does not pursue any theoretical (epistemic) or practical
(moral) interest, nor does it pursue the fulfillment of any desire of any sort.
Whether Kant is right or not in claiming the disinterested nature of aesthetic
experience is not important here. What matters are the two basic tenets of what could
be called the Kantian legacy in aesthetics writ large: (1) aesthetic experience should
be defined not in terms of the object that elicits the feeling of beauty but instead
in terms of particular activation of the cognitive system; (2) subjects can attend to
aesthetic objects—or objects deemed beautiful—within an intentional framework
(or a mind set) that is different from the framework through which we relate to
objects for epistemic or moral purposes; (3) since aesthetic experience should not
be understood and explained with reference to certain properties of an object and
therefore does not require a specific competence for capturing those properties (both
perceptually and intellectually), it is not the privilege of a particularly apt or trained
section of the population—the aesthetic subject is a general subject.
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The philosophical and scientific enquiry into aesthetic experience which has
developed in the wake of the Third Critique has, of course, not been Kantian through
and through: the apriorism proper to Kant’s system, the complex mechanics that
keep the harmony of the faculties together have not been part of most, if any, of
the research programs in this domain. Many such programs can nevertheless be
considered post-Kantian because: (1) the experiencing or sensitive subject is brought
to the fore; (2) the feeling of beauty—or, independently of the feeling of beauty,
the experience of artworks—is considered as being a specific cognitive response
resting on general properties of the human “mind,” the visuo-cognitive system or
human “sensitivity” in general, and therefore amenable to description or scientific
description.
Marshaling such general positions, of course, does not warrant any unity, nor
does it define a research program. With regards to point (2), there is considerable
difference between approaching the response to beauty within Fechner’s empirical
aesthetics (Fechner 1876) or present day neuroaesthetics (Zeki 1999; Chatterjee
2010; Ishizu and Zeki 2011; Nadal and Skov 2013) and addressing aesthetic expe-
rience in terms of those perceptual structures that are meaningful (not necessarily
beautiful) for the visual brain (Arnheim 1954, 1969; Petitot 2009; Bundgaard 2009,
2014). Yet, however different such research programs may be, they address a series
of issues that are all related to the subjective correlate of aesthetic experience
broadly taken (both as an experience accompanied by a rewarding feeling and
as an experience of a specific kind of objects, namely artworks). Some of these
questions are: if we attend to aesthetic objects differently than to plain everyday
objects, then what characterizes this intentional attitude or mindset? If there is a
difference between the phenomenology of seeing three apples, a photo of three
apples, and a painting of three apples, then what characterizes the phenomenology
of aesthetic experience? If artworks affect us perceptually by virtue of their
qualitative (visual, textual, or acoustic) layout or design, what are the phenomenal or
qualitative properties that are particularly significant for us and how do we process
visual information (e.g., how do we reconstruct represented objects from depicting
surfaces)? What attracts our attention or facilitates our memory when perceiving or
reading artworks? If artworks affect us by virtue of given properties of our visuo-
cognitive system, then what are the relevant properties exploited to that effect? If
there is a specific phenomenology of aesthetic experience, does it follow that there
is a general brain state or a neural dynamics that correspond to that phenomenology?
If the feeling of beauty indeed often accompanies aesthetic experience, then how is
it to be described? Is it a unitary response, triggered off by the same kind of stimuli
for natural or biological reasons? Is it conventionally or socially imposed or is it
idiosyncratic?
As already mentioned, the subjective correlate of aesthetic experience is nev-
ertheless only one part of the full story. It is—and has indeed been—difficult
to maintain an exclusive focus on the subjective aspect of aesthetic experience.
If the feeling of beauty is considered a response to a given object or state of
affairs, it seems natural to ask if certain types of states of affairs or designs cause
such responses. This is the hypothesis that drove Fechner’s seminal research in
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experimental aesthetics and a central endeavor in both Zeki and Ramachandran’s
(Zeki 1999, Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999) work in neuroaesthetics. It consists
in laying bare the objective sources of the rewarding feeling of beauty (artists’
alleged capacity of revealing the essence of things represented is claimed to be one
such source [cf. Bundgaard 2014 for a critique]). Moreover, from an ontological
point of view, artworks differ from plain everyday objects in different respects.
Painted landscapes resemble real landscapes, but they don’t look like them, as
it were: they pertain to an entirely different category of things. So even though
the feeling of beauty or of aesthetic interest—in short, the hedonic aspect of
aesthetic experience—may be elicited by both natural phenomena (land-, city-, or
soundscapes; faces and bodies) and artifacts, the latter display sui generis properties
which make them essentially distinct from natural or biological phenomena (be
it only because they have been produced by an intentional agent). Here again, it
seems natural to ask whether the categorical properties of the object1 inform the
phenomenology of perception or inflects the visuo-cognitive system’s processing of
information and sense data. In short, a new cascade of research questions follow
from taking one’s point of departure in the objective correlate of aesthetic expe-
rience: what properties do artworks possess that plain objects don’t? Where does
art come from (evolutionarily speaking)? If artworks depict or represent something,
then what exactly is depiction or pictorial representation? If artworks are intentional
objects par excellence, how is this intentionality encoded in them and how can it be
retrieved if it is to be retrieved in the first place? If artworks are valuable in a sense
that plain objects are not, what do we mean by “value?” Do artworks, in virtue of
their formal structure, embody a meaning that affects the way in which viewers (or
readers) attend to them or process the information conveyed by them?
The latter question opens yet another domain of inquiry, one situated somewhat
between the purely subjective and objective components of aesthetic experience
or between the phenomenology and the ontology of the artwork: the domain
of (pictorial) meaning, the semiotics of the work of art. Paintings are not only
intentionally arranged so as to elicit an appreciative judgment for such and such
reason. Artists give shape to meaning intentions that, of course, cannot be reduced
to the simple objects depicted in their paintings. The semiotics of the work of
art can be addressed in different ways and in different theoretical (psychological,
philosophical) frameworks. The frameworks and the basic theoretical commitments
notwithstanding, the key question is arguably how paintings, in virtue of their
formal structure (their design), “embody” a meaning. Throughout his work, Rudolf
Arnheim has incessantly repeated that painters are not illustrators—that is to say
they do not just depict a scene, however artfully. Crucially, they also interpret to
1This also holds true for literary art or, rather, fictional discourse: does the fact that a text is accessed
as a piece of fiction affect the phenomenology of reading or the reader’s interaction with the text
(cashed out in, e.g., what a reader remembers of a text, how much, and in what way)? Experimental
studies tend to support an affirmative answer to this question (cf. Hendersen and Clark 2007; Zwaan
1994).
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the viewer’s eye the meaning that the motif is intended to communicate to his mind
and do so with purely pictorial or painterly means. This implies that the meaning
addressed here is not the one captured in a global interpretation of the work (such
as “The glorious Napoleon from Jena,” or “The vanquished Napoleon on Saint
Helena”), but those more or less local meaning effects that serve the purpose of
embodying aspects of that global meaning. Here is how Arnheim formulated it: “In
a work of art, an abstract pattern organizes the visual matter in such a way that the
intended expression is directly conveyed to the eyes” (1954, p. 152). A similar claim
is made by John Hyman in the present volume: “Artists exploit the communicative
possibilities inherent in the medium as such [ : : : ] with specific materials, tools and
techniques to communicate thoughts, feelings and perceptions in a work of art”
(Hyman, present volume: pp. 205).
The semiotics of the work of art—here understood as the pictorial meaning
expressed in the painting through the tools and techniques employed by the artist
to this effect—also gives rise to intricate research questions and conflicting research
programs: is pictorial meaning in the final analysis conventional, the outcome of a
grammar shaping pictorial expression from the outside, as it were? Or do artists
exploit both hardwired properties of the visual brain and ontological properties
of the medium (surface properties, brushwork, shapes, spatial relations : : : ) with
a view to producing such and such meaning effects? Regardless of the answer one
is inclined to give to such questions, it seems reasonable to assign a status to the
domain of pictorial meaning that is irreducible to both to the phenomenology and
the ontology of aesthetic experience. Paintings can for example convey meaning
without eliciting a feeling of beauty; or two different paintings can tap into the same
automatisms of the visuo-cognitive system (say, processing by means of grouping)
and produce different meaning effects.
As already mentioned, the present book is intended to address all these three
issues. The book has been structured so that the first chapters mainly concern
issues in empirical and phenomenological aesthetics, followed by chapters mainly
addressing the ontological properties of artworks (that make them distinct from
other objects or which characterize them in general), concluding with chapters
which approach artworks as semiotic objects, either as regards the meaning-making
devices proper to artworks or as regards the semiotic mechanisms in virtue of which
objects are assigned a status as artworks. However, as the reader will quickly realize,
almost all chapters develop topics that recruit insights from the neighboring domains
of inquiry.
The first two articles are developed within the framework of “empirical aesthet-
ics.” This research program is relatively recent (Miall and Kuiken 1999; Bortolussi
and Dixon 2003; van Peer 1986; Sanford and Emmott 2012), but it has roots
back both to Roman Ingarden’s phenomenological studies into the ontology and
the cognition of the literary work of art—in particular his characterization of
the phenomenology of the reading process (how readers, in order to obtain a
full representation of the fictional universe, must “concretize” information given
by the author, and how they must “fill-in” all those spots the author has left
undetermined [Ingarden 1931])—as well as to the notion of “defamiliarization”
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or “foregrounding” developed by the Russian formalists in the beginning of the
twentieth Century (Shklovsky 1917). Pivotal to approaches such as those of David
Miall, Marisa Bortolussi, and Peter Dixon is the intention to lay bare the cognitive
mechanisms and empirical properties of the reading process at large: what do
readers actually respond to and how do certain textual properties affect the reading
process, information processing, recall capabilities, and emotional responses?
In “Temporal Aspects of Literary Reading,” Miall readdresses the readers’
experiences of “defamiliarization” with an aim to laying bare the different mental
processes which are activated when feeling strangeness and which may be consid-
ered as subjective correlates underpinning the presence of “literariness.” Miall’s
model of literary reading covers two domains: first, on the basis of neuroscientific
studies of EEG waves, he addresses the initial moments (the first few hundred
milliseconds) of the experience of literary reading: these include absence of
habituation, the deferral of intention, the thwarting of prototypical feeling, bodily
alertness, and the experience of animacy; each of these are considered as aspects of
“defamiliarization.” In the second domain, he considers some sequential features
that guide and shape response on a larger scale, focusing in particular on the
processes of feeling and their impact on the reader.
In Psychonarratology from 2003, Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon experimen-
tally tested the actual effect well-known narratological tools for meaning-making
have on readers’ information processing and representations of the textual world
(these comprised phenomena such as “perspective,” “narrator,” “free indirect
speech,” and so on). In the chapter “Memory and Mental States in the Appreciation
of Literature,” they address yet another crucial aspect of the reading process: namely
readers’ memory skills. Ideal readers are considered to have unconstrained access to
the text. Bortolussi and Dixon show instead that the processing of literary narrative
is contingent upon the fragmentary memory of real readers. In their chapter, they
highlight a decisive determinant of memory: the variation in readers’ mental states
during reading in terms of mind wandering, in which the reader momentarily gives
relatively little priority to processing the text, and engagement, in which the reader
constructs elaborate and personally meaningful representations of the story world.
They show how variations in both these parameters affect reading processes and
determine memory for both text and aesthetic reactions. Their analysis and claims
are further supported by the results of two experiments in which readers’ mental
states were probed online during reading.
Cathrine Kietz’s chapter, “Temporal Conflict in the Reading Experience,” aims
at capturing a neglected aspect of text processing, which is likely to be exploited
by authors for both aesthetic and semiotic purposes. Kietz’ claims that readers are
imposed a perspective analogous to visual perspective, which she calls a temporal
perspective that spans beyond the present singular point in time. The idea is that
characters in a story of course have a visual perspective on the represented world,
whereas the reader has a temporal perspective that transcends the local perspectives
and embraces the narrative as such. To that extent, the reader’s temporal perspective
is somewhat displaced with respect to the represented visual perspective: there is
a temporal distance between the represented events and the reader’s point of view.
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With examples from Flaubert and Kafka, Kietz shows how this temporal distance
can be exploited aesthetically and semiotically to create a conflict between the world
represented in the literary work of art and the way it is presented.
The empirical investigation of aesthetic experience in the domain of visual art
was launched by Fechner. Fechner’s main concern was to establish the laws of
aesthetic preference—this goal is still eagerly pursued within neuropsychology
of aesthetics. Yet, another primordial branch of the empirical study of aesthetic
experience attempts to characterize perceptual interaction with visual artworks by
means of eye-tracking. This method—as it was used by, for example, the Russian
psychologist Yarbus (1967)—has provided with important insights into what visual
phenomena attract the attention of viewers (i.e. which are intrinsically significant
for viewers) and in what ways the perception of artworks differs from the perception
of plain depictions. In the chapter “The Aesthetic Experience with Visual Art ‘At
First Glance,’” Paul J. Locher, who has himself made important contributions to
this field, presents a key aspect of visual behavior in the aesthetic domain as well
as a review of the literature on this subject. Studies have shown that aesthetic
experience with visual art occurs in two stages (Locher et al. 2007). A viewer first
spontaneously generates a global impression, or gist, of the work. This gist includes
a sense of the general content of the painting, its overall design and style, meaning,
as well as an affective response to it. When gist information in a painting durably
attracts the attention of an observer, a second stage of aesthetic processing ensues.
This consists of directed focal exploration of the image and follows the goal of
increasing knowledge about the work’s compositional features and organization.
This chapter presents an overview of research findings that have identified the types
of visual properties and semantically related information that collectively lead to the
activation of what is labeled a “painting gist” (Locher’s own term). It concludes with
a discussion of the influence of the painting gist response on the focal exploration
of paintings.
John M. Kennedy and Marta Wnuczko also discuss a pivotal aspect of visual
representation in their chapter, “What Is a Surface? In the Real World? And
Pictures?” The crux of their argument is that pictures are depicting surfaces that
show or represent surfaces. In this sense, the perception of pictures is twofold in
a sense akin to Wollheim’s (1987). To understand this double property of pictorial
perception—that we see a surface and in that surface see represented surfaces—
a theory of surface perception is required, which is outlined in the chapter. Linear
perspective, characterized by foreshortening, is what allows perceivers to experience
real surfaces and representational pictures use perspective to depict surfaces with
great fidelity. The authors, in their plea for realism, show that surface information is
picked up by the viewer in the natural world. A further claim is now that perception
of representational pictures is based on such rich and easily retrieved information
from and for surfaces. The authors conclude their chapter with a caveat: their
defense of perceptual realism has natural limits: perception of surfaces (or the
extraction of surface information) can be erroneous, particularly in the case of highly
foreshortened surfaces. The dynamic relation between the two aspects of the twofold
perception triggered of by representational artworks may be a source of illusions.
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Patrick Colm Hogan’s chapter “The Idiosyncrasy of Beauty: Aesthetic Univer-
sals and the Diversity of Taste” comes to grips with what has always been considered
a cornerstone of aesthetic experience: the feeling of beauty. If by “beauty” we
understand an aesthetic response, we must acknowledge the existence of a great
variety of individual aesthetic response while still having to account for what they
have in common. Hogan argues that one may assert the existence of universal
principles of beauty without being forced to claim that everybody has the same
experience of beauty. Hogan shows that it is indeed the other way around: when
understood and defined correctly, universals of beauty predict and explain individual
diversity. The two main principles underlying the feeling of beauty are claimed to be
two main information-processing factors: (1) non-habitual pattern recognition and
(2) prototype approximation. When such processing takes place—i.e. non-trivial
pattern recognition and acknowledgement of a resemblance with an internalized
template of beauty—the experience is felt as rewarding. While universal, these
principles also explain the great variety of responses there may exist, since people
clearly may have different skills for pattern recognition and may have developed
different prototypes for beauty and different prototypes tout court (contingent upon
their previous experiences). As Hogan shows, a viewer possessing the prototype for,
say, pointillist painting may have a finer, more well-attuned or sensitive response
to a late Seurat painting than a viewer who would simply assess it as a token of
the prototype “painting.” The article thus accommodates scientific findings about
the experiential phenomena that activate the reward system (non-trivial pattern
recognition in challenging environments), thus proposing a principled account for
the experience of beauty that is universal in its scope while still being able of not
only subsuming the diversity of individual responses, but also predicting it.
Another important component of aesthetic experience is that it has to be
sufficiently “immersed”—the definition of which is probably still to be refined.
The point being that immersion is not simply to be understood as a partial loss
of world awareness—something which may obtain in plain thinking, meditation or
when reading a particularly interesting scientific text—but as a partial imaginary
enaction of an alternative reality. This holds particularly true for the reading of
fictional works (or film-watching) which has to be accompanied by what Coleridge
called the “willing suspension of disbelief,” i.e., some sort of decoupling of those
cognitive processes in charge of asserting the veracity or plausibility of what we
are experiencing. The capacity to engage in pretense is a necessary condition
for playing games, reading, watching movies, and perhaps even seeing paintings.
This capacity designates a human skill to partially enter alternative realities—
and, of course, to exit them at will. This skill—the imaginary action in and
interaction with alternative realities—is the topic of Shaun Gallagher’s “Why We
Are Not All Novelists.” Drawing from findings in psychology, psychopathology,
phenomenology, and neuroscience, Gallagher proposes a graded continuum of
pretense-cognition, with at one pole, say, children’s game playing and at the other
pole different sorts of pathologies involving delusional subjects getting more or
less stuck in their alternative reality (e.g., subjects suffering from the Capgras
syndrome)—and in-between different degrees of passive immersion. For example,
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from a reader’s immersion in the fictional universe up to more active, but still
non-pathological immersions, epitomized, according to Gallagher, by novelists’
enhanced ability for creating/entering into multiple realities and sustaining them
longer and more consistently than lay people. This enhanced capacity for fiction—
for durably creating and sustaining alternative realities—is, according to Gallagher,
“quasi-solipsistic” and “remains short of dysfunction or delusion,” which is exactly
the reason why we are not all novelists.
Jean-Marie Schaeffer develops a double argument in his chapter “Aesthetic
Relationship, Cognition, and the Pleasures of Art.” Within a phylogenetic “costly
signal” approach to aesthetic activity and experience—based on the structural, not
functional homology between art-making and costly signals in the animal world:
in this case among bowerbirds—he identifies one essential property of aesthetic
perception: its attention is inflected away from standard cognitive attention to a non-
economical use of mental resources characterized, among other things, by the fact
that its finality is not exhausted in and by the recognition of the represented objects.
As regards this quality of aesthetic perception—its style of attention is shifted—
Schaeffer also develops a neo-formalist hypothesis about a property of artworks
that likely causes such an effect: it is the fact that their semiotic function is altered
or defunctionalized; the finality of visual representations of water lilies, children,
interiors, landscapes, or abstract figures is not, contrary to what is the case in plain
images, simply to make us recognize such objects, but rather or also to indulge in the
qualitative presence of such objects, that is to say the very perception of them. The
second aspect Schaeffer claims is essential to aesthetic experience is its hedonic
character. In a Kantian vein, Schaeffer grounds this property from the visual or
attentional system’s awareness, as it were, of its own processing dynamics. Pleasure
or aesthetic interest results from an auto-appraisal of the visuo-cognitive activity,
not simply from an evaluation of the properties of the object. This point is cognate
with Patrick Colm Hogan’s claim to the effect that aesthetic pleasure is grounded on
non-trivial pattern recognition that implies some sort of agreeable perceptual effort
and thus some evaluation of visual processing itself (for example as a worthwhile
effort). This idea is further elaborated in the author’s notion of a bi-directional
feedback between attention and hedonic calculus, which finally leads him to assess
the relationship between cognitive fluency (as developed by Rolf Reber [Bullot and
Reber 2013]) and positive aesthetic experiences, arguing that fluency can explain
the aesthetic pleasures of art only in conjunction with a second and opposite source
of pleasure: curiosity.
As suggested by the title of his chapter, “More Seeing-in: Surface Seeing,
Design Seeing, and Meaning Seeing in Pictures,” Peer F. Bundgaard considers the
phenomenology of aesthetic experience as twofold, in a sense akin to Wollheim’s
(1987): we see an object in a painting, and, simultaneously, we see the constructed
surface in which or in virtue of which the object appears. However, as regards the
perception of artworks proper, the notion of twofoldness needs further specification.
In the wake of Wollheim, the philosophy of pictorial representation has addressed
the second, ‘configurational’ aspect of twofoldness in rather vague terms as
awareness of the “surface” in which a depicted object is recognized or as a sort
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of co-perception of pictorial “design,” without really addressing the aesthetic or
pictorial function of this correlate of aesthetic perception. Following Lopes (2005),
the author calls such co-awareness “design-seeing” and assigns two properties to
pictorial design. First, he identifies a depicting property of design that is a distinctive
property of pictures; that is to say, not something all pictures necessarily instantiate,
but something pictures can that other objects can’t: design in pictures is such that
it can depict two (or, in rare cases, even more) fully consistent objects without the
picture becoming ambiguous. This property is called the multiply depicting design
of pictures and it is shown to exploit basic grouping automatisms of perceptual
processing. The experience of artworks is not simply doubled with an awareness of
the material support in which something can be seen (e.g., a wall or a canvas), but
rather with an awareness of the depicting surface in virtue of which something is
represented; in certain cases the design of the depicting surface can give rise to two
well-structured visual experiences. The second refinement of Wollheim’s notion of
twofoldness is semiotic in nature: the design structure of a painting is not simply a
structure in virtue of which something is represented to the eye, but also a structure
in virtue of which meaning is conveyed to the eye, thus seeing-in doubled with
design seeing occurs every time lines and shapes do not only depict, but also mean
something (in virtue of their morphology and qualitative properties and in virtue of
the relations between them).
In the chapter “Depiction,” John Hyman defends a version of the so-called
‘resemblance’ theory of depiction: pictures are different from texts in that they
resemble the objects they represent. The classical version of this theory has become
increasingly unpopular. For two reasons, both of which, according to the author,
are wrong. Critics have mistakenly taken that resemblance is only a relation:
a relation, moreover, between two existing particulars. Thus, if “resemblance”
demands the existence of two particulars, which look like each other, then, trivially,
“depiction” cannot be suitably captured by a resemblance theory since a picture, as
an individual thing, does not look like the thing it represents (Napoleon, a tree or
a horse). Moreover, the definition of “resemblance” is flawed. Hyman shows that
expressions such as ‘resembles,’ ‘is like,’ ‘looks like’ can indeed function as two-
place predicates and thus express relations between particulars (e.g. ‘SoHo is like
Hampstead’); but, importantly, they can also function as copular verbs—that is, as
part of a one-place predicate (e.g. ‘SoHo is like a village’). Obviously in the latter
case, the resemblance is not claimed to hold between two particulars. Hyman, in
contrast, develops a neo-Fregean framework for a full characterization of depiction,
claiming that all figurative pictures have some generic content (say, a horse), but
only some portray (e.g., Bucephalus or Dan Patch), just as all descriptions have a
sense but only some refer. (‘The greatest integer’ has a sense but does not refer.)
Hyman shows how these mistakes are related in that reference is a relation whereas
sense is not, and the general point is—grossly said—that what pictures represent is
not their reference, but the sense of the reference, its mode of presentation (as Frege
had it in: “Sense and Reference”). In other words, pictures are predications of the
objects represented in them. To that extent, Hyman concludes, a resemblance theory
should not be interpreted as a theory of pictorial reference—in which case it falls
short—but as a theory of pictorial sense.
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The final three chapters address the artwork from a more accentuated semiotic
perspective. In “Green War Banners in Central Copenhagen: A Recent Political
Struggle Over Interpretation—And Some Implications for Art Interpretation as
Such,” Frederik Stjernfelt considers a specific aspect of artful objects, namely the
way in which they, to different degrees, express propositional contents and therefore
lend themselves to interpretation (as well as over- and misinterpretation). In order
to pinpoint some of the possible pitfalls of interpretation, the author introduces
the Peircean doctrine of Dicisigns—proto-propositions—that embraces a range of
sign vehicle types able to instantiate propositional content, such as signs involving
pictures, diagrams gestures, etc. Taking a particular Danish controversy—that of
a military “cartouche” at a Copenhagen barracks—as an analytical example, the
paper argues that the ubiquity of Peircean Dicisigns makes it possible to envisage
different strategies and degrees of weakening the propositional strength of Dicisigns
as we typically find them in the art domain: fictionalization, dispensing with parts of
propositional structure of the Dicisign, as well as weakening the functional structure
of the Dicisign.
Groupe  are also concerned about the sign processes involved in the perceptual
interaction with the work of art. In “The Appropriation of the Work of Art as a
Semiotic Act,” they do not, however, focus their attention on the logic subtending
the representation of “sense” or quasi-propositional contents in artworks (as both
Hyman and Stjernfelt did, each in their own way). Rather, they address the semiotic
acts in virtue of which given objects in space are assigned a specific sign status,
namely as artworks. Such acts require the existence of a certain instance assigning
that status for someone—hence the emphasis put on the interactive character of the
process. In their chapter, the authors unfold a series of key properties of the sign type
involved in the appropriation of objects as works of art, i.e. the ‘index,’ which plays
a pivotal role in this social dynamics, both with regards to the declarative instance
selecting and qualifying an object that thereby count as artful and to the object that is
selected as well as the subject for whom the object is thereby selected and qualified.
This volume concludes with Wolfgang Wildgen’s case study “Sculpture, Dia-
gram, and Language in the Artwork of Joseph Beuys.” Wildgen unravels the
meaning effects produced by Beuys in an analysis of both the ontological properties
of the artist’s works (materials, of course—from steel and stone to fat and
animal matter—but also their temporal specificity) and the semiotic devices he
exploits, particularly in his programmatic diagrams (words, graphics) but also in
the integration of language in his artistic work. A special point of interest in this
chapter is indeed Beuys’ transition towards language as a symbolic system and the
philosophy of art he exposes in his drawings and diagrams as well as the general
relation between art and science in his artwork.
Through these contributions, our hope is thus that the present book will cover
essential aspects of what I have here called the “aesthetic complex,” i.e., the
ontology, the semiotics, and the phenomenology of the work of art. Obviously,
investigations in each of these domains can, to some extent, be conducted inde-
pendently of findings produced in the neighboring disciplines. Artful pictures
have properties that can be characterized irrespective of the way in which they
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are experienced. Similarly, important elements of the phenomenology of aesthetic
experience—for example, the intentional framework for picture seeing compared to
the one for plain object seeing—can arguably be unraveled and laid down without
resorting to experimental psychology. And, e.g., perspective as a tool for meaning-
making can be examined on purely semiotic grounds. However, since the aesthetic
complex is indeed irreducible—visual or literary artworks are intentional objects
shaped to produce certain experiences—it would most likely be counterproductive
to investigate, for example, the phenomenology of aesthetic experience without
ever taking into consideration fundamental ontological properties of the object
perceived as well as the forms and techniques in virtue of which it not only
depicts or represents something, but also produce determinate meaning effects.
By the same token, the phenomenological inquiry into the arcana of aesthetic
experience at large—i.e. both with regards to the feeling of beauty or the interest
triggered by aesthetic objects and with regards to the experience of artistic objects
as such, regardless of the feeling they produce—may be taken in an empirical
direction in order to track down the actual effects written or visual artworks
(and tools for meaning-making) produce in human beings (with respect to, say,
attention, gaze behavior, memory, and interpretation). As appears from the short
presentation above, this volume also contains contributions from authors working
in the domain of empirical aesthetics—or employing methods therefrom. Such
experimental approaches to both visual and literary art should of course not supplant
traditional methods in philosophical, phenomenological, and semiotic aesthetics,
but rather complement them. Indeed, if a painter does employ specific techniques
to produce meaning effects, force specific visual experiences upon the beholder,
and communicate certain contents (emotions, ideas), another essential aspect of the
“aesthetic complex” is the way in which human beings, in virtue of their psycho-
physic constitution, actually interact experientially with such intentionally shaped
objects and thereby pick up or respond to the artist’s meaning intentions. Thus,
another relevant task for aesthetic inquiry is to investigate how the visuo-cognitive
system, text-processing systems, the attention system, and the memory system
contribute to the actual experience and understanding of aesthetic objects.
One volume is obviously not enough to even outline the aesthetic complex thus
understood. We are convinced, however, that the contributions to the present book
will make it clear why aesthetics, as the scholarly investigations of artful objects,
must constantly keep track of what artworks are, how they mean, and how they are
experienced.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Temporal Aspects of Literary Reading
David S. Miall
Abstract One of the prominent features of literary reading is a sense of defamil-
iarization: a passage describing an object, event, or person in the mundane world
unexpectedly seems strange, so that the reader is made to pause or slow the pace
of reading in order to reflect. In Owen Barfield’s words, such moments seem to
come from “a different plane or mode of consciousness” (Poetic diction: a study
in meaning. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1964, p. 171), and they demonstrate the
“unfamiliar” of the artwork discussed by Shklovsky (Art as technique. In: Russian
formalist criticism: four essays, eds. and trans. Lemon LT, Reis MJ. University
of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1965, p. 12). I identify several mental processes that
help constitute the sense of strangeness and that may contribute distinctive elements
to the presence of literariness. I examine the initial moments of the experience of
literary reading, those occurring in the first few hundred milliseconds as suggested
by studies of EEG waves: these include absence of habituation, the deferral of
intention, the thwarting of prototypical feeling, bodily alertness, and the experience
of animacy. I then consider some sequential features that guide and shape response
on a larger scale, focusing in particular on the processes of feeling and their impact
on the reader.
Keywords Literature • Defamiliarization • Reader • Electroencephalography •
Feeling
1 Introduction
Literary readers are in the strange position that they do not necessarily understand
what it is they are reading; yet the text may impel them to pause, perhaps
momentarily, to reflect on what they have just read, or it spurs them to read on
with the prospect of clarification to come. Shklovsky’s well-known comment that
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art should prolong our experience of perception invokes these initial moments of
strangeness, usually in response to foregrounding (unusual stylistic features). He
argues that literature is a different kind of experience from other verbal effects:
The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the
difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in
itself and must be prolonged. (1917/1965, p. 12)
This sense of defamiliarization and consequent difficulty is often mentioned. For
example, Owen Barfield (1964) suggests the “interior significance” of defamiliar-
ization “must be felt as arising from a different plane or mode of consciousness”
(pp. 170–171).
Here, then, we have an impression of literariness, that is, how the literary
experience is distinctive. But how is this achieved? What is occurring in those
first moments of response to the literary artifact? What are its formal or stylistic
fingerprints? We have very little direct evidence on this issue. For the most part,
attempts to understand what is occurring must draw upon less direct evidence—on
guesswork or speculation. In this contribution, I can only offer a brief sketch of
some of the possible components of literariness.
That readers find literary narratives strange at times and express their sense of
defamiliarization is shown by one of our earlier studies (Miall and Kuiken 1999)—
the narrative in question here was “The Trout” by Seán O’Faoláin (1980). The story
was divided into 84 short segments, mostly one sentence in length, and presented on
computer screen cumulatively, one segment adding to previous segments. Readers
paced themselves through the story by pressing the space bar to reveal the next
segment.
In generating comments on the story as part of a think-aloud study, we found
that among the different types of comment it was the frequencies of associations,
comments on style, and queries that most strongly predicted reading times (we
collected reading times data per segment during a parallel study). Associations,
for example, correlated highly with reading times, r D .402, p < .001; queries were
significant at the same level, r D .438, p < .001, as were comments on style, r D .387,
p < .001. In these and other ways, readers showed a sensitivity to several dimensions
of the literariness they were encountering—elaborating their understanding of
settings or actions, appreciating literary devices, or expressing their queries about
the meaning of various passages. In fact, queries were the third most frequent type
of comment at 10.1 %, following character explanation at 33.6 % and quotations at
21.5 % (132). Quotations correlated highly with foregrounding in the story, r D .463,
p < .001, suggesting that readers found the passages they quoted unfamiliar and
challenging, hence the need to repeat the passage aloud.
But what makes such passages distinctive, calling for the additional depth of
attention indicated by lengthened reading times? There can be no one feature
responsible for such experiences of literariness: in what follows I will mention
several possible features that may be responsible for that experience of strangeness.
I will refer in particular to events that, in the light of several (non-literary)
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EEG studies, can be postulated as occurring very early in the reader’s train of
response, at moments half a second or less following an encounter with the unusual
linguistic features of a foregrounded passage or a twist in our experience of the
narrative.
Unlike the reading of expository prose, which elaborates and develops a model
that is based on an initial organizing concept, literary reading is typically prospec-
tive, sustained by anticipations of what is to come, and slowed as we have seen by a
need to engage with foregrounding, or to entertain more than one meaning for what
the text at a given point or as a whole might be saying. In this context, readers may
delay closure on what a text means.
As Zwaan (1993) notes, to the extent that literary texts are indeterminate or
ambiguous, they are likely to invite a bottom-up mode of processing, which is
typically slower than top-down (p. 148). This may also lead to a more loosely
organized textbase, since more information may turn out to be relevant. As he puts it,
there is evidence that “readers of stories pay special attention to details, especially
when they are mentioned in isolation from other details” (pp. 149–150). Another
way of putting it is that the reader forms a weak situation model and defers closing
in on a coherent one that can account for all the information. Here is one apparent
difference in how literary reading feels compared with reading for information. But
in promoting Barfield’s sense of strangeness, what makes the difference in the case
of literary reading? A number of implications come to mind, but these five modes
of processing in particular seem possible contenders for the creation of moments
of strangeness (further research may reveal other contenders). I consider next some
evidence that each may occur early in the response process, that is, prior to the
400–500 ms at which consciousness of an event occurs:
– No habituation
– Intentionality deferred
– Thwarting of prototypical feeling
– Bodily alertness underlies representation
– Animacy of events and objects.
Common to each may be a rapid processing that predisposes consciousness to
generate insights from such earlier phases of response, especially the creation of
new meaning (as in response to a novel metaphor).
In what follows, I refer to “The Trout” for examples of the kinds of interpretive
processes implied by specific moments in the story. The story concerns Julia, a 12-
year-old girl, at the beginning of her vacation in the country. With her younger
brother Stephen, she enjoys a pleasurable fear running through the “Dark Walk,” a
tunnel of old laurel hedging in her garden, where she finds a live trout in a small
well. She tries to find out how it could have gotten there, including an interrogation
of Old Martin the gardener, but to no avail. Eventually she gets up at night and
rescues the trout, releasing it into a nearby river.
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2 No Habituation
Literature, as we saw, is said to enable us to see the world freshly. In his Defence
of Poetry, Shelley claims that a chief effect of poetry is that it “purges from our
inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us the wonder of our being”
(1840/1988, p. 295). The question then is whether with repeated encounters with
the same texts we tire of such defamiliarizing novelty and cease to experience it.
In Colin Martindale’s literary-historical account (1990), literary creation is shaped
by the need for an increasingly defamiliarizing style; only by devising ever more
vivid and unusual stylistic effects can a poet retain an audience. For example, Keats
exceeds Wordsworth in stylistic innovation; Tennyson exceeds Keats; and Swinburn
exceeds Tennyson. Yet we continue to read Shakespeare, Wordsworth, or Keats with
pleasure and, as the years go by, perhaps even greater insight. One explanation lies
in our first responses to detecting evidence of emotion.
In the case of pictures that evoke emotion, it has been found (Schupp et al.
2006) that virtually no habituation takes place: responses occurring within a 150–
300 ms window remain almost as strong after repeated exposure as the first time
(pictures used were of erotic, neutral, and mutilation themes). The study focused
on the differences in rapidly processing pleasant and unpleasant pictures compared
with neutral pictures. As measured by EEG, differences were shown by a larger
early posterior negativity (EPN): a highly significant main effect due to emotion
(compared with neutral pictures) was shown over temporo-occipital and fronto-
central sites, beginning around 160 ms following exposure of the picture and being
most pronounced in the 200–300 ms time window. The authors suggest that “the
detection of emotionally significant stimuli in the environment is an obligatory
task of perception, evincing little evidence for habituation as a function of passive
stimulus experience” (p. 368). As the implication of these findings most likely
extends to literary reading, where response to single words or sounds is obligatory,
it seems we are designed always to react, in Irving Massey’s words, to “the
unquenchable freshness” of the words (2009, p. 89).
While the study of Schupp et al. (2006) shows evidence of dehabituation (as
we will call it) occurring as early as around 200 ms, this is dependent on rapid
and frequent exposure of emotional pictures. How far is this likely to illuminate
the reader’s response to literature? Prompts to feeling occur at the stylistic level of
much literary language: most obviously we find repeated phonemes (alliteration,
assonance) often deployed to underline the intensity of a mood conveyed by
description of a setting or the predicament of a character. For example, in “The
Trout,” after running through the Dark Walk, Julia “emerged gasping, clasping her
hands, laughing, drinking in the sun.” This exhibits in close proximity three long
/a/ sounds, five /ing/ sounds, and several other features that illustrate at the level of
sound Julia’s half-fearful excitement which, as it is read, helps create and sustain the
same emotion in the reader. In the light of the Schupp et al. study, no habituation is
occurring while these repeated phonemes are encountered. Moreover, such repeated
phonemes suggest their own meanings, underlying the overt verbal meaning of the
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text. The long /a/ sound seems to connote exhalation, relief. While phonemes do not
have a fixed meaning (Miall 2001), they take on a local significance determined in
part by the immediate context, contributing to the array of meanings activated for
the reader during this moment of reading.
Other neuropsychological studies of habituation indicate that it is negative
emotional experience that is most likely to show resistance to habituation. In an
ERP study, Carretié et al. (2003) showed that negative emotional pictures were
more resistant to habituation than positive or neutral pictures. They indicate that this
provides an example of the negativity bias, that is, a more rapid and intense response
that occurs to aversive events. The EEG component that was the object of this study
was the N1 (a negative wave peaking at 100 ms), which has been found to be an
indicator of level of attention; thus, higher attention signifies lower habituation. As
the authors put it, “analyses of N1 indicate that the highest resistance to attentional
habituation is specifically produced in response to S- [negative pictures].” While this
study used pictures, previous studies suggest that N1 is not limited to visuospatial
attention (Wang et al. 2008).
Another study, by Marchewka and Nowicka (2007), looked at the concept of
priming, which also implies a measure of habituation. In a series of presentations,
such as pictures, where each picture is the same or similar to the preceding one,
the later presentations can be regarded as primed, that is, expected, by the previous
ones. Participants were required to respond to a verbal or visual stimulus while
their reaction time (RT) was measured. When neutral words or images were shown,
repeated presentations showed the effect of priming (participants had become
used to this kind of stimulus), and RTs became shorter. When presentations were
emotionally negative (fearful faces were used), no effect of priming was found; RTs
remained at the same level. It was also found that new negative stimuli (images or
words) were detected significantly faster than new neutral stimuli (p. 87). Overall,
no effect of priming was seen for emotionally negative stimuli, and this result
occurred whether presentation was to right or left hemisphere—although the right
is said to be specialized for responses to emotionally negative materials (p. 88).
The study can be said to demonstrate the adaptive value of a fast response to
negative events, which most likely had a high survival significance in the ancestral
environment. Thus it would also be significant that the response to negative events
is not attenuated with repeated presentation. The authors point out that no conscious
control is exercised over the response: “Automatic stimulus evaluation is a very
fast process and occurs at a very early stage of information processing.” It is, in
other words, another response occurring prior to the threshold of consciousness (set
at around 400–500 ms). Each word of Julia’s half-fearful “gasping, clasping [ : : : ]
laughing” will be experienced by the reader with a similar force, a similar degree
of dehabituation, thus helping to develop that slight sense of Gothic threat that a
number of our readers have noticed.
A comparable finding in music, although one not dependent on millisecond
timing, is reported by John Sloboda (1991). Sloboda studied the occurrence of
emotional and bodily responses to music, such as tears, shivers, or racing heart.
Participants reported such feelings to be quite reliably experienced in relation to
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particular pieces of music, often a specific phrase or theme; and this held even when
they had listened to the same piece 50 or more times: “Clearly,” Sloboda comments,
“listening to a piece of music very many times does not always entail a diminishing
of strong emotional response to it” (p. 113).
This freshness of emotion may persist as a part of the ensuing emotional
experience, as though the emotion lacked temporal markers. As Coleridge put it,
“All intense passions have faith in their own eternity” (1957–2002, III, p. 4,056).
3 Intentionality Deferred
When accounting for our stance as readers towards literary characters, an important
part will be played by the attribution of intention to a character. Since intentions
cannot always be inferred automatically from actions or dialogue, intentions may
be ambivalent. Old Martin reaches for the trout when it is pointed out to him. Is this
because he intends to rescue and release it or because he would like it cooked for
supper? And what does Julia intend by forcing Old Martin to leave the trout where
it is? Studies of mirror neurons in humans suggest that an observer will simulate
the initial pre-motor and motor phases of this action while inhibiting its execution,
whether based on visual, sensory, or verbal stimuli (and in the case of humans, a
goal for the action is not obligatory; “intransitive” movements may also stimulate
a response: Gallese et al. [2004, p. 397]). Thus a reader will acquire a sense of the
intentionality inherent in the behavior and comments of both Julia and Old Martin—
an array of intentions or the absence of intention that will contribute to the situation
model being constructed by the reader. This represents the straightforward account.
In its early phases, however, we may witness a somewhat divergent situation. I
mention three example studies below that tend to complicate the issue.
First, the early phases may be marked by an attribution issue. The standard
mirror neuron account, as far as it concerns the first several hundred milliseconds,
is questioned by an analysis of Becchio and Bertone (2005). At the early phases of
response (prior to 500 ms), intention is not unambiguously present; later (after the
elapse of a second or so), intention may be assigned through sympathy or empathy
for a character that establishes intentions and goals, or intention may be assigned
to a narrator. Following analysis of mirror neuron systems, Becchio and Bertone
(2005) remark:
When observing other people acting, the activation of shared neural representation allows
us an immediate access to their motor intention. Given the existence of a neural substratum
shared between the self and the other, the problem of the other, we argue, is reversed in its
own presuppositions: the problem is no longer ‘how is it possible for part of the I-experience
to refer to others?’ but rather ‘how one can distinguish one’s own action/intention from
those of other people?’ (p. 21)
Or, as Jeannerod and Pacherie (2004) have shown, “We can be aware of an
intention, without by the same token being aware of whose intention it is” (p. 140).
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This issue over intentionality contributes to literariness in so far as it is developed
by, for example, the uncertainty, ambiguity, or conflict of intentions of a character,
as in the exchange of Old Martin and Julia, or by the unreliability of a narrator
(Miall 2012). We might assume, also, that an inability to attribute intention that
implicates one or more characters, the narrator, or the reader may at times create,
albeit momentarily, that sense of shared significance, of community, which we
experience as literary readers. The mirror system, under favorable circumstances,
may eliminate the wall of solitude that separates two consciousnesses, even though
one is present merely as words on a page (see Keen [2006] for an account of empathy
in literary reading and mirror neurons).
Second, a study of response to faces raises the possibility of an absence of
intentionality over the first few hundred milliseconds under certain conditions; I
will raise the question whether this is likely to generalize to literary response.
In a study by Rellecke et al. (2012), intention on the part of the viewer was
absent when viewers processed an angry face compared to processing a neutral
or a happy face. As shown by ERP visual components P1, N170, and EPN (early
posterior negativity)—ERP components that have been implicated in face and
emotion response—early processing of negative stimuli occurred without intention,
that is, unaffected by one or other of several simple tasks required of participants in
response to the faces. These included passive viewing, or judging the emotional
expression of a face, or stating whether the presentation is of a picture or a
word. Positive (happy) and neutral faces, on the contrary, showed the influence of
intention. The authors conclude that two different kinds of processing are occurring:
“an automatic threat-related processing bias at perceptual stages, while higher
cognitive emotion encoding is subject to voluntary control” (p. 23).
While the authors consider only one negative emotion—anger—in their study,
the findings are suggestive. They show that such an emotion cannot in its first
moments be controlled or modified by any intentional perspective, that intention is
suspended or absent. In this respect, it indicates that a new, unassimilated experience
is occurring, one that will call for attention. For example, here is one occasion when
Julia demonstrates anger: interrupting her mother’s tale of how the trout came into
its hole, “Passionately she had whirled and cried, ‘Mummy, don’t make it a horrible
old moral story!’” That her response is characterized as passionate suggests an
involuntary excess of angry emotion; in that it is unwilled it can be regarded as
a contribution to Julia’s increasing sense of emancipation from the parental ward, a
growth in her being that is at first unattributed. It is not, in other words, a negotiated
state, but one basic to her transition to the state of womanhood. It will conclude with
her bold rescue and release of the trout at the end of the story. Anger may be only
one of several basic, negative emotions that run off initially like anger without the
influence of intention, in that for the system experiencing them the emotion process
is obligatory. This seems essential with fear and likely to be the case with disgust.
In this way, the system is signaling that the emotion preempts any other cognitive or
emotional process currently in train and must be given undivided attention.
The third example I will describe stems from well known studies by Libet
et al. (1983), studies of the moment of choice that appear to cast doubt on our
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possession of freewill. A recent study by Rigoni et al. (2010) focused on evidence
for unconscious preparation for action, the Readiness Potential, shown by EEG
measures occurring from 500 ms up to 1,000 ms (a slow negative-going potential)
prior to action. Thus preparation to act was shown to occur in the brain some 300–
800 ms before participants reported a conscious decision to act. Explicit intention
to act is said to be attributed retrospectively, and to occur only about 200 ms ahead
of action. Hence, the Readiness Potential can be considered preparation for any
possible action, but one that gives a spurious sense of freewill, as though the action
had been freely chosen. The findings of this study are replicated in a number of
other studies, with
evidence suggesting that the sense of volition is not a driving force in the initiation of
our behavior. Rather, it seems that the subjective experience of free will is a construction,
derived from the brain’s motor system producing a movement and somehow ‘informing’
consciousness of the movement, with the effect that we feel as if the action has been freely
chosen. (p. 2)
Action thus only appears to coincide with intention retrospectively.
The study asked participants to press a button and report when they formed
the intention of pressing the button. The button press was supposed to coincide
with auditory feedback (a computer emitted a 200 ms beep), but feedback was
systematically delayed by a number of milliseconds, varying randomly between
5, 20, 40, or 60 msec. Findings showed that the later the feedback, the more the
report of the participant shifted to a corresponding later moment. This suggests that
the experience of the moment of choosing to act is an artifact that in some way
the brain has unconsciously already made a decision to act, so that our awareness
of choosing is belated. (For a critique of these studies of Readiness Potential and
freewill and some alternative construals, see Ellis [2005, pp. 144–146]).
Statements of intention and fulfillment of intention are very frequent in literary
stories. The opening sentence of “The Trout” conveys the implicit intentions of Julia
as she and her family arrive. “One of the first places Julia always ran to [ : : : ]
was the Dark Walk.” She wants the frightening experience of running through its
dark tunnel and out again into the sun. Questions to consider are whether Julia’s
intentions are realized and, if so, does she recognize them only as they are fulfilled;
or if at certain moments when she acts or responds, she has no intentions, only
behaviors. Her behavior running through the Dark Walk in the opening sentences
of the story appears to repeat a favorite activity, but the odd evocation of memory
and the tone of fright with which it is described argues that her running ostensibly
connotes a new experience that she claims only after its completion (she and the
younger brother who also runs behind her “came back to the house to tell everybody
that they had done it”). What appears to occur, shown by Julia’s screams of pleasure,
is that she is setting herself a challenge that will in time develop her personality in
ways that are hinted as the story progresses. The activity seems childish, but in fact
it tests her mettle, her determination, her ability to face an ordeal. But these are
implicit meanings: if they are intended, it is her character, not her conscious self,
that instantiates them. She is the instrument that carries them out. I am assuming
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here that the Libet-type study, which concerns motor intentionality, can be scaled
up to capture the kind of more global intentionality that Julia demonstrates. How
far this capacity can be shown in the case of literary readers will require further
research.
Another sentence early in the story helps set the paradigm for belated intention
that occurs elsewhere in the story. At the beginning of her run, “For the first few
yards, she always had the memory of the sun behind her.” Note that the first phrase
is empty, a merely temporal expression appearing to connote the time taken to run
a certain distance. Yet her experience of this as a period of time is immediately
cancelled by the term “always,” evoking a presence in her memory much more
significant than the running itself. In sum, the author uses the experience of late
attribution of intention almost as though it is this that pulls Julia into transcending
her childish phase and constructing her own maturity. An effective example of this
process is this sentence, a page further on, after being asked if she saw the well:
“She opened her eyes at that and held up her long lovely neck suspiciously and
decided to be incredulous.” Here it is the body that holds open a space for intention
(her eyes, her neck), until an explicit claim to intention (being incredulous) is made.
It is striking that Julia’s primary intention, to rescue the trout, is not made evident
until the last quarter of the story.
4 Thwarting of Prototypical Feeling
As Greg Smith (2003) puts it, prototypical emotions are generally seen as object-
oriented, intentional, directed at something, and including an action tendency
(p. 21). Whatever we are reading (including non-literary texts), the system may
recognize early on that an emotion is apparent and situate it in relation to whichever
prototypical emotion it prompts; such an emotion (for example, pity, anger, joy) will
run off without hindrance and create an unequivocal emotional situation, one that the
reader will recognize as familiar and through which she will shape her expectations
about how the text will continue. Here, for instance, is part of a paragraph from an
article in The Guardian about the surveillance carried out by the British spy agency,
GCHQ, and whether it is necessary (Lanchester 2013):
We do have enemies, though, enemies who are in deadly earnest; enemies who wish you
reading this dead, whoever you are, for no other reason than that you belong to a society
like this one. We have enemies who are seeking to break into our governments’ computers,
with the potential to destroy our infrastructure and, literally, make the lights go out [ : : : ]
We readily identify the main emotion in question in the first sentence here: fear.
The text continues by elaborating and justifying this claim, giving reasons: our
enemies are breaking into important computers; the lights may go out; and so the
article continues, offering additional reasons for feeling fear, and redirecting the
cause of fear onto the spy agencies themselves. The prototypical nature of the fear
in question throughout the article is not questioned.
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In literary reading, however, the text may thwart the systematic development of
the emotion in relation to this first situation—perhaps through conflicting phonetic
patterns or an ambiguous reference to a character; or the action suggested may
become other than what was first implied by the prototypical emotion. In this
way, a literary passage can shift the reader’s attitudes and inclinations away from
what first seemed in question to a prospect that is unfamiliar and challenging.
An action plan is still in evidence, but it may propose ends that we have trouble
recognizing (hence perhaps the “fresh emotions” shown in Cupchik et al. 1998), or
ends that we now find aversive. Such emotions can be powerful: they may call into
question interpretive processes already underway, such as the markers of aesthetic
structure that we create to orient ourselves to the text, the breakdown of monovalent
understanding into a multivalent one, or our empathic regard for the protagonist in
the narrative.
In “The Trout,” we seem to be offered an experience of fear halfway through the
story as Julia jumps out of bed at night: “somehow it was not so lightsome now”
with the prospect of “dim mountains,” “black firs,” and the barking of a dog. But
it seems that Julia does not hesitate and the initial fear transitions to include Julia’s
boldness, her courage in navigating the nighttime visit to the Dark Walk (another
mark of her maturing), and then extends to the situation overall as she finds the
trout—she cries aloud, she is “mad with fright” along with the trout, but she is still
courageous, “her teeth ground.” And in this passage phonetic coloration provides a
third emotional perspective to be experienced alongside the fear and the courage:
the main terms “dim mountains,” “black firs,” and “bark-bark” have a presence to
them given by their adjacent strong stresses that sets them down like the pillars of a
temple. Another supporting sound structure is “the cool but cruel gravel” that helps
animate the setting, underscoring what Julia must contend with as she approaches
the Dark Walk and its inhabitant. In terms of the aesthetic frame of the story, it is
notable how this moment of rescue sees Julia again racing through the tunnel, a
fearful complement to racing through the dark for the pleasure of terrifying herself
that opens the story.
5 Bodily Alertness Underlies Representation
As Kuijpers and Miall (2011) showed, bodily responses seem to occur systemati-
cally while reading a literary text. In their study, participants reported when they
experienced a bodily sensation while reading a modernist short story, describing
how it felt and marking its location on a diagram of the human body. One important
finding was that the frequency of bodily responses to specific passages in the story
correlated significantly with the occurrence of foregrounding in the passages being
read. It seems probable that bodily responses of this kind are elusive and hard to
recognize, and difficult to capture empirically. However, they can also be found at
times in the descriptions of novelists; this would make an interesting study in itself.
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For example, striking examples of bodily responses that create an aesthetic
experience can be seen in Virginia Woolf’s novel The Years (1937/2009). Here we
watch Martin walking across London and arriving opposite St. Paul’s Cathedral.
“He crossed over and stood with his back against a shop window looking up at the
great dome. All the weights in his body seemed to shift. He had a curious sense
of something moving in his body in harmony with the building; it righted itself:
it came to a full stop. It was exciting—this change of proportion” (p. 216). Here is
evidence of the active role of the body in shaping an aesthetic experience—a process
of which Martin is conscious, but this is not necessary; much that we perceive or
experience occurs below the level of consciousness yet still exerts some influence
on subsequent attention and processing: “Unattended objects [ : : : ] may still be
processed to fairly high levels, and the processing itself may summon attention”
(Posner and DiGirolamo 2000, p. 882).
We don’t often think of the mind as influenced by the body, but this was one of
the major insights of the poet Wordsworth. This is elaborated in a number of places
in Wordsworth’s early writing. For example, in 1799, while sketching early drafts
of what was to become his great autobiographical poem The Prelude, he refers to
bodily shaping and realization of mind, how sensations internal and external provide
materials out of which the mind is created. Thus he claims a sensibility “quickened”
by emotion, where “all my thoughts / Were steeped in feeling” (1799, II, 447–448),
showing how early experience, as Richardson (2001) notes, “implies a mind shaped
by and realized in bodily organs, though not entirely defined by them” (p. 71). In his
response to nature, images are “Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart” (“Tintern
Abbey,” p. 29, in Gill 2000)—images that persist and help shape the mind:
By force
Of obscure feelings representative
Of joys that were forgotten, these same scenes : : :
Become habitually dear, and all
Their hues and forms were by invisible links
Allied to the affections. (Wordsworth 1799, I, 435–442)
Thus the literary power of a text, in a similar way, may enforce itself upon the
reader’s body, forging “invisible links” that shape response for years to come.
6 Animacy of Events and Objects
It has often been remarked (e.g., Coleridge 1983, I, p. 9) that not a word can be
missed from a literary text; we commonly respond as though all words and sentences
are relevant, although during an initial reading it may be too soon to judge if this
is the case. Yet we endow objects and events with the gloss of final significance,
such that whatever is said, done, seen, felt, etc., while reading is considered to
contribute somehow to the total aesthetic experience and meaning of the text. This
assumption underlies what I will call animacy tracking: if all is relevant, then each
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separate mention embodies a relationship to the overall meaning. Supposing a tree is
described: then the tree must be inherently implicated in the unfolding feelings and
perceptions of the narrative and that is why the description of it has been included
by the writer. This is exemplified by the “pathetic fallacy” to which Ruskin objected
(1897, III, pp. 161–177)—the attribution of human emotions to objects in nature so
that they participate in forwarding the narrative drama that is infolding. (One feels
that Snoopy in the Peanuts cartoon is about to commit this fallacy when he begins
his novel: “It was a dark and stormy night.”) To produce, on the contrary, a sense of
the ordinariness, the randomness of events and objects is actually nearly impossible.
And as many writers have observed, animacy is the default assumption when a
questionable object in the environment attracts attention. This enlivenment of the
verbal may extend to objects that we read about in the first few hundred milliseconds
of response. The sense of other presences, of dimly sensed consciousnesses, may
then continue to animate the ensuing narrative. As Wordsworth put it, in a fragment
of verse: “There is an active principle alive in all things” (Wordsworth 1979, p. 676).
Julia evidently feels some affinity with this power in nature: she is aware of the
landscape beyond her bedroom window, as the poetic description of it suggests: “the
dim mountains far away and the black firs against the breathing land.” Yet this does
not dissuade her from getting up and going outside, where she becomes an active
agent herself in the animate world of the trout. Here too as she releases the trout we
find animation in how “the moon-mice on the water crept into her feet.”
My comment here around the Wordsworth passage is speculative, but it is in
accord with what we are coming to know about embodied cognition and the role and
powers of feeling in particular, what Ellis (2005) describes as the “intentionality of
feelings—what they are ‘about’—[which] includes aims as well as environmental
affordances and triggering objects” (p. 6). Although literary response articulates
these premises, they have been little studied until now with serious attention to
the bodily correlates of reading. Here, as Mark Johnson (2007) puts it, “immanent
bodily meaning is paramount” (p. 209).
7 Sequence Issues
Given the five processes I have just reviewed, it remains for us to see how they can
be placed within a functioning psychological system, one that does justice to the
complexities of literary response as far as possible, and one that would help account
for that early sense of strangeness. Here is where questions of sequencing become
important. First, what sequence is in question when we consider emotion itself?
Arguments over the place of emotion or feeling in the cognitive and bodily
system, in particular the place and nature of appraisal, have been occurring for over
a 100 years. Does appraisal, that is, realizing the meaning of an event, precede our
development of feelings towards the event? Notice how, in the following description
emotion is placed last in the sequence. This is David Brooks’ account of emotion in
his recent book The Social Animal (Brooks 2012).
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In what Brooks terms the Emotional Positioning System, or EPS, the system
“senses your current situation and compares it to the vast body of data it has stored
in its memory. It reaches certain judgments about whether the course you are on will
produce good or bad outcomes, and then it coats each person, place, or circumstance
with an emotion [ : : : ]” (pp. 501–506). This looks a plausible process, but emotion
is put at the wrong end. First, an emotion occurs informed by a preliminary sense of
context, situating us in relation to a future state if the emotion were extended; this
possibility is then appraised, with the assistance of our autobiographical memories;
finally the future situation evoked by the emotion is evaluated, i.e., judged as
constituting a good or bad outcome for the self (e.g., what kind of person would
I become if I gave free rein to this anger). Development of this system begins in
infancy when emotional responses are learned through social referencing (Feinman
1992), as it has been called. In this situation, when infant and mother regard the same
object, emotion and perception of the object or event are learned simultaneously by
the infant—especially if the mother’s response is a vocal one: the intrinsic acoustic
properties of vocal affective expressions, such as loudness and pitch, may induce
emotions directly, a phenomenon that we can also infer from the EEG studies of
responses to emotion over the first 400–500 ms in language and other media.
To summarize the processes we have suggested with a view to their sequencing:
The early, i.e., preconscious, occurrence of emotion during verbal response (not
yet literary) may, we can suggest, be inflected by the precursors of intentionality
(as in the Libet-type study) or its ambivalence, or even its absence in the case
of the negative emotion; by the absence of habituation that marks the freshness
of the emotion; and by experiences of animacy that will be striking if applied
to objects that later (within a second or two) turn out to be inanimate (e.g., the
“smooth, sinewy branches” of the Dark Walk). At the same time, response may
recruit areas of the body that help shape and prolong the aesthetic sense. It is when
there is a thwarting of the prototypical emotion on the cusp of consciousness (at
400–500 ms) that literary response begins to develop, as it picks up and is shaped
by the implications of the sequence of phenomena—as intentionality shapes the
sociality of the described moment, as alternative scenarios develop and trouble the
emotion prototype, and as the body resonates to the emergent flow of awareness.
Here is where the strangeness of the literary is emergent, with its complexities
and ambiguities, its divergent perspectives that propose themselves to the evaluative
regard of the reader.
The actual sequence of events will depend on the interaction between the text and
the individual reader who brings to each moment of reading her own proclivities
and experiences. For instance, in the following segment Julia is beginning her run
through the Dark Walk:
then she felt the dusk closing swiftly down on her so that she screamed with pleasure and
raced on to reach the light at the far end
In the opening section of the story up to this point Julia’s intentions in
running remain unspecified, although this is certainly the most significant piece
of information that a reader requires so far. Readers will either fill this gap
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with their own concept of intention taking up whatever clues may have emerged
preconsciously, or they will leave intentionality in abeyance until this segment,
which supplies a first draft, as it were, of Julia’s intention. This is signified by
the phrase “so that,” from which we learn that she “screamed with pleasure.”
The ambivalence of this emotion is developed by subsequent references to Julia’s
“ordeal,” to “terrifying” her younger brother, and to their “fear.” These references
summon negative emotions, suggesting points in the story where habituation will
not occur, thus ensuring the freshness of attention that the reader must bring to a
key aspect of the story. In the present segment, we also find another hint of animacy
in attributing motion to “the dusk closing swiftly down”—an image that one reader
we studied compared to “something like a blanket closing around me when I read,”
a bodily response that other readers may also have experienced. In addition, as we
noted earlier, a description of action, which is also the case here, activates the motor
and premotor neurons while inhibiting execution of the action, and this enlivens the
reader’s imagery of Julia’s behavior.
The text continues to guide us, of course, in shaping the parameters of response.
Somewhat as in social referencing (as we mentioned earlier), where the baby shares
its mother’s line of gaze, readers look to a narrator for simultaneous guidance on
what to pay special attention to and how to feel about it (drawing on our version
of this capacity as adults); in literary response, there may be more than one line to
follow here—in the most dramatic examples, both acceptance and rejection, both
belief and disbelief, etc. (think of The Turn of the Screw). But all normally felt
experiences of literariness are likely to share these moments of emergence, the
set of impulses from processes initiated and shaped preconsciously during the first
few hundred milliseconds of response. Such processes, or their traces, are hard to
detect—and will be difficult to study empirically.
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Memory and Mental States in the Appreciation
of Literature
Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon
Abstract An implicit supposition in literary studies is that ideal readers have
unconstrained access to the text. However, we argue instead that the processing of
literary narrative must be mediated by the fragmentary and distorted memory of real
readers. In the present chapter, we focus on an important determinant of memory:
the variation in readers’ mental states during reading. In particular, we identify
two prevalent fluctuations that have critical implications for memory and literary
appreciation: mind wandering, in which the reader momentarily gives relatively
little priority to processing the text; and engagement, in which the reader constructs
elaborate and personally meaningful representations of the story world. We describe
how the variation in these mental states over the course of reading affects reading
processes and determines memory for both text and aesthetic reactions. This
analysis is supported by the results of two experiments in which readers’ mental
states were probed online during reading.
Keywords Narrative processing • Cognitive psychology • Memory • Mental
states • Mind wandering
1 Introduction
One of the most profound but least understood insights concerning literature is the
phenomenological idea that, until read and processed by readers, literary works are
merely physical objects. As Escarpit (1966) put it, “when we hold a book in our
hands, all we hold is paper. The book is elsewhere” (p. 7). Today, no one would
dispute the intuitive metaphor that works come alive in the minds of their readers.
But what precisely this entails is still the object of considerable debate. At the
heart of the controversy are some thorny issues: the nature of the text, the nature of
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the reader’s processing, and the relationship between texts and their readers. More
specifically, we need to resolve whether the text can be considered an objective
entity and to what extent it can be reproduced in readers’ minds. Ingarden (1973)
and Iser (1978) were inspired by ideas from phenomenology and acknowledged
the active role of reading. However, their reader was nonetheless conceived of as
a textual counterpart with little creative license, the text was conceived of as an
objective entity, and the reading process was conceived of as a decoding activity.
Implicit in this conceptualization is the fundamental assumption that aesthetic
response is to the objective text as reproduced in readers’ minds during the
reading process. But these assumptions, which continue to pervade literary studies,
are undermined by an abundance of psychological evidence that has emerged in
cognitive psychology and discourse processing. This research sheds light on some
of the real limitations of human memory and attention and their consequences for
reading and readers’ mental representations of text. In particular, it indicates that
comprehension is not just a text-driven process but also a constructive activity. That
is, mental representations are not reproductions of text but rather more schematic
“situation models,” dependent to a large extent on both the reading context and
reader variables such as mental states, capacities, interests, goals, and so on. Thus,
any appreciation or aesthetic response cannot properly be thought of as related
to the text per se but rather to this reconstructed representation of the text. When
considered seriously, this body of research leads us to some fundamental revisions
of phenomenological accounts of literary processing and aesthetic response.
We begin by identifying and briefly reviewing some of the prevailing assump-
tions concerning the appreciation of literature in some branches of literary studies.
This is followed by a summary of relevant psychological research, and especially the
constraints on the cognitive processes of attention and memory. Finally, we describe
two experiments that provide evidence for a revised model of literary processing
and response. This new approach takes into account how readers’ mental states
fluctuate over the course of the reading and how such fluctuations affect their mental
representations of, and aesthetic response to, the text.
2 Literary Studies
In his extensive 1931 work, Ingarden explained that due to the finite and limited
nature of literary texts, objects can only be partially represented, and the gaps in
the representation, which he calls “spots of indeterminacy,” must be fleshed out by
the reader. He identifies two such processes: “concretization” and “filling-out” or
completion. “Concretization” refers to the reader’s active representation of what has
actually been mentioned in the text; “filling-out” refers to the reader’s representation
of what is not mentioned in the text. Since different readers respond differently,
the results of the concretization and completion processes can be innumerable.
Although Ingarden recognized this inevitable fact, he by no means believed that
any concretization or completion was acceptable. As Bundgaard (2013) explains:
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“idiosyncratic associations foreign to the meaning universe of the artwork [ : : : ]
can rationally be rejected as irrelevant” (p. 175). For this reason, as Holub (1995)
explained, Ingarden specified that not all concretizations are licensed by the text
but rather that “they must be based on a faithful and accurate reconstruction of the
text” (p. 302). Used in this sense, the word “reconstruction” refers to a process
of decoding and implies that texts are objective entities that can be faithfully
reproduced in readers’ minds. Following in his mentor’s footsteps, Iser (1974)
agreed that meaning does not reside in the text, but rather arises in the interaction
between reader and text. However, like Ingarden he allowed for only a minimal
margin of creativity: Readers may supply trivial details not provided by the text,
such as the color of a character’s hair, but their processing must conform to the
demands of the text. His “implied reader” was in fact a hypothetical correlative
of the text, an idealized projection of what is presumed to be a stable, objective
encoding of an intention.
Many traditions of literary scholarship betray the persistence of this phenomeno-
logical legacy in their descriptions of literary texts and the presumed effects of
textual features. Below, we consider, in turn, the positions of narratologists and
stylisticians. Both groups of literary scholars at least implicitly endorse the struc-
turalist Culler’s (1975) understanding of the text as an objective entity, decodable
by competent, ideal readers who have mastered the literary conventions required for
successful comprehension.
To begin with, narratologists also seem to share this sensitivity. When one aggre-
gates the vast quantity of features and devices that narratologists deem important for
competent readers to notice, track, remember, and associate in textually mandated
ways, one is lead to the inevitable conclusion that the competent reader is nothing
short of a super reader, endowed with a super brain. With respect to just the
characters in the story, readers must notice and remember who said what to whom;
who thought what and when in what kind of language; who was where at any given
point in the story; and who noticed what and where; who knew what and when,
and so on. The cognitive narratologist Lisa Zunshine (2006) echoes this intuitive
expectation by stating that “the ability to keep track of who thought what, and felt
what, and when they thought of it, is crucial” (p. 60). Furthermore, with respect to
the discourse, readers must also notice and decipher all the metaphors, similes, and
grammatical and syntactical deviations, and they must distinguish between narrator
and character discourse and relate those entities to a narrating agent. Besides
tracking all of this information, they must also retain it in working memory so as
to make necessary associations and periodically update their inferences. As well,
all of this processing must be informed by all of the relevant literary conventions
and traditions, presumably encoded in readers’ long-term memory and retrieved
effortlessly as needed. The theoretical assumption is that all relevant textual features
are noticed, tracked, interpreted, and remembered. Although no narratologist has
claimed that such copious amounts of information can be processed in one reading,
the implicit assumption is that is achievable through a series of different activities,
such as rereading and note taking. However, the assumption is undermined by
the contradictions and debates arising in narratologists’ own laborious attempts
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to identify the features and devices of narrative texts. Well-known polemics, such
as the discussion of within-sentence shifts in speech and thought representation
(Bal 1977) or the more than 40 years of theorizing about the nature and features
of focalization (Bronzwaer 1981; Fludernik 2001; Nieragden 2002; Herman and
Vervaeck 2004; Margolin 2009; Klauk 2012), suggest that defining what is in
the text is often reader (and narratologist) dependent, with the result that mental
representations of the text differ even with careful, scholarly analysis.
Second, within stylistics, one issue that has received considerable attention is
the notion of foregrounding. Like Ingarden, Iser, the structuralists, and the nar-
ratologists, stylisticians assumed that foregrounding could be objectively defined,
a belief that lead to the establishment of toolkits of foregrounding features (e.g.,
Leech and Short 2007). Wishing to advance our understanding of the function
of foregrounded features, some scholars in the empirical studies of literature
attempted to investigate their effect on real readers (van Peer 1986; Miall and Kuiken
1994). However, as Sanford and Emmott (2012, pp. 82–83) cogently demonstrated,
empirical studies of the forms and functions of foregrounding in particular texts
have been methodologically flawed. One of the main weaknesses, they explained,
is that the determination of which textual features can be considered foregrounding
devices is the product of inconsistent, subjective judgments. The second is that the
relationship between features and effects in these studies is merely correlational, not
causal: Because foregrounding features were studied in situ, we have no evidence
that any of these features have a causal effect on readers’ response. They may
or may not be noticed, they may or may not form part of the reader’s mental
representation of the text, and they may or may not be retained in memory. Indeed,
van Peer’s (1986) seminal study demonstrated very weak memory for foregrounded
elements. In sum, while theoretical concepts such as the ideal reader allow us to
anticipate a variety of possible text-consistent responses that could potentially arise,
the evidence for effects of foregrounding in actual readers is not overwhelming.
As we demonstrate throughout the remainder of this chapter, no reader’s
processing can ever reproduce the original text, owing in part to the limitations of
human memory implicated in the reading process. Reading, like stories, unfolds
over time. This may seem like a trivial fact, yet its implications for mental
processing have yet to be fully appreciated. Precisely because reading is a temporal
process, every portion of a read text is consigned to memory, and therefore must
be retrieved from memory. At any one moment, only a small window on the text
is immediately available for processing and for detailed inferences. As the reader
progresses through the story, this window scrolls over the text, with the previous
content continually replaced by current portions. Thus, short sequences of text are
only available in the window for a limited period of time, and then they are gone (cf.
Fletcher 1986). In other words, the full text is never present in a reader’s mind. If
any information is relevant for understanding subsequent aspects of the text, it must
be retrieved from memory at that later point. This retrieval might be optimal for an
ideal reader with ideal memory. However, as will be demonstrated in the following
section, human memory is by nature incomplete and distorting; anything consigned
to memory must be pieced together from fragmentary and fallible memory traces
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(cf. Bortolussi and Dixon 2013). Therefore, the very nature of the human mind
renders complete reproductions of the text impossible. In turn, this implies that the
aesthetic response engendered by the text is not, precisely speaking, a response to
the text. Rather, it is a response to the reader’s own mental representation of the text,
with all of the limitations that implies.
Because everything that is read is consigned to memory, all aspects of literary
response—comprehension, emotional reactions, inferences, interpretations, and
appreciation—are mediated by memory. All of these processes are dependent on
what we recall about characters’ conversations, spatial configurations, the narrator’s
status and discourse particulars, stylistic devices, and so on. Once the memory-
dependent basis of literary processing is acknowledged, one must acknowledge that
aesthetic response is to the reader’s representation of the text. As we describe in the
following section, that representation can only be a distilled, schematic outline of
the text.
3 Evidence on Memory for Text
As we have argued previously, the limitations of human memory are well appre-
ciated in cognitive psychology. For the present purposes, two well-known facts
about memory are central: First, far from acting as a video camera that repli-
cates past experiences, memory is fragmentary and incomplete. Second, memory
reconstruction is susceptible to distortion by a variety of influences independent
of the information to be remembered. It is worth considering each of these points
separately. The term “reconstruction” is used here, as in cognitive psychology and
discourse processing, to refer to a fallible and indeterminate process of inference
rather than the straightforward decoding mechanism envisioned by Ingarden (as
described by 1995).
Elizabeth Loftus, among other researchers, exposed the flawed “memory as video
camera” metaphor. In their classic investigation of eyewitness memory, Loftus and
colleagues (1978) showed subjects a series of slides depicting a traffic accident, in
one of which a red car appeared on a road in front of either a stop sign or a yield
sign. Subjects were asked to pretend to be eyewitnesses to the scenes. They then
answered questions about the slides, one of which linguistically presupposed the
existence of either the stop sign or the yield sign (e.g., “Did another car pass the red
Datsun while it was stopped at the stop sign?”). Subsequent recognition of the slides
showed a substantial “misinformation effect”: Recognition accuracy was 71 % when
the presupposition matched the original slide but only 41 % when it mismatched.
These results demonstrate that memory can be distorted by verbal information that
is independent of the original perceptual experience.
Carmichael (1932) provided another demonstration of the influence of contextual
information on memory retrieval. Subjects studied ambiguous line drawings (e.g.,
two circles connected by a straight line) along with verbal labels (e.g., “eye glasses”
or “dumb bells”). Subsequently they were asked to draw the pictures from memory.
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Fig. 1 Representations and processing in the comprehension of text. On the left is the immediately
available text currently being processed; to the right are the traces of that processing; to the right
of that is the story world situation as reconstructed from the memory traces and knowledge and
experience
Results showed that their drawings from memory were affected by the nature of the
label, independent of the perceptual information in the drawing. This result suggests
that people do not retrieve some form of verbatim perceptual information from
memory but rather that they must make inferences—based on all sorts of available
information—in order to reconstruct what they saw. The same must be true of text:
Readers do not have a recording of what they have read, but rather must reconstruct
that information from fragmentary memory traces.
These findings have serious implications for the processing and appreciation of
literary narratives, some of which we illustrate in Fig. 1. The figure outlines why we
can only reconstruct a schematic representation of the story we just read from the
fragmentary traces of processing. On the left of the figure is the text. The highlighted
lines indicate that limited portion of the text that is currently being processed. As
described above, this is the only portion of the text that is immediately available for
processing and inferences; material from earlier in the text must be reconstructed
from memory. Just to the right of the text are processing traces that remain in
memory. These are schematic representations of concepts and relationships rather
than a verbatim copy of the words of the text. The traces near the top are depicted
in light gray to suggest that traces become increasingly difficult to retrieve over
time. Although we are mostly concerned with the traces of textual processing,
as we discuss later, traces of other, extra-textual processing will also be found in
memory. The actual representation of the situation and events described by the text
are then reconstructed based on these traces; this is depicted in the box just to the
right of memory traces. The depiction is intended to indicate simply a schematic
situation model, or distilled representation, that has been reconstructed from the
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textual information we read. Further, as shown on the far right, comprehension
and reconstruction rely substantially on world knowledge and personal experience.
Thus, the schematic representation of the text will inevitably be intertwined with
other knowledge. This means that the two can become confused (e.g., Bower
et al. 1979). As with Carmichael’s (1932) ambiguous pictures experiment, what
is recalled is not a replica of the original experience, but rather a reconstruction that
is based on other information besides the original processing. On balance, memory,
either for past experience or for previously read text, is not only incomplete but also
a function of a wide range of other information; the distilled outline that emerges
in the reader’s mind is at best a distorted reflection of the original narrative. The
implication is that appreciation of the text and aesthetic response pertains to this
reconstructed representation, not the text itself.
It must also be emphasized that memory is not only fragmentary and distorting,
it is also ephemeral. Discourse processing studies have shown that memory for all
aspects of text is short lived, making the mental representation of the read narrative
more unreliable still. Three levels of memory representation have been identified:
memory for surface structure, which dissipates almost immediately (e.g., by the
end of a clause or sentence, Goldman et al. 1980); memory for the textbase, or
propositional content, which has been shown to last a little longer (e.g., Singer
and Kintsch 2001), and memory for the situation model, which lasts longer than
the other two (cf. Zwaan et al. 1995). However, the situation model is far from
complete or accurate. For example, Graesser and colleagues (1999a) demonstrated
that memory for one critical aspect of the story, who said what in a story, is generally
very poor, although it is better for the speech acts of first person narrators than
for those of characters or third person narrators. In his classic experiment, Bartlett
(1932) demonstrated that recall is very difficult and quite inaccurate when the
material read was from a cultural background different from the reader’s. These
results were replicated more than four decades later (Kintsch and Greene 1978).
Furthermore, it has been shown that the contextual knowledge at the time of reading
has a great impact on memory and recall (Bransford and Johnson 1972). Graesser
et al. (1999b) found that judgments concerning who knows what in the story are not
a function of episodic memory (i.e., the ability to retrieve the speech act of agents in
the story world) but were rather based on inference processes incorporating a range
of different types of knowledge.
Together, these findings pose a serious challenge to approaches to literary
response that include no role for the limitations of human memory. In literary
studies, the topic of memory is only studied as a theme, such as the way in which
memory for historical events is represented in specific literary works. The issue
of how memory constrains the reading experience of real readers has received
almost no attention in this field. Thus, scholarship in this tradition cannot provide
an accurate account of reader processing. One of the few literary scholars who did
foray into this terrain was Norman Holland (1975). In an informal study, he had five
readers retell a story they had read, and found numerous changes in the retelling.
This was taken as evidence that memory reconstructs rather than reproduces (cf.
Bartlett 1932). Within the field of linguistics, Emmott (1997) acknowledged the
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limitation of real readers’ memory in the reception of literature. She drew on
cognitive psychology to better understand the mental activity of reading literature
and reflected on “the minimum amount of textually presented information needed
for the text to make sense” (p. 121). Apart from these limited exceptions, there has
been relatively little rigorous, systematic study in linguistic and literary studies of
the topic of memory for text.
As explained above, the general nature and role of memory have been studied
extensively in discourse processing. Some attention has also been dedicated to the
investigation of individual differences with respect to memory capacity. However,
the contextual or situated determinants of textual memory have received less
attention. Indeed, common theoretical approaches to reading in discourse processing
often ignore the impact of context on reading, implying in effect an ideal reader and
an idealized reading situation. In the following section we discuss the constraints
that the situated nature of reading poses on the understanding and appreciation of
literary texts.
4 Text Processing in Context
Reading and, by extension, readers are situated in the sense that reading does not
occur in a vacuum; it transpires over time in both a mental and environmental
context. Readers’ mental states and factors peculiar to the environment necessarily
affect processing. We describe two aspects of readers’ mental states in particular
that have an impact on the processing of the text: variations in attentional focus and
variations in reading engagement.
Readers’ mental states inevitably vary from moment to moment over the course
of reading any text, a fact ignored by idealized concepts of the reader. For example,
Nell (1988, p. 9) maintained that “because of the heavy demands reading makes on
conscious attention, the reader is effectively shielded from other demands, whether
internal or external.” But in real-world reading contexts, external stimuli, such as
even mundane changes in the environment—phones or doorbells ringing, temper-
ature fluctuations, background noise—could alter a reader’s priorities, causing a
cessation of the reading or a decrease in attention. Other internal factors can also
influence attentional resources devoted to the reading task. These include factors
such as bodily needs, caffeine or lack of caffeine, the time of day, personal priorities,
responsibilities, preoccupations, or even personal recollections prompted by the
text (Dixon and Bortolussi 2015). Indeed, recent research on mind wandering
has demonstrated that attention is never unwavering for any reader, under any
circumstances. For example, Schooler, Reichle, and Halpern (2004) claimed that
mind wandering can occur up to 23 % of the time. Mind wandering varies with
the interest value of the text but is still common for compelling and engaging texts
(Dixon and Bortolussi 2013; see also Unsworth and McMillan 2013). As one might
suspect, mind wandering has an important effect on memory for the text (Schooler
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et al. 2004; Dixon and Li 2013), reconstruction of the text during recall (Dixon and
Bortolussi 2013), and inferences from the text (Smallwood et al. 2008).
Some of the effects of mind wandering can be understood with reference
to Fig. 1. As discussed above, the read portions of the text are registered as
traces in the reader’s mind and must be distilled into a schematic outline of the
narrative. However, mind wandering introduces processes, and memory traces of
those processes, that are independent of the text. In the figure, these are depicted in
the middle set of memory traces, unconnected to the text. Some of this processing
may spring from personal preoccupations or desires, such as an up-coming trip
or meeting with a difficult authority. Others may be prompted by the text itself:
For example, a character in the story world might produce recollections and a
mental image of someone known to the reader who in some way resembles that
character. In other cases, passages may require the reader to stop and reflect on
past experiences in an effort to understand some characters’ thoughts, feelings, or
behavior, and others still may prompt philosophical musings about human existence.
Inevitably, this intermittent extra-textual processing affects the traces that are used
during reconstruction, potentially interacting with memory for details of the text,
and ultimately affecting the reader’s ability to reconstruct the text.
Engagement is another mental state that may affect memory and the reconstruc-
tion of the text. Engagement—also known as narrative immersion, absorption, or
transportation—has been the object of a variety of empirical investigations (e.g.,
Gerrig 1993; Green and Brock 2000; Green 2004; Green et al. 2004; Busselle and
Bilandzic 2009; de Graaf et al. 2009; Tal-Or and Cohen 2010; Johnson 2012). The
motivation of much of this work is to capture the idea that readers can be immersed
in, intensely absorbed by, or engaged with the fictional world, experiencing it as if
they had been transported into that world. English has its own expression to capture
the phenomenon—“to be carried away by a book”—and, as Nell (1988, p. 50) has
pointed out, many other languages have an equivalent expression. The idea itself is
hardly new: Plato considered immersion a dangerous illusion (Herman et al. 2007).
Since then, many literary scholars and critics have alluded to this notion to defend
some essential point about the literary experience; transport is a property of some
kinds of texts (Green and Brock 2000, p. 719) or a requirement for meaningful,
productive reading experiences.
Some of these studies stress the mechanisms that enable the experience of
immersion, particularly simulation and emotional involvement (Currie and Raven-
scroft 2002; Herman et al. 2007; Bal and Veltkamp 2013). Others stress the effects
of transport, including increased appreciation and deeper processing (Craik and
Lockhart 1972; Busselle and Bilandzic 2009), although some have reported that
cognitive depth and transport are conflicting processes (Green and Brock 2000).
More recently, Janit (2011) suggested that transportation might lead to better
memory for text. However, since the materials used in Janit’s study were stories
in textbooks, more research with literary narratives is needed before we can reliably
conclude that transport into fictional worlds has a beneficial effect on memory for
text more generally. Some of the alleged effects include attitudinal and behavioral
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changes (Appel and Richter 2007; Johnson 2012). In all of these accounts, it is taken
for granted that transportation entails the full attention of the reader; readers are
described as being so focused on the reading that they are even unaware of their
immediate surroundings. The metaphor suggests deeper processing; presumably
readers lose track of their surroundings because their minds are actively engaged
in processing the text.
As we argued elsewhere, the transport metaphor has become so entrenched and
naively accepted that it is no longer questioned (Bortolussi and Dixon 2015). Yet
many questions have not been adequately addressed, if at all. For example, does
transport necessarily entail sustained attention? Does emotional engagement always
enhance attention to and memory for textual details, or might a gripping scene
cause the reader to divert attentional resources from some textual features, such
as linguistic or stylistic devices and reallocate them to emotional musings? How,
specifically, are attentional resources distributed, and, concretely, what aspects of
the text that are read in an engaged state are remembered? In fact, empirical studies
of literature devoted to transportation bear much in common with traditional literary
studies in terms of assumptions about the nature of the text: Transportation is a
property of certain texts or the capacities of the reader; readers have the ability
to sustain focus and attention; and there is an optimal text-reader relationship in
which readers respond as intended. But transportation is not necessarily a property
of certain kinds of texts, that is, a unitary phenomenon that may or may not happen
for any given story. Rather, attention and engagement are more likely to vary across
texts in accordance with textual shifts and changes; for example, some portions
of any given text might be more evocative than others in the same text. While
it is logical to assume that writers produce fiction for the purpose of inducing
transportation and artfully employ techniques to achieve that purpose, whether and
to what extent readers notice, track, associate, and process them accordingly is an
empirical question.
More generally, the relationship between reading focus and engagement has not
been carefully articulated. Although it seems intuitive that being engaged involves
attending to the material, these variables need not be the same. For example, one
may be engaged with the story in the sense of thinking deeply about the situation and
characters and attempting to analyze and understand the relationships in the story
world. However, such processing might mean actually paying less attention to the
details that are presented in the text. Indeed, such details may be suppressed if they
are inconsistent with the broader inferences drawn by the reader. For example, Green
and Brock (2000, p. 711) argued that engaged readers “appeared more accepting of
the story” and were “less likely to doubt, to question, or to engage in disbelieving
processing.” Under other circumstances, being engaged might entail considering
personal experiences related to the story; a form of mind wandering would ensue if
such considerations become deeply involving. Conversely, one could carefully focus
on the text without generating much in the way of an understanding of the story
and its more profound implications. In this case, the reader would generate only a
superficial representation of the story-world events. Thus, it is plausible that under
at least some circumstances, textual engagement is not tantamount to reading focus.
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One possibility is that neither does engagement imply focusing on the text, nor
does reading focus imply engagement. Instead, both processes may be determined
by other factors. (de Graaf et al. 2009 considers some related complexities). In
particular, it seems reasonable to suppose that one such variable is the interest
value of the text (Hidi and Baird 1986). For example, if readers find the material
interesting, they are likely to focus on the material more carefully (Giambra
and Grodsky 1989). Similarly, the relationship of the text to the reader (which
presumably determines reader interest) has been shown to be related to engagement
(Green 2004). Thus, although it is intuitive that readers will more likely appreciate a
text in which they are interested, it is critical to consider the variables that are likely
to mediate that relationship, among them, engagement and focus.
5 Evidence on Mind Wandering and Engagement
In the following, we describe two empirical studies that demonstrate the importance
of mind wandering and engagement in memory for the text. As we discussed at
the outset, memory is the basis for any kind of literary interpretation, and hence
any aspect of processing that affects memory can be a factor in interpretation. We
used two texts, one that was likely to be of interest to our readers and one that was
likely to be relatively uninteresting. Our general goal is to explore how variations in
processing over the course of the text affect memory. Both experiments employ what
might be termed a mental-state probe procedure in which subjects are occasionally
interrupted while reading and asked to report on the nature of their mental state (e.g.,
Teasdale et al. 1995).
5.1 Method
We asked separate groups of subjects to read an interesting story (the initial 7,342
words of Interview with the Vampire by Ann Rice) or a less interesting story (the
initial 7,753 words of The Story of Pendennis by William Makepeace Thackery).
(Our description of Interview as interesting and Pendennis as less interesting is
based on our intuitive judgment but was borne out by the reactions of subjects
to these materials.) In Experiment 1, 19 subjects read Interview and 18 read
Pendennis; data from 10 other subjects were not used because they appeared to be
skimming large portions of the text. In Experiment 2, 21 subjects read Interview
and 14 read Pendennis; data from 9 other subjects were not used because they
were skimming. The texts were read on a computer screen one sentence at a time.
After reading each sentence, the subject pressed the spacebar to continue on with
the next sentence. At ten unpredictable locations in the text, instead of the next
sentence, subjects were asked about their mental state. The mental state probe in
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Experiment 1 took the form of the question, “Were you fully comprehending the
story or were you thinking of something else?” Underneath the question was a
line with points labeled with: “Definitely thinking of something else,” “Thinking of
something else to some extent,” “Not sure,” “Comprehending to some extent,” and
“Definitely comprehending.” Subjects used a computer mouse to click somewhere
along this line. The response that was measured was a number, ranging from 225
to C225, indicating the position (in pixels) along the response scale where subjects
clicked. Experiment 2 was precisely the same except that the question used was,
“Do you feel like you’re experiencing the story as if you were there or are you
just reading superficially?” Points along the response scale were labeled with:
“Definitely reading superficially,” “Reading superficially to some extent,” “Not
sure,” “Experiencing the story to some extent,” and “Definitely experiencing the
story.”
After reading the text, subjects were given 20 multiple-choice questions. There
were two questions concerning the material just prior to each of the mental-state
probes. Thus, accuracy on the questions could be compared to the probe response
that was made previously. For example, in Experiment 1, when a subject responded
to a probe by indicating that he or she was on task, one would expect the subject
to have less difficulty with the questions pertaining to the just-completed material.
Similarly, in Experiment 2, when a subject responded to a probe by indicating that he
or she was engaged with the story, one might expect the subject to be more accurate
for that material.
5.2 Results
Briefly, the results of the first experiment show what we intuitively would expect,
that is, that the more interesting story produced higher on-task ratings. Further,
better memory occurs when the on-task ratings are the highest. Critically, being
on task appears to be the sole determinant of memory: The more interesting story
does not, by itself, lead to better memory.
The pattern of results is shown in Fig. 2. There are four aspects of this figure
that deserve explanation. First, for a variety of statistical reasons, the accuracy of
the subjects’ response to the memory questions was measured in log odds correct.
For comparison, on a log odds, or logit, scale, 50 % correct would be 0, 75 %
correct would be 1.1, and 90 % would be 2.2. In Fig. 2, although subjects’ responses
were substantially better than chance, they were far from perfect: Accuracy scores
in the figure ranged from about .5 to 1.0 logits. Second, the on-task response is
shown along the horizontal axis, with higher values indicating greater focus on the
text. Thus, values at the right of the graph (higher on-task rating) should go with
higher values on the vertical axis (more accurate memory). This general trend was
found, although the increase in accuracy was not substantial unless the on-task rating
was fairly high. Third, for each story, we divided all of the responses into a high
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Fig. 2 Memory accuracy (in terms of log odds correct) in Experiment 1 as a function of story and
on-task probe response
group and a low group based on a median split. In order to indicate how spread
out each group was, the standard deviation of the scores in each group is plotted
as a horizontal error bar in the figure. As described above, subjects were more on
task with the interesting story (Interview, shown with the solid circle and line) than
with the less interesting story (Pendennis, shown with open circles and dotted line).
In effect, interesting stories keep subjects on task. Fourth, for each high and low
group, the overall accuracy associated with those responses is shown by the vertical
position. The vertical error bar indicates the standard error of the accuracy as derived
from a statistical model fit. Although accuracy is relatively unrelated to on-task
response over most of the range, very high levels of on-task response (the right-
most point for Interview) is associated with some improvement in memory.
We turn now to the results of the second experiment in which engagement
was probed. In this case, the results were different in several important ways.
As expected, subjects were more likely to be engaged with the more interesting
Interview than with Pendennis. Moreover, memory was better for Interview; this
can be seen as replicating the effect of interest value found in Experiment 1.
However, engagement by itself had little impact on memory. For both stories, more
engagement had little positive (and perhaps even a negative) effect on memory. In
this sense, being engaged is quite different from being focused on the text.
Figure 3 shows this pattern of results in a manner analogous to the previous
figure. Not surprisingly, Interview lead to greater engagement than the more tedious
(for our subjects) Pendennis; thus, the Interview responses are generally to the
right of the Pendennis responses. However, unlike the on-task rating, there was no
relationship between engagement and later memory for either story by itself. This is
depicted in the figure by the slope of the Pendennis line and the slope Interview
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Fig. 3 Memory accuracy (in terms of log odds correct) in Experiment 2 as a function of story and
engagement probe response
line: Neither slopes up as would be expected if engagement affected memory.
In other words, greater engagement with a given story did not produce better
memory. Indeed, there was a small trend for greater engagement with Interview
to be associated with weaker memory. There was, of course, an overall difference
between stories: Interview was remembered better than Pendennis. However, the
results make clear that this difference is not due to greater engagement. This is a
surprising revelation.
5.3 Discussion
The results from the two experiments illuminate how memory is affected by mental
processing over the course of the text. The first experiment demonstrated that high
levels of attention to the task can lead to improved memory for the text. This,
of course, is perfectly intuitive: If you want to remember what you are reading,
you should concentrate on the material. However, there are two constraints on this
intuitive interpretation. First, the effect on memory was fairly modest and only
occurred at the very extreme of the on-task scale. Overall, being on task had a
relatively small effect on our measure of memory. Second, there was no independent
effect of interest value on memory. Although memory was generally better for
Interview, the results suggest that the story led subjects to focus on the material
more, and this increase in attention led to better memory. For example, in Fig. 2, the
high on-task group for Pendennis had the same on-task rating as the low group for
Interview, and the result was comparable levels of memory. In contrast, Experiment
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2 demonstrated that this was not the case when engagement was measured. Although
the more interesting story was rated as more engaging and that story was more
memorable, within each story, engagement had no effect on memory.
Making sense of this pattern of results requires a careful analysis of the causal
connections in the processing of the text. Our interpretation is illustrated in Fig. 4.
We selected two texts that we assumed varied in interest value. In turn, the interest
value had clear effects on both the extent to which subjects focused on the story
and the degree of engagement. Memory, on the other hand, seemed to be only
related to focus, not whether or not they were deeply engaged with the story world.
Thus, while engagement might make for a more memorable reading experience, it
doesn’t necessarily lead to a better recollection of story details. Our memory test
was designed to assess the quality of the memory traces (being based on textual
details) rather than the reconstructed situation in the story world.
This is not to say that engagement has no effect on reading. On the contrary,
we suspect that being engaged with a story leads to a more elaborate and detailed
representation of the story world, one that makes a greater use of world knowledge
and personal experience. In other words, the reconstructed representation in Fig. 1
would be elaborate and extensive when readers are engaged with the story world.
This is illustrated in Fig. 4 by causal connections from both engagement and
memory to reconstruction. In other research, we have found evidence for more
elaborate story-world representations when engaged: The more engaging a story is,
the better subjects are at recalling the story rather than simply recognizing details
(Dixon and Bortolussi 2013). Finally, Fig. 4 illustrates our overarching point that
any appreciation of the text must depend on the reconstructed story, not the text
itself. The appreciation of a story must necessarily be mediated by a complex of
processes and memory representations.
Fig. 4 Hypothesized causal
relationships. Interest leads to
an increase in on-task
processing and engagement;
being on task (but not
engagement) leads to better
memory; reconstruction
depends on both memory
traces and engagement; and
reconstruction provides the
basis for appreciation
46 M. Bortolussi and P. Dixon
6 Conclusions
We began with a brief review of the phenomenological legacy in theoretical
accounts of literary processing. Phenomenology, explained simply, “is the way in
which human beings come to understand the world through direct experience—the
perception of a phenomenon, whether an object, event, or condition” (Littlejohn
and Foss 2011, p. 47). For early proponents of a phenomenological approach to
literary studies, such as Ingarden (1931) and Iser (1974), the object of the experience
was the text. One can infer from their works that competent, alert readers can
potentially be aware of everything in the text as well as their mental actions on the
text. In other words, appreciation of literature was mediated by what the reader had
available in consciousness and what was in consciousness was dictated precisely
by what was in the text. In contrast, we are concerned with the complexities
of how the mind is known to work. We know, for example, that awareness,
perception, attention, and memory are limited, and that the use of these capacities
varies dynamically over time. Thus, a variety of mental mechanisms intervene
between the text and the reader’s appreciation, and many of these mechanisms
operate without awareness. We cannot, in fact, have an account of appreciation
based simply on conscious introspection. We have shown how the understanding
and interpretation of literary texts requires memory and have discussed the well-
documented limitations of memory: Memory traces are fragmentary and ephemeral
and the reader’s representation of the story world must be reconstructed based on a
variety of extra-textual sources of information (cf. Bortolussi and Dixon 2013). To
these limitations, we add the varying mental states of the reader. He or she may or
may not focus on the text at any point in time, and he or she may or may not be fully
engaged with the story. These mental states have implications for what processing
traces are available in memory and how this information is used in reconstruction.
Further, the mind supplements textual information with extra-textual input, and
confuses what is in the text with what is not. Readers notice what is of interest or
relevant to them, filter out what is not, and can draw unpredictable connections. In
other words, we process literature in terms of how we interact with it. Each reader’s
interaction is selective.
A serious endorsement of these limitations of the real reader’s mind has extensive
implications for the understanding of literary processing. Perhaps one of the most
interesting is that aesthetic reaction is not to the text, but rather to readers’
mental representation in memory, and that this mental representations bears a pale
resemblance to the original. What is produced in the reader’s mind can never, for any
reader under any circumstances, be the equivalent of the text. Rather than bemoan
this reality, as literary theorists might, we should instead recognize that it is that very
outcome of the reading process—the mental representation—that makes literature
memorable: Readers interact with the text, bringing themselves to it, so that the
product of their processing is a unique combination of the objective and subjective,
of the text and themselves.
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Although our understanding of the reader’s mental states is only beginning, there
is no question that such an understanding is fundamental to a description of literary
processing. In order to understand the nature of a reader’s literary appreciation, we
cannot depend on the phenomenological supposition that appreciation is available
to the conscious mind. Rather, the phenomena of appreciation among real readers
must be understood only with carefully designed empirical evidence.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Temporal Conflict in the Reading Experience
Cathrine Kietz
Abstract Analogous to our visual perspective, we also have a temporal perspective
spanning beyond the present singular point in time. In literary narratives, the
characters in the story have a visual perspective on the represented world whereas
the reader has a temporal perspective on the narrative as such. The reader’s temporal
perspective is a bit eschewed to the represented visual perspective in that there is a
temporal distance between the represented events and the reader’s point of view.
This temporal distance can be exploited aesthetically to create a conflict between
the representation and the presentation of the literary work of art. In a vein similar
to the ‘conflict’ in Husserlian picture consciousness, there is a temporal conflict in
reading consciousness that will be discussed here with reference to literary examples
from Flaubert and Kafka.
Keywords Phenomenology • Literature • Reader • Temporal perspective •
Grammatical aspect
1 Introduction
What characterizes the reader’s phenomenological experience of literary artworks?
Edmund Husserl has intensively investigated the phenomenology of the different
acts of perceiving, remembering, imagining, and picture-viewing. Acts of percep-
tion are presentational acts, acts of imagination and memory are representational
acts, but acts of picture-viewing are a special combination of presentation and
representation. The experience of pictures is characterized by an experience of a
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conflict between presentation and representation, which makes the experience of
even the most realistic picture (a trompe l’oeil) non-illusionistic.1 But how, again,
do we experience literary artworks? Is it like looking at pictures?
While Husserl himself has not conducted a thorough investigation of literary
artworks,2 his pupil Roman Ingarden certainly has (Ingarden 1931, 1968). In this
article, I will focus on a hitherto neglected part of Ingarden’s investigations, namely
the relation between the literary artwork and the reader’s temporal perspective,3
which, as I will try to show, has the ability to capture that experience of conflict in
a representation.4 Pictures are present in our visual perspective, but the represented
objects of literature can only be ‘seen’ with the mind’s ‘eye;’ thus the reader’s actual
visual perspective is irrelevant when it comes to the represented objects of literature
(unless we are dealing with concrete typographical poetry). I will argue that, instead,
the reader’s temporal perspective is relevant—because literary artworks are present
to temporal perception. Thus, the relevant conflict to be analyzed in literary artworks
is a temporal conflict (rather than a spatial conflict).
I will first discuss the presentation of literary artworks, where I will argue
that there is a pure presentational layer that is temporal and available to temporal
perception. For that reason, I will argue that, during reading, literary objects have
a special affinity to remembered objects compared to imagined objects proper. The
similarity between literary reading and remembering will be further explored in
regard to the concept of temporal perspective. Both memory and literature can
show us events from different temporal perspectives: the temporal distance to events
varies—similarly to how the spatial distance to objects varies in visual perception.
The hypothesis will be put forward that the temporal presentation of events in
literature can create a temporal foreground-background structure to the reader. On
the basis of Roman Ingarden’s investigation of temporal perspective in reading, I
will discuss literary examples of temporal conflict from Gustave Flaubert’s Madame
Bovary and Franz Kafka’s unfinished tale The Burrow.
1On conflict: Widerstreit, see Husserl on intentionality LU 1900–1901, and picture consciousness
1898–1925.
2Husserl does have some notes on the relation between fact and fiction somewhat mirroring the
relation between presentation and representation. But more often than not, fiction consciousness
is understood as illusion and seems to be the very antithesis of picture consciousness with its
illusion-breaking ‘conflict’ (Widerstreit). But what interests me is the experience of the non-
illusionistic elements, the conflicting intentions, in “representation” in general, especially in
literary representation.
3See the chapters on temporal perspective in Ingarden 1972.
4As opposed to Ingarden’s recap of the term quasi from Husserl, as in quasi-judgements in fiction
for instance, which are somewhat illusion-preserving. On the other hand, the concept of Widerstreit
seems to reemerge in Ingarden’s ontological analysis as the existential moment of heteronomy,
which applied to all man-made representations (see Ingarden 1931, but also Ingarden 1965). But
what I am looking for here is something a little less general and more readily applicable to literary
analysis.
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2 Presentation of Literary Artworks and the Reader’s
Temporal Perspective
My initial question concerns the experience of literary works of art, and is, as such,
more narrow than the question of the experience of represented objectivities in
general. In what way does it matter which type of artwork a represented object is
dependent on? Ingarden defines the literary artwork as opposed to other artworks
both ontologically and epistemologically. Ontologically (Ingarden 1931), artworks
(or representations) are stratified formations and the literary work of art is the
most stratified with four different strata: word sounds, word meanings, schematized
aspects, and represented objectivities. The presence of language elicits two strata by
itself; visual artworks, for example, only have the strata of aspects and represented
objects. When he investigates the cognition of the literary work of art, Ingarden
(1968) addresses this entire stratified formation and not just the stratum of the
represented objectivities. Secondly, since he investigates an artwork, he is mainly
interested in the aesthetic reading (and, in relation to this, the possibilities for
scientific readings of the work before and after the aesthetic reading, i.e., literary
analyses). Aesthetic reading in general is a process with different phases,5 but the
particularly literary experience is further characterized by three features (Ingarden
1968, §26; cf. Kietz 2013):
1. Only the qualities appearing in the stratum of word sounds are accessible to the
senses.
2. The whole work cannot be apprehended in a single moment, but only in temporal
phases.
3. The experience is constituted on a purely intellectual understanding of the
semantic units.
I will concern myself primarily with the second element of the literary experience
since it is in particular the relation between the non-actuality of the derived purely
intentional object on the one hand, i.e., the non-temporality of the represented
object, and the temporality of the process of reading on the other hand, which
interests me.
First of all, Ingarden’s description of the three elements of the literary experience
corresponds very much to that of the Enlightenment philosopher G.E. Lessing’s (cf.
Laokoon 1766/1887), in that the temporal structure, and hence the temporal expe-
rience, is distinguished as elements in their own right. Lessing’s thesis concerning
the natural signification of literature was that the relation between word sounds and
5Cf. Ingarden 1968, §24.
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semantic units should be mediated by the temporal structure, which would create
structural iconicity between the stratum of word sounds and the semantic stratum.6
Scholars have mainly investigated the temporal presentation of literature in two
ways:
1. From the perspective of the stratum of word sounds.
2. From the perspective of the semantic stratum.
The first perspective is generally applied in relation to poetry; the second
perspective is generally applied to narratives. The first perspective is available
to sense perception, but the second perspective is based on a purely intellectual
understanding. Underscoring Lessing’s thesis is the possibility for an intuitive, i.e.,
perceptual, apprehension of both poetry and narratives. Unless prosody is important
to the narrative, perception seems to be reserved for poetry only. But (according
to, e.g., the tradition of cognitive semiotics), semantics also rely on schematic
structure. Schematic structures are formal structures and, as such, must be available
to categorial perception. So, the word sounds are accessible to sense perception,
i.e., material perception, and the semantic units, given that they rely on schemas
are accessible to categorial perception, i.e., formal perception. But what about the
second element, the temporal experience itself? Both the rhythm of the word sounds
and the discourse (in which the events are presented) are dependent upon temporal
structure, so how is temporal structure available to us? I will venture the hypothesis
that the temporal phases and their relations are accessible to temporal perception.
Temporal perception resides somewhere in-between sense perception and categorial
perception in that time is neither purely material nor purely formal.
The question of different types of perception lies at the heart of Gestalt theory.
In the founding essay by Christian von Ehrenfels (1890), it was the existence of
temporal gestalts, like melodies, that initiated the theory. A melody is something
more than the sum of its material parts; it can be transposed, for instance, to a
different key while remaining the same as a melody. The theory of gestalts concerns
our ability to perceive something independently of material and time—our ability
to perceive forms, what Husserl calls categorial perception. But Husserl was not
satisfied with the explanation of our experience of a melody through categorial
perception alone. In his lectures on the phenomenology of the consciousness of
internal time (1893–1917), he argues that we must also be able to perceive time in
itself, if we are to perceive a melody.
When a melody sounds, for example, the individual tone does not utterly disappear with
the cessation of the stimulus or of the neural movement it excites. When the new tone is
sounding, the preceding tone has not disappeared without leaving a trace. [ : : : ] If they [the
tones of a melody] were to remain unmodified, then instead of a melody we would have a
chord of simultaneous tones, or rather a disharmonious tangle of sound, as if we had struck
simultaneously all the notes that had previously sounded. (Husserl 1905/1991, p. 11)
6In this sense, Lessing’s thesis is the exact opposite of Roman Jakobson’s ‘poetic function,’ where
the iconicity is established by disregarding the temporal structure, i.e., projecting the principle
of (spatial) equivalence from the paradigmatic axis onto the syntagmatic axis. But my interest
concerns temporal structure.
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The individual tones of a melody do not disappear completely from conscious-
ness after they have sounded; they remain present, albeit in a modified sense
as just-past. According to Husserl, time consciousness is a tripartite structure
composed of both the present moment (impression), a memory of the just-past
moment (retention), and an anticipation of the immediate next moment (protention).
If we are to perceive time as a continuity, and not just as discontinuous, punctual
instances (pearls on a string), our experience of time must have a certain extension
(similar to William James’ idea of a specious present). Husserl says we have a
temporal field in analogy to the visual field:
The original temporal field is limited, precisely as in perception’s case. Indeed, on the
whole, one might dare to assert that the temporal field always has the same extension. It
moves, as it were, over the perceived and freshly remembered motion and its objective time
in the same way as the visual field moves over objective space. (Ibid., p. 32)
The temporal field, or temporal perspective, moves over objective time like a
visual perspective moves over objective space. Despite the fact that Ingarden saw
the beginning of Husserl’s turn to idealism exactly in his lectures on internal time—
and, therefore, tried to explain temporal continuity as belonging to the mode of
real being and not to the intentional mode of being (cf. Ingarden 1965)—he does
retain the concept of temporal perspective. As Ingarden says in regard to the second
element of the literary experience:
The second essential element of the literary aesthetic experiences which distinguishes them
to a certain extent from the aesthetic experience of painting, sculpture and architecture is
contained in the fact that a literary work of art can be apprehended only in an aesthetic
experience occurring in several phases, in which all the successive parts of the work must
be reconstructed one after the other, and the fact that there is no phase of this experience in
which the whole work can be apprehended all at once in full actuality. And in every phase—
except for the last—only a part of the work is cognized and made familiar and always only
in a temporal perspective characteristic of this phase. (Ingarden 1968, p. 227, my italics)
Each phase of the experience of the literary work of art corresponds to a specific
temporal perspective. In every present visual perception, the temporal perspective
is always the same; but in memory, as we remember and re-present past events,
our temporal perspective changes: we can, for example, recall an event in detail
and thus have a more proximal temporal perspective on the event as opposed to
when it is floating vaguely in the back of our memory, e.g., when we have trouble
recalling something. Ingarden takes temporal perspective in memory as the basis for
his investigation of temporal perspective in literature.
3 Temporal Perspective in Memory
Ingarden has formulated the question of our experience of literary artworks in the
following way:
How can we be witnesses to the events portrayed in the work when, in dealing with a purely
literary work, we do not actually perceive these objects and events in the strict sense of the
word? (Ingarden 1968, p. 98)
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And he continues:
In any case, it is impossible to be satisfied with the stereotyped view that the reader simply
‘imagines’ the objects when he reads. One would at least have to say that there is a particular
way of ‘imagining’ that makes the ‘imagined’ object present to us. Husserl speaks of a ‘pre-
sentification’ [Vergegenwärtigung] that, though different from the ‘presentifying’ [Gegen-
wärtigung] that takes place during perception, is definitely related to it. (Ibid., pp. 98–99)
The ‘presence’ of the objects and events that are represented in a literary work
of art must be understood in a temporal sense. One way of making things present in
time that are no longer present in space is through memory.
According to Ingarden, there are two main ways of remembering past processes:
Either we apprehend a whole temporal interval and what happened in it from the standpoint
of our actual present in a single act of remembering, all at once (for example as we call to
mind in one act the long period of World War I) or else we transport ourselves in memory
back to the beginning of the period in question and, in the process of remembering, progress
as it were simultaneously with the remembered period by calling to mind the successive
events and processes phase by phase. (Ibid., p. 110)
The two main ways of remembering results in two main types of temporal
perspective:
Temporal Perspective
– Distal, i.e., disparateness with events
– Proximal, i.e., simultaneity with events
But, as Ingarden points out, since memory is a re-presentational act, a proximal
perspective in memory is not the same as in a presentational act:
Absolute proximity is out of the question. If that were possible, what is simply remembered
would be something perceived; but there is no genuine return to the past. (Ibid., p. 114)
In memory, only a quasi-presence is possible. A distance between the temporal
point of view and the remembered event characterize temporal perspective in
memory. I am not referring to the actual distance in objective time, but rather to the
phenomenological distance in our memory—phenomenological in the sense that it is
qualitative, not quantitative. For example, if there is some event we try to remember,
it is not enough to be told the exact date of the event; we have to localize the event
within our own experience; it must be qualitatively determined. The localization
is crucial; the distance is greatest when the remembered event cannot be localized
phenomenologically (ibid.), i.e., when the distance is unbounded. To remember is to
localize events in our own phenomenological memory. When the event is localized,
it is possible to diminish the distance even further by moving the temporal point of
view back in time, as it were. The temporal point of view must also be localized:
either we stay in our own present moment, and time stands still while we remember
the past event—we disregard the fact that the remembered event is continuously
sinking further and further into the past (ibid., p. 115): this is a static viewpoint.
Or we transport ourselves back to the past events, our own present moment seems
to disappear, and we move along with the past events (ibid.): this is a dynamic
viewpoint.
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So, temporal perspective in memory always entails a distance. The distance
depends on the localization of both event and viewpoint.
Distance
– Localization of event
– Localization of point of view
The different possibilities can perhaps be illustrated thus:
1. Localized perspective, non-localized event:
[Point of view] Event
2. Localized perspective, localized event:
[Point of view] [Event]
3. Non-localized (moving) perspective, localized event:
→Point of view [Event]
4. Non-localized perspective, non-localized event:
→Point of view Event
The events are experienced differently according to the different temporal
perspectives they are seen through, i.e., according to the distance and, hence,
the different localizations. One possibility is, of course, that a given event is not
remembered at all. This happens when the event is not yet localized (1). But there
is also the possibility that what is remembered is a recurrent or habitual event,
which is difficult to localize at a specific time since it has happened many times
(1). Then there is the possibility of remembering an event all at once, so that there
is no internal time sequence in the event. (2) And lastly, of course, there is the
possibility of remembering an event in its temporal progression (3). I have included
the possibility of neither point of view nor event being localized (4), which is not a
real possibility in memory, but, as I will show later, this is a possibility in literature.
Event
• Not localized
– None (no event remembered)
– One-in-many (one event recurring many times)
• Localized
– Static
• Many-in-one (many events remembered as one)
• One (punctual event)
– Dynamic
• One-by-one (an event remembered in its temporal succession)
The structure of a remembered event is dependent upon the temporal per-
spective and vice versa; they are mutually dependent. From the non-localized,
non-remembered event down to the localized dynamic event, there is a change in
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temporal perspective from distal toward proximal. Proximal perspective in memory
is not real proximity where our real present coincides with the past present; hence,
proximity can only come about if we move our point of view from the present back in
the past. This means that distalness/proximity relies on a point of inversion between
localization of event and localization of point of view; the most distal perspective
entails non-localization of event (we cannot localize the event in our memory) and
the most proximal perspective entails non-localization of point of view (i.e., moving
our point of view away from our present temporal perspective).
Events can be remembered as independent wholes, either as several events
summed up into one event or as one punctual event. In both these cases, they are
remembered as bounded events. They can also be remembered by going through
their dependent parts one-by-one, in which case they are remembered as unbounded.
But there are two types of unboundedness. One is where the unboundedness is
elicited by the non-localization of the point of view—when the point of view is
immersed, so to say, in the ongoing temporal unfolding of the different parts of an
event. The other type of unboundedness is elicited by the non-localization of the
event—habitual events are generic and as such are not clearly bounded in relation
to other events—they can vary. In other words, the boundedness of an event is
dependent on the boundedness of the distance between point of view and event.
Distance is dependent on localization of both point of view and event—so that
it is bounded in both ends. If the distance becomes unbounded in either end, the
event becomes unbounded. But the two types of unboundedness belong to the two
different types of temporal perspective, distal and proximal, respectively.
While the reader’s visual perspective might not be relevant to the experience
of literary artworks, the reader’s temporal perspective is. In literary works of art,
there are also temporal aspects held-in-readiness and actualized by the reader during
reading. This is what I will turn to now.
4 Temporal Perspective in Literature
The temporal perspective under discussion only appears in the reading of the literary
work of art because the literary work of art in itself is non-temporal; the temporal
perspectives must be actualized. The temporal perspective can never coincide with
the represented events; absolute proximity is, like in the case of memory, out of
the question—and even more so in regard to literature, where the relation between
perspective and represented objectivities is not just a matter of temporal distance
but a matter of a radical discontinuity between modes of being. But contrary to the
spatial perspectives actualized, the temporal perspective coincides with the reader’s
own temporal perspective.
In the psychological research on spatial cognition, a distinction is made between
an allocentric (distal) perspective and an egocentric (proximal) perspective (e.g.,
Linde and Labov 1975; Taylor and Tversky 1996). An allocentric perspective
entails an object-to-object reference frame (e.g., North-south-East-west is defined in
Temporal Conflict in the Reading Experience 59
relation to each other), whereas an egocentric perspective entails a subject-to-object
reference frame (e.g., Right-Left defined in relation to me). Even if a literary work
of art is written from the first-person perspective (or focalized from a represented
egocentric perspective), the reader’s spatial egocentric perspective never coincides
with the represented egocentric perspective in the text—represented objects in a
literary work of art are never to my right or to my left. But when a scene is presented
from a proximal temporal perspective, i.e., when discourse time coincides with story
time, the temporal before and after of the different parts of the represented event
correspond to the temporal before and after of my reading. This is because the time
of reading is equivalent to the time of discourse. The represented events belong to
story time (representation) but the temporal perspective belongs to discourse time
(presentation). A literary work of art is not temporal in itself (cf. Ingarden: it has the
ontological moment of non-actuality, Ingarden 1965), the only temporality it has
stems from the act of reading. As the narratologist Gerard Genette said
The temporality of written narrative is to some extent conditional or instrumental; produced
in time, like everything else, written narrative exists in space and as space, and the time
needed for ‘consuming’ it is the time needed for crossing or traversing it, like a road or a
field. The narrative text, like every other text, has no other temporality than what it borrows,
metonymically, from its own reading.
This state of affairs, we will see below, has certain consequences for our discussion, and
at times we will have to correct, or try to correct, the effects of metonymic displacement; but
we must first take that displacement for granted, since it forms part of the narrative game,
and therefore accept literally the quasi-fiction of Erzählzeit, this false time standing in for a
true time and to be treated—with the combination of reservation and acquiescence that this
involves—as a pseudo-time. (Genette 1983, p. 34).
Genette, like Ingarden, contrasts the nontemporality of the literary work of art
in itself with the temporality it gains from the act of reading. But accepting the
fiction of discourse time as the time of telling the story emphasizes the cognitive
relation to the representation, whereas focusing on discourse time as the time of
reading emphasized the phenomenology of presentation. Instead of investigating
the fictive narrator, I am here investigating the real reader. I will soon show how
certain aesthetical features, which the phenomenological analysis can point out,
escape Genette’s analysis, but first let me return to the introduction to temporal
perspectives in reading.
When reading literature, the temporal perspectives manifest themselves on two
planes: horizontally during the reading process (in the reader’s memory) and
vertically in the individual phase of the reading process (temporal perspective
actualized). So the different types of localization take place also within the reading
of the literary work in question—the different represented events must be localized
within the reader’s memory of the past phases of the literary work (Fig. 1).
These two temporal perspectives cross each other during the reading; and the
crossing at any given point is an important locus for the aesthetic experience,
i.e., when our present temporal perspective coincides with the actualized temporal
perspective. Hence, here I will only be talking about the vertical perspective, i.e.,
the literary representation of events with corresponding temporal perspectives. At
any time during the reading, past events of the literary work can be recollected, but
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if we transport ourselves back to the past events of the work by leaving our present
point of view, we are, strictly speaking, no longer performing an act of reading but
an act of remembering. The aesthetic experience is prompted by the reading and,
hence, actualization of the given part of the work and is as such tied to the present.
Yet, given the sequential structure of literary artworks, memory is necessary for the
reading of both the whole and the different parts. Ingarden points to existence of
what he calls active memory—a type of memory that goes beyond the retention of
the immediate past moments within the given temporal perspective.
Like in memory, there are two main types of temporal perspectives in literature,
a distal and a proximal, on a graded continuum. As an example of a distal temporal
perspective belonging to a represented event, Ingarden quotes from the beginning of
Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim (2000).
On the lower deck in the babel of two hundred voices he would forget himself, and
beforehand live in his mind the sea-life of light literature. He saw himself saving people
from sinking ships, cutting away masts in a hurricane, swimming through a surf with a line;
or as a lonely castaway, barefooted and half naked, walking on uncovered reefs in search of a
shell-fish to stave off starvation. He confronted savages on tropical shores, quelled mutinies
on the high seas, and in a small boat upon the ocean kept the hearts of despairing men—
always an example of devotion to duty, and as unflinching as a hero in a book. (Conrad
2000, p. 3)
Here, the represented events are not located; the first sentence dislocates Jim’s
fantasy from his surroundings (cf. he would forget himself). But instead of focusing
on the marks of internal focalization or the mood, Ingarden is only interested in the
temporal presentation. How the distal perspective is elicited:
[The] distance is a result of the sketchiness of the portrayal and of the constant use of
the iterative in the narration. We are always given almost simultaneously a multiplicity
of similar facts, which take place at different moments. Thus we cannot grasp any truly
unique event in itself. As readers, we must place ourselves in a sense outside the concrete,
unidirectional flow of events and cannot place ourselves mentally in any given moment, in
order from there to move along with the stream of events and regard them from close up.
(Ingarden 1979, p. 128)
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Importantly, Ingarden here notes that the structure of events is specified linguis-
tically by the use of grammatical aspect. Ordinarily, the grammatical category of
tense concerns the temporal location in relation to other events, whereas the category
of aspect concerns the internal temporal structure of an event. But because, as shown
with the categories before, the structure of an event (e.g., a successive structure)
determines its phenomenological temporal localization relative to perspective,
grammatical aspect is related to the localization of events in discourse time—
grammatical tense to location in story time. When events are cast in the iterative
aspect, they are not localized in at a specific time. Localizing an event reduces the
temporal distance:
It was the dusk of a winter’s day. The gale had freshened since noon, stopping the traffic
on the river and now blew with the strength of a hurricane in fitful bursts that boomed
like salvoes of great guns firing over the ocean. The rain slanted in sheets that flicked and
subsided, and between whiles Jim had threatening glimpses of the tumbling tide, the small
craft jumbled and tossed along the shore, the motionless buildings in the driving mist, the
broad ferry-boats pitching ponderously at anchor, the vast landing-stages heaving up and
down and smothered in sprays. (Conrad 2000, p. 4)
Here, the events are localized, yet the events are summed up; many smaller events
are portrayed in one. Following Ingarden’s categories, the temporal perspective is,
thus, closer but still fairly distal. For the temporal perspective to become more
proximal, the events must be portrayed in their successive unfolding:
Jim felt his shoulder gripped firmly. ‘Too late youngster.’ The captain of the ship laid a
restraining hand on that boy who seemed on the point of leaping overboard, and Jim looked
up with the pain of conscious defeat in his eyes. The captain smiled sympathetically. ‘Better
luck next time. This will teach you to be smart.’ (Ibid., p. 5)
Here we have a proximal temporal perspective, due to both the successive
description and the punctual aspect. Dialogue here enhances proximity. The proxi-
mal perspective corresponds to a scenic presentation, as Ingarden says:
Suddenly the temporal distance changes radically. A ‘scene’ is described in its different
phases at very close temporal proximity. From a certain moment on we must in a sense
become part of the course of events and move forward with them by observing them one
after the other. (Ingarden 1979, p. 129)
The temporal point of view is dislocated and moves along with the progressive
event—the temporal perspective is proximal and the event is dynamic. The scene is
portrayed at such a small temporal distance that we almost “become eyewitnesses
to what is ‘just’ happening” (ibid., p. 130). Herein lies, I believe, the answer to
the question of how literature can make us feel as if we are witnessing the events
portrayed; it is all a matter of temporal presence: our actual temporal perspective
on the represented events becomes more proximal, i.e. more proximal to our present
now. Given that temporal perspective indeed changes, as described by Ingarden, this
is a real effect.
Often the more important events will be told from a proximal temporal perspec-
tive and the less important things will be told from a more distal perspective, i.e.,
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background information: thereby the phenomena of temporal perspective become
part of a text’s semiotic structure—and all sense-making tools can be played with
to create different effects. But to Ingarden, and my present investigation, it is more
important what the changes in temporal perspective do to the presentation of the
literary work of art during reading. The interchanging in the course of a literary
work of art of the different temporal perspectives creates, according to Ingarden, a
foreground-background structure:
Only then does the portrayed world acquire plasticity and a certain three-dimensionality as
a result of the intermittent emergence into the foreground and recession into the background
of various events. (Ibid., p. 128, my italics)
The changing temporal perspectives can literally give the experience of literary
artworks a temporal depth. With a proximal temporal perspective, the represented
events come to the foreground, and with a distal temporal perspective the rep-
resented events retire into the background. If Ingarden is correct about temporal
perspectives creating a foreground-background structure in time, it seems it must
be the temporal perspectives rather than, for instance, the spatial aspects that yield
the perception-like experience of literary artworks. Here, I say ‘perception-like.’
I will make the claim even stronger in saying: if temporal perspectives create a
foreground-background structure, it means that we can temporally perceive literary
artworks. Instead of figures appearing in a dimensionless murky space, they appear
in temporal dimensions—to the linearity of time, temporal perspective contributes
not only width but also depth.
Perception is minimally defined as a figure-ground organization: a figure stands
out in relation to a background. A figure is not the same as foreground. A figure
is ‘foregrounded’ in relation to a background, yet the foreground in, for example,
a painting is not in itself a figure. The closest proximal perspective occurs in
combination with a dynamic event, which is unbounded. A figure is something
bounded that stands out on a background. If the distance between the point of
view and the event is too small, no figure stands out—like looking at a Monet too
close up. When events are portrayed as dynamic, the point of view is inseparable
from the event—it moves along with it. Only when events are experienced from a
located point of view can the figure be anchored. The temporal point of view can be
considered a ground and the event can be considered a figure; hence, this temporal
figure-ground structure exists only in reading. The change in temporal perspective
can change the figure-ground organization of events and hence our perception of
events.
In linguistics, temporal aspects have also been thought to create a foreground-
background structure in discourse (Joos 1964; Weinrich 1964/1973; Hopper 1979;
Fleischman 1990/2011), but there the foreground is defined as a figure, and, hence,
elicited by the perfect (bounded) aspect as opposed to the imperfect (unbounded)
aspect (Fleischmann 1990, p. 24). That is the difference between the concept of
figure-ground in linguistics and foreground-background in the phenomenology of
Ingarden. In Ingarden, unboundedness creates more proximity; the figure is an
intermediary state between foreground and background.
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In cognitive linguistics, Leonard Talmy (2000) has investigated figure-ground
structures in language, albeit in spatial terms and not in connection with temporal
aspect. He has, though, investigated the effect of boundedness and unboundedness
on (spatial) perspective. According to Talmy’s general thesis, grammatical elements
structure lexical elements, and they can reconceptualize lexical elements by intro-
ducing a shift in their content. He has an example of a (lexically) bounded event
being (grammatically) unbounded. The bounded event is to climb a ladder (Talmy
2000, p. 61). It can be restructured as an unbounded event by saying, “She kept
climbing higher and higher up the fire ladder” (ibid., p. 62).
Here a cognitive operation of magnification, or adoption of a proximal perspective,
would seem to have taken place. By this operation, a perspective point is established from
which the existence of any exterior bounds falls outside of view or attention. (Ibid., p. 62)
According to Talmy, unboundedness creates proximity—whereas making an
event punctual, i.e., through reduction (e.g., she climbed the ladder at exactly
midday), creates a distal spatial perspective. So just like in Ingarden, there is
a relation between unboundedness and proximity. Talmy’s category of ‘state of
boundedness’ includes: point, boundedness, and unboundedness, which correspond
to static localized ‘one,’ static localized ‘many-in-one,’ and dynamic localized
‘one-by-one,’ respectively—but his is defined as a spatial category which alters
the spatial perspective. Besides, his description cannot account for the effect of
the unboundedness in the first example from Conrad (“He saw himself saving
people from sinking ships, cutting away masts in a hurricane, swimming through
a surf with a line”), which, according to Ingarden, creates a distal perspective.7
Talmy does not consider the temporal unbounding of an event because he only
studies spatial boundedness. For example, ‘She always climbed the ladder at exactly
midday’ enhances the temporal distance to the event and makes the temporal
perspective more distal. This is a different operation in that it concerns temporal
boundedness, not spatial boundedness. Apart from the correspondence between
spatial organization in perception and language, my hypothesis is that when we
concretize a literary work in acts of reading, we can actually temporally perceive
the represented events.
In narratology, Genette has three categories relating to the temporal relation
between story time and discourse time (cf. defined according to the ‘fiction’ of
Erzählzeit): order, duration, and frequency. Order concerns tense; the latter two
concern aspect and are more similar to Ingarden’s temporal perspective. Duration
concerns speed and thus the relation between summing-up (many-in-one) and
succession (one-by-one). Frequency concerns the relation between punctual events
7This is due to the iterative. Talmy (2000) refers the iterative to a completely different operation
called ‘pattern of distribution,’ where the iterative is defined as having a “multiplex” pattern of
distribution, which is unrelated to perspective (p. 63f). Traditional grammatical aspect is explained
by his two spatial categories of boundedness and distribution.
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(one) and iterative events (one-in-many). But Genette only focuses on the logic of
narratives and, thus, disregards the effect on the reader’s (temporal) perspective,
which means that incongruent temporal relations between story and discourse are
considered as merely logical inconsistencies. Given my hypothesis of temporal
perception, logical inconsistencies can be described as having an aesthetic effect
in the presentation—similar to how ‘logical inconsistencies’ in paintings (when
there is no clear distinction between foreground and background) can have aesthetic
effects. One such inconsistency is what he calls the pseudo-iterative. As a test case
for the relevance of my hypothesis.
5 Temporal Conflict in the Reading Experience: The
Example of the Pseudo-Iterative
Genette mainly uses examples from Marcel Proust. But one thing he cannot account
for with his narratological system is Proust’s use of the iterative aspect. Iterativity
belongs to Genette’s category of ‘frequency.’ There are four possible types of
frequency relations
1. Narrating once what happened once
2. Narrating n times what happened n times
3. Narrating n times what happened once
4. Narrating one time (at one time) what happened n times
The iterative corresponds to No. 4, an example could be: ‘For a long time, I went
to bed early,” which sums up many repetitive occurrences in one. The iterative is not
to be understood as a singular event representing similar events by way of example,
but as several similar events summed up into one, i.e., a general description. In
classical narratives, Genette says:
Iterative sections are almost always functionally subordinate to singulative scenes, for
which the iterative sections provide a sort of informative frame or background (Genette
1983, p. 116f, my italics)
Genette’s use of the term ‘background’ is here to be understood in an informa-
tional sense—that the iterative functions as a sort of description. Nonetheless, the
equivalence between phenomenological background and semiotic background is,
while not surprising, worth noticing. But along came Modernism, e.g., Flaubert. In
French, the imperfect tense is, among other things, used for repeated action, and
Marcel Proust especially admired Flaubert’s use of imparfait, what Proust calls
Flaubert’s “éternel imparfait” (Proust 1920, p. 8). The éternel imparfait not only
renders the speech of his characters (often in free indirect discourse), but their whole
life (ibid.). What touches Proust the most about Flaubert’s style is that it gives a
masterful impression of time (ibid., p. 17). Proust finds in Flaubert a solution to his
own ‘modest attempts’ (j’y retrouve l’aboutissement des modestes recherches que
j’ai faites). The new aspect on things and bodies is literally a new temporal aspect,
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which creates a (temporal) distance to the objects portrayed.8 Proust himself uses
the iterative aspect even more extensively and rigorously. Proust narrates what used
to happen, regularly and ritually. According to Genette, Proust is intoxicated with
the iterative (Genette 1983, p. 123). Proust, like Flaubert, uses the iterative in a way
that “liberates the iterative from its functional dependence,” it no longer serves as an
informative background; instead, the iterative passages take on “a wholly unusual
fullness and autonomy” (ibid., p. 117). Proust’s portrayal of scenes is marked by a
special pseudo-iterative aspect:
the very characteristic presence of what I will call the pseudo-iterative—that is, scenes
presented, particularly by their wording in the imperfect, as iterative, whereas their richness
and precision of detail ensure that no reader can seriously believe they occur and reoccur in
that manner, several times, without any variation. (Ibid., p. 121)
The aspect is iterative, but the content of the scenes, the detailedness, makes
it implausible that they reoccur exactly like that; it is logically inconsistent that
any real repeated occurrence would have no variation, hence Genette calls it a
pseudo-iterative.9 Genette’s definition is based on the logic, or lack thereof, of
the represented world, the story. In view of the representation, the insistence on
the identical re-occurrence becomes almost comical—like when we are told after
a long monologue in Cervantes’ “The Jealous Extremaduran” that it was spoken
“not once but a hundred times” (ibid., p. 122). But in view of the presentation,
the use of the pseudo-iterative has a very interesting aesthetic effect. And since
8Let us have Proust express it with images: “[ : : : ] donc cet imparfait, si nouveau dans la littérature,
change entièrement l’aspect des choses et des êtres, come font une lampe qu’on a déplacée,
l’arrivée dans une maison nouvelle, l’ancienne si elle est presque vide et qu’on est en plein
déménagement.” (Proust 1920, p. 8) Flaubert’s new use of the imparfait entirely changes the aspect
of things and beings, like a lamp that has been replaced, arriving at a new home or being in the
middle of moving out of the old. Familiar things suddenly seem strange; they are defamiliarized.
9An example would be the long conversation between Aunt Léonie and Françoise every Sunday at
Combray, here is an extract:
—Francoise, imaginez-vous que Mme Goupil est passée plus d’un
quart d’heure en retard pour aller chercher sa soeur; pour peu
qu’elle s’attarde sur son chemin cela ne me surprendrait point
qu’elle arrive apres I’élévation.
—Hé il n’y aurait rien d’étonnant, répondait Francoise.
—Francoise, vous seriez venue cinq minutes plus tot, vous auriez
vu passer Mme Imbert qui tenait des asperges deux fois grosses
comme celles de la mere Callot : : :
—Il n’y aurait rien d’étonnant qu’elles viennent de chez M. le
Cure, disait Francoise.
—Ah! je vous crois bien, ma pauvre Francoise, répondait ma
tante en haussant les epaules.
(Quoted from Houston 1962, p. 39). Houston was the first to point out the existence of the
pseudo-iterative—or rather, the strange temporal patterns in Proust.
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the pseudo-iterative aspect was first used by Flaubert that is where I will turn to
find some interesting literary examples of the pseudo-iterative, or what I will call,
instead, examples of temporal conflict.
5.1 Flaubert’s Éternel Imparfait
Prominent examples of the pseudo-iterative in Flaubert are, according to Genette,
the narration of Emma’s life in the convent, her life at Tostes before and after the
ball, and her Thursdays at Rouen with Léon (I: ch. 6, 7, 9; III: ch. 5). Here is how
her Thursday meetings with her lover Léon are described:
C’était le jeudi. Elle se levait, et elle s’habillait silencieusement pour ne point réveiller
Charles [ : : : ] Par peur d’être vue, elle ne prenait pas ordinairement le chemin le plus court.
Elle s’engouffrait dans les ruelles sombres, et elle arrivait tout en sueur vers le bas de la
rue Nationale, près de la fontaine qui est là. C’est le quartier du théâtre, des estaminets et
des filles. Souvent une charrette passait près d’elle, portant quelque décor qui tremblait.
Des garçons en tablier versaient du sable sur les dalles, entre des arbustes verts. On sentait
l’absinthe, le cigare et les huîtres. Elle tournait une rue; elle le reconnaissait à sa chevelure
frisée qui s’échappait de son chapeau. Léon, sur le trottoir, continuait à marcher. Elle le
suivait jusqu’à l’hôtel; il montait, il ouvrait la porte, il entrait : : : Quelle étreinte!
(Flaubert 2011: Loc 4819 of 6588) [She went on Thursdays. She got up and dressed silently,
in order not to awaken Charles [ : : : ] For fear of being seen, she did not usually take the most
direct road. She plunged into dark alleys, and, all perspiring, reached the bottom of the Rue
Nationale, near the fountain that stands there. It is the quarter for theatres, public-houses,
and whores. Often a cart would pass near her, bearing some shaking scenery. Waiters in
aprons were sprinkling sand on the flagstones between green shrubs. It all smelt of absinthe,
cigars, and oysters. She turned down a street; she recognized him by his curling hair that
escaped from beneath his hat. Léon walked along the pavement. She followed him to the
hotel. He went up, opened the door, entered : : : What an embrace!]
Despite the iterative, specified by the use of imparfait, the meticulous description
of every part of her tour with a wealth of details, like the specific sights and
smells, makes the description tend toward the foreground, especially the last
sentence, where all of the subparts of going up to the hotel room are described,
yet still in the iterative: “il montait, il ouvrait la porte, il entrait : : : Quelle
étreinte!” (go up, open door, enter). The event is both iterative (one-in-many) and
dynamic (one-by-one). The iterative temporally unbounds the events, which creates
a distal perspective. But the detailed description of all the dependent parts makes
the event dynamic and thereby temporally unbounds the point of view—which
creates a proximal perspective. There are actually two possibilities for creating a
simultaneous foreground-background structure: by bounding both event and point
of view (summing-up or punctual) or by unbounding both event and point of view.
The pseudo-iterative, which seems somewhat logically inconsistent in terms of
the representation (the story), makes the presentation stand out more clearly—the
distance to the represented event is enhanced, we are not just immersed in the
dynamic action.
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This type of description continues almost throughout the chapter (i.e., for many
pages). Here is how they spend their time in the hotel room:
Comme ils aimaient cette bonne chambre pleine de gaieté, malgré sa splendeur un peu
fanée! Ils retrouvaient toujours les meubles à leur place, et parfois des épingles à cheveux
qu’elle avait oubliées, l’autre jeudi, sous le socle de la pendule. Ils déjeunaient au coin du
feu, sur un petit guéridon incrusté de palissandre. Emma découpait, lui mettait les morceaux
dans son assiette en débitant toutes sortes de chatteries; et elle riait d’un rire sonore et
libertin quand la mousse du vin de Champagne débordait du verre léger sur les bagues
de ses doigts. Ils étaient si complètement perdus en la possession d’eux-mêmes, qu’ils
se croyaient là dans leur maison particulière, et devant y vivre jusqu’à la mort, comme
deux éternels jeunes époux. Ils disaient notre chambre, notre tapis, nos fauteuils, même
elle disait mes pantoufles, un cadeau de Léon, une fantaisie qu’elle avait eue. C’étaient des
pantoufles en satin rose, bordées de cygne. Quand elle s’asseyait sur ses genoux, sa jambe,
alors trop courte, pendait en l’air; et la mignarde chaussure, qui n’avait pas de quartier,
tenait seulement par les orteils à son pied nu.
(Flaubert 2011: 4877 of 6588) [How they loved that dear room, so full of gaiety, despite its
rather faded splendor! They always found the furniture in the same place, and sometimes
hairpins, that she had forgotten the Thursday before, under the pedestal of the clock. They
lunched by the fireside on a little round table, inlaid with rosewood. Emma carved, put bits
on his plate with all sorts of coquettish ways, and she laughed with a sonorous and libertine
laugh when the froth of the champagne ran over from the glass to the rings on her fingers.
They were so completely lost in the possession of each other that they thought themselves in
their own house, and that they would live there till death, like two spouses eternally young.
They said ‘our room,’ ‘our carpet,’ she even said ‘my slippers,’ a gift of Leon’s, a whim
she had had. They were pink satin, bordered with swansdown. When she sat on his knees,
her leg, then too short, hung in the air, and the dainty shoe, that had no back to it, was held
only by the toes to her bare foot.]
In this scene, the iterative almost makes the dynamic events static. They play
together like “two spouses eternally young,” the room becomes a state; Flaubert’s
éternel imparfait becomes very literal here. Yet, the distance created by the iterative
is not simply, like so often in Proust, an aesthetic distance—it also augments the
Flaubertian irony. Emma’s coquettish ways, the little game of ‘our room’ and ‘our
carpet,’ the dream of living there till death: all are easily recognizable clichés. The
distal temporal perspective prevents the reader from becoming completely absorbed
in their doings. It creates an ironic distance—similar to the ironic distance in the
famous bed scene (cf. part one), where Charles is gazing at Emma’s eyes—eternally
at a distance.
In the next chapter, however, things change. One Thursday, as Léon is on his
way to meet Emma, he is held up by the apothecary Homais. Emma waits in vain
for him at the hotel. She is devastated by his absence. At a late hour, Léon manages
to escape from Homais and runs up and explains the situation to Emma. She is first
passionately angry, then offended, and then tears fill her eyes. Léon promises to
come back “immediately” after he has said goodbye to Homais, waiting downstairs
(ignorant of the situation upstairs). But, alas, Léon does not manage to escape from
the apothecary—when he finally returns to the room, Emma is gone. They have
missed a Thursday. The iterative pattern is broken. But as they resume their meeting,
the iterative is also resumed—yet a radical change has happened:
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Ils en vinrent à parler plus souvent de choses indifférentes à leur amour; et dans les lettres
qu’Emma lui envoyait, il était question de fleurs, de vers, de la lune et des étoiles, ressources
naïves d’une passion affaiblie, qui essayait de s’aviver à tous les secours extérieurs.
Elle se promettait continuellement, pour son prochain voyage, une félicité profonde;
puis elle s’avouait ne rien sentir d’extraordinaire. Cette déception s’effaçait vite sous un
espoir nouveau, et Emma revenait à lui plus enflammée, plus avide. Elle se déshabillait
brutalement, arrachant le lacet mince de son corset qui sifflait autour de ses hanches comme
une couleuvre qui glisse. Elle allait sur la pointe de ses pieds nus regarder encore une fois
si la porte était fermée, puis elle faisait d’un seul geste tomber ensemble tous ses vêtements;
et pâle, sans parler, sérieuse, elle s’abattait contre sa poitrine, avec un long frisson.
Cependant il y avait sur ce front couvert de gouttes froides, sur ces lèvres balbutiantes, dans
ces prunelles égarées, dans l’étreinte de ces bras, quelque chose d’extrême, de vague et de
lugubre, qui semblait à Léon se glisser entre eux subtilement, comme pour les séparer. (my
emphasis)
(Flaubert 2011: 5228 of 6588) [They gradually came to talking more frequently of matters
outside their love, and in the letters that Emma wrote him she spoke of flowers, verses,
the moon and the stars, naïve resources of a waning passion striving to keep itself alive by
all external aids. She was constantly promising herself a profound happiness on her next
trip; then she confessed to herself that she felt nothing extraordinary. This disappointment
quickly gave way to a new hope, and Emma returned to him more inflamed, more avid. She
undressed brutally, tearing off the thin laces of her corset that they would whistle round her
hips like a gliding snake. She went on tiptoe, barefooted, to see once more that the door was
closed, then with one movement, she would let all her clothes fall at once; and pale, without
speaking, serious, she would throw herself against his breast with a long shudder.
Yet there was upon that brow covered with cold drops, on those quivering lips, in those wild
eyes, in the strain of those arms, something vague and dreary that seemed to Leon to glide
between them subtly as if to separate them.] (my emphasis)
I have emphasized the strip scene because it is dense with action: the parts
of the action are described one-by-one; the action verbs naturally correspond to
the successive structure, like Lessing would have it; and the fictive motion of the
thin laces whistling (sifflait) round her hips like a snake, the telic lexical aspect of
undressing (se déshabillait).10 Even if part of a striptease is prolonging the end,
the specification “brutally” removes the teasing—the adverbial markers of punctual
aspect like “one movement” and “at once” enhance the dynamics of the event. From
a logical point of view, if she strips like this every time they are together—brutally
tearing off the thin laces of the corset—she must be spending a lot of money on
buying new corsets. In other words, the precise re-occurrence of this event seems
implausible.
From a phenomenological perspective, on the other hand, the temporal point of
view is here unbounded and moves along with the depicted events. It creates a prox-
imal temporal perspective. But the constant use of the iterative temporally unbounds
the event, creating a distance. The temporal conflict between the represented events
and the present perspective is enhanced, but because both event and point of
view are temporally unbounded, the perspective is very unstable—even more so
10I am grateful to Peer Bundgaard for pointing this out to me.
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than when a foreground-background structures is established by boundedness. The
configuration is rare as it regards memory—if we cannot locate an event, we cannot
go back in time and move along with its dependent parts. We must first grasp the
events as bounded, independent wholes. But here, the figure-ground structure is
created through unboundedness, which is especially salient in this example, where
the dynamics of the events threaten the discontinuous organization. The eternal
striptease elicits a non-generic temporal perspective (in the sense of, e.g., Jean
Petitot 2004). It is difficult to stay with this unstable presentation because of the
non-genericity of the temporal perspective: the result is a temporal conflict in the
reading experience.
The dynamic proximity makes the schematized aspects appear very clearly
and vividly—it is hard to refrain from filling-out. But only by staying with the
concretized presentation can the “something vague and dreary” that seems “to glide
between them subtly as if to separate them” be perceived. The aesthetic distance
crucially depends upon the filling-out being held back—because, as Julian Barnes
has said of the Flaubertian aesthetics: who needs to burst into fulfillment’s desolate
attic?
5.2 Kafka’s Eternal Present
So far, it might seem as if the pseudo-iterative is something particular to the French
language, where the iterative aspect is marked by the imperfect tense. Therefore, I
will give a comparable example from German. The examples are from one of Franz
Kafka’s last unfinished short stories “The Burrow” (Der Bau). The text has been
the object of much discussion due to its deviant use of aspect (e.g., Henel 1972;
Cohn 1978; Coetzee 1981). The story is written in first-person present tense. In
German, temporal aspect is not specified morphologically but only through the use
of adverbs. The present tense oscillates between the general and the particular, i.e.,
between generic present and progressive present. It is not stabilized as the imparfait,
but the aspectual ambiguity of the present tense makes it suitable for temporal
experimentation. Kafka has often experimented with the present tense, e.g., in
“The Country Doctor,” which has led to the title of Dorrit Cohn’s famous essay
“Kafka’s Eternal Present” (1968). In connection to “The Burrow,” Cohn quotes
from one of Kafka’s aphorisms: “The decisive moment of human development is
everlasting” (Cohn 1978, p. 197). J. M. Coetzee (1981) cites the same aphorism, and
describes the awareness of time presented therein as eschatological, not historical;
it recognizes no continuity:
There is only the present, which is always present, separated from Ingarden’s ‘dead past’
by a moment of rupture, the entscheidende Augenblick. Hence the paradox that history is
over in ‘a second’ while the present moment is ‘everlasting.’ (p. 578)
How Kafka depicts the eternal present in “The Burrow” Cohn and Coetzee
disagree upon. The discussion revolves around whether or not there occurs a change
in temporal aspect midway through the narrative.
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An undefined mole-like creature at work constructing a huge labyrinthine burrow
tells the story. The narrative moves continuously along, but midway through, there
is a gap in narrative time (discourse): “I must have slept for a long time,” it says.
When the creature awakens, there is a change: a whistling sound can be heard. The
sound is low at first, but, at least in the creature’s consciousness, it becomes louder.
The creature is convinced it is some enemy coming for him—another creature in a
rivaling burrow, trying to dig his way through. The creature’s paranoia more and
more consumes him as he tries to take precaution against the unknown enemy
(i.e., the whistling sound) by endlessly reconstructing the burrow. The story ends
unresolved midsentence. According to Cohn, the first part before the whistling
sound is narrated in a durative-iterative present, while the part after the arrival of the
sound is in a punctual present. Coetzee disagrees, and I side with Coetzee. Here is
an example from after the sound—the creature is working at moving his provisions
to the inner circles:
Die erste Arbeit ist sehr mühselig und nimmt mich ganz in Anspruch: die Beute nämlich
durch die engen und schwachwandigen Gänge des Labyrinths zu bringen. Ich drücke
vorwärts mit allen Kräften und es geht auch, aber mir viel zu langsam; um es zu
beschleunigen, reiße ich einen Teil der Fleischmassen zurück und dränge mich über sie
hinweg, durch sie hindurch, nun habe ich bloß einen Teil vor mir, nun ist es leichter, ihn
vorwärts zu bringen, aber ich bin derart mitten darin in der Fülle des Fleisches hier in
den engen Gängen, durch die es mir, selbst wenn ich allein bin, nicht immer leicht wird
durchzukommen, daß ich recht gut in meinen eigenen Vorräten ersticken könnte, manchmal
kann ich mich schon nur durch Fressen und Trinken vor ihrem Andrang bewahren.
[The first part of the work is very laborious and requires all my energy: that is, bringing
my catch through the labyrinth’s narrow passages with their thin walls. I push forward with
all my might, and this works, but much too slowly for me; to speed things up, I tear back
a piece of this mass of meat and push my way over the top, right through it, now I have
only some of it in front of me, now it is easier to advance, but I am so deep in the midst of
this profusion of meat here, in these narrow passages, through which it is not always easy
to pass even by myself, that I could easily suffocate in my own provisions, there are times
when I can save myself from the crush of plenty only by feeding and drinking.] (p. 176, my
emphasis)
At first, it seems like a punctual present, but I have emphasized when a change
begins to happen. As the creature is caught in the midst of the meat, an iterative
aspect begins to take over. The event is clearly temporally unbounded in the final
sentence, through the “manchmal” (there are times, often), yet the telic actions
of feeding and drinking, which the fear of suffocation implies are performed in a
rather desperate fashion, pulls the description back towards the punctual. Since the
aspect is not clearly marked in German, the presentation oscillates rapidly between
a proximal and a distal perspective. Caught in the midst of the profusion of meat
in a narrow underground passage, trying to avoid suffocation by repeatedly eating
and drinking a way through—at least that presents a good image of a state of eternal
desperation.
But in some of the passages from before the sound, a punctual aspect breaks
into the iterative passages. The creature is, as always in the story, restructuring
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the burrow; here it is that his sleeping quarters are moved toward the inner circles
(where, at this particular point in the story, his provisions are also located):
Dann pflegen besonders friedliche Zeiten zu kommen, in denen ich meine Schlafplätze
langsam, allmählich von den äußeren Kreisen nach innen verlege, immer tiefer in die
Gerüche tauche, bis ich es nicht mehr ertrage und eines Nachts auf den Burgplatz stürze,
mächtig unter den Vorräten aufräume und bis zur vollständigen Selbstbetäubung mit dem
Besten, was ich liebe, mich fülle. Glückliche, aber gefährliche Zeiten; wer sie auszunützen
verstünde, könnte mich leicht, ohne sich zu gefährden, vernichten.
[Then, especially peaceful times tend to follow, when I slowly and gradually shift my
sleeping quarters from the outer circles toward the inner, diving ever more deeply into the
smells, until I can’t stand it any longer and on a given night, storm into the castle court and
wreck havoc among the provisions, gorging myself to the point of total torpor on the greatest
delicacies I have. Happy but perilous times; anyone who knew how to take advantage of
them could easily annihilate me at no danger to himself.] (p. 167, my emphasis)
I have emphasized the punctual ‘interruption’ of the iterative present. Again, it
is the telicity of the ‘storming into,’ ‘wrecking havoc,’ ‘gorging to the point of total
torpor,’ that elicits the punctual, but the framing of the event as first ‘peaceful times,’
then ‘happy but perilous times’ marks the event as iterative, reoccurring within a
given period of time. In contrast to the French examples, the shifting aspects do
not create a structured foreground—background; rather, the temporal perspective is
constantly oscillating between foreground and background. The temporal location
of both events and point of view is ever-changingly unbounded, and the reader is lost
in the labyrinth. Where the example from Flaubert created a non-generic temporal
perspective, the examples from Kafka create a bi-stable temporal perspective. If
Flaubert (and Proust) elicits a perspective comparable to the perfect symmetry of
this view on the Necker cube—which is very non-generic in memory—Kafka’s
text, instead, elicits a temporal perspective comparable to the bi-stable Necker cube
(Fig. 2).
The square is ambiguous. Either it is seen ‘from above’ (focus on the base of
the cube) or ‘from below’ (focus on the left side of the cube). In Kafka’s text,
Fig. 2 The non-generic, symmetrical Necker cube (left); the bi-stable Necker cube (right)
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the temporal perspective is similarly ambiguous. There is a constant (or at least a
potential constant) shift in perspective. Thus, the everlasting decisive moment is
present to the reader—as an eternal Kafkaesque catastrophe.
6 Conclusion
In this article, I have discussed the specificities of the presentation of literary
artworks, which I argued were to be compared with acts of remembering—in that
memory re-presents events in time that are no longer present in space. I also,
rather gently, suggested that both reading and remembering depend on temporal
perception, in that both processes entail the perception of a temporal distance
to the re- or represented events. I thus discussed the phenomenon of temporal
perspective—first in relation to memory, then in relation to literature. In literature,
the reader’s temporal perspective creates a foreground-background structure, which
gives a certain three-dimensionality to the experience of literary artworks. I briefly
mentioned the similarities to and differences from linguistic and narrative theories
of perspective and foreground-background (and figure-ground). I then went on to
discuss the phenomenon that Genette has dubbed the pseudo-iterative. I wanted to
show how the idea of the reader’s temporal perspective could better account for
the phenomenological and, hence, also aesthetic effects of the pseudo-iterative—
something Genette’s logical handling of the phenomenon could not. I argued that in
Flaubert’s case (especially in the last example), the pseudo-iterative elicited a non-
generic perspective; in Kafka’s case, a bi-stable perspective. In both cases, these
perspectives enhanced the temporal conflict between presentation and representa-
tion in reading.
By way of conclusion on my analysis of the pseudo-iterative in terms of temporal
perspective, I will venture the claim that, like spatial perspective in pictorial art
was discovered in the Renaissance, perhaps temporal perspective in literature was
‘discovered’ in Modernism. And like spatial perspective was played with for
interesting effects (e.g., Piero della Francesca and Nicolas Poussin, cf. Petitot 2009),
so can temporal perspective be played with for presentational effects.
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The Aesthetic Experience with Visual Art
“At First Glance”
Paul J. Locher
Abstract The aesthetic experience with visual art has been shown to occur in
two stages. Upon initial exposure to a painting, a viewer spontaneously generates
a global impression, or gist, of the work. One’s first impression of a painting
includes a sense of its pictorial content, overall structural organization and style,
meaningfulness, and an affective reaction to it. When gist information in a painting
is deemed to have sufficient interest to an observer, the second stage of aesthetic
processing ensues. This consists of directed focal exploration of the image to expand
knowledge concerning the work’s compositional features and organization to satisfy
cognitive curiosity and to develop aesthetic appreciation of a composition. This
chapter presents an overview of research findings that have identified the types
of visual properties and semantically related information that collectively lead to
the activation of what is labeled a “painting gist” by this author. In addition, the
influence of the painting gist response on the focal exploration of paintings is
discussed.
Keywords Painting gist • Tachistoscopic presentation • Perceptual processing •
Eye-tracking • Masking technique • Pictorial content • Pictorial style
The casual visitor in a museum gallery typically glances at a painting and based on
a first impression, or gist, of it either almost immediately moves on to another work
or stops to spend some time with it. The gist of a painting generated by individuals
unsophisticated in the visual arts is the product of the pictorial content of a work
interacting with the viewer’s personal context that reflects his or her cognitive
structures (see Locher 2012). Art professionals initially respond to paintings in
a similar fashion. For example, Batinic (2005) asked a large sample of specialist
visitors at the international art fair Art de Cologne to rate the individual factors that
influence their decision to buy a work of art. They gave most weight to their first
impression of a work, followed closely by its style and price. Similarly, Grasset
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(1998) claims that the process of evaluating the authenticity of a painting suspected
of being a fake or forgery by museum and art professionals frequently begins with
the emotional experience given by their first visual encounter with it. This reaction
leaves an unforgettable impression that leads to a good part of further investigation.
In the case of art professionals, this “gut feeling” is inspired by a frequent and
repeated acquaintance with truly authentic works of the same period, region, and
the artist to whom the work is attributed.
1 The Painting Gist
Unsophisticated and art-trained individuals’ initial aesthetic reaction to an artwork,
just as with many types of non-aesthetic everyday stimuli, constitutes the first stage
of a broad two-stage processing framework of aesthetic experience with visual
art proposed by this author and his colleagues (e.g., Locher et al. 2007; Locher
2012; Nodine et al. 1993).1 According to this framework, which is based on early
psychological theories of aesthetics (see Eysenck 1942), a viewer spontaneously
generates a global impression, or gist, of a painting with the first glance at it.
As described in detail below, one’s first impression includes a sense of a work’s
pictorial content, its global structural organization, its semantic meaning, and
an initial affective response to it. These pictorial qualities and meanings simply
“happen” in immediate awareness of the retinal image of an artwork and, as such,
the gist is pre-cognitive in nature. Its content appears as a single, indivisible entity
(Koenderink 2011, p. 320). When gist information in a painting is deemed by a
viewer to have sufficient interest, the second phase of aesthetic processing ensues.
This consists of directed focal exploration of the image to build up knowledge about
interesting pictorial features and their structural organization to satisfy cognitive
curiosity and to develop aesthetic appreciation of the painting. The purpose of this
chapter is to provide an overview of experimental investigations conducted from
early to recent times that describe the types of visual properties and semantically
related information that collectively contribute to the activation of what I call the
“painting gist.” To limit the content of the chapter and to maximize credibility and
persuasiveness of the findings to scholars and professionals in the field of aesthetics,
only studies that used reproductions of paintings as stimuli are reported to the
exclusion of stimuli used in investigations of other forms of gist responses such
as scene gist (e.g., Castelhano and Henderson 2008; Grossberg and Huang 2009).
The methodology used to investigate the painting gist is common to all of the
experiments described in this review. First, each study utilized flash (tachistoscopic)
presentations of paintings with at least one duration less than approximately 250 ms.
1More detailed multicomponent information processing models of an aesthetic experience with art
have been proposed by Leder et al. (2004) and Tinio (2013) and with design objects (Locher et al.
2010).
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This duration reflects the perceptually relevant average pause time of single eye
fixations for adults performing a search-type task. Thus, its use ensures that subjects
generated a gist response based on the emergence of information available in just
the initial fixation on a painting. In addition, a masking pattern presented after (or
before and after) the stimulus is typically utilized with tachistoscopic presentations
to terminate the visual image at the offset of the physical stimulus. This is done so
that the time available for extracting information from a given glimpse is carefully
controlled and a viewer’s performance reflects perceptual processing efficiency
during specific intervals of constant durations.2 Whether masking was used or not
is mentioned for each study described throughout the review.
As stated, the purpose of the studies described in this chapter was to identify the
various types of compositional elements that can be discriminated by a viewer in
a snapshot of time. Locher (2014) points out that the composition of a painting is
built up of three types or levels of image content and organization. At the lowest
level of stimulation are the individual first-order pictorial elements of painting
such as line, color, texture, and shape. Although the influence of primary features
on the perception and aesthetic evaluation of paintings has received considerable
experimental scrutiny (see Locher [2014] for a review of this literature), researchers
have not studied the contribution of first-order properties to the emergence of the
painting gist. This is likely due in part to the assumption that a gist response occurs
in response to the overall structural organization of a painting. The findings of a
study conducted by Locher et al. (2007) (described later in detail) revealed that, in
fact, less than 2 % of viewers’ verbal reactions to paintings seen for just 100 ms
were of the first-order type (e.g., reference made to the line orientations or colors
in a composition). Holistic second-order pictorial features such as complexity,
symmetry, balance, perspective, and depicted motion are created by structural
coupling of first-order pictorial elements. At the next highest level of organization,
pictorial attributes are arranged by the artist into a composition that conveys through
its content and artistic style the conceptual and semantic meaning of a work. All
of the studies included in this review have utilized second and third levels of
compositional components to investigate the activation of painting gist.
2 Early Investigations of the Nature of the Painting Gist
We turn now to a review of the research designed to provide information concerning
the nature of the painting gist response. One of the earliest experimental studies in
this field was performed by Brighouse in 1939. His art stimuli were 10 paintings
2For a detailed description of the mechanisms underlying visual masking, the reader is directed
to Bachmann et al.’s (2007) overview of the contents of a collection of articles (published as a
Special Edition of the journal Psychological Research) that shed light on the mechanisms of visual
masking models and how our perceptions are created in a snapshot of time.
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representing a variety of subject matter and styles (e.g., paintings by Braque, El
Greco, Renoir, Hokusai) and his participants included children from 8 to 14 years
of age, adults with no training in the visual arts, and graduate students and faculty
in a Department of Graphics and Plastic arts. Participants were shown each painting
tachistoscopically for 260 ms without masking and when the image disappeared
they told the experimenter everything that went through their minds based on the
snapshot view of the painting. This procedure was repeated until a participant felt
that he/she had acquired all the information and hedonic value the picture had
to offer and that nothing new would occur with further exposures. Additionally,
participants were instructed to tell the experimenter as soon as they knew they
liked or disliked the picture. After viewing each painting tachistoscopically, it was
projected normally and participants had unlimited time to rate how much they liked
it now that they could examine it carefully.
Brighouse (1939) reported that 78 % of all children and untrained adults gave
verbal expressions of pleasure, indifference or dislike following the first exposure
of a painting and they made practically no corrections to their initial expressions
of affect after viewing paintings for a median number of 7.2 and 11.4 exposures
per stimulus, respectively. Taken together, these findings provide evidence for the
existence of a painting gist. Not surprisingly, trained viewers were more hesitant
to express an affective reaction and only 55 % did so by the fifth exposure. They
also exhibited a greater tendency to modify their expressed feelings about a work
following unlimited viewing than did children and untrained adults. According
to Brighouse, this observation suggests that the immediate hedonic tone of the
paintings was minimized in importance by the trained individuals in favor of a
much more carefully weighed judgment based on careful examination of an artwork.
An interesting and very forward thinking aspect of this research is that Brighouse
used the contents of participants’ verbal reports following each flash presentation to
suggest the temporal course of the perceptual processes underlying viewing of the
artworks, much in the same way as a viewer’s fixations pattern is used in later eye-
movement studies to infer the same type of information (e.g., Locher et al. 2007).
Eysenck (1942) repeated Brighouse’s (1939) study with three subjects chosen
for their “aesthetic abilities.” They were shown 50 uncolored paintings by a variety
of artists for 40 ms followed by “a way to eliminate after-images” (p. 350). Subjects
indicated their liking for each artwork following its brief presentation and again
after a second unlimited viewing time exposure. The correlations between the two
sets of ratings for the three participants were .82, .80, and .76 resulting in Eysenck’s
conclusion that “the appreciation of the aesthetic worth of a picture may be as
instantaneous as the perception of the picture itself ” (p. 351, italics in the original).
In another early study also published in 1939, Kellett (Procedure 1) used
reproductions of 14 paintings representing different artistic styles as stimuli (e.g.,
works by Marin, Rousseau, Vermeer, van Gogh). Each painting was paired with
a photograph either taken at the actual scene of an artist’s work or a studio set-
up photograph that attempted to simulate an artist’s painting. According to Kellett,
this procedure resulted in pairs of relatively well unified (the photographs) and less
successfully unified (the paintings) stimulus objects. Participants were high school
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students classified as either “untrained” or “trained” in the arts, the later defined
as having had at least two semesters of high school art training. Participants saw
a painting and its paired photograph each randomly displayed one after the other
for 240 ms unmasked after which they indicated the version they preferred. This
procedure was repeated with presentation time set at 30 s. The key finding for the
present discussion was that preferences for images given in the short time condition
were highly stable, with stability being 72 % or higher for 11 of the 14 stimulus
pairs. There was a negligible difference in preferences expressed by the untrained
and trained groups.
The studies described in this section were “devised to throw light upon the
functioning of the aesthetic elements and principles in a painting” (Brighouse 1939,
p. 1). These investigations were conducted before the notion of a gist response
was introduced in the literature. Nevertheless, as will become apparent throughout
this review, the research questions addressed in these early studies as well as their
findings are fundamentally the same as those of more recent investigations designed
to clarify which components of aesthetic stimuli contribute to the painting gist.
3 Pre-attentive Detection of the Collative Properties
of Paintings
Cupchik and Berlyne (1979) conducted two tachistoscopic experiments to deter-
mine how soon during the processing of an aesthetic stimulus one could discern
collative properties. According to Berlyne (1971), a collative stimulus property
is created by spontaneous organization of stimulus elements into a perceptual
configuration. They require an observer to note, put together, and sum up charac-
teristics of several elements that are present simultaneously in a painting (p. 69)
(i.e., structural properties at the second- and highest-order organization levels).
Cupchik and Berlyne note that, prior to the publication of their study, almost all
investigations on aesthetic perception permitted participants multiple glances at
the stimulus. Their study was designed to address this limitation in the field. In
a first experiment, they presented university students untrained in the visual arts
with 12 color reproductions of paintings by such artists as Rubens, Renoir, Poussin,
and Pissarro. (Twelve patterns consisting of black and white squares were also
used as stimuli but these are not discussed here.) The paintings represented high
and low levels of the collative properties uncertainty, arousal, and hedonic tone.
Factor analytic and multidimensional scaling techniques were applied to a large
collection of artworks in a previous study by the researchers to generate these classes
of stimulus materials. For example, high and low levels of the uncertainty factor
consisted of paintings’ ratings on a number of scales such as disorderly-orderly and
simple-complex.
Each stimulus was evaluated following one of three exposure durations—50, 500,
and 5,000 ms—that were preceded and followed by a blank white exposure field.
Following each stimulus presentation, the painting was rated on five scales: simple-
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complex; disorderly-orderly; displeasing-pleasing; drowsy-alert and relaxed-tense.
Results revealed that participants were able to discriminate complexity levels after
only a single fixation. They also rated high arousal paintings less pleasing and more
tension producing after a single glance. In addition, the 50 ms exposure condition
evoked greater alertness and attention than did the 500 ms and 5,000 ms duration
conditions.
In a second experiment, Cupchik and Berlyne (1979) investigated the moti-
vational implications of the existence of a gist response on the second-stage of
perceptual processing using a binary preference method. The same 12 art stimuli
used in Experiment 1 (and also the patterns) were presented in pairs at one of the
three presentation durations utilized in the first experiment, with each pair including
one painting that was high and the other low on the uncertainty, arousal, and hedonic
tone properties. Participants were instructed to choose which painting of the pair
they would like to see again for an additional 5 s (a pseudo-task not performed)
and to rate how much they preferred it over the painting not selected (this measure
did not prove fruitful and no results were presented). The findings revealed that for
exploratory choice, participants were particularly sensitive to the paintings’ order or
unity after only a single 50 ms glance at the pairs. On the other hand, participants
chose high uncertainty paintings for a second look in the multiple fixation conditions
(500 and 5,000 ms), but no clear preference was observed following the 50 ms
presentation despite the findings that participants were able to discriminate between
low and high uncertainty images in Experiment 1. Cupchik and Berlyne suggest
that this finding supports the principle of “perceptual curiosity” (Berlyne 1963),
a motive to reduce stimulus uncertainty through expanded exploration of stimulus
details (i.e., stage 2 processing of an aesthetic experience).
As mentioned, Cupchik and Berlyne’s (1979) study addressed an important
limitation of almost all investigations on the nature of aesthetic perception prior to
theirs, namely, that participants were permitted multiple glances at the art stimuli.
The researchers demonstrated viewers’ ability to discriminate certain collative
properties of artworks such as complexity and order after a single initial glance at it.
Their findings provide early support for the view that the initial phase of perception
of an aesthetic stimulus begins with the holistic processing of a painting’s structural
and organizational properties.
4 Pictorial Balance—A Perceptual Primitive
It is a widely held belief among artists and art theoreticians from ancient times to
the present that balance is the primary design principle for unifying the structural
elements of a painting into a cohesive narrative statement (see Arnheim 1988).
Furthermore, it is believed in the art world that the induced organizational structure
resulting from the balanced configuration of a painting is established spontaneously
by vision and that it determines how the elements of a composition are visually
scanned, interpreted, and evaluated (Locher 2003). Moreover, this view suggests
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that the global percept is a “structural primitive” that can be detected rapidly and
effortlessly in a painting by all viewers regardless of their background in the visual
arts. A tachistoscopic study by Locher and Nagy (1996) support these assertions.
Their stimuli consisted of black-and-white more- and less-balanced version(s) of the
same painting taken from plates of the Maitland Graves Design Judgment Test and
the Meier Art Tests I and II measures. The images were balanced about either the
horizontal or vertical axis. In addition, color reproductions of highly perceptually
balanced paintings by renowned artists (e.g., Kandinsky, Sargent, Vuillard) and
an experimentally altered less balanced version of each original were employed.
The full set of images included a range of stylistic characteristics along the
dimensions linear-painterly and abstract-representational. Participants, who either
held a Bachelor’s degree in Art History or had no formal training in the visual arts,
rated for balance each of the 40 stimuli following a 100 ms presentation (pre- and
post-exposure mask employed) and then again following a 5,000 ms exposure.
Results revealed that both art naïve and sophisticated individuals discriminated
the less balanced from the more balanced versions of the black-and-white paintings
with a single 100 ms glance at each. They were also able to discern the large
differences in balance among the original paintings in the single fixation condition,
but were not able to reliably detect the subtle differences in balance between the
balanced and slightly less balanced versions of each painting. Locher and Nagy’s
(1996) findings provide empirical support for the view held by artists and art
theoreticians that pictorial balance is an holistic second-order pictorial feature that
simply “happens” in the immediate awareness of an artwork.
5 Meaningfulness Is Detectable in Painting Gist Perception
Meaning, according to Martindale’s (1991) theory of cognitive hedonics, is a
prime determinant of aesthetic appreciation that overshadows other properties.
Meaningfulness is a function of the following variables: the personal relevance
of a painting’s components to a viewer, the prototypicality of its components,
and how clear and naturalistic they are. Moore et al. (2006) conducted a study
demonstrating the influence of meaning over other determinants of preference at the
pre-attentive stage of processing. They showed artistically-naïve university students
32 paintings ranging in style and period that were previously rated for perceived
unity, meaningfulness, and preference. Participants saw each artwork for 10, 100, or
1,000 ms (without backward masking), after which they rated them for preference,
unity, and variety.
With respect to participants’ preference ratings, eight paintings were consis-
tently among the most preferred at any exposure duration and these had been
previously rated very high on meaningfulness. These works consist of many
everyday naturalistic scenes with clear details, such as Seurat’s Bathers in the Seine.
Similarly, eight paintings were consistently among the least preferred regardless of
exposure duration. These paintings are composed of unfamiliar or unnatural scenes
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lacking much meaning to the participants, such as David’s Oath of Horatic. Two
other classes of paintings were observed with respect to preference, works whose
ratings increased and those whose ratings decreased across presentation conditions
(examples are Turner’s Venice, The Piazetta from the Water and Kneller’s Triumph
of Marlborough, respectively). In the first case, the researchers speculate that the
increase in preference was due to the fact that the content of the paintings became
more vivid and clear as details became more visible with increased processing
time. Preference ratings decreased across the second group of paintings because
their details, which seem simple and orderly when the structure was shown briefly,
appeared unfamiliar and/or incongruous (i.e., less meaningful) with longer visual
access to the image. Moore et al.’s (2006) findings demonstrate that, consistent with
Martindale’s theory of cognitive hedonics, meaningfulness is a prime determinate
of a painting’s composition and its effect is already evident at the pre-attentive stage
of an aesthetic experience.
6 Categorization of a Painting’s Content and Style
at First Glance
At the highest level of compositional organization, there are content and structural
properties of paintings that contribute to an aesthetic experience that differentiate
artworks from every day visual displays (see Locher 2014; Tinio 2013). Composi-
tional content (or subject matter) and artistic style are two such art-related properties
of a painting that contribute to an observer’s interpretation, aesthetic judgment,
and emotions regarding it. With respect to content, schools of art tend to differ in
their choice of motifs such as those found in landscapes, still-life, and portraits. In
addition to affectively neutral subject matter, the contents of some artworks depict
positive or negative themes designed to evoke positive or negative emotions (see,
e.g., Silvia 2012). And viewers’ appraisals of comprehensibility and novelty of
the contents of a painting along the realism and abstractionism continuum also
contribute to their interest in it. Artistic style of a painting refers to the visual
appearance of a painting as it relates to other artworks produced in a certain period
of time and place by a certain group of artists (i.e., schools of art). Finally, it must
be mentioned that a viewer’s level of aesthetic fluency, defined by Smith and Smith
(2006) as the knowledge base that one has about art and aspects of life closely
related to art, will determine the extent to which a painting’s style and content
influence one’s aesthetic experience with it.
Bachmann and Vipper (1983) conducted a study to compare the dynamics of per-
ceiving paintings belonging to different well-known schools of art during the initial
stage of processing. They sought to determine which pictorial dimensions were best
able to differentiate paintings from among the various schools of art and also the
dimensions best able to differentiate the perception of one painting from others.
University students with no special education in art rated slides of paintings belong-
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ing to six different schools of art—Expressionism, Naivism, Realism, Surrealism,
Abstractionism, and Impressionism—on six semantic differential scales: simple-
complex, involved-indifferent, regular-chaotic, passive-active, vigorous-impotent,
and precise-vague. Four different exposure durations were employed—1, 20, 100,
or 500 ms (no mention is made that a mask was used). Bachmann and Vipper
found that even at the shortest exposure times (1 ms and 20 ms), participants
were able to significantly differentiate between schools of art on the scales simple-
complex, involved-indifferent, regular-chaotic and precise-vague, with the most
divergent schools being Realism versus Abstractionism. Additionally, they observed
that, with increased exposure durations, the ratings pooled across schools became
increasingly “simple,” “regular,” “precise,” “involved,” “vigorous,” and “passive.”
The researchers interpreted these findings as demonstrating a gradual reduction of
visual uncertainty over time concerning the pictorial information available in the
painting gist.
Findings reported thus far demonstrate that people are able to detect the
content and style properties of a painting on the basis of information contained
in the gist. Augustin and her colleagues (Augustin et al. 2008, 2011) conducted
a series of experiments designed to investigate the time course and interrelations
between content- and style-related processing and to determine when and how
these characteristics of paintings play a role during the initial perception of an
artwork. Stimuli in their first investigation (Augustin et al. 2008) consisted of 48
reproductions of paintings representing four contents, or motifs, (house, flowers,
tree/trees, and a male person) fully crossed with four individual artist styles (works
by the artists Cézanne, Chagall, Kirchner, and van Gogh). Art-naïve university
students gave similarity ratings for pairs of pictures seen for 10, 50, 200, 3,000 ms
or for unlimited viewing time. A delayed masking procedure followed the 10 ms
and 50 ms presentations.
Findings revealed that the effects of content were already present at 10 ms and
remained relatively stable over all presentation durations whereas the influence
of style on perception was only apparent at 50 ms and gained in relevance with
increasing presentation times. Augustin et al. (2008) argue that this difference likely
reflects the fact that processing of a painting’s content is related to general processes
of everyday object perception which is presumed to rely on rapid, automatic feed-
forward mechanisms. Style on the other hand constitutes a complex combination
of different feature aspects of an artwork learned through experience that are art-
specific and therefore exert some top-down influence on processing. Related to this
explanation is the important finding that participants who were untrained in the
visual arts differentiated between different artist styles on the basis of information
available in the initial fixation on an artwork. Augustin et al. suggest that this
sensitivity to artistic styles may reflect the fact that judgments of similarity of
the pairs of artworks did not require explicit classification of styles but could be
accomplished using lower-level compositional features such as the use of color,
brush strokes, etc.
Following up on their earlier findings, Augustin et al. (2011) investigated the
temporal relation between style- and content-related processing of representational
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art to identify when sufficient information is available to allow accurate classifica-
tion of paintings. The two levels of artistic style employed consisted of paintings by
two artists with very distinctive individual styles, the German Expressionist Ernst-
Ludwig Kirchner and the Post-Impressionist Paul Cézanne. The content dimension
was defined by the two motifs person(s) and landscapes. Participants were university
students with no background in the visual arts. (See Augustin et al. for details
concerning the EEG data acquisition procedures and the two dependent measures
employed viz., the N200 effect and the Lateralized Readiness Potential.) Consistent
with their previous findings, results of this study demonstrate that the processing
of a painting’s artistic style follows processing of its content, with style-related
information becoming available to an observer at approximately 40–94 ms later
than its content-related information.
7 Perceptual Processing of Paintings Across the Time-Course
of an Aesthetic Experience
This review concludes with results of two experiments the author conducted with
colleagues (Locher et al. 2007) that were designed to examine the relationship
between the pictorial content of paintings and the way individuals visually grasp,
explore and think about this information across the time course of an aesthetic
experience. Their first experiment investigated the types of perceptual and cognitive
content that constitutes a gist reaction to paintings. Stimuli consisted of repro-
ductions of eight paintings by renowned artists representing a variety of artistic
styles (e.g., Klee’s Temple Gardens; Giotto’s The Epiphany; Vermeer’s Young
Woman with a Water Pitcher). In Experiment 1, university students who reported
no formal education or studio training in the visual arts saw a 100 ms presentation
(with masking) of each artwork after which they wrote five impressions and/or
descriptions of the painting they would tell someone who had never seen the artwork
in order to describe it to him or her. Following this task, the paintings were presented
randomly a second time for 100 ms (masked) and participants rated the pleasingness
of each artwork.
Subjects’ written reactions to each painting were categorized on a qualitative
continuum of response ranging from the perception of a painting’s individual phys-
ical characteristics and single pictorial elements, to holistic second-order pictorial
features or two or more elements described as a perceptual unit, to more holistic
properties of the compositions including their realism, beauty, expressiveness,
style and form. Locher et al. (2007) found that almost all (98 %) first reactions
to the paintings reflected attention to a group of pictorial elements perceived as
a compositional unit (e.g., There is a large wave with breaking foam) to the
expressiveness of the whole composition (e.g., The colors are dreary and dull and
make me feel sad) or to its artistic style (e.g., The painting is very abstract) and
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form (e.g., It has geometrical shapes arranged together into three panels). The same
distribution of response types was observed for the four additional reactions reported
by participants for each artwork.
In Locher et al.’s (2007) second experiment, art naïve participants had unlimited
viewing time to look at each artwork before assigning it a pleasingness rating.
Their eye fixation patterns (or scanpaths) were recorded across the time course of
viewing and a concurrent verbalization procedure was employed simultaneously
requiring participants to talk out loud about their reactions to and thoughts about
each painting. For purposes of analyses of the eye-movement and verbal response
data collected, the aesthetic episode was divided into three time periods: the first
3 s of exploration, from 3 to 7 s, to the end of exploration which lasted 30 s
on average. These time periods reflect the observation that participants began to
speak about a composition between 2 and 3 s after it appeared on the screen and
within 7 s of viewing all initial verbal statements were completed. As was found
for limited viewing time in Experiment 1, the vast majority (88 %) of participants’
initial verbal reactions to the artworks after the first 2 s of viewing were of the
holistic types described above and their frequency rose to 98 % by the time all
initial verbalizations were complete. The fact that the average fixation duration in
this study was approximately 300 ms indicates that first impressions of the artworks
were based on the information obtained with at most the first few glances at a
painting. Furthermore, evidence that a global impression of an artwork was in fact
achieved at first glance in this study is provided by the finding that the pleasingness
ratings for the limited and unlimited viewing time experiments correlated .73. This
similarity also suggests that the evaluation of an artwork’s pleasingness can be made
rapidly as is typically observed in the viewing behaviors of museum goers and art
professionals mentioned above. Not surprisingly, however, the average pleasingness
ratings for Experiments 2 were higher than those obtained in the first experiment—
6.17 versus 4.59, respectively (on a 10-point scale)—demonstrating that pictorial
information acquired by scanning the images added significantly to the paintings’
pleasingness.
To study the continuity of processing across the two stages of the aesthetic
experience, the percent coverage of the pictorial field (the area of the useful visual
field based on a viewer’s scanpath) and the fixation pattern for each participant
for each painting were “quantified” separately for each time period (see Locher et
al. 2007 for a detailed description of these analyses and findings). It was observed
that by the start of participants’ initial verbal reaction to a painting at 2 s, they had
already explored approximately one-fourth of the pictorial field (27 % on average
across the stimulus set). This coverage included direct foveal attention on 67 % of
all trials to at least two of the three key pictorial elements identified by art experts to
be the principal contributors to the structural organization and semantic meaning
of a painting. This suggests that major pictorial qualities of the paintings were
flagged in the activated painting gist and likely contributed to the initial holistic
impressions of the artwork. Moreover, they are consistent with Rasche and Koch’s
(2002) explanation of the nature of a gist response and the neural mechanisms
responsible for it. According to them, gist recognition is based only on a subset
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of an image’s information. They argue that a gist response to an image is generated
from the visual input that is concurrently spread across many cortical areas that then
communicate with each other rapidly in a distributive manner, quite likely with the
help of “interpretation.”
Participants significantly increased coverage of the paintings to an average of
38 % by the time they had completed their first comments about an artwork and
their attention to key structural features increased to 85 % for the stimulus set.
Coverage, on the other hand, increased to only 46 % at the time participants
gave their pleasingness rating and stopped looking at a painting; this is a non-
significant increase over coverage at 8 s. Furthermore, the specific area of coverage
and pictorial elements of a given painting which drew attention remained basically
unchanged after the initial processing stage during which a global impression of
a work was established. It is important to note, however, that once scanning is
in progress, it is difficult to separate pictorial features that were targeted with the
initial gaze for later attention from properties newly identified for checking with
focal search. Global analysis occurs simultaneously with focal analysis during each
fixation directed at an image. It discovers new elements, now in a bottom-up top-
down processing fashion, that require analysis (Võ and Henderson 2010). This is
reflected in Locher et al.’s (2007) finding that participants given unlimited time to
examine the paintings in the second experiment assigned them significantly higher
pleasingness ratings on average than did viewers restricted to a single 100 ms gaze
at each work in the first experiment.
8 Conclusions
This review described the types of pictorial information in paintings that collectively
contribute to the rapid activation of a painting gist and the changes in its perception
as more and different types of pictorial information become available during the
initial fixation on a painting. It has been found that one’s first impression of a
painting includes a sense of its pictorial content, overall structural organization
and style, meaningfulness, and an affective reaction to it. Much additional research
of the types described herein is needed to identify other painting-based global
properties that lead to the activation of painting gist. In addition, the extensive
literature that has identified stimulus information leading to activation of scene
gist is relevant to the study of painting gist because scenes (natural and man-
made) and representational and abstract art share many perceptual properties that
adhere to the same basic statistical regularities (e.g., Graham and Field 2007). Not
only can scene gist literature provide insights into the activation of painting gist,
but many such investigations could also be readily adapted for future research
into the nature of painting gist. For example, researchers have investigated the
influence of color on the perception of scene gist (Castelhano and Henderson 2008),
scene coherence based on its content, actors, and objects (Dobel et al. 2007), and
the contribution of the surrounding scene on the recognition of facial expressions
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(Righart and de Gelder 2008). To reiterate, much additional research is needed
before a scientifically comprehensive model of how an impression of a painting
simply happens in immediate awareness and how and to what extent a painting gist
influences perceptual processing during an aesthetic experience with art.
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What Is a Surface? In the Real World? And
Pictures?
John M. Kennedy and Marta Wnuczko
Abstract Pictures are surfaces. Pictures show surfaces. But what is a theory of
perception of surfaces? Surface perception was first mentioned in experimental
psychology by Metzger in Ganzfeld experiments in the 1930s. However, it was
first offered as a serious concept in perception theory by Alhazen in his Book of
Optics (1039). Remarkably, almost no contemporary theory of perception uses the
term. To rectify this omission, a theory of surfaces is presented here, suggesting
that surface perception occurs in all 8 of vision’s modes. Optical information for
the shapes of surfaces is given by the ratio of azimuth to elevation. Flat surfaces
such as the ground have a linear to quadratic ratio. Increase the ratio and hills are
seen. Decrease it and the surrounds are a bowl. Sudden changes in the ratio indicate
changes in slant. Sudden changes in density without changes in the ratio indicate
a drop-off. The theory is applied to outline drawing and to the fact that pictures
provide two surfaces (the real surface of the picture and the depicted surface).
The two surfaces create illusions. Features on the picture surface cannot be seen
correctly. The importance of surface perception is its breadth of application. The
theory of surface perception shows why pictures taken on the Moon or Mars are as
intelligible as terrestrial pictures. Surfaces allow control of action even for creatures
that fly in 3D without touching surfaces during flight, such as bats and birds.
Keywords Picture • Surface • Perception • Perspective • Outline
Often, artworks are representational pictures, surfaces that we experience as show-
ing other surfaces. They give us twofold experiences—two things simultaneously in
one space: firstly, surfaces standing before us, and, secondly, represented surfaces
(Wollheim 2003). To understand the double experience, we need to understand
perception of surfaces, both the real ones and the represented ones. Here, we argue
linear perspective, characterized by foreshortening, allows us to experience real
surfaces (in touch as well as in vision), and representational pictures use perspective
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to depict surfaces with great fidelity. Surfaces and perspective are the key to an
argument for realism. We show that there is plenty of information around us in the
natural world for surfaces and the cornucopia allows us to experience our earthly
environment accurately. Far afield, the same goes even for the Moon and Mars—
anywhere we are not immersed in fog! The experience we get from representational
pictures is based on this abundant information for surfaces. However, we confess,
our principled defense of realism is highly circumscribed. We need to get around
two issues. We will acknowledge here that, in practice, our experience of highly-
foreshortened real surfaces has niggling errors. Further, we will admit here that the
crosstalk behind the twofold experiences given by representational artwork is the
source of illusions.
1 Real Surfaces
We begin our introduction to the experience of surface perception with a definition
of a surface, a list of the shapes of surfaces, and their possible and impossible
combinations.
Physically, a real surface is a continuous, polarized plane. About continuous
surfaces, Gauss (1825/1827) wrote: “A curved surface is said to possess continuous
curvature at one of its points A, if the directions of all the straight lines drawn
from A to points of the surface at an infinitely small distance from A are deflected
infinitely little from one and the same plane passing through A” (point 3, p. 6).
Basically, a surface is two volumes meeting. The change from one volume to the
other occurs at the surface. For vision, the volumes are usually filled by a solid
or liquid and air. The surface is the boundary of the solid or liquid, which reflects
light to the observer’s vantage point. The surface is polarized, that is, different on
its two sides, and usually only the solid or liquid reflects light, not the boundary
of the air. The exception is a mirage, in which air layers reflect light. Another kind
of surface is that of a cloud, defined by the boundary between air with many drops
of water (a vapor) reflecting light, and air with few drops. In a sense, vision is
rather superficial, since when we look around, almost always what we see is just
the surfaces of opaque things of the world and little more. Skin. Clothes. Bedding.
Rugs. Curtains. Furniture coverings. The floor. In the open air, the ground. Brick
fronts. Bark. Plumage. Fur. Stone. Roadways. Mountainsides. Evidently, to explain
how see the world veridically (Runeson 1988; Pizlo 2008), accounts of accurate
perception need a theory of surfaces (Pomerantz 2013).
Color, brightness, and texture appear to cover broad continuous expanses of
surfaces. In nature, the expanses are rarely uniform. In marbling, reflectance varies
continuously but within a distinct range. Gibson (1979) called this stochastic
variation—continuously changing values within limits. Marbling’s streaks, skeins,
and knots are like a rope’s strands, since few if any extend over the full expanse
of the surface. Overlaps of the strands support stable perception of the surface’s
continuity.
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A cautionary note should be sounded about the sky. It has many of the color,
brightness, and texture properties of a surface, without actually being one. The sky
is air thinning. It appears to be behind anything else we see above the horizon, but
otherwise its depth is indefinite. There is apparent space between us and the sky’s
color, by day, and its blackness, at night (Sachs 2010).
Immersed in mist—perhaps atop Elsinore in a Hamlet movie—there might be
no surface whatsoever that we see or feel. In swimming underwater, we can feel
suspended in a place with no surfaces to see other than our body’s. At night, we see
stars as dots and we cannot tell that they have flaming surfaces—but here on Earth,
flames have visible surfaces.
Light gives vision lots of information about surfaces. Falling on a surface, a
cast shadow tells us about bumps and hollows, especially if it moves across them.
Sweeping across the ground, the direction of its boundary’s curves elevates with
every bump and declines with every hollow, changing the shapes of curves the
shadow projects to the eye. Attached shadows are just as useful, curving on the
far side of hills from the apparent direction of illumination, and the near side of
hollows. What looked like bumps can switch to hollows if the apparent direction of
illumination reverses.
Highlights are bright optic images, appearing as if behind the surfaces bearing
them. They can make the surfaces look like mirrors, transparent, or matte and
grainy. Highlights are evidence for a bright surface, reflected by another surface.
Like transparency, a highlight allows us to see more than one surface in a given
direction. Like shadows, as highlights move they reveal the surface’s bumps and
hollows (Norman et al. 2004). A bump’s highlight moves with us if we move to one
side, and a bowl’s highlight moves in the opposite direction. Shadows stretched over
a surface and highlights tracking over a surface are particularly good at showing that
a surface is continuous, rather than a net. A spider’s web covered in dew sparkles
along its threads and the brightness stays on the strands as we move—revealing
there is nothing between them.
Information useful for perception of the shape of smooth surfaces follows from
the simple fact that at any point on a surface, there are always two curves. Unlike
an edge, which has one well-defined curve, a surface slants away from any point
on it with at least two values of slant. An edge is a limit to a surface. It end-
stops the surface. The edge can be represented by a single equation, but a surface
needs at least two. Choose any direction and it will have a specific tangent—and the
orthogonal direction will, too.
From any point on a surface, there is a curve in each direction. A ball has two
convex curves at any point; the inside of a sphere, two concave curves (Alberti
1436). At the top of a steep slope, a wide ski-run may fall away steeply—a convex
curve—but in the orthogonal direction the terrain may be a flat, mogul-free, broad,
smooth hill all the way down to the lodge. Conversely, a runner at the bottom of a
path may see it as a concave curve, gently slanted directly ahead and yet flat, wide,
and with good footing in the opposite orientation. At the top of a saddle or mountain
pass, the downhill slope is a convex curve, and the hills on either side are concave.
Convex and convex, concave and concave, and convex and concave are the possible
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curves of surfaces at a point, wrote Gauss (1825/1827, p. 14). A channel or rut is
flat in one direction and concave in the other, and a ridge is flat in one direction and
convex in the other (Wagemans et al. 2013). In these terms, a plain is flat and flat.
Flat, convex, and concave are parts of a single mathematic function. So we can
imagine that what vision considers a smooth surface fits a formula for a curve in all
possible directions from a point. The possible curves have different rates of change
of slant—linear, quadratic, or exponential functions, for example. Two directions
that provide the most different rates of change suffice for describing many smooth
surfaces. The surface between the two different rates can be taken as gradually
changing from one to the other.
The slant of a surface can be specified optically by the surface’s texture. The
texture on the surface projects optic texture to the observer’s vantage point; the
units of texture foreshorten their optic projections the more they slant away from
the vantage point. To the extent that vision experiences the optic texture gradient
due to foreshortening as due to surface slant, it detects surface shape. In practice,
failure to grasp the exact relationship between foreshortening and surface shape
results in underestimation of a stretch of ground far off on a ground plain. We can
check our impression by walking over to it. Underestimation also results in pictured
scenes with highly foreshortened surfaces looking shallower than they should. We
can correct this error by walking into a real scene matching the pictured one, of
course!
Bumpy hills and potatoes do not offer monotonic, gradual changes in surface
relief. To see each bump requires detection of its distinctive optic texture gradient.
For gnarly surfaces such as clumpy roots, vision may take individual clumps as
texture elements forming an ensemble (Cant and Xu 2012) in addition to being a
continuous surface. To detect the overall shape of the ensemble, vision may take
high spots on the clumps, where the gradients of optic change at the vantage point
fall to zero, corresponding to one side of a hill giving way to the other, and fit them
with two orthogonal curves. Like a root ball, the result would perhaps be generally
convex and at times even equally curved in orthogonal directions like a sphere.
Taken as a group, separate elements can trigger perceived curves. Grouping the
elements of a surface in a texture detection task occurs at different scales, tiny and
large (Diggiss and Kingdom 2013). For example, a circle is seen if 8 dots on a flat
surface are evenly spaced around a common center. At a tiny scale, the individual
dots are seen and, at a large scale, their grouping is seen. Curiously, eight dots can
form an octagon, but they generally group as a circle, enjoying what Gestalt theory
called good continuation (Wertheimer 1922). Perhaps the key fact is that perception
can fit a function, octagon or circle, but favors one.
Besides tiny dots, the texture on a surface is often mottled or spotty, much like
ink-blots or amoeba. To see the shape of the mottled surface, vision can fit shape
functions to centers of blots and clumps. The distribution of the centers can be
detected even if the eccentricities of the spots make for an “anisotropic” texture
(Knill 2003), meaning the spots protrude in a biased way, i.e., generally longer in
some direction, as if smeared horizontally or diagonally. However, Knill (2003)
finds some anisotropy affects the apparent slant of surfaces. Hence, we can make
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flat surfaces look other than they are. The result is a picture, a surface deliberately
and artificially modified to present an optic pattern reserved by nature for another.
Using centers of spots and ignoring biases or smears, vision can fit shape
formulae to tiny and large anisotropic elements, including ensembles of ants, leaves,
bushes, or hills, since shape functions are independent of the scale of a target. The
shape taken by a flock of birds or a school of fish can be seen in this fashion. Each
element can be taken as a dot in an ensemble, and the dots can trigger a function in
the visual brain that makes us see the convex shape of the flock or school.
It is worth stressing that the reason dots of a group can be discrete but a
continuous shape is implied is because the dots trigger a shape function. A function
such as y D ax2 C bx C c is continuous. This is useful in nature, since an extended
object such as a log is often partly hidden by branches, and the curve fitting to
samples of the log allows occluded parts to be implied. An equation for a curve is
continuous even if the samples that triggered it in perception are not. Likewise, the
shape function triggered by the curved front of an object implies how the curvature
continues onto the back.
A circle made of dots is seen as having invisible joins between the visible dots
because curve fitting provides continuous perceptual Gestalts, in Koffka (1935)
terms. Wertheimer (1922) described Gestalts as having unity and simplicity, but
they might best be described as results of curve fitting. Gestalt theory noted that a
set of dots could be grouped by vision as a line. To understand representational art, it
should be noted that the dotted line could also be taken as depicting the continuous
edge of a surface. The equation for a line, triggered by dots, allows the perceiver to
have an experience of the edge of a continuous surface. Also, regions on either side
of the dotted line can be experienced as surfaces limited by the edge. Both regions
depict surfaces if the edge is seen as a convex or concave corner. Only one region
depicts a surface if the line is an occluding edge of, say, a flat knife blade against
an empty background, or the occluding boundary at the rounded brow of a hill set
against the sky.
2 Information and Surfaces
If only two tangents and curves are needed for vision to get information about
large, smooth, continuous surfaces, this is not a difficult task in principle. Consider
a vantage point above a ground plain stretching to the horizon, pictured in linear
perspective (Fig. 1). Square tiles stretch from underfoot to the horizon. Above the
horizon, the sky is depicted as empty; apart from being further than the horizon,
there is no information for its depth. Below the horizon, there are many features
providing information for distance in linear perspective. For a given task, skill in
perception largely comes down to picking out the key information in reliefs such as
the one depicted in Fig. 1 (Ooi et al. 2006).
Information is present if A only occurs when B occurs. A specifies B. For an
optic pattern A such as the one generated by Fig. 1 to be informative about a
94 J.M. Kennedy and M. Wnuczko
Fig. 1 Target circles on
square tiles on the ground.
The L joining the centers of
three targets has an azimuth
line joining two targets
horizontally and a
near-vertical line governed by
the elevations of two targets
terrain B, it must occur within a set of constraints. For vision, the constraints are
given mostly by the ecological environment in which sight evolved. The constraints
make the problem of induction (Goodman 1968; Vickers 2012) irrelevant because,
within the constraints, key light patterns can only occur when a particular distal
source is present: a giraffe optic pattern only arising when a real giraffe is present.
A fingerprint, say, or a DNA sample has this kind of specificity. The giraffe, the
fingerprint, and the DNA sample are distinctive. Each picks out an individual.
Besides being distinctive, for an optic pattern to be useful in practice, it must lie
within the bounds of visual sensitivity. Underfoot, tiles on a ground are highly
distinguishable, but ones farther away are highly foreshortened, with the result that
their differences are hard to make out.
The accuracy of perception of the ground depends on what features are available
and selected (Ooi and He 2006, 2007). Miss or omit the key information and
observers can, of course only guess and infer using past experience (Berkeley
1709/1732) and biases (Wu et al. 2007). For example, to avoid guesswork, observers
should zero in on information for distance in Fig. 1 present in the elevation of the
tiles, that is, their proximity to the horizon. The further tiles are higher in elevation
and closer to the horizon.
The visual angles subtended by far-off tiles in Fig. 1 are tiny. For a 2 m tall adult
observer, standing and looking at a piazza like that depicted in Fig. 1, after 40 m,
any 1 m square tile on the ground subtends less than .1ı and it becomes difficult to
tell the differences between angles subtended by the tile that starts at 41 m, the one
at 42 m, etc. In shorter distances, the angular differences are much larger and more
useful to perception. The 1 m tile starting at 5 m subtends 3.4ı, and the one starting
at 6 m subtends 2.5ı. The difference of .9ı is plainly visible—the moon subtends
.5ı.
Consider the angles 3.4ı and 2.5ı subtended by sides of tiles running into depth
to be “elevation-extent” angles. They diminish with distance along the ground. The
orthogonal dimension to elevation provides “azimuth angles,” also diminishing with
distance. Elevation is measured from vertically below the observer to a point on a
target, such as a corner of a square tile depicted in Fig. 1 (as in Juricevic et al.
2009) or the center of a circular target in Fig. 1 (as in Wnuczko and Kennedy 2014).
Sometimes called “altitude,” elevation with respect to the horizon is 90ı and zero
is “straight down.” More generally, zero is the direction from the vantage point to
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Fig. 2 In the elevation dimension, the angle subtended by the side of an object is governed by
the extent of the tile in the z dimension. In the azimuth, angles are subtended by the width of an
object—its extent in the x dimension. The optical slant of a surface is the angle between the line
from the observer’s vantage point and the surface normal. An optical slant of 90ı means 0ı angular
subtense. At an optical slant of 0ı, sides and widths of squares subtend equal angles
the foot of the normal on a surface of interest. Alberti (1436) called this direction
“centric.” The surface of interest can be the ground, a wall, or a surface at a slant to
the ground. Each surface has its own horizon. The everyday ground and our familiar
horizon is only a special case. For targets on any surface, the further from the foot of
the normal, the higher the target’s elevation. It will approach the surface’s horizon
if it moves further away from the foot. This has implications for vision. Raising the
apparent horizon results in smaller elevations and smaller apparent distances to the
objects (Rand et al. 2011). Lowering the apparent horizon has the opposite effect.
If the near ends of parallel lines on walls are at eye-height and the lines are tilted
downwards, observers underestimate their true eye-height. If elevation is decreased
by viewing through base-up prisms, observers underestimate distance (Ooi et al.
2001) (Fig. 2).
Azimuths are orthogonal to elevations. Let the near side of a square tile on the
ground run left-to-right, that is, let it be in the frontoparallel plane. At the observer’s
vantage point, the azimuth angle subtended by the near side is the angle between the
directions to the side’s left and right corners. As distance along the ground to the
tile increases, the azimuth angle compresses and its elevation rises. The projection
of a square tile on the ground onto a vertical picture surface becomes a trapezium
with converging sides (Fig. 3). A flat circular target lying on the ground and near to
the horizon in Fig. 1 is highly foreshortened and shows as a highly eccentric ellipse
in the figure. The target is at an extreme optical slant, a slant defined by the angle
between the normal of the surface at a point on the target and a line joining the
point to the observer’s vantage point. As optical slant increases, projections to the
observer’s vantage point become compressed and the circles on the ground depicted
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Fig. 3 A square projecting a trapezium, top and bottom sides parallel, symmetrical about the
vertical, with two converging sides
in Fig. 1 project ellipses—the more distant the circle, the more extreme the aspect
ratios. The aspect ratios given by their minor axes divided by their major axes shrink
towards zero.
The vertical axes of the ellipses in Fig. 1, the extents in elevation, would shrink
especially quickly up the page if the figure is redrawn to show targets placed on a
convex curved surface—a hill. They would decrease particularly slowly for targets
on a concave surface—a bowl. Convex and concave surfaces can also be revealed by
target azimuth angles changing more quickly or slowly than is true for a flat plain.
The optic projections from an object’s surrounds on the ground help show its
location, distance, size, and shape. If a target lying on Fig. 1’s piazza projects
an ellipse in the proximal optic array with a specific aspect ratio and elevation,
it is a circle. Any ellipse can be projected by any other ellipse (Pizlo 2008), but
information for it resting on a ground plane, its elevation, and its aspect ratio, taken
together, specify the target’s true shape.
3 The Surface in the History of Perception Science
A surface was clearly and thoughtfully offered as an essential concept in perception
theory by Alhazen (1039) in his Book of Optics. Alhazen noted that if we were
looking through a peephole at a scene in which a pole poked up above a wall it
would be very difficult to tell the distance to the pole. But, he wrote, if the wall was
removed, and now a ground plain stretched towards the pole, it would be obvious
how far the pole stood back from us. The pole’s base would be at a determinate
spot on the ground. The amount of ground towards the pole’s base is a measure
of its distance. Convert “amount of ground” to angle of elevation with respect to a
horizon and Alhazen would be modern.
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Surface perception was first mentioned in experimental psychology in the 1930s
(Koffka 1935; Metzger 1936). Metzger found that we see a space-filling fog if
we are inside a dimly-illuminated sphere—a Ganzfeld (half of a ping pong ball
over an eye is an easy way to produce a Ganzfeld, Hochberg (1964) pointed out).
Metzger’s Ganzfeld was a large sphere, into which the observer could put his head
and shoulders. Metzger observed that if the concave Ganzfeld surrounding the eye
is the right distance away and is lit with enough intensity, the apparent fog lifts
and observer can see the microstructure of the surface. In essence, a surface at a
determinate distance appears. The hollow clear space between the surface and the
observer’s vantage point becomes evident (Sachs 2010). One interpretation of this
demonstration is that vision of most anything precise requires a visible texture. Most
natural surfaces are textured, so visible texture is a major basis for perception of
shapes of surfaces. Texture is more important than shadows and highlights if lighting
on the surface is fairly even. In seeing combinations of surfaces and surface shapes,
it is a major partner with edges of surfaces (Pizlo 2008; Diggiss and Kingdom
2013). Being elementary in perception of the world, texture should have dedicated
resources in the visual brain. Besides marbling, textures are often ensembles of
objects that stick up from surfaces like grass or trees, or that rest on surfaces like
leaves, cows in a field, or masses of downhill skiers careering down a slope. Cant
and Xu (2012) find that anterior and medial aspects of the ventral visual stream are
involved in processing large ensembles of multiple objects lying on a surface (e.g.
cherries on a plate). In fMRI studies, Cant et al. (2009) and Cant and Goodale (2007)
found texture inputs engage specific regions of occipital-temporal cortex different,
say, from those engaged by expanses of color.
Following Metzger, the next important step in theory of surfaces in perception
was taken by Gibson (1950, 1979) in his ground theory of perception. Wu et al.
(2007) wrote that “studies have shown that the ground surface substantially influ-
ences object localization in the intermediate distance range (2–25 m), supporting
the ground theory of space perception advocated by J. J. Gibson” (p. 654). Rand
et al. (2011) wrote, “Gibson suggested that [ : : : ] judged distance is consistent with
the assumption that the target is on the ground plane, [which] has been shown to
play a large role in both relative and absolute distance perception” (p. 426). Gibson
discussed Fig. 4, lines converging up the page and then bending, decreasing their
rate of convergence. In the bottom half of the figure, converging lines depict a
ground surface, while the upper half, where the lines converge up the page at a
slower rate, suggests the ground has turned into a hill. The lower lines depict the
ground as if planks were laid on it. Wu et al. (2007) drew converging lines on a
ground surface and observers overestimated the distance to objects on the ground,
presumably taking the rapid convergence to suggest parallels going into the far
distance. In the Renaissance, this architecture trick was used to increase the apparent
size of corridors. Rand et al. (2011) put targets on stands, raising them in elevation.
If the stands were visible, observers were accurate about the target’s distance. On
invisible stands, observers overestimated the distance, presumably only taking the
target elevation into account.
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Fig. 4 Ground meets hill slope
Gibson (1950, p. 83) wrote about the “Law of the Visual Angle.” According to
this law, the azimuth angle “is the reciprocal of the distance (D)” to a stretch of
ground at a distance. However, in addition, the elevation-extent angle of the stretch
of ground “is proportional to 1/D2.” To study the law for azimuths and its ally
elevation, let us introduce an observer of height H standing on a ground, their feet
at distance D from the near edge of a square tile. How does distance D to a tile
affect the foreshortening evident in Fig. 3? Consider azimuth projections, and then
elevation. The edges of the tile have width W. The angle subtended by W depends
on D and H, the height of the observer’s vantage point. The middle of W is directly
in front of the observer and the normal from the observer hits the middle of W.
Hence tan A D 2 (.5 W / p(H2 C D2)), or simply tan A D 1 / p(H2 C D2), where
“H” is the height of the observer. Because height is a constant, the denominator is
changed by the square root of D squared, so we can further simplify the expression
to tan A  1/D. Hence, in the distance A gets smaller as an inverse function of D—a
linear function.
The angle subtended by the elevation dimension of the tile, “E,” is a difference
between two subtended angles. The first is subtended by the elevation of the near
edge of the tile, “An.” The second is subtended by the elevation of the far edge
of the tile, “Af.” For a distance “D” of the near edge of the tile and a distance
“D C W” for the far edge of the square tile of width “W,” tan E D tan (Af – An),
which can be simplified using the difference formula for tangent to tan E D WH /
(H2 C D2 C DW). Because width and height are constant, we can further simplify
the expression to tan E  1 / D2 if D is larger than H and W. Hence, the angle
subtended by the elevation dimension is an inverse function of distance squared.
Figure 4 has two rates of diminution of azimuth with elevation. If, instead,
the diminution rate increases monotonically and steadily with elevation, Fig. 5
appears—a hill.
If the azimuth diminution rate decreases with elevation, the result is Fig. 6—a
concave surface.
Sudden changes in density of the lines in the figure with elevation are sudden
diminutions of azimuth angles. These indicate a drop-off (Fig. 7).
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Fig. 5 A hill
Fig. 6 A concave surface
Fig. 7 A drop-off, as if at an edge of a stage with a floor beyond the edge
Diminution of azimuth and elevation compresses the quadrilaterals projected by
squares on the ground in Fig. 8a, b, and c. The result is that diagonals in the squares
project as obliques closer and closer to horizontal in Fig. 8a as elevation increases.
The set of obliques in Fig. 8b are shown explicitly converging to a point on the
horizon, showing that they are depicting parallels in the world. A line showing the
receding side of a square tile converges towards the central vanishing point and its
angle of convergence on the picture surface is labeled in the figure.
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4 Perception and Elevation and Azimuth
Perspective is not just a convention. Nor is it purely visual. Elevation and azimuth
are to do with the direction of targets. Direction matters to vision, but it also matters
to touch. Besides looking out for targets, we reach out to targets to pick them up.
Hence, linear perspective is as relevant to touch as it is to vision (Loomis and
Philbeck 2008). It allows blind people to draw pictures showing objects in depth
(Kennedy 2008).
To test the claim that both vision and touch are sensitive to perspective and the
diminution of azimuth and elevation with distance, we arranged a path of targets,
0.5 m to 6.5 m from underfoot, made observers familiar with the targets, blindfolded
them and asked them to point to the targets (Wnuczko and Kennedy 2014). We
measured azimuth and elevation of their pointing arm. The targets were circles,
in two parallel rows, each successive pair 1 m apart. All the participants were
adults. One group viewed the circles before being blindfolded. Another group were
blindfolded and then walked between the targets, touching them with a meter-long
stick while walking past. Then they returned to one end of the path and pointed,
still blindfolded. A third group were blind from early in life. They too explored
the targets with the meter rod. Another rod was attached to the participant’s arm
before pointing, and its position in space was measured as observers pointed to the
targets. For all three groups, as distance to the circles increased, pointing azimuths















Fig. 8 (a) The short obliques are at different angles to the horizontal. However, they converge
and come to a single point on the horizon line. Hence, they are parallels on the ground. (b) On
the picture surface, the obliques are shown converging to a point on the horizon line, explicit
information that they depict parallels on the depicted terrain. (c) On the picture surface, the
erstwhile obliques are depicted by horizontals. The sides of the quadrilaterals converge to points
on the horizon line, revealing that they are parallel on the depicted terrain
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Fig. 8 (continued)
elevation more quadratically. Of interest, there were no significant differences
between the sighted blindfolded-after-viewing, the sighted blindfolded-throughout-
the-procedure, and the blind. Indeed, the blind increased their pointing elevation
from the nearest targets to the further ones by an amount (about 38ı) in-between
those of the blindfolded-during-touching (about 35ı) and the blindfolded-after-
viewing (about 40ı). Changes in azimuth and elevation specify a surface and vision
and touch work along (Loomis and Philbeck 2008).
5 Perception’s Biases and Far Surfaces
Vision is a biological device and can only reflect mathematic certainty rather
approximately. The result is minor biases in the use of the perfect azimuth and
elevation geometry defining optic information. The biases affect nearby ground very
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Fig. 9 Piazza with far tiles shown foreshortened
little, but they grow with distance, as shown by the literature on visual impressions
of depth and size (Bian and Andersen 2011). Let us examine the consequences.
The central dashed line on a motorway is good visual information for the road’s
flatness. The stripes, and the distances between them, are uniform. But a driver
may be forgiven for having an impression that the very distant stripes on the road,
highly foreshortened, look a lot smaller than those nearby. The bicycles painted at
the sides of highways are highly elongated. But a cyclist viewing them from far off
sees them compressed and squat, it is likely, due to their foreshortening. The arrows
on superhighways pointing like > to exits, viewed a kilometer ahead, seem to have
sharp arrowheads, thin points, like highly acute angles, perhaps 5ı. Come close and
the arrowhead, it become obvious, is blunt, its edges forming a very obtuse angle,
perhaps 170ı.
Figure 9 shows a piazza with distant tiles darkened. Often viewers experience
the higher-elevation and apparently-further square tiles as eccentric or brick-shaped
(long axis horizontal). A 1 m square may look to be 1 m by .3 m. But further, asked
to judge the proportions of the higher-elevation Fig. 9 quadrilaterals, the shapes on
the page, which may be about 1 by .1 on the page, observers report them fatter than
they truly are. Observers may say they are 1 by .2, as if biased towards the 1 by .3
forms they appear to depict. The distant tiles look slimmer than true, and the forms
depicting them look fatter. First, let us consider the false eccentricity of the distant
piazza tiles—then, secondly, the forms on the picture surface.
6 Theories of Biases
It may be that the quadratic rate of change of elevation extents is underestimated,
compared to the linear change of azimuth (Bian and Andersen 2011). The rate of
change at extreme optical slant is underestimated. If so, far distances on the ground
(high elevations in Fig. 10) are underestimated. Squares appear as rectangles, long
axis in the azimuth. The result is that distant angles appear in error. In Fig. 8a, the
diagonals of the distant squares, those at higher elevations, should not seem parallel
to the nearby ones at low elevations.






Fig. 10 Observer standing on a z-line with an oblique
Figure 10 shows a person viewing an oblique line, with its near end touching a
line running directly away from underfoot, a z-line. Wnuczko et al. (2013) asked
viewers to judge the angle formed by the oblique and the z-line. The oblique
was set at different angles to the z-line, and its contact with the z-line was at
different distances from the observer. Wnuczko, the chief investigator, also varied
the distance from the z-line to the observer’s vantage point—the “eye-height.” If
distance is underestimated, the z-line’s length is underestimated. The region of
surface bearing both the z-line and the oblique is compressed. That compression
pushes the oblique towards the azimuth, and the angle between the oblique and the
z-line should be overestimated. Imagine the oblique is the diagonal of a 1 m square.
The side of the square running in depth is compressed. The oblique of 45ı might
be seen as 60ı. An oblique at 80ı to the z-line might be seen as 85ı. At a further
distance, which suffers more apparent compression, the 45ı oblique might look like
80ı, and the 80ı like 89ı.
The results of Wnuczko’s experiments were indeed that judged angle was
increasingly overestimated as optical slant increased. This was true for ground and
wall surfaces, and low and high eye-heights.
Would the same error occur if more information was added? Experiments could
be run with several obliques present, all parallel, all at different distances. To detect
that all the obliques form the same angle with the z-line, perception can use the
information that all the obliques converge to a single spot on the horizon. The
bias evident if only one oblique is present can be skirted. That is, distance and
angle information—spatial information—comes in many forms. The major task of
a theorist and investigator is to find it and to establish what observers can readily
use.
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7 Bias on a Picture Surface
Pictures were invented in the ice age, roughly 40,000 years ago. Cave artists
discovered that pictures can use two surfaces: the real one bearing the daubs put
there by the artists and the depicted one—the flanks of, say, a mammoth. The
presence of two surfaces in one direction from the viewer offered an unusual task,
so new it was not an influence Charles Darwin would have found pressuring homo
sapiens during evolution. One could look at the mammoth, or at the daubs. Since the
task was new, and not part of our evolutionary history, it may come as no surprise
that it is riddled with biases. Notably, perception of the 2D marks on the picture
surface is mixed up with what the marks depict in 3D (Koenderink and van Doorn
2003), in the sense that perception of the 2D daubs is biased towards the properties
of the 3D pictured surfaces, creating illusions, as Fig. 11 illustrates.
In Fig. 11, on the left, a 2D ellipse depicts a circular surface tilted in depth at 68ı
to the picture surface. The figure creates an illusion. Using line drawings like Fig. 11,
Hammad et al. (2008) depicted circular tops of cylinders with tilts from 5ı to 85ı.
Observers judged the aspect ratio of the 2D ellipses in the cylinder picture as less
eccentric than similar ellipses viewed on their own, with no extra lines indicating
cylinders, like the ellipses on the right of Fig. 11. That is, perception of the 2D
form on the picture surface was biased towards the form of the depicted surface
tilted in 3D. Presumably, an illusory bias resulted from cross-talk between two kinds
of information presented simultaneously—information for 2D flat features on the
picture surface and information for 3D surfaces in a space behind the picture plane
(Sedgwick and Nicholls 1993; Koenderink and Van Doorn 2003).
If the 2D form made of lines is seen as being on the picture surface and the
3D form is a surface appearing behind it, they appear at different distances. If two
shapes subtend the same angle at the observer, and vision uses linear perspective,
the further one should be seen as larger. Axes of the 2D form seen as depicting cords
of a circle tilted back in 3D from the picture plane should seem larger than true. The
Fig. 11 A line drawing of a cylinder with a circular top and seven ellipses. One matches the line
form at the top of the line drawing of the cylinder
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illusory effect on the minor axis should be large, since it is highly foreshortened.
The effect on the major axis of the 2D ellipse on the picture surface should be
small, for two reasons. It is hardly foreshortened, and the contribution from the
extra distance of the pictorial depth is minimal, since the pictorial depth is likely
slight. The depicted circle could have its near edge at the picture surface and the
size of the depicted circle, stretching back from the picture surface, is only about
the same size as the major axis.
Figure 11 shows a cylinder and seven ellipses. The ellipse on the far right phys-
ically matches the one depicting the top of the cylinder, but observers experience it
is too small (Mastandrea et al. 2014), its minor axis not tall enough and its major
axis almost but not quite wide enough.
In a study on this illusion (Mastandrea et al. 2014), observers adjusted the size
of an ellipse to make it match the one depicting the cylinder’s top. The adjusted
ellipses were taller than the true size by about 40 % on the minor axis and wider
by 5 % on the major axis. The conclusion to be drawn is that observers cannot tell
the true size of features on picture surfaces. It seems that ellipses, like other 2D
features depicting shapes tilted in depth, are seen biased towards the shapes they
depict. Linear perspective creates biases in viewing shapes on picture surfaces.
Untroubled, a Realist can accept that pictures involve many, many illusions.
Pictures are artificial and break free from natural-world constraints within which
optical information is to be defined. Also, 2D features of picture surfaces only
fool us if we restrict ourselves to viewing on the normal to the picture surface.
Turn the picture close to 90ı and view it at a glancing angle, as if it was an
anamorphic. Any 2D dimension of the ellipse can be seen in this fashion perfectly
accurately, untroubled by the crosstalk from 3D information. Like walking into a
scene, turning an object is a natural way for observers to inspect objects. The result is
accurate impressions, a Realist concludes with satisfaction, despite illusions present
in relatively immobile and needlessly restricted viewing.
8 Conclusion
In this short introduction to the experience of artworks as representational pictures,
which are those that allow the perception of represented surfaces, the key point has
been that smooth surfaces are polarized planes that reveal themselves by means
of orthogonal optical variations, organized by linear perspective. For extended flat
surfaces, angles subtended by elevation extents diminish at quadratic rates with
increasing distance and corresponding increases in optical slant, and azimuths at lin-
ear rates. Observers use these rates imperfectly, with distance being underestimated,
under high optical slants and severe foreshortening. Angles subtended by far-off
stretches of ground are compressed and hard to distinguish, and angles inscribed in
the stretches of ground appear large, in error, more so with distance. The arrival of
pictorial art generated another error. Shapes on picture surfaces are seen as if biased
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towards the surfaces they depict. Despite these errors, there is a case to be made that
Realism holds for our experiences in the normal world and the experiences we get
from representational artworks.
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The Idiosyncrasy of Beauty: Aesthetic
Universals and the Diversity of Taste
Patrick Colm Hogan
Abstract There are different senses of the word “beauty.” It may refer to a
broad social norm or to an individual psychological experience, what we might
call “aesthetic response.” The main contention of this chapter is that common or
universal principles need not mandate nor even entail that everyone has the same
experience of beauty. To the contrary, research indicates that the factors underlying
aesthetic response predict considerable individual diversity. It initially seems that
the search for universals of beauty is both hegemonic and falsely homogenizing.
However, it is not hegemonic if we are concerned with aesthetic response, rather
than social norms. Moreover, a clear understanding of universals does not preclude
idiosyncrasy. In fact, when properly formulated, such universals predict and explain
individual diversity.
Keywords Attachment • Beauty • Prototypes • Taste • Aesthetic universals
1 Aesthetic Universals: Some Initial Issues
It seems that we have two choices in speaking about beauty. We can either find
universal principles that define and explain what beauty is or we must set it aside
as a coherent object of study. However, as soon as one mentions “universals” of
beauty, one is faced with an obvious problem—the variability of taste. Professors
and students of literature today are likely to phrase the problem in terms of
culture, saying that cultures develop radically different conceptions of beauty.
This presumption of internal cultural uniformity and external cultural difference
is widespread today, but highly problematic on many grounds. (For a discussion of
some of these problems, focusing on literature, see Hogan 2003; for a treatment of
political problems with the culturalist view, see Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2012.) But
one does not need to accept culturalist presuppositions to accept the main point.
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Simply put, tastes differ. Even those of us who share the same general tastes do not
always favor precisely the same works of art—and many of us do not share the same
general tastes. To some extent, this is a matter of the ambiguous usage of such terms
as “beautiful.” But not all cases can be explained away so easily.
For example, confining ourselves to facial beauty—one of the areas where
universality seems best established—Maxim Magazine recently proclaimed Miley
Cyrus the most beautiful woman (http://news.yahoo.com/miley-cyrus-hottest-
woman-world-photo-153229449.html). For me, she is perfectly fine, but nothing
exceptional. In contrast, I recently saw an old film staring the Indian actress Tanuja,
whom I found very lovely. But Tanuja has no particular reputation as a great beauty.
The same point holds for men. One magazine proclaimed Josh Hartnett the world’s
most beautiful man (http://acidcow.com/pics/7706-top-100-most-beautiful-men-
100-pics.html). When I think of a good-looking man, someone like Raj Kapoor
occurs to me, at least at a certain period. However, Kapoor is not renowned for his
beauty.
In short, despite research indicating that test subjects judge attractiveness
similarly across races (see Zebrowitz et al. 1993), it seems incontrovertible that
individually we differ in our tastes. For many of my colleagues, this itself is
definitive proof that there are no aesthetic universals. If beauty were a “universal
value,” then should we not all like Miley Cyrus (or Tanuja) and Josh Hartnett (or
Raj Kapoor)? To make matters worse still, when I discuss aesthetic universals (e.g.,
in talks), I may be faced with the criticism that any universals are necessarily an
imposition of oppressive standards—European, male, heterosexual, and so on.
The political objection is important. It is undoubtedly the case that people unself-
consciously generalize their own idiosyncratic aesthetic and other preferences. It is
important to recognize and respond to this. In a political context, this may have
an ideological function. Judgments of beauty may function to denigrate the artistic
achievements of other cultures. In a political context, it is important to respond to
that denigration practically, in terms of policies and social action. Moreover, in a
scientific context, it is important to recognize the full range of aesthetic experience.
In other words, the key scientific issue is the importance of non-dominant views as
data. It is simply bad science to take, say, European male preferences—or rather the
preference of European male professors of aesthetics—into account while ignoring
everyone else. But this simply returns us to the issue of idiosyncrasy.
2 Three Meanings of “Beauty”
As a preliminary step in clarifying what is at stake in discussing principles of beauty,
we may distinguish three different ways in which the term “beauty” is used. The
first and simplest usage is what might be called “essential.” This is the use of the
term “beauty” whereby it refers to some property intrinsic to the object. A Platonist
might say, for example, that there is a form or idea of beauty and all beautiful objects
participate in that idea, even if the idea or, for that matter, the objects are unobserved.
By this account, there is a fact as to whether Josh Hartnett is or is not beautiful,
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just as there is a fact as to whether the stuff in my cup is or is not water (i.e.,
H2O). Not being a Platonist, I must admit that this conception of beauty—like other
conceptions of objective essences—has no appeal for me. In fact, it seems ultimately
a rather bizarre idea since it is not evident that we can relate this “objective” beauty
to our subjective sense of beauty in any clear or systematic way. If the essential
beauty is not linked with our subjective sense of beauty, it is not clear that we are
speaking of the same thing in the two cases. However, if we are speaking of the
same thing, then it is difficult to see how we could solve the problem of the diversity
of taste. That diversity would seem to suggest that there is no essence or that, when
tastes conflict, one person is right and another is wrong. In principle, the latter is
possible. However, that leaves us with the problem of how to learn just what the
objective essence is. That would seem to lead us into mysticism, which is (to say
the least) scientifically problematic.
Another use of the word “beauty” is social and normative. This refers to what
is accepted as beautiful in a given group. Knowing the cultural norms of beauty
is part of social competence for participation in any group. (I use “cultural” very
broadly to refer to the practices of any group—whether a large society or a small
clique.) Thus, if I am among American English professors, I can assume that To the
Lighthouse has high normative status. Personally, I vastly prefer Mrs. Dalloway (in
fact, I prefer The Waves and Jacob’s Room). Indeed, I do not actually care much
for To the Lighthouse (I find Mr. Ramsay to be more of a cartoon than a character),
while I find Mrs. Dalloway to be one of the greatest novels ever. Nonetheless, it is
part of my social competence to know that, socially, To the Lighthouse has higher
aesthetic status. To take a simpler example, extreme slenderness is part of the social
norm for female beauty, while muscularity is a social norm for male beauty (see the
discussion of body ideals in chapter three of Giles 2010). Since the word “beautiful”
is commonly used to refer to the social norm, it makes sense to say, “She has a
beautiful body, but I don’t care for skinny women” or “He has a beautiful body, but
I don’t care for muscle-bound men.” In contrast, it would be odd to say (of a plump
woman), “She has a beautiful body, but I’d prefer her if she were slender” or (of a
slender man), “He has a beautiful body, but I’d prefer if he had some muscle.”
Colleagues who make political objections to aesthetic universals (e.g., “those on
the political left for whom the aesthetic is simply ‘bourgeois ideology’” [Eagleton
1990, p. 8]) probably have this socially normative view of beauty in mind. This is
the area where political objections to “universalism” have their greatest force. For
example, reflecting one segment of European norms, Thomas Babington Macaulay
(1835) made a famous statement that “a single shelf of a good European library was
worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” This is the sort of statement
that involves a specifically “hegemonic universalization” (as Lalita Pandit might
put it [see Pandit 1995, p. 207]), an extension of one set of social norms to other
societies. The same thing happens not only with nations, but also with classes and
other groups. This is clearly problematic and an apt topic for political analysis and
response.
On the other hand, none of this means that social norms are wholly outside
the realm of universality. The issue is the level at which universality enters. Most
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obviously, social norms may differ in their particulars while remaining open to
explanation in terms of universal principles. For example, there is a commonplace
that the dominant views in a society are the views of the dominant class (e.g.,
this is implied by most uses of “hegemony” [see, for example, Williams 1985, p.
145 on the generality of hegemony]). Thus, bourgeois aesthetic norms are often
seen as becoming dominant with the rise of capitalism; English aesthetic norms
become dominant in English colonies, and so on. In some cases, the production
of aesthetic norms may be understood as more complex and indirect, but still a
matter of historical variations on dominant social conditions. For example, Watt
argues that “The novel’s serious concern with the daily lives of ordinary people”
depends on “general conditions.” The first of these is that “the society must value
every individual highly enough to consider him the proper subject of its serious
literature.” This condition arises with “individualism,” which is itself contingent on
“the rise of modern industrial capitalism and the spread of Protestantism” (Watt
1957, p. 60). Other writers stress a different sort of complexity with resistant
norms always playing a role, often in relation to politics. For example, having
emphasized dominant discourse in Orientalism (Said 1978), Edward Said developed
the topic of “cultural resistance” (Said 1993, p. xii) in Culture and Imperialism (see
in particular chapter three). Susan Faludi has argued that social norms of female
beauty, such as extreme thinness, have a role in sustaining patriarchy—and those
norms change “during periods when the culture is more receptive to women’s quest
for independence” (1991, p. 204). In all these cases, we see general principles
linking social norms of aesthetics to social domination and, for some, resistance
to such domination. In each case, this is a form of universalism.
In the remainder of this essay, we will only give passing attention to social norms
of beauty. Our focus will be on the third, the psychological sense of “beauty,” what
we might equally call “aesthetic response”—what one finds beautiful. Problems of
idiosyncrasy arise most obviously for this psychological sense. If our psychological
responses to beauty are different, how can there possibly be (psychological)
aesthetic universals? However, our brief sketch of social norms in beauty has already
indicated that variability need not be incompatible with universal principles, since
the principles and the variability will occur at different levels—just as the law
of universal gravitation and specific trajectories of gravitational motion occur at
different levels in physics. We would not say that there is no universal gravitation
because, in ordinary atmosphere, it takes longer for a feather to fall than a
bowling ball. Here, as elsewhere, divergence in manifestation in no way contradicts
universality in principles.
Indeed, one could go further in the case of psychological principles. When
dealing with psychological response, we are almost necessarily dealing with a
wide range of factors bearing on perception, memory, inference, emotion, and
other systems and processes that are sometimes highly divergent from person to
person. These all involve possible variability and their interaction only multiplies
that variability. For instance, it seems to be the case that emotional response involves
at least three factors: innate propensities, formative critical period experiences,
and specific emotional memories (see chapter two of Hogan 2011b). The first
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will vary somewhat across individuals. The second will vary more significantly
(e.g., there will be differences between secure and insecure attachment). Finally,
specific emotional memories, though perhaps the least consequential, may vary
considerably. Our experience of an artwork (e.g., a novel) clearly involves complex
interactions of all components of emotional response, not to mention other variable
cognitive processes. Indeed, the same point seems to hold even for our response to
facial beauty.
Given the preceding points, it would be very surprising if universal principles
predicted uniformity of aesthetic response. In fact, the nature of psychological
processes predicts that universals of aesthetic response will lead to diversity
in individual feeling. Put differently, given the complexity of the human mind,
uniformity of response would seem to entail difference in principles, not uniformity
of principles. To take a simple example from outside aesthetics, imagine that there
is some life-threatening crisis. There are two mothers, Jane and Sally, each with
her own child, baby Jane and baby Sally. Faced with the crisis, Jane tries to save
baby Jane. If Sally tries to save baby Sally, then she is doing something different
from Jane, but following the same general principle (roughly “Save your own child
first”). In contrast, if she tries to save baby Jane, then she is engaging in the same
manifest behavior as Jane (saving baby Jane), but it seems clear that she is not
following the same principle. In short, far from being inconsistent with variability
in taste, a cognitively based set of universal principles of taste would seem to predict
such variability. In the following sections, we will consider just what variability it
predicts.
3 Aesthetic Response and Idiosyncrasy (I): Pattern
Recognition and Endogenous Reward
In earlier work, I have argued that empirical research on beauty suggests that
aesthetic response involves a complex integration of cognitive and emotional factors
(see 2013 and 2014). Specifically, there seem to be two key cognitive processes
in aesthetic response and two key emotional systems. As to the first cognitive
process, some research points to non-habituated pattern recognition as central to
some aesthetic response, most obviously in music (see Vuust and Kringelbach 2010;
this is presumably the principle operative in a range of other aesthetic experiences
as well, ranging from decorative art to mathematics). Non-habituated means that
we have not come to fully anticipate the pattern, but must discern it in the course of
our experience. Or, rather, it may be that we do anticipate the pattern for background
phenomena (e.g., a drum or bass sequence); however, we come to discern the pattern
in foreground elements or phenomena that are the object of attentional focus (e.g.,
melodic variations) in the course of experience.
This cognitive aspect of aesthetic response appears to be connected with acti-
vation of the endogenous reward system (see Vuust and Kringelbach 2010, p. 266).
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The reward system governs seeking behavior and is related to our experience of
pleasure (on reward “wanting” and reward “liking,” see Fareri and Delgado 2013,
p. 446). Like other emotional responses, the intensity of reward system activation
is presumably connected with the gradient of change in the “eliciting conditions”
for the emotion. In general, the intensity of a final emotion is affected by the
change from a prior emotion. If, on being called to the Department Head’s office,
I anticipate being told that I won an award, I will respond differently to the
announcement of the award than if I anticipated chastisement (cf. Ortony et al. 1988,
p. 72 on disappointment and relief in relation to effort; the point seems generalizable
to more passive conditions of anticipation). If, in aesthetic response, reward system
activation is produced by pattern recognition, then one would expect the intensity
of the response to be in part a function of the rapidity and extent of the change
from disorientation to pattern recognition (as well as the effort involved, as Ortony
et al. [1988] suggest). By “rapidity,” I mean the timing. Intuitively, it seems that
there is a certain temporal window in which pattern recognition has the right effect.
A comparable case might be the understanding of a joke; it is only funny if one
understands it immediately after the punch line, but usually not if one understands
the pattern only after reflection on the joke. By “extent,” I mean the degree of change
from incomprehension to comprehension. Recurring to the example of a joke, it
seems clear that our enjoyment of a witticism is diminished to the degree that we
anticipate the punch line or anticipate features of that punch line.
We have here a very complex universal principle, or candidate for a universal
principle, of aesthetic response. By this principle, aesthetic pleasure involves
the following components (slightly elaborated beyond the foregoing): (1) a focal
object and (often) a background object; (2) consistent pattern recognition for the
background object; (3) non-habituation to the pattern in the focal object; (4) a shift
from some degree of disorientation to fuller recognition of a pattern in the focal
object within a certain temporal window; (5) reward system activation. There are
undoubtedly other factors as well, for example, (6) limitation of the aversive quality
of disorientation (as severe disorientation may lead to such aversive response that
it inhibits subsequent pleasure at pattern recognition). The list here is not meant
to be complete, but to indicate some of the complexity at issue. The key point
for our present analysis is the following. This complex principle, with its multiple
components, is a plausible, empirically supported candidate for a universal aesthetic
principle. One may reasonably argue that an experience satisfying this principle
gives rise to aesthetic enjoyment across cultures and historical periods. But it is
clear that there will be a great deal of “output variation” in the application of these
principles in particular circumstances. In other words, there will be considerable
individual variation in aesthetic response.
We may consider the components in turn. First, there is the difference between a
focal object and a background object. This would seem to be relatively uniform
across individuals. However, it is not. Consider Hindustani classical music. A
typical performance will include a drone playing the main notes of the piece, a
drum, and a solo instrument or a vocalist. Even listeners unfamiliar with Hindustani
music are likely to focus their attention on the solo instrument, allowing the drone
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and drum to provide a patterned frame that aids in discerning motivic variations
from the main instrument. For most of a performance, this makes sense. However,
at a certain point, the instrumentalist may cede the floor to the drummer. At this
point, the instrumentalist is likely to repeat the same motif over and over, allowing
the drum to engage in variations. Listeners familiar with Hindustani music will shift
their attention to the drum, relegating the instrumentalist to the background, where
his or her repetitions will help to frame the variations in the drum. However, other
listeners will often fail to do this, thus producing a different response.
Even when listeners have the same foreground and background object, they may
not have the same degree or kind of pattern recognition. For example, when I teach
Hindustani music, I generally find that most students are sensitive to the pulse of the
drumming without instruction. However, few if any are sensitive to its cyclic quality,
the repetition of the drumming pattern after a fixed number of beats. Put differently,
a few students could not even tap their foot to the beat of the music. Most could
do this; however, they could not say when a rhythmic cycle began or how long
it extended (seven beats? eight beats? twelve beats?). This is important because
part of the aesthetic pleasure one experiences in listening to Hindustani classical
music involves ways in which the rhythmic cycle creates, frustrates, and fulfills
expectations for the resolution of melodic improvisations on the main instrument.
One misses this entirely if one responds only to the pulse and not to the cycle.
Technically, this is a matter of “encoding.” Encoding is the process whereby our
mind selects elements of experience, segments them into units, and structures them
into relations with one another. Encoding is a process that recurs at various levels of
processing. For example, visual neurons are sensitive to only certain aspects of the
environment. They fire only in the presence of certain phenomena—for instance, a
line with a particular orientation in a particular area of the visual field (see Wurtz
and Kandel 2000a, p. 534). Thus they select only that information. Through “lateral
inhibition” (reducing the likelihood that neighboring neurons will fire [see Tessier-
Lavigne 2000, p. 521]), they enhance the salience of that line, thus making an
object’s edge clearer to perception. This is a form of structuring. At subsequent
levels of processing, some configurations of lines are selected and further structured,
producing object perception (see Wurtz and Kandel 2000b, pp. 564–565). In the case
of Hindustani drumming, my students were not encoding the rhythmic cycles; their
encoding stopped with the rhythmic pulse and did not extend to the cycle.
Encoding affects one’s response to focal phenomena as well. First and most
obviously, degree of encoding will affect one’s pattern recognition. A simple
case is variation on a theme. In Hindustani classical music, as in most if not
all other traditions of music, a great deal of the aesthetic pleasure results from
ornamentations, juxtapositions, and/or transformations of motifs. When the scales
overlap with those used in Western music and the instrument is familiar (e.g.,
a flute), my students seem to find it easier to hear at least some of the motifs
in the instrumental performance. However, if the scale is very different and/or
the instrument is unfamiliar, this becomes more difficult. For example, perhaps
disoriented by the strangeness of the scale (roughly, F, G[, A, B, C, D[, E), they
may be unable to discern the main motifs of rāga Lalit. In consequence, the only
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pattern they hear is very general—a single instrument playing with a drum and a
drone—and is therefore likely to give rise to habituation (and boredom) swiftly. A
related problem may occur when the scale is more accessible, but the instrument is
unfamiliar (e.g., a vı̄n. ā) or the soloist uses unfamiliar techniques (such as ongoing
oscillation around scale tones in vocal performance). In connection with this, my
impression is that, at least initially, students find it difficult to encode the difference
between part of a motif played by plucking different strings and the same notes
played by gliding from one note to the next by stretching a single string. What strikes
them as mere repetition (thus a potential source of habituation, thus boredom),
strikes me as a variation.
Finally, it seems clear that we have not only different degrees of pattern
recognition and disorientation, but also different degrees of sensitivity to enjoyment
of pattern recognition (i.e., different degrees of reward system reactivity) and
different degrees of aversion to disorientation. Moreover, there are variations in the
precise timing of our pattern recognition, even in cases when that recognition is
shared. Even very small differences in timing could make a great difference in the
degree of pleasure or aversion. I may get the joke only a fraction of a second after
you do, but that fraction of a second may be enough to make the joke not terribly
funny for me and hilariously successful for you. Moreover, there is undoubtedly
some difference in the degree to which aversive emotional responses linger. Perhaps
my irritation at disorientation lasts longer than yours, inhibiting my subsequent
pleasure at pattern recognition, thus dampening or even overcoming my enjoyment.
In short, it seems clear that the apparently universal aesthetic principle of non-
habituated pattern recognition entailing reward system involvement is not merely
compatible with variety in aesthetic response. It actually predicts such variety. The
same point holds for the second main cognitive process and the second emotion
system that seem to produce aesthetic response.
4 Aesthetic Response and Idiosyncrasy (II): Prototype
Approximation and Attachment
While some research points toward non-habitual pattern recognition as definitive of
aesthetic pleasure, another set of studies points toward prototype approximation.
The difference may be a matter of single versus distributed targets (e.g., faces
versus decorative art, such as calligraphic ornamentation), with music counting
as a paradigmatic distributed target. Another possibility is that it is a matter of
differences in processing streams, where the prototype-approximation condition
applies to the ventral or “what” pathway while the pattern-recognition condition
applies to the dorsal or “where” and “how” pathway (on the pathways, see Wurtz
and Kandel 2000b, p. 548; for a different account of the possible relevance of these
pathways in aesthetics, see chapter eight of Ramachandran 2011). In any case, we
seem to respond to different targets as aesthetically pleasing depending on their
conformity to one of these criteria.
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Prototype approximation is the degree to which a given target is or is not
similar to one’s prototype of the relevant kind of object. A prototype is roughly
an average case and it is often discussed as an average case (for a concise account
of prototypes, see Rosch 2011; on prototypes and averaging, see Mcleod et al.
1998, p. 63). However, it seems clear that the “averaging” process here is complex.
For example, diet foods would include a range of items, from low-fat chicken to
butterless vegetables. Clearly, an actual average of these foods would have a certain
number of calories. However, for many people, the most prototypical diet food is
zero-calorie lettuce (see Kahneman and Miller 1986, p. 143). This suggests that
there is not simply an averaging process, but some sort of weighted averaging. Thus
our minds do not count all instances of a given kind equally. Rather, we seem to give
greater weight to some instances over others. A number of factors may contribute to
this weighting. In Understanding Nationalism (Hogan 2009), I isolated five factors
that seem to govern the degree to which one identity category is more important
than another. These were saliency, functionality, contrast, emotional force, and
durability (the list is not intended to be complete). The same factors are likely to
be operative here, given that both are a matter of categorization, with each factor
having an effect on prototyping. For example, the function of a diet food is to reduce
caloric intake. Thus the most highly functional diet food would be the one with the
least calories. Emotional force seems particularly important. If one has wretched
memories of choosing to snack on lettuce leaves rather than one’s favorite dish of
crispy, deep-fried pork fat, that will likely have more force in defining the prototype
than memories of choosing chicken over beef for one’s main course. Prototypes
also differ from actual averages in that they may vary with context. As Kahneman
and Miller point out, in the context “Manhattan apartment,” the prototypical dog
will be rather different from that in the context “a farm in Maine” (1986, p. 140).
In keeping with this, in the context of “dessert,” the prototypical diet food is not
lettuce, but perhaps non-fat frozen yoghurt.
There also seems to be a difference between continuous and discrete domains for
prototypes. In discrete domains, the prototype may be readjusted from a weighted
average to a particular sub-category. That may be the case with lettuce, clearly a
discrete sub-category of diet foods. In contrast, categories that govern relatively
continuous domains may be closer to actual averages. For instance, at least on
certain dimensions, a prototypical cup would probably be about average height and
width, rather than a particular sub-category of cup.
Returning to aesthetics, we find considerable research linking prototypes—or, in
some cases, averages—with beauty (see Hansen and Topolinski 2011, p. 710 and
citations). The results are very robust, ranging from faces (Langlois and Roggman
1990) to colors (Martindale and Moore 1988, p. 670) to cars (Halberstadt and
Rhodes 2003) to performances of sonatas (Repp 1997). There are two problems
with some of this research, however. The first is that it often does not distinguish
averages from prototypes. Thus the research on facial beauty by Langlois and
Roggman (1990) stresses averages. However, Russell’s (2003) work indicates that
enhancing facial luminance differences between men and women enhances aesthetic
appeal (see also Rhodes 2006). In other words, making the women’s faces more
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“feminine” in facial luminance makes them more appealing, whereas the opposite
is the case for men’s faces. This points toward prototypes, with their weighting of
contrasting features by category, rather than strict averages. The point is related to
Ramachandran’s observations on beauty. His example of Tamil statuary (2004, p.
42) provides a case in point, as does classical Greek sculpture. We may instance, for
example, a Standing Parvati (from Tamil Nadu, India, during the Chola Period of the
ninth to twelfth century C.E. [see http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MET_
Standing_Parvati.jpg]) and Polykleitos’s Spear Bearer (from Greece, fifth century
BCE). Anyone who has visited a beach or a locker room should recognize that
these are not strict averages, but enhance distinctive female and male properties
respectively.
In sum, we have good reason to posit prototype approximation as a universal
principle guiding aesthetic response (i.e., a feeling of beauty; response to art is
clearly much broader than a response to beauty). What does this tell us about
variability in taste? That variability is not likely to be random or unconstrained,
since our prototypes are unlikely to diverge too massively. They will be constrained
by averaging (which, again, enters into prototypes) and by certain broad tendencies,
such as enhancement of difference from contrasting categories, such as male or
female. (On the last point, in addition to the works cited earlier, see also Chatterjee’s
discussion of Ramachandran on “peak shift” or the enhancement of response to
distinguishing properties [Chatterjee 2014, pp. 45–47.]) Nonetheless, as with non-
habitual pattern isolation, the principle predicts considerable difference in particular
aesthetic responses. Here, too, the nature of the universal is such that it in effect
requires at least some diversity in its particularization.
It may seem that the result of tacit averaging processes should be the same across
individuals. But our averaging processes are not self-conscious, statistically strict
procedures. They are, rather, implicit, heuristic processes. Crucially, they do not
begin with a random sample, but with individual memories. Even if all individual
memories counted equally (which they do not), there would be significant differ-
ences across individuals’ sets of memories. Consider the case of facial prototypes
(the same points hold for all relevant prototypes—for example, prototypes relating
to stories). First, we see different people (read or hear different stories, and so on).
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we see people with different frequencies. It
is possible that we average our observations across individuals. However, it seems
more likely that we average our observations across instances—or, at least, that
frequency and duration of experience affect the average. Suppose I see Jones ten
times every day, Monday through Friday, sometimes meeting for long conversations
on weekends. In contrast, I briefly passed Smith in the hallway. It is possible
that Jones’s face and Smith’s face will each count equally in my implicit facial
averaging and in the formation of a facial prototype, since each is one individual
face. However, it seems far more likely that my implicit averaging will be an
ongoing process, affected to some extent by each reappearance of Jones, but only
by the single appearance of Smith—thus counting Jones much more than Smith. In
short, the sets across which we are averaging are very different.
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Second, it is at least possible that there are critical period experiences in prototype
formation. Critical periods are developmental stages when cognitive or affective
systems are subject to particularly formative experiences. For example, experiences
during the critical period for language acquisition largely determine the languages
in which we will have native speaker fluency. We may learn other languages at
later ages, but with much more effort and usually far less success. It is at least
possible that something like this occurs in childhood with beauty—not that our
beauty-defining prototypes are fixed forever in the first few years of life, but that
early experiences may form an initial prototype or set of prototypes that have a great
degree of influence on later prototype formations. In other words, early prototype
formations may bias later averaging processes. This is particularly consequential as
it seems likely that infantile experiences are, if anything, more idiosyncratic than
adult experiences, given that infantile experiences tend to be more limited.
Third, writers in situated cognition have shown that, in actual practice, our
interactions with the world do not simply involve fixed cognitive structures applied
uniformly to experiences with the external world. Rather, our cognition is constantly
changing and reforming itself in ongoing interaction with the world (see Robbins
and Aydede 2009). Cognitive processing could hardly be different in aesthetic
response. Thus our formation of prototypes does not occur once and for all. Each
new experience alters our prototypes. Indeed, following Barsalou (2009, p. 244),
we might infer that, to a great extent, our prototypes are formed ad hoc and in
specific contexts, more strongly influenced by recent cases than would be the case
if this were a matter of simple averaging. In terms of facial prototypes, this means
that the context of faces we have recently seen is likely to alter our prototypes and
thus our sense of just what approximates the relevant prototype. Here, as elsewhere,
the point holds for a range of cases, not just facial beauty. Moreover, perhaps in
contrast with Barsalou, I suspect that the effects of context may not only be short-
term, but medium-term as well. For example, a student or teacher’s response to a
particular literary work is in part dependent on what other works are being read in
the class. Such effects would probably be a matter of what works are given particular
activation in reading the new work. The extended context of the class as a whole
would tend to make other works from the class more salient, thus more significant
for averaging.
The mention of salience brings us to another set of output differences, those con-
nected with weighting variables—again, beyond salience, these include durability,
function, contrast, and emotional force. Durability is the most equivocal. The idea
here is that objects involve properties and conditions. Our minds abstract from the
changeable conditions, isolating what is durable. To take a simple example, different
directions and sources of light will affect a face—for example, what parts are
illuminated and what are shadowed. In forming an image of the face, our minds in
some degree subtract the lighting effects (if they did not, we would find it difficult to
recognize someone in different lighting conditions). This process should repeat itself
across faces, leading to prototypes that bear on enduring features of faces rather than
ephemera. As far as I can tell, people generally abstract from circumstances in much
the same way, so this is largely irrelevant to the issue of diversity in output. Indeed,
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the most interesting issues here concern why we find certain sorts of lighting or other
ephemera more aesthetically pleasing. This could be because the situations are more
prototypical or, what is perhaps more likely, that they make the target appear more
prototypical.
Function is of somewhat limited value here as well. Responses to functionality
appear, in general, fairly uniform. Perhaps the main differences involve professional
or related specialization. Literary critics will view some features of a work as
functional in that they will contribute to teaching or research; authors will encode
some aspects as functional in inspiring their own creativity, or inhibiting it. These
functional emphases are likely to lead to certain features of works and certain types
of work entering significantly into the prototype formation of professionals in a
way that they do not enter into the prototype formation of non-professionals. This
is important because it suggests one reason why it is likely that there will be a
difference between professional and non-professional tastes. (Other reasons include
different sorts of habituation and different skills at encoding and pattern recognition
in a particular area. Some of the complexity of the issue is brought out by Nodine
et al. (1993). Though they formulate their findings in different terms, their research
may suggest that there are differences in preferred type of aesthetic process, with
art-trained viewers of paintings stressing pattern-recognition across figures rather
than prototype-approximation of figures.)
The point bears most obviously on complex works of art. However, it extends
well beyond that. An amusing example concerns a lab technician’s observation, after
a colonoscopy, that a relative had a “cute colon.” She showed me the photograph,
to which I actually had a mild disgust reaction, and certainly did not experience
aesthetic pleasure. Presumably what was going on was that the lab technician had
seen so many colon pictures that she had formed a prototype. In addition, the lab
technician’s assessment of the aesthetics of internal organs was also in part a matter
of contrast. She not only had experience of colons generally, she had experience
of healthy and unhealthy colons. Indeed, her categorization here was presumably
not simply “colon,” but “healthy colon” versus “unhealthy colon.” The features of
a healthy colon were weighted due to their contrast with unhealthy colon features.
The reader will no doubt be delighted (if also moderately repulsed) to learn that
the relative in question had a very healthy colon indeed. This contributed to the
laboratory technician’s aesthetic evaluation. When profession-related differences
occur, they may be highly significant, as in this case. However, they remain a
somewhat limited case.
As this example suggests, contrast is inseparable from categorization. The point
holds outside medicine, as indicated by Russell’s research on male and female faces
(Russell 2003). Indeed, categorization and contrast are among the most important
variables in aesthetic response. If one’s aesthetic response to a target is in part
a matter of prototype approximation, then clearly categorization is crucial even
independent of contrast, because categorization determines just what prototype is
activated. If you and I categorize a target differently, we are likely to have different
aesthetic responses. The point is suggested by a popular Hans Christian Andersen
story, “The Ugly Duckling” (“Den grimme Ælling” [Andersen 1949]). In that story,
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a poor, orphaned waterfowl is thought to be quite unaesthetic, until he is recognized
as a swan, rather than a duck. One way of understanding the story is in terms of
categorization and prototype approximation. “Duck” and “swan” activate different
prototypes. While the “ugly duckling” did not closely approximate a prototypical
duck, he did closely approximate a prototypical swan.
The point is not confined to commonly shared categories, such as duck and
swan. Indeed, it applies perhaps most significantly to more or less fine-grained
subcategories, including professional subcategories. Research on emotion cate-
gorization has shown that the more or less fine-grained quality of our emotion
categorizations affects the experience and course of those emotions (see Lindquist
and Barrett 2008). We may expect the same sort of consequences for categorization
and subcategorization elsewhere. For example, when Northern Europeans first saw
sub-Saharan Africans, they had no option but to categorize their faces in the same
way that they categorized their own faces. Since there were highly salient ways in
which Africans deviated from the statistical average for Europeans, they were very
likely to find Africans ugly, at least in those respects. The same point holds for sub-
Saharan Africans seeing Europeans. This would change either when the unusual
group (whether Africans or Europeans) began to affect prototype formation on the
part of the home society or when members of the home society formed subcategories
with associated prototypes, such that they began implicitly or explicitly to judge
a “beautiful European face,” a “beautiful African face,” and so on. In keeping
with this, research indicates that “ratings of facial attractiveness” are consistent
“across ethnicities and cultures” (Chatterjee 2014, p. 7) when the groups involved
are not isolated from one another. In contrast, the limited contemporary research
on the topic indicates that, when the groups are isolated and there are differences
in appearance, then aesthetic response differs (see Chatterjee 2014, pp. 7–8 and
citations). This contemporary research is of course supported by historical materials
related to colonialism and other early contact (e.g., the association of black skin with
ugliness in Shakespeare’s Othello, as in the characterization of Othello as a “sooty
[ : : : ] thing” who gives rise “to fear, not to delight” [Shakespeare 1986, I.ii.69–70]).
The importance of categorization and contrast extends beyond faces, encompass-
ing for example artistic movements and literary genres. Categorizing a particular
work as “a painting” or even “a painting of the Madonna and child” may produce a
very different effect than categorizing it as “early Mannerist,” since the relevant pro-
totypes would differ, as would the ways we encode the features of the work itself (the
importance of categorization is stressed particularly by Carroll [2009], in a different
theoretical context). Indeed, categorization generally affects both prototypes and the
encoding of the target. Consider an example from narrative. The Indian film Fanaa
concerns a Kashmiri revolutionary and a young, blind Kashmiri woman. They meet,
apparently fall in love, and culminate their relationship. The revolutionary then
leaves the woman and rejoins the revolution (after securing medical care to restore
her sight). The ending of the film reunites them briefly, before the woman has to kill
the revolutionary to prevent a possible terrorist attack. Though the film has many
serious flaws, I probably find it much more aesthetically successful than would many
other viewers, largely because I categorize it as a seduction plot. (The seduction plot
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is a cross-cultural genre wherein a man seduces and abandons a woman, who often
pursues him, with one or both often dying. On this genre, see Hogan 2011a, pp.
210–220.) Without this categorization and associated prototype, viewers are more
likely to see the film simply as a loosely romantic melodrama. (I should perhaps note
that, in this case, my response is complex. It combines prototype approximation and
non-habituated pattern recognition, which is probably common in our response to
works of art.)
The last variable that affects averaging is affective force. We would expect pro-
totype formation to be disproportionately guided by strongly emotional instances,
as opposed to neutral instances. It is well established that emotionally consequential
instances tend to overwhelm statistical information in judgment tasks (see Nisbett
and Ross 1980, p. 15). The formation of prototypes would seem to involve processes
of the same general sort. In the case of aesthetic response, we may expect another
emotional factor as well. The research we have been considering often treats
prototype approximation alone. But presumably prototype approximation fosters
a feeling of beauty only when it is connected with the right sorts of emotion.
For example, prototypes related to disgust-provoking objects should not produce
aesthetic delight. This may seem contradicted by the laboratory technician’s com-
ment about the colon picture. However, once again, she presumably subcategorized
colons into “healthy” and “diseased.” It seems highly unlikely that she would have
found beauty (or “cuteness”) in a picture of a colon showing a high degree of disease
prototypicality.
In the case of the colon photograph, the emotions at issue are presumably joy
and relief. The context of such an evaluation is rather like that of a story where a
possible tragedy is reversed in a comic conclusion. The difference is that the fate
of the protagonist in the technician’s story is real and not merely simulated. This
example suggests that aesthetic pleasure may arise with prototype approximation
involving positive emotions generally, perhaps due simply to reward involvement.
However, there is some evidence that one sort of positive emotion is perhaps
particularly significant for aesthetic feeling. That emotion is attachment, the sort of
bonding one feels in parent/child relations, companionate love, and as one compo-
nent of romantic love. (On the evidence here, see Hogan 2014a, b and Koelsch 2013,
pp. 293–295.) If indeed attachment is especially important in fostering a feeling of
beauty, then we would expect prototypes with a strong attachment component to
be particularly germane to aesthetic response. More exactly, we would expect to
find that the relevant prototypes stress attachment-based memories in averaging.
These memories may concern literary works to which we feel attachment, places or
characters to which we feel attachment, or real people to whom we feel attachment.
In the case of facial beauty, for example, it would seem that our prototypes bearing
on aesthetic feeling should stress the faces of attachment figures. Here we have
another source of individual output variability, since our attachment figures differ
greatly.
In my view, the attachment variable is likely to be the most important. Some
authors appear to agree. I have argued elsewhere that in Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf
presents an implicit account of beauty as largely attachment based (Hogan 2013).
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Sappho wrote that people say many different things are beautiful, but her claim is
for “whatever one loves” (Barnard 1958, p. 41). Shakespeare suggests the point in
sonnet 130—“My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the sun [ : : : ] And yet, by heaven,
I think my love as rare/As any she belied with false compare” (in Bevington 1992, p.
1643). Taking up a broader, cultural source, Khan recounts that, when the legendary
Arabic lover, Majnu, was asked about how he could be entranced by Layla’s beauty
since, in fact, she was “rather plain,” he responded, “My Layla must be seen with
my eyes” (1997, p. xxi). In each case, the point seems to be that a sense of beauty
is bound up with attachment, at least in particular cases. The present analysis adds
to this observation the idea that a history of attachment bonds might actually affect
the prototypes through which one responds to targets as beautiful or not beautiful.
When I first began formulating these ideas, I was struck by the degree to which
they explained my judgments about faces. Beyond faces, my sense of literary beauty
seems to be affected by books that I “love”; cinematic beauty, by films that I “love,”
and so on. Sticking to the case of faces for the moment, it seems clear that my
aesthetic response to Tanuja is in part the result of my attachment relations to my
wife over the course of the past three decades. Lalita (see http://www.koausa.org/
Books/Sukeshi/index.html) is clearly more similar to Tanuja than to Miley Cyrus.
Indeed, the effect of my attachment relation here is made even clearer if I contrast
Tanuja with a woman that I considered strikingly beautiful when I was 15, Joey
Heatherton. In looking at these faces, I am struck by the degree to which the young
Heatherton resembles Cyrus, suggesting that my aesthetic response at 15 was much
closer to that of Maxim Magazine than after 30 years of attachment bonding.
The case of my wife indicates that prototypes for aesthetic response may be
altered in adulthood. However, the case with my male prototype may be different.
Here, the obvious connection is with my father (see Fig. 1), my primary attachment
object in childhood.
(Though not shown in this photograph, for many years my father even had pencil
moustache, making his appearance even more similar to that of Raj Kapoor. I should
note that I picked Tanuja and Raj Kapoor as good examples of my aesthetic response
before I thought of explaining my aesthetic preferences in terms of attachment
bonds.) This may point to the importance of critical period experiences. Indeed,
Fig. 1 The author (age
23 months) and his father
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as my primary attachment figure, my father may have contributed to my larger
prototype of a beautiful face. It is striking to me that the putatively most beautiful
man and woman, Josh Hartnett and Miley Cyrus, actually look somewhat alike. In
contrast, my own choices for aesthetic preference—Tanuja and Raj Kapoor—are
somewhat similar as well. This suggests that people may have a broader, non-
gendered facial prototype that is to some extent particularized and differentiated
into gender-specific prototypes in contrastive sub-categorization. If so, then it may
be that my critical period experiences facilitated the adult change in my aesthetic
prototype. Put simply, my wife’s face exerted a greater effect on my facial averaging
in part because its effects were not entirely dissimilar to those of my father’s face—a
striking case of complex, variant responses developing through universal principles.
Of course, it is difficult to say just how critical period experiences bear on
works of art, as opposed to faces. It is possible that such experiences affect some
domains of aesthetic response and not others. However, critical period experiences
are clearly central to attachment. In consequence, if attachment is indeed crucial
for a feeling of beauty, it seems likely that critical period experiences are important
for our aesthetic response to works of art, at least in this respect. To take, once
again, a personal example—some of my most intense aesthetic experiences bear on
mystical literature, such as the poems of Rumi. Moreover, I seem to have a particular
preference for mystical poetry relating to female divinity, prominently including
many Bengali Goddess poems (see McDermott et al. 2001), which stand (perhaps
with Rumi) as a paradigm of aesthetic excellence for me. This is to some degree
surprising, since I am not religious. However, my earliest aesthetic experiences
were bound up with Catholicism, and particularly to my family’s Marianism, with
its specific devotion to Our Lady of Częstochowa, or the “Black Madonna.” It
seems likely that these critical period experiences are affecting my current aesthetic
preferences in literature and art.
5 Conclusion
In sum, it may seem at first that any assertion of aesthetic universals is undermined
by the diversity of taste. However, this apparent contradiction dissolves when we
examine the issue more carefully. First, we must distinguish between objective or
essential beauty, social norms for beauty, and the psychology of aesthetic response.
We set aside the first usage, since it is difficult to make sense of the idea of essential
beauty as something parallel to, say, the chemical composition of water. The second
and third meanings require us to make a further distinction, that between principles
and the output of principles. In physics, the laws of nature produce different results
when applied in different conditions. The same point holds for social norms of
beauty and principles of the psychology of beauty. In both cases, we might give
universal accounts of beauty without thereby requiring that the observable outcomes
of the universals be uniform.
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There is evidence pointing toward two important cognitive contributors to
aesthetic response: non-habituated pattern recognition and prototype approxima-
tion. There also appear to be two particularly important motivational systems:
endogenous reward and attachment. If the principles governing aesthetic response
are indeed governed largely by these four factors, our universals actually predict that
there will be considerable diversity in outputs, which is to say in feelings of beauty.
Among other things, our encoding of targets thus our ability to isolate patterns
will vary, as will our proneness to habituation and our reward system sensitivity.
Our categorizations will differ, often in terms of specificity, thus changing what
prototypes are activated for a particular target. Our actual prototypes will be
different due to individual variety of experience, context, emotional variables, and
other factors. In short, the currently most plausible universals of beauty not only do
not require uniformity of output; they are not even compatible with uniformity of
output.
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Why We Are Not All Novelists
Shaun Gallagher
Abstract In this chapter I consider one of the necessary conditions for being
a novelist, the ability to open up and sustain a fictional world. My approach
will draw from psychopathology, phenomenology and neuroscience. Using the
phenomenological concept of “multiple realities,” I argue that the novelist is in some
ways like and in some ways unlike someone who experiences delusions insofar
as the novelist can enter into a sustained engagement with an alternative reality.
I suggest, however, that, compared with the delusional subject, the novelist has
better control of the mechanisms that allow for this sustained engagement.
Keywords Multiple realities • Delusions • Capgras • Creativity • Novelist
The title of this paper derives from a Times Literary Supplement essay by Daniel
Dennett (1988).1 This was the original essay in which Dennett outlined his concept
of narrative self as abstract center of narrative gravity. According to Dennett, we
cannot help but spin narratives about ourselves—some of them fictional. Quite
obviously, however, in another sense, we are not all novelists in the way that Henry
James, Jane Austen, or Franz Kafka are novelists. These novelists have a talent for
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spinning stories that seemingly involves an ability to imagine a sustained scenario
and to portray characters in an invented world. In this paper, I consider one of the
necessary but not sufficient conditions for being a novelist (and possibly other kinds
of creative artists), connected with an idea of creativity that involves the ability to
open up and sustain a fictional world. My approach will draw from psychology,
phenomenology and neuroscience. It will also involve an extended detour through
psychopathology.
1 Two Experiments from Stanford
Let me start by considering a now classic experiment—the Stanford Prison Exper-
iment (Zimbardo 1973). In this experiment, 24 male students played the roles
of prisoners and guards in a mock prison at Stanford University to study the
psychology of imprisonment. The planned 2-week experiment was cancelled after
6 days because an external visiting researcher was shocked at the behavior of
the “guards” who were brutalizing and degrading the “prisoners.” She insisted
it be stopped for ethical reasons. Indeed, five of the previously healthy student
“prisoners” were suffering from extreme stress and pathological behavior; the others
were in a “zombie-like” attitude entirely submissive to domineering guards. Despite
their treatment, the participants stayed in the game and forgot they were free to
leave. Even the research staff and experimenters (who went home in the evenings)
went along with the guards’ behavior when at the experiment site.
A more recent experiment from Stanford is Natalie Phillips’ Jane Austen
experiment (Thompson and Vedantam 2012). This is an ongoing cross-disciplinary
fMRI study at Stanford. Subjects read a chapter of one of Austen’s novels employing
one of two styles of attention: close reading (literary analysis) or pleasure reading.
The results have shown that brain activity goes far beyond differences in “executive
function” or attentional mechanisms. Absorbed or immersed reading of Jane Austen
showed activation of areas across the entire brain—not just language areas and
attention areas, but also “areas associated with physical activity and movement, parts
of the brain we use to place ourselves spatially in the world, as though the readers
were actually physically present in the story” (Natalie Phillips, cited in Thompson
and Vedantam 2012). It seems that it’s not just the whole brain that is involved, but
that changes in experiences of self and environment are involved.
In both of these Stanford University experiments, for better or for worse, the
participants found themselves immersed in scenarios that are not commensurable
with their everyday reality. In the case of reading a novel, one gets immersed in a
world that opens up on the page. In the prison experiment, the participants seemed
to get immersed in a reality that went beyond what they were really trying to do—
they lost track of the fact that it was a psychology experiment and that they were
doing science. How should we explain this?
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2 The Phenomenology of Multiple Realities
What happens in these experiments is not merely cognitive; one way we might
think about this is to refer to what the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (1974)
called “multiple realities” or “finite provinces of meaning,” following a suggestion
made by William James (1890, II, pp. 291–306) about sub-universes or sub-worlds.
Schutz described paramount reality as the reality of shared everyday meanings and
practices that we normally engage in. This is the default everyday world where we
work, earn our salary, socialize, enjoy family life, and so forth. But there are also
multiple other, alternative “realities” that take us away from everyday or paramount
reality. We find them by reading a novel, attending a theatrical play or the cinema,
playing a videogame. In such cases, we escape into a different sort of reality that
opens up on the page, on the stage, or on the screen.
Entering into such alternative realities involves not just an intellectual transition;
the status of the self changes. The participants in the Stanford prison experiment
were surprised by a complete change in their own behavior that was atypical and
contrary to how they normally thought of themselves. In reading a novel, I may
not have a role to play as myself; or I may modulate my self-narrative to fit an
appropriate role within the alternative reality. I may identify with one or more of
the characters presented in these different media. In dreams—or even daydreams
or various fantasies—I may more actively play a part as myself, or as a modified
variation of myself, but not one that I usually play in my everyday reality.
Pretend play in childhood may be a forerunner of what we experience in the
transition to an alternative reality. Pretend play has traditionally been defined as
“symbolic play” involving linguistic capabilities (Huttenlocher and Higgins 1978)
and internal representational and intellectualist meta-representational capacities
(Leslie 1987). It’s possible, however, to take a less intellectualistic or cognitivist
and a more enactivist approach to pretend play.
Following a more enactive view, for example, Zuzanna Rucinska (2014) suggests
that the ability to see playful affordances in objects (Currie 2004), combined with
embodied actions, is sufficient for constituting some basic types of pretend play.
Sensorimotor skills take over the role of off-line imaginative capacities; they provide
support for on-line perceptual-imaginative capacities based on direct perception,
where the seeing of affordances motivates action. For example, 18-month old
infants, with presumably limited linguistic and conceptual capacities relative to
adult cognition, are capable of basic object-substitution pretense, as in the example
of pretending that a banana is a phone (e.g., Sainsbury 2009). It seems unlikely,
however, that the infant is engaging in a manipulation of propositions, symbols,
or offline representations in order to effect the pretense. In such pretend play,
the infant literally manipulates the banana—grasps it and puts it to her ear. In
doing so, specifically, in the doing itself, she treats the banana metaphorically.
The metaphor at stake, however, is not sitting someplace in her head; it’s in her
hand and in the movement that she makes with the banana. She constitutes the
metaphor by her action. She, in effect, enacts the metaphor. This can happen,
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as Mitchell (2002, p. 8) puts it, “within any medium—including bodily actions,
gestures and sounds [ : : : ] and has considerable consequence, in that it allows
organisms to experience something as something else—a doll as a baby, a stick
as a horse [ : : : ] which is essential for pretence.”
Seeing or imagining an affordance is not a passive process; it involves a
transformation—it involves acting-as-if or seeing something as something else. On
the overly-intellectualist view, imaginative transformation is simply to “substitute
one thought content for another,” thus, “accessing and controlling inputs (beliefs
and desires) to the acts of imaginative projection that underpin pretence” (Currie
and Ravenscroft 2002, p. 140). This interpretation relies heavily on belief-like states
and thinking processes to underpin such abilities. “In pretence one acts under a
supposition, for example, that the box I am sitting in is a car; in suppositional mode
one can also consider an idea, draw consequences from it, consider the evidence for
it, and compare it with other ideas” (Currie 2004, p. 233). It’s not clear, however,
that the infant is doing any of this when she literally grasps the banana as a phone
or drives the box as a car.
The point is that entering an alternative reality is not just a matter of an
intellectual change; and it is not just a matter of sensory-motor contingencies either.
As Rucinska points out with respect to pretend play, affective and intersubjective
dimensions are also involved. My actions or virtual actions are often different
in these different realities than they are in everyday existence. I may experience
existential changes involving a transformation of background familiarity, different
involvements, feelings, and saliencies, all adding up to different senses of reality
(see Ratcliffe 2008).
The “realities” and the rules that apply within them are not necessarily commen-
surable with each other. From the perspective of everyday reality, “I didn’t really
slay a dragon; rather, I was playing a game.” There are normally clear transitions as
I move from one reality to another. The theater, for example, is a kind of doorway
into a different reality. At some level, when I enter into a virtual world, I keep
track of that fact from the perspective of everyday reality. I know at some level, for
example, that I am playing a game. I can distance myself from the various roles that
I might play or fantasize about. In this respect, immersion in the alternative reality
may be by degree—typically, it’s relatively easy for me to enter or leave it. One
possible exception to this ease of transition from one reality to another can be found
in cases of delusion.
3 Delusions
In working out how we transition from one reality to another, the case of delusion
offers some important clues. Here I need to make a long detour through a discussion
of delusion before I can get back to the issue of why it is that we are not all novelists.
The understanding of delusions in fields of psychiatry, psychology, and phi-
losophy of mind has been formed by orthodox conceptions of cognition; in this
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regard, delusions are understood in terms of various things going wrong inside
the head of the subject. Many theorists explain delusions in terms of represen-
tational/computational conceptions of the mind and brain, and they are clinically
characterized in terms of belief-desire (folk) psychology. In the influential DSM 4,
delusion is defined as: “a false belief based on incorrect inference about external
reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the
contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s
culture or subculture.”2
Some accounts of delusions are top-down or rationalist (Campbell 2001); such
approaches retain an overly-intellectualized view of delusions as problems with
self-referential theory of mind or self-narrative (e.g., Graham and Stephens 1994;
Stephens and Graham 2000). In discussing delusions of control and thought
insertion, for example, Graham and Stephens, following Dennett and Flanagan, refer
to “our proclivity for constructing self-referential narratives.” The fact that we are
all novelists, in Dennett’s sense, allows us to explain our behavior retrospectively.
“Such explanations amount to a sort of theory of the person’s agency or intentional
psychology” (1994, p. 101). Subjects typically make sense of their actions retro-
spectively in the context of a set of consistent beliefs and desires.
[Normally] the subject’s sense of agency regarding her thoughts [ : : : ] depends on her belief
that these mental episodes are expressions of her intentional states. That is, whether the
subject regards an episode of thinking occurring in her psychological history as something
she does, as her mental action, depends on whether she finds its occurrence explicable in
terms of her theory or story of her own underlying intentional states. (Graham and Stephens
1994, p. 102).
Delusions, in this view, involve inferential mistakes that first show up at the
attributional level where we make judgments about agency. “On our account, what
is critical is that the subject find her thoughts inexplicable in terms of beliefs about
her intentional states” (Graham and Stephens 1994, p. 105).
Other accounts of delusions are bottom-up or empiricist (Hohwy and Rosenberg
2005; Gallagher 2004). On this view, problems with the sense of agency in regard
to delusions of control would show up initially at the level of first-order experience,
that is, in our pre-reflective experience or feeling rather than judgment of agency.
Such anomalous experience would likely be due to disruptions in neuronal processes
that correlate with the pre-reflective sense of agency for action, and have been
2There is some improvement in defining delusion in DSM-5, insofar as there is no mention of “false
belief,” but it is still cast in terms of belief and the notion of veracity is still present: “Delusions are
fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. [ : : : ] Delusions are
deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not understandable to same-culture peers and do
not derive from ordinary life experiences. [ : : : ] The distinction between a delusion and a strongly
held idea is sometimes difficult to make and depends in part on the degree of conviction with which
the belief is held despite clear or reasonable contradictory evidence regarding its veracity.”
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explained in terms of sensory-motor comparator (Frith 1992) or filtering (Langland-
Hassan 2008) models. Retrospective attributions or judgments of agency, rather than
originating the problem, would be reports (possibly veridical reports) of this first-
order experience.
Neither top-down accounts nor bottom-up accounts, however, on their own, are
able to explain all aspects of delusions. Top-down/rationalist accounts refer to
problems with framework beliefs or propositions (Campbell 2001) or, as we’ve
seen, faulty introspective attribution (Graham and Stephens 1994). Some aspects
of delusions remain puzzling, however. (1) The mechanism problem: top-down
accounts fail to give a good explanation of how or why things go wrong on the
neuronal level—if they did, the explanation would become bottom-up or hybrid. (2)
The consistency problem: not all of the subject’s beliefs (even those governed by
a problematic framework belief) are delusional. Why are attributions or judgments
so selective? For example, one finds inconsistencies in the case of Capgras delusion
where a subject may claim that his wife is an imposter but fail to wonder what
happened to his “real” wife. (3) The double bookkeeping problem: patients don’t
always act on their delusional beliefs. If delusions are beliefs (albeit false and fixed),
folk psychology predicts that they will be acted upon.
Likewise, bottom-up/empiricist accounts, where delusions are not considered
false beliefs but primarily anomalous experiences, are unable to explain a number
of problems. These accounts fail to solve: (1) The poverty of experience problem:
anomalous or alien experiences are not sufficient to explain the floridly complex and
extravagant delusions that are sometimes found in advanced schizophrenia. (2) The
specificity problem: despite the putative neural dysfunction (a broken mechanism
of some kind), not all of the subject’s experiences are delusional, and there is some
commonality of theme among the delusional ones. For example, some actions are
experienced as controlled, but not all actions; and some familiar people seem to be
imposters while others do not. If neural dysfunction is only occasional, however,
then delusions should be arbitrary, but they’re more consistent than that.
Still other accounts are hybrid, combining elements of top-down and bottom-
up explanations (e.g., Garety et al. 2001; Kapur 2003). These may be two-factor
accounts where a first factor (some neuronal problem) causes an anomalous expe-
rience, and a second factor, e.g., retrospective attribution confounds the experience
and takes it to the more extravagant extremes. This may get around the poverty of
experience problem. But two factor approaches tend to be either more top-down
(the delusion originates in the retrospective attribution) or more bottom-up (the
experience itself is delusional), and they respectively run into one or more of the
leftover problems mentioned above.
Notice, however, that on all of these accounts, delusions are still “in the
head”—delusions are either the result of something going wrong at a cognitive or
metacognitive, or introspective level—in the mind—or something going wrong at a
neuronal or neurotransmitter level—in the brain—generating aberrant experience—
in the mind. Of course, it seems right to say that delusions are “in the head” since
they do not reflect the world as it objectively exists and they clearly involve some
brain dysfunction. But the fact that not all problems can be resolved by these
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explanations suggests that something important may be missing in these approaches.
Here’s one way of putting it: rationalist and empiricist models feature “a bodiless
subject with no incarnated habitus in its phylogenetic past, with no roots in the
social community in which it has grown [and in which the] emotional component
is relegated to a secondary place, a mere accompaniment, without a constitutional
role” (Varela and Depraz 2004, p. 156; 2005, p. 64).
The orthodox approaches to cognition that inform our understanding of delusion
have been challenged by embodied, enactive, externalist theories, with roots in
the phenomenological tradition. On these alternative conceptions, the experiencing
subject is in-the-world (Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty)—the subject is not, first
and foremost, an intellectual creature who perceives the world objectively and then
formulates her beliefs about this and accordingly acts upon those beliefs. Rather, the
experiencing subject is primarily an embodied pragmatic agent who finds herself
already physically, affectively, and socially situated in a world that is defined as a
set of practical involvements. This phenomenological approach is reflected in Karl
Jaspers’ view of delusion.
To say simply that a delusion is a mistaken idea [or belief] which is firmly held by the patient
and which cannot be corrected gives only a superficial and incorrect answer to the problem
[ : : : ] All experience of reality [ : : : ] has a root in the practice of living [ : : : ] Delusion
proper [ : : : ] implies a transformation in our total awareness of reality (Jaspers 1913/1963,
pp. 93–94).
On this view, the “world” (or reality) is not an objectively defined physical place,
but consists of, in some respects, a set of affordances (Gibson) and emotional
saliencies that we relate to. What would an account of delusion look like on
approaches that suggest that delusions are generated in a system that includes brain,
body, and (physical, social and cultural) environment—the idea that a delusional
subject is existentially in-the-world—in a world with specific kinds of affordances,
and emotional saliencies? Could such an account solve some of the leftover
problems that remained unresolved in the standard approaches?
4 Delusion as an Alternative Reality
I’ve argued (2009) that the concept of multiple realities, as found in Schutz (1974),
may give us a better account of delusions. I’ve proposed this not as a causal
explanation of delusions but as a more adequate characterization that would provide
a framework for any such explanation. The idea is that one might enter into a
delusional reality just as one might enter into a dream reality, a fictional reality,
or a virtual reality. Like other multiple realities, some delusional realities are more
or less cut off from one’s everyday reality; they may be incommensurable with the
normal rules of reason that govern one’s everyday normal lifeworld, and they may
offer a different set of affordances and saliencies.
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Consider a description offered by Renee in Autobiography of a Schizophrenic
Girl (Sechehaye 1968).
[A jug appeared] not as something to hold water and milk, a chair not as something to sit
in—but as having lost their names, their functions and meanings; they became ‘things’ and
began to take on life, to exist. (cited by Sass 1992, p. 118).
This signals a change in affordances offered by things in her environment. If I
am truly engaged in an alternative reality (even a delusional reality), it is not simply
or primarily that I adopt an alternative set of beliefs or values. Rather, I may enter
into it body and soul, or to some varying lesser degree. Objects may have different
affordances—jugs, chairs, bananas, cardboard boxes—offer different possibilities
in pretend or delusional realities. The delusional world has a certain “presence” and
salience that makes it more than a belief or a product of an intellectual exercise.
I am in-the-world of the play, the film, the game, etc., to some degree, perhaps
maintaining some anchor or some free-floating or vague awareness that this is just
a play, or film, or game; and perhaps to a higher degree (and sometimes fully), I am
in-the-world of delusion.
Unlike other multiple realities, the delusional reality may be “firmly sustained
[and] is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or
subculture” (DSM-4). Even if it is firmly sustained, this may vary in degree—
more or less comprehensive or pervasive, more or less “firmly sustained”—so in
some cases the subject may interact with others or objects in everyday reality in a
close to normal way. For example, in some rare cases of Capgras Delusion, there
is sometimes a rare doubling of objects. A person may complain that the tools
in his tool chest are not his, but replacements. But this may have no practical
effect—he will still work with the tools as if they were his (Ellis 1996; Dreyfus
1987; Kafka 1989). Likewise, a Capgras patient may complain that his wife is an
imposter when he sees her, but has no problem talking with her on the phone. In
some cases of delusion, then, the deluded subject may live according to this double
bookkeeping—one foot in the delusional world, one foot in everyday, paramount
reality. In extreme cases, however, the delusional reality rather than everyday reality
becomes paramount.
In these two regards—that is, in offering alternative affordances and in being a
matter of degree—delusional realities may be similar to other alternative realities.
In other regards, they may be different. Realities created in theater, film, novels,
and games are socially constructed realities, they are for others, and by definition
are understandable to many people. In contrast, delusions are more like dreams;
they are in some regards idiosyncratic, or as Louis Sass (1994, 2004) puts it,
“quasi-solipsistic.” The delusional subject “inhabits a world radically alien to that
of common sense” (Sass 1992). Alternative realities, including delusions, however,
may share certain themes. Feeling controlled by others or seeing others as imposters,
and so forth, are themes that may have their origin in a particular culture or e.g. in
literary works.
If delusion involves entering into a delusional reality, this has implications for the
notion of veridicality as well. To think of delusion as a mistaken belief, for example,
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is not just to remain too cognitive; it may also target the wrong world. The delusion
may not be about “external” or everyday reality, but may be tied to an alternative
reality, in the same way that events that take place in a play are tied to a fictional
reality. If I believe that Hamlet killed Polonius, this is clearly not a false belief about
the objective world, but a true belief about the fictional world. The delusional subject
is not intellectually mistaken (deluded) about the everyday world; he’s living in a
delusional world.
5 Welcome to the Hotel California
My aim here has not been to offer a causal explanation of delusion; rather, I’ve
intended to adjust the framework in which we might be able to find a proper
explanatory account that could address some of the leftover problems that the overly
cognitive, “in-the-head” explanations have been unable to solve. The multiple reality
framework is nonetheless consistent with something like a hybrid account—it can
integrate both top-down and bottom-up explanations, since it does not rule out
explanatory contributions in terms of brain dysfunction or higher-order cognition.
But this framework importantly includes other contributories—including embodied,
affective, environmental, social and cultural factors. The concept of a delusional
reality on this account is defined across all of these factors. Elsewhere, I’ve tried
to show how this framework has sufficient resources to address the various leftover
problems outlined above (Gallagher 2009). Here, however, I will focus on only one
of these problems—the mechanism problem—and show how solving this problem
may get us closer to an account of why we are not all novelists.
One might easily raise an objection against the alternative multiple realities
framework: As a broad, phenomenologically inspired framing hypothesis, this
proposal has not identified any particular causal mechanisms that would explain
how delusions come about. Even if one could resort to a bottom-up account to
explain the strange or alien aspects of anomalous experience as due to neural
dysfunctions, this doesn’t give us a specific mechanism to account for the transition
into a delusional reality. Here, I want to give a twofold reply. First, if being in
a delusional reality is more than being in a particular belief state and is more
than simply experiencing an anomalous perception, the full mechanism may not
be reducible to just neural dysfunction—brain states will be linked to broader
changes in embodied comportment and emotional experience within a physical,
social, and culturally contextualized environment. This actually suggests a multiple-
factor account of delusions (where factors are spread across behavior, brain, body,
experience, and physical, social, cultural environments). Second, having said that,
as one part of the explanation, there is in fact a more specific brain mechanism that
can help to account for transitions into delusional realities.
Let’s consider, for example, a multiple factor account of Capgras Delusion. In
Capgras, as we noted, a subject takes some familiar person or persons (or more
rarely, a set of objects) to be imposters (or replacements). For example, a patient
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may think his wife (but not his children or other people) is an imposter, or a
robot, or somehow taken over by alien invaders (Coltheart and Davies 2000; Passer
and Warnock 1991; Young 2000). What we know is that in Capgras, there is an
anomalous experience in face recognition caused by a neural dysfunction that slows
processing in the face recognition area of the brain. The wife’s face is recognized,
but, for the subject, something doesn’t feel right. To explain why this happens in
regard to the person’s wife but not in regard to other familiar people, one may need
to appeal to personal circumstances that involve intersubjective affect or emotion,
and the effects such affects can have on brain processes, leading to disruptions in
the dynamics of intersubjectivity and of familiar social affordances. But why should
this lead to a sense that the other is an imposter? Why imposter? Or robot? Or
body snatcher? These are concepts that we easily have from pretend play, film or
literature, or more general cultural sources (Wise 2012). In different cultures and at
different times, Capgras may manifest differently. Such cultural resources, however,
provide a kind of support for the delusion. Normally, when there is no support
for an alternative reality, the conflict, discrepancy, or difference between everyday
reality and the alternative reality is resolved in favor of paramount, default, everyday
reality. This makes the following question critical. Why does the subject stay with
or in the delusional reality—why does that reality sustain itself?
Here we can offer a causal model (in functional terms) that has to be taken as part
of the multiple factors account. Two functions in our cognitive system normally
work together: (1) The first has to do with maintaining coherence (or reducing
conflict). We may think of this sometimes as a reality testing. To be immersed in a
game, for example, we may need to suspend disbelief about the reality of the avatars
we encounter in the game environment and, at the same time, suspend belief about
being nowhere other than our living room. (2) The second is a form of executive
control that reverts the system to everyday reality. At the end of the game, we end
up back in our living room. It turns out that there are neural mechanisms in a fronto-
parietal network that correlate with these functions (Egner and Raz 2008). Conflict
monitoring involves activation in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC); executive
control involves the lateral pre-frontal cortex (lPFC).
The dACC “functions, in part, to signal the occurrence of conflicts in information
processing, thereby triggering complementary adjustments in cognitive control”
(Botnivich et al. 2004, p. 539; see van Veen and Carter 2002). fMRI studies of highly
susceptible subjects under hypnosis, for example, show that there is a decoupling
between dACC activation (conflict monitoring) and activation in lPFC (executive
control) (Egner et al. 2005; Oakley and Halligan 2009).
These mechanisms, and their proper functioning, provide part of a causal
explanation of why we are able to transition from one reality to another. Specifically,
a transition into an alternative reality involves a temporary decoupling of conflict
monitoring and executive control (which may involve reduced activation in dACC
or lPFC). This would be a normal function that allows us to enter and exit
alternative realities (from pretend play to immersion in a novel). In the case of
delusion, however, the decoupling mechanism dysfunctions—it gets stuck in the on
position—or the dynamic connection between these two brain areas fail. This failure
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of conflict monitoring or of controlled return to default reality constitutes the broken
mechanism that can explain the persistence of delusion. In the extreme, this could
be called the “Hotel California” (HC) dysfunction—making a slight adjustment to
the lyrics of the famous Eagles song: “you can check in any time you like, but you
can never leave.”
The HC dysfunction works as part of a multiple factor explanation of delusion.
For example, Capgras Delusion involves a particular pattern of dysfunction and
normal function.
(1) Some personal affective circumstance triggers a dysfunction in the face recog-
nition area and leads to an anomalous experience in regard to a specific person
(bottom up).
(2) A (normal) importation from cultural/literary sources of concepts of imposter,
robot, alien kidnapping, etc. (in different culture, we would likely see different
manifestations).
(3) The HC dysfunction: a decoupling of conflict monitoring and executive control
leading to (some degree of) immersion in the alternative reality.
A similar scheme of factors can explain other delusions.3
6 Why Everyone Is Not a Novelist
A novelist like Jane Austen, Franz Kafka, or Henry James (and possibly other kinds
of creative artists) must have an ability to create, enter into, and sustain an alternative
world, and this ability may involve a higher degree of immersion than we experience
in just reading a novel, enjoying the theater, or engaging in pretend play, and so on.
All of these things require a decoupling of conflict monitoring and executive control
functions—an ability to transition into an alternative reality and stay there for some
time—but also an ability to re-connect and use executive control to come back to
the default, everyday reality. Novelists and artists are not necessarily delusional, but
it seems likely that one necessary condition that allows for creativity in such cases is
the ability for sustained immersion in an alternative reality. This capacity builds on
a normal functioning that allows for a voluntarily decoupling of executive control
from conflict monitoring, providing an ability to imagine an alternative reality and
to stay in it for a while. This may also be a matter of degree.
3For example, thought insertion may involve (1) a neurological dysfunction (in the insula) leading
to loss of sense of agency; (2) a cultural concept of telepathy or parapsychology or religious
communication, suggesting that someone else is inserting the thought; (3) the HC dysfunction.
Cotard delusion: (1) limbic system dysfunction generating a feeling of body alienation; (2) cultural
concepts of zombies or afterlife; (3) the HC dysfunction. Even non-schizophrenic delusions such
as Somatoparaphrenia (delusional misidentification of body parts) may involve multiple factors:
(1) stroke damage to parietal cortex and/or orbital frontal area; (2) possibly a regressive narrative
that would explain why the limb seemingly belongs to someone else; (3) the HC dysfunction.
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In the case of the novelist, as in the very clear case of the child engaged in pretend
play, I want to suggest that this immersion is not just an intellectual accomplishment.
To the extent that the proper functioning of the frontal executive control is involved,
we can note that this is connected with automatic, unconscious processes that inhibit
motor activation across all aspects of cognition (McBride et al. 2012). When we
willingly enter into an alternative reality, however, we do not want to be continually
distracted by constant reminders from the conflict-monitoring alarm system telling
us that the fictional world we are enjoying is not real (Wise 2012). So we should
expect ongoing activation in lPFC doing inhibitory work for all of the other areas
and not so much in the conflict monitoring area—dACC. If activation in the dACC
area for conflict monitoring is in some sense allowing entry into an alternative
reality, it may also be allowing various affective, motor, and embodied processes
to be activated and then, to various degrees, inhibited by the lPFC. Accordingly,
it is no surprise that in studies like Natalie Phillips’s Jane Austen experiments
at Stanford, readers immersed in the alternative reality of the novel will show
activation in sensory, motor, and emotion areas (and not just language or attention
areas). In an alternative reality, I can get excited and emotional, or remain cool
under pressure; I may adopt a certain physical posture, in some cases I may act
virtually (inhibiting physical movement of my body). I may engage in such action
explicitly as in pretend play or theatrical acting. Sometimes, as I come back out of
such realities, everyday reality can seem oddly unreal in relation to what I have
been doing. Full existential engagement in a fictional world requires the ability
to temporarily suspend disbelief—and to some degree, to decouple the executive
control processes from the conflict monitoring processes.
Both the Stanford prison experiment and the Jane Austen experiment suggest
that this decoupling process is more complex than just the functioning of a brain
mechanism. To differentiate between the immersed reader, the Stanford prison
participants, the novelist and the delusional subject, two things, which we have
already discussed, are critical. First, there are differences of degree, where we may
expect the immersed reader to be more easily called back to everyday reality, in
contrast to the delusional subject, the Stanford prison participant, or perhaps the
novelist. Second, that these differences in degree are not reducible to the mere
function or dysfunction of brain mechanisms is clear because these differences can
be modulated by the amount of support that the alternative reality gets from culture,
social practices, and, importantly, other people. The Stanford prison experiment
developed into something close to a mass delusion, not because of some initial
dysfunction in each individual’s brain, but precisely because of the ongoing support
for the alternative reality provided by the other participants. The readers of Jane
Austen, as they are immersed in their reading, have only Jane Austen and her
characters to support the alternative reality of the novel. Although the novelist
may find intersubjective support for her writing, understood as a particular social
practice, and although she usually intends the fiction to be for others (her readers),
and may take her audience into consideration, the actual creation of the fictional
reality may involve something closer to a quasi-solipsistic process. In this regard,
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the novelist is somewhere between the immersed reader and the delusional subject
as she enters into the alternative reality without intersubjective support.4
I conclude by mentioning one other study. Nelson and Rawlings (2010) have
shown that there is a strong overlap of schizotypal experience and the phenomenol-
ogy of the creative process in a significant sample of creative artists. Schizotypal
experience does not involve schizophrenic delusion, but Nelson and Rawlings do
suggest that their findings are consistent with the idea that
schizotypy is associated with central features of “flow”-type experience, including distinct
shift in phenomenological experience, deep absorption, focus on present experience, and
sense of pleasure. The neurologically based construct of latent inhibition may be a
mechanism that facilitates entry into flow-type states for schizotypal individuals. This may
occur by reduced latent inhibition providing a “fresh” awareness and therefore a greater
absorption in present experience, thus leading to flow-type states (2010, p. 388).
Latent inhibition, which is also a characteristic of the schizophrenia spectrum,
involves attenuated attention to stimuli upon repeated exposure and an openness to
seeing things anew, or to experiencing stimuli with a fresh awareness. The subject
may be less anchored to the default experience of reality, a less intense pull-back
to default reality and the possibility of higher absorption in seeing things anew,
allowing for ease in transitioning into and sustaining alternative realities.
To the question of why we are not all novelists, then, I propose a testable
hypothesis: one necessary (but not sufficient) condition for being a novelist or a
creative artist, compared with non-novelists/artists, is an enhanced ability for creat-
ing/entering into multiple realities and staying there longer and more consistently,
and without intersubjective support—an ability, however, that remains short of
dysfunction or delusion. Certainly there are other necessary conditions involved.
One might think of someone with an extraordinary talent for description or for
psychological character development. If that person did not have the ability to persist
in the world of the novel, however, they might have to settle for writing short stories.
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Aesthetic Relationship, Cognition,
and the Pleasures of Art
Jean-Marie Schaeffer
Abstract The paper tries to clarify the relationship between aesthetic experience
and artworks, as well as between cognition and the pleasures of art. Starting with an
analytical distinction between aesthetics and art-theory, I propose a psychologically
and phylogenetically grounded description of the mental resources on which
aesthetic experience draws. After tracing a tentative phylogeny of the cognitive
and affective resources defining aesthetic experience, I distinguish three structural
components: (a) a marked inflection towards a costly use of mental resources
(characterized by costly signaling, attention-driven cognitive dynamics, perceptual
learning, attentional overload and divergent cognitive style); (b) a real-time hedonic
calculus evaluating the properties of the attentional processing; (c) a bi-directional
feedback between attention and hedonic calculus. Finally, the paper discusses the
relationship between cognitive fluency and positive aesthetic experiences, arguing
that fluency can explain the aesthetic pleasures of art only in conjunction with a
second and opposite source of pleasure: curiosity.
Keywords Aesthetic experience • Attention • Hedonic calculus • Fluency •
Curiosity
1 Aesthetic Experience: A Preliminary Definition
I am assuming that the term “aesthetic” can be construed notionally in a way that
allows us to identify a specific type of mental relationship: a specific attitude toward
the world. This was already Kant’s hypothesis and the idea has resurfaced again
and again in philosophical aesthetics. Of course it has also been much criticized.
Most of the critics think that the very idea of aesthetic experience prevents us
from getting a true understanding of art. This criticism has been formulated by
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continental philosophy as well as by analytical philosophy. According to Hans
Georg Gadamer (1990), the idea of aesthetic experience misrepresents the ontology
of the artwork; according to George Dickie (1964), a famous analytical philosopher,
it misrepresents our relationship with art. In fact, Gadamer and Dickie disqualified
the notion of “aesthetic experience” on different grounds. Dickie argued against the
existence of a specific mental attitude—the “aesthetic attitude”—seen as a type of
attitude distinguishing the attention paid to artworks from the attention paid to other
objects, or distinguishing the “proper” attention to artworks from improper ones.
Gadamer only objected to a specific understanding of the notion of “experience:”
experience as a “subjectivist feel” (“Erlebnis”). But at the same time, he thought that
paying attention to a (valuable) artwork is an outstanding experience (“Erfahrung”):
an interpretative encounter with something that changes one’s existential outlook.
These criticisms are partly valid. “Aesthetic experience” does not refer to a
specific mental attitude or to a specific type of attention (disinterested, distanced,
and so on). And it is true also that you cannot adequately understand the ontology
of artworks in terms of aesthetic experience and that you cannot understand the
complexity of our relationship with art if you reduce it to a subjectivist feel of
qualia. But this does not disqualify the notion of “aesthetic experience.” My aim
here is to show not only that the notion of “aesthetic experience” is not vacuous, but
also that it is central for understanding our relationship with artworks.
Admittedly, the expression “aesthetic relationship”—or any semantically equiv-
alent paraphrase in some other language or some other culture—will probably
activate different representations in different individuals at different times and in
different groups or cultures. But I think it reasonable to assume that all situations
we commonly describe as “aesthetic,” or would accept to describe this way, share
two characteristics. Taken together they identify a specific intentional relationship:
– All aesthetic experiences are attentional activities. Being engaged in an aesthetic
relationship is paying attention to this or that: reading a poem, listening to
Thelonious Monk, contemplating the garden of Ryoan-ji, and so on. I take this to
imply that to engage in an aesthetic relationship means to engage in a cognitive
relationship. I use the term “cognitive” here in a very broad sense, encompassing
all perceptive, conceptual, and imaginative activities we engage in, in order to
understand the world, ourselves, and other humans. But of course nobody would
like to say that all cognitive acts are aesthetic acts. How can we distinguish
aesthetically oriented attention from other types of attention? Is there a specific
type of attention that would be aesthetic attention? Or is the cognitive dimension
only a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for something to be called an
“aesthetic experience?” Following Kant and some others, I opt for the second
branch of the alternative, although I will try to argue later that when cognition is
activated in an aesthetic setting it has a very specific profile.
– So what is the second element that, taken together with attention, will yield a
definition of “aesthetic experience” that meets our intuitions? Well, it seems
to me that in all experiences that we would accept to describe as aesthetic,
the attentional activity is regulated by the satisfaction or dissatisfaction it
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causes. This hedonic component has been recognized by almost everybody
taking a serious look at the question, even if many would be unhappy with the
words “pleasure” or “satisfaction:” they would prefer to talk of “appreciation,”
“evaluation,” “grading,” and so on. On my level of analysis, all this boils down
to satisfaction (or dissatisfaction), which boils down to hedonic valence. But not
every satisfaction or dissatisfaction will do. I shall try to show, following Kant
and cognitive psychology, that the hedonic component must be derived from
the unfolding attentional activity itself and not from its object. And, of course,
satisfaction or hedonic valence is not the last word about aesthetic experience: it
only explains the dynamics of ongoing attention.
As it stands, this definition, I agree, doesn’t take us very far. And it is not new: it
is largely a reformulation of what Kant had to say in the famous § 1 of the “Analytik
des Schönen” in the Kritik der Urteilskraft (The Critique of Judgment). But I don’t
think that it is vacuous: it catches nicely the array of phenomena that we want to take
into account when we are looking for something which could reasonably be called
“aesthetic experience.” That said, we must of course be able to give more content
to the two aspects of our tentative definition: the attentional aspect and the hedonic
aspect.
I’ll begin with the question of attention. As George Dickie rightly contended
already some 30 years ago, there seems to be no empirical backing for the idea of
the existence of a specific type of attention—which would be aesthetic attention.
But I want to defend the idea that when attention functions in an aesthetic context,
it acquires a very specific profile. It is this profile that will interest me now.
2 The Artist and the Connoisseur
“Bowerbirds” is the name given to a group of twenty or so species of passerines
living in the Pacific, notably in Australia and New Guinea. They owe their reputation
among ornithologists to the fact that males build complex and highly decorated
architectures called “bowers.” The construction is made out of shrub branches
interwoven in a remarkable way and skillfully decorated. The decorative design
consists of items of all types collected and recycled: flowers, feathers, ribbons, bottle
caps, broken glass or crockery, plastic utensils stolen from neighboring campsites,
and so on. Often, the inside wall of the bower is “painted” with a mixture of berries,
bark, charcoal, saliva, and dirt. The male bowerbird is busy with the architecture for
several months every year, building it, upgrading it, repairing it, and “refreshing it,”
for example by replacing wilted flowers.1
Why does the male invest such a huge amount of energy in a construction that
seemingly has no utilitarian function? Well, in fact it has a function: the bower is a
1For what follows, I draw from: Diamond (1983, 1986); Borgia (1986); Uy and Borgia (2000).
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central element in the male seduction strategy and in the selection process through
which the female picks out her preferred one among the would-be lovers. During the
courtship ritual, the bower fulfills successively three different roles. In the first place
it works as a visual trap: it attracts the attention of the female who then thoroughly
inspects it visually. At this stage, it functions as a signal of fitness compared to other
bowers the female has already inspected. If the result of the inspection is positive
from the point of view of the female, the bower takes on a different function: the
female moves inside to watch the second part of the seductive strategy of the male:
the parade. Once the female is inside the theater building, the male places himself in
front of it and engages in a ritualized dance and sound performance. While dancing,
he emits all sorts of sounds, partly mimetic (for example, he mimics other birds) and
partly self-mimetic (he imitates his own cries of threat). Once he has gone through
his show, he tries of course to mate with the female. At this point the bower takes
on a third function: it becomes a device which prevents forced mating (copulation):
to get at the female, the male must circle around the bower, which gives the lady the
opportunity to fly away if she prefers to do so.
As is evidenced by my talk about architecture, dance, theatre, show, and so on, I
want to suggest that the situation I am describing has important points in common
with what in humans we would call artistic creation and aesthetic experience—
sculptural and choreographic creativity on one hand, expression of preferences
grounded in experienced qualities of an attentional activity on the other. In fact, I
want to suggest that the activities of the bowerbirds are very illuminating for a better
understanding of the structure of artistic activity and aesthetic attention. My specific
target in this paper is aesthetic attention, but a short look at the artistic side may be
useful. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the productive side is easier
to access: it gives rise to artifactual and bodily incarnations which can be analyzed
directly, whereas the activity of reception is mostly perceptual and evaluative, which
means that it consists in internal processes that are more difficult to access and
assess. The second reason is that the productive activity and the receptive activity
are coordinated, co-adapted: so if we can pin down a specificity of the relevant
phenomena on the side of the male compared to other, unmarked activities of this
same male, we can tentatively assume that on the side of the female there must also
be some specificity compared to non-marked attentional activities. If this was not
so, the whole interactive process would break down (or would never have existed
on the level of phylogeny). So a better understanding of the productions of the male
can help us to describe what is going on in the black box of the female brain. And
the two taken together can help us to better understand aesthetic attention.
Of course I do not ignore that the whole questioning I just entered into may be
judged to be completely flawed. It seems to imply a form of biological reductionism
ignorant of the specificity of human cultural facts. We all know what the function of
the bowers, the parade, and the attentional activity is: it is all about sexual selection.
Which, clearly, is not the case of artistic creation and aesthetic experience. So, how
could sexual selection in animals be helpful for a better understanding of artistic
creation and aesthetic experience in humans? Well, I am not saying that sexual
selection can be helpful to understand artistic creation and aesthetic experience. I
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am only saying that the type of activities and processes that are activated in the
process of sexual selection in bowerbirds throw some light on the activities and
processes of artistic creation and aesthetic experience. What I want to say is that
what I address here, and find interesting, are the structural homologies of mental
processes and not the functional identity of behaviors. The idea is that there is a
homology on the level of the poïetic and attentional processes or, to be more precise,
a homology in the way they diverge from other unmarked productive and attentional
processes. It seems to me that such a type of questioning implies no reductionist
move, because structural homology does argue neither for nor against functional
equivalence. This is a common lesson taught as well by evolutionary biology as by
structural anthropology or system-theoretical sociology: one and the same structure
can be co-opted by different functions, and the same function can be performed by
different structures. The two-way relationship between structure and function is not
a “one to one” but a “one to many and many to one” relationship. Of course the
existence of such a structural relationship calls ultimately for an explanation. The
default explanation would be in terms of a predecessor-relationship linking sexual
selection to aesthetic attention, although I concede that in the context of our present
state of knowledge such an explanation would remain largely speculative.
But is there really a structural homology between our two sets of facts? Am I
not simply playing with vague analogies and surreptitiously anthropomorphizing
animal behavior? To neutralize this objection we must rephrase our question: if
a human being (male or female) was building the type of construction built by
the male bowerbird and if she or he was engaging in the organized sequence of
movements the male is engaging in, and if another human being (male or female)
was relating to this construction and this organized sequence of movements the way
the female bowerbird is relating to the bower and the parade of the male, wouldn’t
we say, and rightly so, that we are dealing with an artwork and with aesthetic
experience?
To answer this question, we need to take a closer look at the behaviors just
described. For the reasons already given, I’ll begin with the male. In what sense can
we defend the hypothesis of a structural homology with human artistic practices?
A first answer is that we are dealing with two sets of activities that seem to
be based on the same mental resources and the same modalities of externalizing
them. Thus the construction of the bower mobilizes the same type of procedural
competences as human art-making: the capacity of internal modeling; the ability to
translate this model into a physical three-dimensional reality; a sequential planning
of a global script split up into subroutines—construction and decoration; the
capacity to make preferential decisions when confronted with alternative solutions;
the access to a synthetic evaluation of the structure closing the whole sequence,
and so on. The same holds for the parade when compared to human dance: bodily
movements forming organized sequences not related to a transitive action-goal; a
capacity to produce rhythmic sounds forming non-random sequences not related to
first-order communication, and so on. Maybe the bird’s repertoire is largely innate
(but there must still be individual differences, because if there were no individual
differences sexual selection would break down). Maybe the behavior of the bird is
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not “intentional” in the sense human cultural activities are. Maybe the bird has no
“conscious” phenomenal experience in the way humans have. As far as I know, all
these are hotly disputed questions, but in any event, the hypothesis of a homology
of “poïetic” and attentional processes does not require a homology as far as the
levels of treatment are concerned. Of course, having or not having a phenomenal
experience of these processes makes a difference, notably in terms of feedback, but
this difference concerns the richness and plasticity of the processes and not their
nature.
One could still formulate another objection: perhaps there exists some homology,
but it certainly is not operating on the level of artistic production and on the level
of aesthetic attention, but on a more generic level, that of production of artifacts as
such and of attention as such. If this were the case, the bowerbirds would teach us
nothing interesting for artistic creation or aesthetic attention.
Well, let’s once again reflect on the bower. Its foremost characteristic is the
fact that it is a marked construction. To understand what I mean by a “marked
construction,” we must compare the bower to the nest constructed by the female.
The nest is a purely practical construction, used to breed and raise the small ones.
It can therefore be regarded as homologous to shelters constructed by humans.
The bower has no such practical function (if we except its function against forced
mating). Its central function is to be part of a display: it exhibits the value of
the male. So it is “marked” compared to the nest because it has a special status
compared to the nest—although its construction is the result of the same motor
and planning capacities. The same can be said about the parade. Its time structure
is a marked sequence: it is not the time of common interactions. It is ritualized
time. Specifically, the movements and vocalizations of the male lose their pragmatic
significance. For example, the typical cry of threat emitted by the male loses its
pragmatic significance on two levels. First, the sound is not a response to an external
stimulus: it is endogenous. Second, it is not emitted to threat the female or some
other living being: it is emitted as a display of the male’s capacity to threat.
In fact, the parade possesses several other quite remarkable characteristics. First,
behaviors which outside of the ritual have no semiotic status are transformed into
signs when they take place inside the ritualized time of the parade: body movements
and building capacities transform into signs of the male’s fitness. Second, behaviors
that have already a semiotic function outside of the ritual are transformed into meta-
signals: when the male produces the threat-signal “SKRA,” the sound does not have
the semiotic function to threat—but its phenomenological qualities (loudness and
so on) become signs of the male’s fitness. What is interesting here is the way in
which the ritual moves all activities one level up compared to their “normal” status:
non-sign becomes sign, sign becomes meta-sign.
Third, the whole process functions as a self-referential device: the bower, the
dance, and the sounds refer to themselves as an embodiment of the value of the
male. This may seem an unwarranted assertion: if, as I said, these processes are
signals or signs of the male’s fitness, doesn’t this imply that they function quite
normally in a hetero-referential way? Well, we’ll soon see that they function in a
very peculiar way, which warrants the thesis of self-referentiality.
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But before that, we must take a closer look at the partner of the male. As I
said, the behavior of the female is exclusively attentional. But this attention is very
peculiar compared to standard attention. The first point is that, like the “artistic”
activity of the male, it is embedded in a ritual time frame that is internally structured.
As we have already seen, it is sequentially organized into three phases. It starts with
the visual inspection of the bower. The second phase, initiated by the female if and
when she moves into the bower, is the phase of the parade. It is the most intriguing
part of the whole sequence as it implies a strong decoupling of the female’s attention
from the larger environment and its stimuli. The third phase is the concluding
appreciation, followed by the consent or refusal to engage in sexual intercourse. The
sexual intercourse itself does no more belong to the ritual time: it is pragmatic busi-
ness as usual. Notice that the ritual time frame can be broken off prematurely if the
female’s reaction to her inspection of the bower is negative and that the whole ritual
sequence is retrospectively disqualified if the final decision of the female is negative.
The second point, at which I alluded already, is that, like the production of
artifacts and the bodily movements of the male, the attentional sequence of the
female is cut off from its normal pragmatic function. The ritual time of the parade is
a shared time not only because the time of the male and the time of the female
are synchronized but also because both are cut off from pragmatically oriented
interactions and from normal attentional feedback with the real life environment.
The second function of the bower we encountered, that of a theater-house for the
female, can be read as the expression of this absence of pragmatic functionality:
it provides a shelter against predators and so allows the exclusive focusing on the
ritual. But the absence of any direct pragmatic function is also characteristic of
the interaction with the male partner. For the ritual to work, the female must be
able to handle the whole situation as one not of direct interaction, but of “display.”
She must process the signals emitted by the male as self-referential signals, that
is to say, as signals whose content is not their standard one, for example a threat,
but their exemplifying function: they denote what they are the result of, a certain
degree of male fitness. Processing signs in this way is a very complex undertaking.
The female must be able to neutralize all direct feedback loops, that is, all loops
where a stimulus is paired with the direct behavioral response it normally produces.
Thus she must not look at the berries decorating the bower as fruits to peck at
and eventually to eat, but as objects to be processed only attentionally. The same
holds true for the sounds emitted by the male: she must not react to their standard
function—for example, by flying away when he emits threatening cries—but she
must attend to and appreciate their internal phenomenal qualities. In short, she must
be able to cut off her perceptual processes from the ecological context. The standard
cycles of ecologically embedded perception are the cycle of perception-reaction-
perception and the cycle of action-perception-action. During the mating ritual these
cycles are replaced by the dynamics of an attentional flow regulated by an online
evaluation of the phenomenal qualities of the perceived stimuli (intensity, color,
rhythm, and so on). Of course, the non-pragmatically oriented interaction and, more
specifically, the self-teleological dynamics of appreciative attention are imbedded
in a larger sequence of actions—the process of sexual reproduction—which is of
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utmost pragmatic importance in the life of the partners. This shows that auto-
teleological processes can be, and most of the time are, instrumental for achieving
pragmatic ends: auto-teleology is often hetero-teleologically motivated. This is also
the case with aesthetic experience.
It follows from the preceding description that the actions of the male and the
attention of the female share important characteristics. The most interesting one
is the following: all these activities are costly in terms of energy expenditure and
risk exposition. The architecture involves a huge investment of time, energy, and
ingenuity, as does the parade, whether it be dancing or singing. The same holds for
the attentional processes of the female bird: they are very intense, near to what in
psychology is called attentional overload. And of course the whole ritual is handi-
capping in terms of maximization of survival: the male and the female are focusing
all their energies and attention on the ritual, and they process the ecological real-life
context only in a marginal way; most of their resources, notably their attentional
resources, are being mobilized by the situation of the parade. This may appear to be
somewhat of a mystery if seen in the context of natural selection processes.
In biology there is a theory which has been developed especially to account for
such paradoxical situations. It is called the theory of costly or honest signaling. It
arose in the context of evolutionary biology to account for situations of incomplete
knowledge, that is to say, situations of communicative interaction about attributes
varying in quality, intensity, or degree among subjects and which are difficult to
assess directly—although it is very important for the individuals to assess them
correctly.2 In the case of bowerbirds, the issue is genetic fitness. For the female,
it is important to correctly assess the fitness of the male; for the male, it is very
important to signal his fitness. At the same time, fitness is very difficult to assess in a
direct way, which means that we are in a typical situation of incomplete knowledge,
which in turn opens up the possibility of cheating. The theory tries to explain how
individuals who differ in terms of fitness and whose interests diverge may still obtain
mutual benefit from reporting honestly their qualities instead of trying to cheat. But
how can one prevent cheating? The theory of costly signaling answers that the only
way to prevent cheating is to choose a signal that cannot be dishonest. This condition
implies that the signal must be such that its very existence is the incarnation of
the value it signals. Such a signal cannot be simulated: if you do not possess the
qualities you want to signal you cannot signal them, because the signal operates
through exemplification. The best known example is the peacock’s tail: the tail is
objectively disabling because it is a major handicap when the bird soars to escape a
predator. How could evolution select a trait that handicaps its possessor? Well, the
answer is: it has been selected precisely because it is a handicap.3 Being a handicap
makes it an honest signal: it depends directly on the qualities of the individual who
exhibits it. If the male peacock has survived until the mating season although the tail
is a disabling feature, then the tail is an honest signal of his fitness and the female
2See Smith and Harper (1995); Lachmann et al. (2001).
3See Zahavi (1975); Zahavi and Zahavi (1997).
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can take it as direct proof of that. Now, the bigger and the more colorful the tail is,
the more handicapping it is. This explains why females tend to choose always the
longest and the most colorful tail. This dynamics can lead to what has been called
“a runaway process”, because every generation of females selects among the males
the ones with the most colorful and longest tails; in the long run, the mean level of
colorfulness and length of tail of the males will rise.4 If this process would not come
to a halt, it would open a very grim perspective for the male population and more
generally for the species. Happily, the cost vs. benefice balance will at some moment
halt this potentially self-destructive dynamic. The logical possibility of a runaway
process illustrates very nicely the difference between costly signals and inexpensive
signals. A costly signal has to be paid cash. This is not the case with inexpensive
signaling. Take language for example: it is the prototype of an inexpensive signaling
device and, as we all know, you generally don’t have to pay cash for your utterances.
That is the reason why language can so easily be used for simulating and cheating. It
is easy to signal in a linguistic way qualities that you don’t possess. And you might
even wonder if I am not doing it now. Who knows?
The theory of costly signaling is heuristically very powerful: it is a tool which
helps us to link together facts studied by many different disciplines: evolutionary
biology, anthropology of religion, economic theory (the problem of conspicuous
consumption), sociology (theories of symbolic capital), and so on. Bird and Smith
(2005) have shown how the theory of costly signaling is able to bridge the gap
between social anthropology (which emphasizes the intangible relationships, self-
representations and symbolic representations, the question of status symbols, etc.)
and “naturalistic” approaches seen in terms of selfish but socially immersed indi-
viduals. They note: “By paying attention to the problem of maintaining credibility
when individuals are taking interdependent decisions (concerning joint alliances,
conflicts, relations of trust, etc.) in situations of incomplete information, signaling
theory gives us a new interpretation of symbolic activities such as the aesthetic
development, initiation rites, the ethnic boundaries, the ceremonial festivities, the
circulation of wealth, conspicuous consumption, monumental architecture, religious
commitment and the supply of altruistic goods” (p. 222). As far as aesthetics is
concerned, the heuristic function of the costly signaling model resides in the fact
that it allows us to locate art and aesthetics in the broader context of other social
facts to which they are associated in most societies, such as religion, ritual, politics,
conspicuous consumption and so on. The fact that aesthetics is only one of the
multiple domains of costly signaling in humans loosens somewhat its exclusive ties
with sexual selection, although it remains important to stress that what marks their
common specificity among the forms of costly signaling is the fact that in both cases
the signaling is realized through a display which asks for a specific type of attention.
But as it stands, the theory, when applied directly to problems studied by social
sciences, has several drawbacks.
4See Grafen (1990).
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The first is that it is not sure that every costly signal is honest and that
every honest signal is costly: cheating can sometimes be very costly and in non-
competitive relationships, even inexpensive signaling can be honest. After all, acts
of language are sometimes honest, aren’t they? But these difficulties imply neither
that costly signaling does not exist nor that it is not mostly honest.
The second problem is that it is not always clear whether the social facts which
the theory is supposed to explain are really costly signals, the danger being that,
contrary to what happens with signaling theory in evolutionary biology, its use
in human sciences risks defining the notion of “cost” in a vague or metaphorical
manner.
The third is that when it is used in human and social sciences, costly signaling
is generally interpreted in terms of a vague functional equivalence and not of a
structural homology. When using the concept, human sciences are generally looking
for (supposedly) functional equivalents to sexual selection, like symbolic capital,
agonistic power relations, prestige politics, and so on.5 As far as art and aesthetics
are concerned, these vague functional equivalences, although they are relevant to
some extent, have no great explanatory power. They can explain why some people
collect art, why some organize lavish performances and so on, but they seem unable
to explain on a general level why people create art and why they are interested in
it even when no prestige comes into play: enjoying a movie or a poem, inventing
geometrical perspective or abstract art and so on, have not much in common with
functional equivalents of some strategy of egoistic genes.
The fourth drawback is that, generally speaking, the theory of costly signaling
is taking into account only the cost of issuing the signal: the signal is costly for
the issuer (the male bird). But what about the female? She certainly is not emitting
a costly signal, because she is emitting no signal at all. But to be illuminating for
aesthetics, the theory must be able to say something about attention. As far as I
know, very little attention has been paid to the question of the cost for the retriever
of the signal: is the retrieval inexpensive or is it costly? Well, if we think about
the behavior of the female, it appears that the costly signals emitted by the male
command, on the side of the female, a type of attention that is itself costly and
handicapping. We have seen that she has to synchronize her attentional behavior
with that of the male: she has to tune in. This implies that her attentional profile must
have the same characteristics as the “poïetic” profile of the male: loss of pragmatic
significance, focalization, heavy investment in perceptual and neurological cost,
capability of sustaining delay of decision making, risk of being attacked by a
predator, and so on. We have seen that for the ritual to work, the female, cognitively
as well as on the level of her emotional reactions, must look at the whole situation
as one not of direct interaction but of “display.” She must be able to read the signals
as self-referential signals. And to do this, she must be able, as we have seen, to
5The equivalences remain vague because sexual selection, like natural selection, is a genetic
process, which is not the case with symbolic capital, agonistic power relations, and prestige
politics.
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process all relevant stimuli—the bower structure, the decoration, the colors, the
movements, and the vocalization of the male—by neutralizing direct feedback loops
pairing a stimulus with an immediate behavioral response. Instead of the standard
stimulus-driven behavior she must switch to a self-reinforcing, attention-driven,
costly behavior. This is the price she has to pay if she wants to be able to assess if
the signal is honest: as the male can only emit the signal if he possesses the qualities
he advertises, so too can the female only get the assurance she is looking for if she is
willing and capable of assessing the signals through an attentional process which is
costly compared to standard attention. The most important point is that she can only
get the information she is looking for if she processes the signals of the male in this
costly way: it is not enough to identify them as being costly for the male, because
you cannot identify them independently of the fact of experiencing them as costly
which means experiencing them in a costly way. There is no shortcut because only
the complete sequence of the ritual gives access to the needed information.
So my tentative conclusion at this point is that once we reframe the notion
of costly signaling in a way which takes into account also the mode of attention
demanded by the emission, it can have an illuminating capacity as far as the study
of art and aesthetics is concerned.
3 Aesthetic Attention
With this in mind, it is time now to focus directly on the question of aesthetic
attention. In what way does the setting called “aesthetic experience” affect the
dynamics of attention? What are the inflections that characterize the attentional
processes occurring in an aesthetic setting compared to those occurring in standard
attentional processes? The notion of a standard attentional process is problematic,
but for my purposes this is not very important because I will not say anything
specific about it: I use it loosely as a contrasting element for the traits which I
take to be specific of attention in an aesthetic context. What I have to say about
this specificity draws heavily on cognitive psychology and I will be unable here
to go into the specifics of the experimental settings or to discuss the legitimacy of
extrapolating from these settings to the problem of aesthetically oriented attention.
But in a general way, the extrapolation of the experimental results to the case
of aesthetic attention can be justified on grounds of commonly accepted and
commonsensically formulated characteristics of aesthetic experience. I would like
to foreground three major specificities:
The aesthetic inflection of attention results in a reversal of the relative importance
of bottom-up information processing compared to top-down processing. Standard
pragmatic information processing puts emphasis on stimulus-driven, bottom-up,
schematic, and automatic treatments. In aesthetic experience, information retrieval
is more heavily attention-driven, top-down, concretizing and reflective. Now it
is important not to construe this as a dichotomy. Every attentional process is
partly stimulus-driven, bottom up, schematic, automatic, and partly attention-driven,
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top-down, concretizing, and reflective. Looking at a picture in an aesthetic way
doesn’t neutralize the pre-attentional stages of visual organization, which are
constitutively automatic, bottom-up, and so on. What happens is that aesthetic
attention, contrary to standard attention, which is driven by the norm of perceptual
and cognitive economy, does not maximize these processes but rather emphasizes,
on the contrary, the attention-driven top down ones. I think this explains why we
often consider aesthetic attention to be active and standard attention to be passive.
Of course, literally speaking, this opposition does not make much sense because
stimulus-driven, bottom-up perception is never passive, even at the pre-attentional
level: as we know, the pre-attentional processing of a visual stimulus, for example,
is made up of operations of selection, as one of the central functions of this pre-
attentional stage of information processing is the reduction of the complexity of the
proximal stimulus. But it is easy to understand why we can have the impression that
standard perception and attention are “passive”: we do not have conscious access to
pre-attentional cognitive processes and at least in settings of ecological familiarity
even the attentional levels are largely automatic because they are founded on an
acquired expertise.
But of course, not all non-aesthetic attentional processes are operating this way:
“hard-looking” processes do also exist in other contexts. We have only to think
about the entomologist or the botanist looking for specimens of a hitherto unknown
species, or less exotically, about a person looking for a displaced item. I think
what is peculiar to the aesthetic inflection of attention is foremost the fact that
it is not only attention-driven but has also a peculiar auto-teleology built into it:
the aim of looking aesthetically at something is the process of looking itself. The
entomologist looking for specimens of unknown species is hard-looking because he
is aiming to identify the discrete differential characteristics which will allow him
to identify the specimen as belonging to species A or B. So, his hard-looking is
still a looking which strives for the most economical way to achieve this result,
which means that his attentional processes are guided by the final result he wants to
achieve: the correct identification of the specimen. This, it seems, is not the situation
when attention is aesthetically inflected: if you adopt the aesthetic stance towards
a flower, a sound, or a picture, your activity is not driven by the transitive aim of
identifying it correctly as the flower A, the sound of K, or the representation of Z.
This identification surely is often part of the aesthetic process—but once you have
achieved this goal of identification, the process is not over. One could even say that
it is now that it really begins. Take the example of a picture: you’ll go on to look at it,
descending attentionally beneath the level of representational identification, looking
for the visual organization, the balance of colors, then perhaps ascending again,
putting the colors in relation with the representational content, and so on. What this
comes up to is that when attention is aesthetically inflected it is self-reinforcing:
attention calls for further attention in an internal process of continuous feedback—
a point already implicit in Kant’s analysis of “aesthetic judgment.” What could
motivate such a costly process? As I suggested already in the opening statement
the motivation is I believe hedonic reinforcement, a question I will try to expose at
the end of this paper.
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Attention-driven information retrieval, which is typical of aesthetically inflected
attention, enhances our capacities of discrimination, be they perceptual, categorical,
or emotional. Practicing this type of attention, even when it is not producing
object-knowledge, is enhancing our cognitive abilities. Aesthetic attention is, among
others, a way to achieve what psychologists call perceptual learning.6 Perceptual
learning is not acquisition of new object-knowledge but results in the lowering of
the attentional threshold. Lowering of the attentional threshold is a typical outcome
of top-down, attentionally driven processes. It has been studied notably in the area of
videogames, but it is a general process corresponding to what the two psychologists
Ahissar and Hochstein (2004) call the “reverse hierarchy theory.” Their idea is that
what limits performance in the field of simple visual discrimination is not that the
relevant information is absent from neural representations, but that neophytes do
not have access to it. In other words, the same visual stimulus gives rise to the
same neural representations in all subjects, because their capacities in processing
stimuli sub-personally in a bottom-up way are basically identical because they are
biologically hardwired. The subjects differ only in terms of their ability or inability
to attentionally access this information. So potentially the necessary information
is there for everyone but people differ in their capacity to gain attentional access
to it. As Ahissar and Hochstein showed, the training of top-down attention-driven
information retrieval lowers the threshold of our attentional access and so enables us
to reach further down in the hierarchy of information retrieval. The reverse hierarchy
theory predicts more precisely that this development of attentional discrimination is
due to a descending cascade of top-down transformations on a neural plane that
enhances the relevant information and weakens the irrelevant one.
A well-known pictorial strategy to produce such “reverse hierarchy” processes is
to create pictures that are difficult to treat in a coherent way by automatic, bottom-up
processes. This is the case for example of post-impressionism: although post-
impressionism is still figurative painting, it very often is on the borderline between
figuration and design. Think of the later series of Monet’s “Water Lilies:” at the
first look, some of them seem to be pure design; it’s the attention-driven descending
processing caused by the title of the Work which will give it its figurative content,
without at the same time neutralizing the all-over design effect, producing in this
way a constitutively unstable attentional logic. Using very different techniques,
Matisse and Bonnard produce the same instability, this time in the form of a tension
between the principle of depth construction and the principle of surface scanning.
To a naive eye, Bonnard’s treatment of the relationship of depth-effect and surface-
effect is disturbing and produces perceptual dissonance. Attention-driven, top-down
perceptual processing is able to reduce this dissonance by producing a process of
perceptual learning, developing in the spectator the capacity to adopt the so called
“pictorial vision” stance and to switch between this stance and the canonical visual
mode. Even if such learning is not explicit and does not give rise to propositional
6See for example Kellman (2002).
158 J.-M. Schaeffer
knowledge, at least not directly, it seems hardly deniable that an important part of
the cognitive appeal of pictorial art is related to this dialectic between painterly
vision and world vision.7
The dynamics of aesthetic exploration is characterized by a prevalence of
horizontally distributed exploration over vertically integrated exploration. Standard
cognitive processes use preferentially bottom-up automatic processing to produce
efficient beliefs and evaluations in the least costly way. Specifically, when we
encounter a perceptual stimulus, we try to associate it in the most economical way
with a maximum of properties which do not belong to the perception itself but which
allow us to integrate it into a larger context. This generalization operates through
a process known as “schematizing:” this process “impoverishes” the potential
complexity (and richness) of the stimulus by projecting upon it an internalized
general pattern (or category) and by ascribing to the perceived event the categorical
attributes of the scheme. A “cognitive pattern”8 or “template” (“Sollmuster” or
“Superzeichen” in German) of this type is a short-cut allowing us to minimize
the cost of cognitive processing and to maximize its effectiveness (all other things
equal). The cognitive patterns, or at least the perceptual ones, generally operate at
the pre-attentional level. For example, when we look for a fraction of a second at a
triangle lacking one summit, we see a complete triangle with three summits, because
and anticipatory sub-personal mechanism has “filled in” the lacking third summit:
But of course, this mechanism operates not only at the level of perception. It also
plays a central role in conceptual categorization where it has been studied under
various names (such as “schema,” “prototype,” or “horizon of expectation”) by
many disciplines like, for example, cognitive psychology, social psychology, and
sociology of knowledge along with descriptive phenomenology and hermeneutics.
In all cases, the function of the anticipatory “simplification” is to reduce the amount
of potential information contained in the ongoing experience of our “being-in-the-
world” and so to ensure the quickest possible integration of the new stimulus in
the stock of familiar stimuli. But in the case of attention in the context of an
7For a more precise and satisfactory account of these dynamics, see Peer F. Bundgaard’s paper in
this volume.
8d’Andrade (1992).
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aesthetic experience, the quickest way to produce beliefs is no longer the goal of
the process. We are looking on the contrary for “contextual complexity,”9 which is
characterized by the fact that the top-down and horizontal explorations outweigh
one-way bottom-up processing. This does not necessarily mean that the field of
perception is more important than intellectual discrimination. The difference is one
of cognitive dynamics: instead of trying to reduce the complexity of information,
the aim being to produce a stable belief in the most economical way that fits into
a class of already existing beliefs or (more rarely) that reorders the prototype of
that class, aesthetically oriented attention favors complexity of information, looks
for multiple (top-down as well as bottom-up) relationships between the different
levels of information-processing and accepts to linger on the same level to explore
it horizontally in all its richness.
4 The Hedonic Component
But why would we engage in such a costly relationship? As I suggested earlier, in
aesthetic experience the costly cognitive process is regulated by hedonic feedback.
Of course, most if not all cognitive processes are tied to hedonic reactions. But
whereas standard attention is regulated mostly by its final outcome and therefore
is heavily hetero-teleological, aesthetically oriented attention is self-teleological
because, in its case, the hedonic calculator is functioning online in a feedback-loop
with the ongoing attention: in aesthetically oriented attention, the costly processing
of the signal is driven by an internal reward.
The empirical existence of direct online feedback loops between attention
and reward in aesthetic experience has been amply demonstrated, notably by the
cognitive psychologists Rolf Reber, Norbert Schwarz and Piotr Winkielman (2003).
Reber and his colleagues are working in the field of cognitive psychology and
their empirical evidence is mostly behavioral, although Winkielman and Cacioppo
(2001) used facial electromyography (EMG) as a way to measure participants’
affective response. But their findings are corroborated by neuroscientific research
by Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) or by the team of Semir Zeki, who identified
the area of the medial orbito-frontal cortex that mediates this feedback in the case
of experiences of visual and musical “beauty” and “ugliness.”10
One very important difference between the psychological model of Reber and
his colleagues and most neuroscientific models is that Reber’s experimental work
is concerned with establishing a difference between hedonic value attributed to
the processed object and hedonic value attributed to the processing itself. Reber’s
experiments highlight the fact that, in aesthetic contexts, pleasure/displeasure is a
9Hepburn (1963).
10Kawabata and Zeki (2004); Ishizu and Zeki (2011). For a general presentation of Zeki’s theory
of art, see Zeki (1998, 1999).
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reaction to the process of attention, which implies that although the properties of the
object of attention are a central part of the distal cause of aesthetic appreciation, its
proximal cause is the ongoing attentional activity focused on the object. For Reber,
what is rewarding during the process is neither the represented object as such nor the
final cognitive outcome of the processing of the object (a “determining judgment,”
to speak with Kant), but the act of processing itself (the Kantian “harmony of the
faculties”). Neuroscientists, it seems to me, tend (more classically) to relate the
hedonic response to the properties of the attended object.11
Another important difference is that neuroscientists mostly address issues in
visual art, and although Zeki extends his research to music, he too is interested
mostly in arts where the level of perception is central, which excludes not only
the whole domain of literature (the case of oral poetry is of course more complex)
but also conceptual art and, more generally, many forms of contemporary art
which minimize the perceptual level of attentional engagement. Although Reber’s
experiments are also exclusively studies of visual stimuli, his model explicitly
claims validity for perceptual and conceptual levels of processing.
For multiple reasons, I think that we should look out for a generic model of
aesthetic experience, valid for all modalities of aesthetically oriented attention,
and for a model that foregrounds processing instead of object properties. Along
these lines, aesthetic experience could be defined as a bidirectional feedback loop
established between the attention paid to the object (artwork or whatever) and an
online hedonic calculus evaluating the positive or negative valence of the attentional
process as it unfolds in time. Several points must be stressed: it is the attentional
process which is evaluated by the hedonic calculator and not directly the object
(although the appreciation will generally be projected on the processed object); this
implies that the processing is meta-cognitive and reflective in important ways; the
feedback goes both directions; the hedonic evaluation is done online, which means
that it regulates and is affected by the attentional processing.
Can we go further and try to find out if there are specific characteristics of the
profile of the attentional process which are in a deterministic way linked to positive
hedonic valence and therefore to positive aesthetic experience? As already indicated,
contrary to objectivist theories of aesthetic evaluation, which place aesthetic value
directly in the object’s properties, a model based on the hypothesis that what is
evaluated are not the qualities of the object per se but the quality of the way
it is processed can of course not look for object-properties to find an answer to
this question. The relevant characteristic must be a characteristic of the processing
itself. What is this characteristic? The standard answer in cognitive psychology as
to what causes positive feedback in the case of aesthetic experience has been for
a long time been that it is fluency of processing which is the hedonic regulator.
The more the processing is experienced as fluent, the more the aesthetic experience
will be positive. This would imply that the only variable on which the hedonic
calculator draws is fluency or easiness of processing. This has notably been the
initial explanation given by Reber et al. (2004).
11See especially Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999).
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This conclusion has been considered by many critics of Reber to be counter-
intuitive. The first objection comes from art-history: if fluency is the end of the
story, how can we explain that many works of art—and, more precisely, many
highly successful ones—are designed intentionally in a way so as to limit fluency
of processing: this is the case notably with important parts (but of course not
all) poetry. It is also the case not only in modernist music but also in classical
polyphony and so on. To answer this criticism, Reber has complexified his theory.
In Reber and Bullot (2013), “disfluency” is introduced as an artistic strategy to
“manipulate fluency.” As the authors explicitly state, fluency remains the cause of
the positive effect, which implies that disfluency is considered to be a source of
negative affect. Why then should the artists be keen on introducing “disfluency?”
Reber and Bullot state that its function is instrumental for manipulating the mode
of engagement of the public: “[ : : : ] disfluency can elicit inferences about the
artwork and a more analytical style of processing in appreciators who adopt
the design stance and acquire art-historical understanding.” Later on they state:
“For instance, artists may aim to elicit processing disfluency in order to prevent
automatic identification of the content of a work, or elicit thoughts about issues
that are culturally significant in their art-historical context.” As the use of the
expression “automatic identification” suggests, disfluency seems simply to be a
new word for the process called “defamiliarization” by the Russian formalists.
But in fact, disfluency is not the same thing as “defamiliarization.” Whereas the
Russian formalists thought that defamiliarization was necessary to uphold satisfying
aesthetic experiences, Reber and Bullot think its aim is to compel the public to go
beyond the basic exposure stance (the stance of the naive spectator, so to say) and
to take into account the design stance (personal and historical intentionality) and
the artistic understanding stance. As Reber and Bullot state, this implies to adopt
a more “analytical style of processing,” which in fact culminates in a historical
interpretation of the native signification of the artwork. But adopting the stance of
historical analysis and interpretation is different from adopting the aesthetic stance.
Of course, intentional and historical information may inform aesthetic experience:
it can render it richer. But it is part of the input into the aesthetic experience and
not part of the experience itself. The “analytical style of processing” is a standard
cognitive approach to art, for example that of the art-historian. If the function
of “disfluency” is of this kind, it cannot be the right answer to the problems
encountered by the theory of fluency because it displaces the problem from an
aesthetic plane to the plane of the background information for the experience. It
also gives a biased image of standard aesthetic experience in many arts: in movies,
narrative, theater, poetry, and many others, the standard experience is not historicist
in this way. On an analytical plane, we should not conflate cognitive understanding
of the native intentional identity of artworks with the aesthetic appreciation of
artworks.
But there exists a second objection to the fluency theory, which could perhaps
show us a way out of the problem. This second objection comes from inside
psychology itself. Several studies have shown that the attractiveness of fluency has
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a boundary condition: boredom.12 When fluency is pushed too far, the hedonic
valence is inverted and becomes negative. This fact indicates that fluency cannot
be the whole story and suggests the existence of the second factor counterbalancing
fluency. What could be this factor? Well, the most plausible candidate would be
curiosity.13 Artworks must not only be “beautiful,” they must also be “interesting,”
that is, stimulate curiosity, and my tentative hypothesis would be that positive
hedonic feedback is the result of fluency and curiosity counterbalancing each other.
Curiosity is somewhat difficult to assess in psychological terms: although it is
defined by a lack of information and by a drive to reduce the information gap, it
is not, contrary to disfluency, experienced as dysphoric but rather is associated with
positive feelings. This inherent positive hedonic valence of curiosity has perhaps
been shaped by evolution, curiosity being a fitness-enhancing quality. But whatever
the evolutionary cause, the reality of the positive hedonic valence of curiosity is well
established.
In what way could curiosity go together with fluency to enhance positive
hedonic value? I think it is important to notice that the two factors have not the
same status. Fluency and disfluency are two opposing experiences of processing
dynamics, disfluency being generally experienced simply as that which hinders
fluency. Curiosity is not an experience in this sense. It is a mental attitude (or
disposition) opposed to that of lack of interest (and lack of interest is provoked,
among others, by boredom, which, as we have seen, is a limiting condition for
experiencing fluency positively). Curiosity is an attitude of positive cognitive
alertness for stimuli (objects, events) not yet processed or only partly processed. The
positive valence depends not on the nature of the stimuli but is tied to the simple fact
that the stimuli are as of yet not processed. This means that curiosity values the act
of processing information as such. Loewenstein (1994), along with Lahroodi and
Schmitt (2008), argue therefore that, in its purest forms, curiosity is characterized
by an auto-teleological drive: when we are curious, we are valuing information in
itself independently of any specific cognitive or pragmatic reward. This means that
the reward of curiosity lies in the onset and the going on of processing itself.
If this tentative outline is correct, then artists are not obliged to construe traps
of “disfluency” to maintain the positive interest of the art-lover: they have to get
him to become, and then to stay, interested in processing the object (work of
art). That is, the work must be rich in the sense of opening up the possibility of
an intense and open processing. This means that it must be complex: as Reber,
among others, noticed, if people value fluency in a positive way, they nevertheless
prefer complexity over simplicity. If curiosity is a factor of the dynamics of positive
aesthetic evaluation, this would be what we should await. All this does not mean
that fluency is not important, but it certainly cannot explain positive aesthetic value
12See Bornstein et al. (1990).
13Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) already hypothesized an interplay in artworks between
fluency and curiosity-eliciting strategies.
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on its own. It seems to me that a model based on the tensional interplay between
fluency and curiosity is what we should look for.
I should, of course, add that this psychological description—if it helps to
understand the internal dynamics of aesthetically oriented attention, its mechanics
so to say—tells us nothing about the social and cultural factors that shape the
attribution of hedonic valences and, of course, the attentional processes themselves.
I was here only interested in the mechanics, even if it can be argued, and I would
agree with this argument, that the most complex problems we have to face are those
concerning the level of a correct understanding of the way social and cultural factors
shape our attention and our allotment of positive or negative hedonic valence.
5 Some Concluding Remarks
I am not sure that the descriptive and explanatory outlines I have sketched above
really fit together to draw an integrated portrait of aesthetic experience, but it seems
to me that they constitute a possible starting-ground if we want to gain a better
understanding of aesthetic experience. The difficulties that remain are numerous.
One difficulty is the following: if aesthetic experience and artistic creation are
phenomena of costly signaling, what about the second condition of costly signaling,
the honesty condition? We saw that the decisive criterion explaining the existence
of costly signals was their inbuilt honesty, due to the impossibility to simulate them.
Is this condition valid for artistic creation and aesthetic relation? As of today, I
am unable to give a satisfactory answer to this question. To explore the problem,
one possible entry is the question of paraphrase and summary: although artworks
can be paraphrased or summarized to convey information about them, they cannot
be aesthetically experienced through a summary or a paraphrase. If this is the
case, then one could perhaps develop an argument in favor of their constitutive
“honesty:” they cannot be separated from their singular contingent identity, because
the work of art is not the vehicle of the signal but its incarnation: the relation
is one of self-exemplification. And I would argue that the idea of autonomy and
of the artwork as a self-enclosed self-referential phenomenon, defended notably
by Gadamer and Wittgenstein, should be studied in relation with this question.
The impossibility of replacing an artwork by a summary or a paraphrase holds
true not only for intermedial situations (for example, replacing a painting by its
verbal description), but also for paraphrases or summaries in the same medium.
To experience Remembrance of Things Lost, you have to read the whole novel: no
summary will do. Of course, a summary or a paraphrase can give me substantive
information about the representational content of Proust’s work. But experiencing
the work aesthetically is to experience it not only as representing a world but
incarnating it verbally in precisely the “form” Proust gave it. To elicit the same
experience, one would have to copy it. The same holds true for aesthetic experiences
relating to natural phenomena: no description of a landscape can replace the real
experience in its singularity as experienced by a singular individual. Of course, the
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description of a landscape can itself be the object of an aesthetic experience, but in
this case, the experience is tied to the description and not to the landscape. I am not
sure that these hints are really conclusive but it could be interesting to push them
further.
Another open question is that of the evolutionary aspect of the homologies
between the processes of the bowerbirds on one hand artistic creation and aesthetic
experience on the other. In fact, this question boils down to that of the functionality
of costly signaling as evidenced by artworks and aesthetic experience. The hedonic
feedback loop helps to explain how the process is possible on the level of the
individual person but this does not tell us how and why it evolved and survived
culturally, as a social fact present in a variety of forms in all human societies.
Remember that costly signaling is characteristic of situations where the information
that agents have access to is both incomplete and essential to them. This could
perhaps help us to understand why art and aesthetic experience are so often present
in risky communicative situations were inexpensive signaling does not seem to
be appropiate: this is certainly the case when men or women want to seduce,
when they want to impress a rival, when they want to show their power or their
submission. But as I said, it would be simplistic to focus on these agonistic situations
between individuals. Socially speaking, art and aesthetics are very often tied to
existentially more elementary situations of risky communication: when we enter
into a relationship with otherness, for example, with the spirits or the ancestors
or the dead, or when we are faced with the conundrum of our own existential
identity within the social, natural, and cosmic world—in short, in the countless
lived situations in which our existential mood, our attunement, our “Gestimmtheit”
(Heidegger) as individuals or as groups caught in a network of human and cosmic
realities ceases to go without saying. In most human communities, these situations
have given rise to a number of cross-culturally related phenomena and artifacts:
dances, ornaments, sculptures, verbal productions, performances, and so on—what
we here and today call art.
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More Seeing-in: Surface Seeing, Design Seeing,
and Meaning Seeing in Pictures
Peer F. Bundgaard
Abstract The paper considers the phenomenology of aesthetic experience as
“twofold” in a sense akin to Wollheim’s (Painting as an art. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1987). However, as regards the perception of artworks proper, the
notion of twofoldness needs further specification. In the wake of Wollheim, the
philosophy of pictorial representation has addressed the second, ‘configurational’
aspect of twofoldness in rather vague terms without addressing the aesthetic or
pictorial function of this correlate of aesthetic perception. I shall talk about such co-
awareness as “design-seeing” and assign two decisive properties to pictorial design.
First, I will point to a depicting property of design that is a distinctive property of
pictures. Design in pictures is such that it can depict two (or, in rare cases, even
more) fully consistent objects without the picture becoming ambiguous. Next, I’ll
show that the design structure of a painting is not simply a structure in virtue of
which something is represented to the eye, but also in virtue of which meaning is
conveyed to the eye. If I am right in considering the design level of pictures as a
genuine platform for meaning making, then seeing-in doubled with design seeing
occurs every time lines and shapes do not only depict, but also mean something
Keywords Seeing-in • Surface seeing • Design seeing • Twofoldness • Pictorial
meaning
1 Preamble
Do pictorial works of art have inherent properties that inform our experience of
them, i.e. qualify this experience to make it “aesthetic?” By “aesthetic,” I do
not mean pleasant, rewarding, or accompanied by an appreciative judgment of
something that is considered beautiful or valuable in some respects. I simply
understand it to mean the experience of a kind of object that differs from other
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objects in that its creator has intended it to be a work of art and designed it
accordingly. And by “inform,” I mean that such properties elicit this kind of
experience and shape its phenomenology, causing it to be of a certain sort.
While I do think such properties exist and trigger aesthetic experience, I also
consider it vain to establish a list of such essentially aesthetic properties that qualify
a given object as a work of art. For two reasons: first, because a work of art need not
display all of them; second, because very few, if any, can be found exclusively in
pictorial works of art. Nevertheless, in this chapter I will point at two prototypical
and essential properties of art that do inform people’s experience of them.
The first is that they are stratified objects insofar as they simultaneously represent
something and present the design in virtue of which they depict that thing. This
makes the phenomenology of aesthetic perception “twofold,” as Richard Wollheim
(1987) famously put it: the visual experience of paintings consists of the recognition
of an object represented on a surface (what he calls “seeing-in”) accompanied by
the awareness of that surface. This claim is far from evident with regard to picture
seeing (it may not be twofold at all) and the exact nature of “surface seeing” (which
ultimately is correlated to precisely what we or Wollheim mean by “surface”). The
first section of this chapter is an investigation into what actually characterizes the
“twofoldness” of aesthetic perception. To this effect, I shall propose a distinction
that seems to have escaped Wollheim and most of his commentators: twofoldness is
not simply simultaneous awareness of both the represented (or otherwise appearing)
object and the matter (the canvas, the cloud, the frosty pane, and so on) in which it
is represented or in which it appears. If this were the case, seeing faces in clouds
and seeing them in canvases would be tokens of the same kind of experience.
Twofoldness in the aesthetic domain concerns rather the simultaneous awareness
of the represented object (the motif) and the surface, which (unlike clouds, walls,
and frosty panes) has been designed to depict that object; that is, to enable a certain
kind of visual experience. The distinction between material support (canvas) and
depicting surface leads me to pinpoint an essential, close to unique property of
paintings (including, as we shall see, artful photographs): they may have multiply
depicting surfaces, that is, surfaces which enable two or more equally consistent
visual experiences, without being bi-stable.
The next property I will focus attention on in the last section of this chapter
is that paintings are platforms for meaning-making in ways that plain pictures are
not. This is so not only because of what they represent (which may appear as
culturally, religiously, historically, or biologically significant), but also, and first and
foremost, by virtue of their depicting surface, i.e. by virtue of the way in which the
depicting surface has been designed to produce certain meaning effects. There is
a top-down constraint in seeing an object in a picture that does not exist when the
same kind of object is seen face to face. I only see a given object in a picture because
someone wanted to express himself by means of that object, and ultimately because
he intended to present that object in that picture the way he did. In virtue of this
intentional setting, picture seeing at large is obviously not simply about recognizing
objects; it also, and importantly, means exploration. In virtue of this intentional
condition, as it were, an important task for the philosophy, the psychology, and,
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of course, the semiotics of art therefore consists in laying down those techniques
and tools by means of which artists in general shape their meaning intentions, and
in showing how these tools and techniques can take on various specific semiotic
functions in different works of art.1 As regards the phenomenology of aesthetic
experience, and twofoldness, this has a major consequence: our perception of works
of art is always twofold, even when the depicting surface does not display any
obtrusive design properties, i.e. even when the style is perfectly naturalistic or
neutral. In such cases it remains an inherent part of aesthetic perception, not because
of its visual saliency, but because of its semiotic saliency: it expresses a meaning
intention; it is the platform for the construction of meaning effects.
2 The Strata of Artwork and Their Perceptual Correlates
According to Husserl (1980), paintings are three-layered objects and each layer can
be attended to as such; i.e. each layer can be the objective correlate of a perceptual
act. (1) Paintings are plain material things endowed with surfaces on which colored
marks of pigment or other materials can be observed. (2) They depict objects,
enabling a certain visual experience. (3) They are pictorial objects with a certain
content, a motif.2 In this chapter, I will only discuss the first two aspects of paintings
and the modes of perception through which we attend to them. I will do so along
the lines suggested by Dominic Lopes in his investigation into the nature of picture
seeing (Lopes 2005), with the ultimate goal of both refining the understanding of
twofoldness in aesthetic perception and enriching the concept of depicting surface.
2.1 Surface and Surface Seeing
When it is regarded as a thing, a picture is an object with a surface covered with
marks made of a certain matter and with certain qualitative properties. Essential
to this global and straightforward characteristic of artwork is, as Lopes (2005)
notes, that the surface and its marks are here considered independently of the
visual experience they give rise to, what they depict, and their depicting function in
general. Surface seeing, that is to say the phenomenological or perceptual correlate
of the surface, is “a visual experience of a picture as a configuration of marks, colors,
1Cf. Hyman 2003, 2006, and the present volume for a view akin to what I propose here.
2Husserl states it the following way: “We have three objects: (1) the physical picture, the thing
made out of canvas, marble, etc.; (2) the representing or depicting object; and (3) the represented
or depicted object” (Husserl 1980, p. 19).
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and textures on a two-dimensional surface” (Lopes 2005, p. 36). Thus, I may look
at a picture and see cracks in the pigment or, as Lopes again remarks, notice that the
canvas is old; I may be able to see a fine layer of dust covering it. I can approach it
and perhaps see blotches of color or reflections and shades due to ambient light; or
finally I can consider it as being oriented in this or that way (because it is oriented
in this or that way relative to me). Now, all these elements—the quality of the
pigment, the age of the canvas, the orientation of the surface, dust, and lighting
conditions—may be very real parts of the aesthetic experience, but they are not
genuine features of it, since none of them concern the artwork as a depicting object,
endowed with a design in virtue of which something is represented to a viewer.
Thus, surface seeing proper—i.e. awareness of the painting in its materiality—
blocks picture seeing proper. As Lopes states: “not all visible properties of a picture
surface are ones in virtue of which it depicts a scene” (Lopes 2005, pp. 35–36). It
is also worth noting in passing that surface properties are not only and not strictly
material properties of a painting; they are also correlates to perceptual intentionality
(i.e. a specific manner of attending to the object). For instance, a conservator may
be concerned by the physical state of a part of a picture and then take one step
back and appreciate what that very part depicts and the way it does it. In the former
case, he is attending to the canvas and its physical properties; in the latter case, he
is attending to the depicting surface and the motif that the surface enables us to
experience. This leads us to those properties which depict something and thus elicit
what Wollheim called the experience of seeing-in: the experience of recognizing or
seeing something represented in a picture.
2.2 Design and Design Seeing
According to Husserl, the second ontological layer of a picture (the Bildobjekt) is
the picture qua depicting surface, i.e. an object endowed with a surface that has
been designed to make certain represented objects appear in a certain way. The
perceptual correlate to this stratum is well characterized by what Lopes (2005) calls
“design perception.” The design of a picture is a considerable subset of its surface
properties. It is “a configuration, on a two-dimensional surface, of marks, colors,
and textures in virtue of which the surface depicts a scene” (Lopes 2005, p. 28).
Hence, design seeing is, correlatively, a visual experience of such a configuration
of marks which have a genuine depicting function and as such—at least following
this first definition—are genuine features of aesthetic perception. However, since the
design is not the same as the content or the motif of the picture, design seeing proper
“comprises the surface configurations that you see when you see the picture surface
without seeing anything in it and that are responsible for your seeing something in
it” (Lopes 2005, p. 25). In other words, what Lopes calls design seeing is not the
trivial fact that when you see a picture, say the Mona Lisa, you see what you see
in it in virtue of the pictorial design used by the painter to enable a certain kind
of visual experience. If that were the case, there would be no conscious experience
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of the design; it is not part of the phenomenology of the experience. Design seeing
proper is thus seeing the design as design independently of what it actually depicts.3
Design seeing is perceptual awareness of the purely pictorial properties of the
object, e.g. the characteristics of the contours (clear-cut, fuzzy, chiaroscuro, etc.), the
chromatic properties, luminance, the degree of representational realism, perspective
(simple, multiple, ambiguous), point of view (generic, non-generic), and so on
and so forth up to our simple categorization of a picture as, say, a “Fontana,” a
“Millet,” a “Pollock,” or, on an even larger scale, “Cubist,” “Post-Impressionist,”
independently of what the picture represents. To this extent, and by contrast with
surface properties, design properties are genuine correlates of aesthetic perception:
you do not just see the represented objects, you also see the way in which they are
given, their manner of presence.
However, and as just mentioned, it is important to stress that considering design
properties as genuine features of aesthetic perception or picture seeing does not
explain how or to what extent design is a genuine part of aesthetic perception. There
is indeed a difference between, on the one hand, asserting the truism that design
informs aesthetic perception because it is thanks to the design that we see something
in the painting, and, on the other, making the claim that we are genuinely co-aware
of the design when we see an object in a picture, that is to say that our act of seeing
the motif of the picture (the picture as Bildsujet) is fused with our perception of the
design of the picture as a depicting surface (the picture as Bildobjekt). In the former
case, seeing what is in the picture implies “seeing (in virtue of) design,” but only in
the latter case is the act of seeing what is in the picture accompanied by or doubled
with design seeing proper.4 As we shall see, it seems perfectly sensible to claim not
only that we “see (in virtue of) design,” but also that we can consciously focus our
attention on pictorial design as design, without claiming that design perception is a
genuine part of aesthetic perception or fused with seeing the motif.
In Sects. 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, I will consider this issue in more detail with a view to
clarifying Wollheim’s notion of “twofoldness” and proposing a refined description
of the depicting surface.
2.3 Seeing-in and Design, Seeing-in and Surface
Naturally, the role one assigns to surface seeing and design seeing in aesthetic
perception has an effect on what one considers the phenomenology of such
perception to be. Let us first take a look at the definitions of design and design
3Lopes puts it like this: “It is only in virtue of seeing the configuration of marks on its surface,
and being sensitive to visible changes in them, that we see anything at all in the picture. However,
seeing a pictorial design face to face does entail seeing the design as a design—it does not entail
design-seeing” (Lopes 2005, p. 28).
4The distinction between “seeing design” and “design seeing” is developed by Nanay (2010).
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seeing. Following Lopes’s definition, to perceive design as design is to perceive it
independently of what it depicts. One could then take a Gombrichian stance and
assert that design perception is not a feature of aesthetic perception proper if we
understand this to be the experience of the depicted object as the object seen face to
face. So you are either immersed in seeing Dora Maar in Picasso’s picture or you
consider what design features enable this visual experience. You cannot have both
at the same time. Gombrich says it like this:
A master of introspection, Kenneth Clark, has recently described [ : : : ] how even he was
defeated when he attempted to ‘stalk’ an illusion. Looking at a great Velázquez, he wanted
to observe what went on when the brush-strokes and dabs of pigment on the canvas
transformed themselves into visions of transfigured reality as he stepped back. But try as
he might, stepping forward or backward, he could never hold both visions at the same time,
and therefore, the answer to his problem of how it was done always seemed to elude him.
(Gombrich 1960, p. 5; also quoted in Lopes 2005, p. 38)
Gombrich would clearly not subscribe to the strong interpretation of design
seeing as a genuine, full-blown feature of aesthetic perception. Either you have
design and surface perception or you have the immersed experience of the motif;
just as you, in the famous drawing, have either duck or rabbit, but never both
simultaneously (Gombrich 1960, p. 4).
Nevertheless, the definition also lends itself to the opposite, Wollheimian inter-
pretation: since design is what makes us see whatever we see in a picture, design is
immediately displayed in the picture. We see the object in the design in virtue of the
physical marks on the physical surface. The phenomenology of aesthetic perception
is thus, in essence, “twofold.” It is characterized by the double, fused, simultaneous
awareness of the objects we see in the picture and the surface on which, in which,
through which or in virtue of which we see them.5 This perceptual recognition of
objects in surfaces is what Wollheim calls seeing-in. The correlate to “recognitional”
seeing-in is awareness of the surface in which the object appears as well as of the
“configurational” properties of the marks upon it (the quoted terms are borrowed
from Wollheim). The conflated character of these aspects is what characterizes the
visual experience of a depicting object.
Seeing-in is a distinct kind of perception, and it is triggered off by the presence within
the field of vision of a differentiated surface. [ : : : ] When the surface is right, then
an experience with a certain phenomenology will occur, and it is this phenomenology
that is distinctive about seeing-in. [ : : : ] The distinctive phenomenological feature I call
‘twofoldness’, because, when seeing-in occurs, two things happen: I am visually aware of
the surface I look at, and I discern something standing out in front of [ : : : ], something else.
[ : : : ] The two things that happen when I look at, for instance, [a] stained wall [and see
a figure of a boy in it] are, it must be stressed, two aspects of a single experience that I
have, and the two aspects are distinguishable, but also inseparable. They are two aspects of
a single experience, they are not two experiences. (Wollheim 1987, p. 46)
5I do not multiply the phrases for rhetorical reasons. As we shall see, it is not a straightforward
affair to define the relation between surface/design and depicted object, both in general and
according to Wollheim in particular.
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Fig. 1 Asger Jorn, Le canard
inquiétant, 1959. © Donation
Jorn, Silkeborg, billedkunst.
dk
This is obviously the exact opposite of Gombrich’s stance. To Wollheim, another
duck, namely Asger Jorn’s Ominous Duck, is likely to epitomize twofoldness (see
Fig. 1).
In Jorn’s Ominous Duck, both the structural design properties of the painting
as a depicting surface (the evident fact that the duck has been painted on another
painting) and the material properties of the duck itself (size, colors, brushstrokes)
seem not only to be immediately picked up by perception, but also to be essential to
understanding why the duck is ominous (and the painting humorous). Even though I
do side with Wollheim in what we, for reasons of convenience, could call his debate
with Gombrich, this is not the place to unravel all aspects of this discussion about
the constituent elements of aesthetic perception. I only mention it here because the
above quotations and the issues they address may indeed help us to better define
what exactly twofoldness comprises, i.e. what the two aspects of the single aesthetic
experience are, or rather what they are not. As will soon become clear, I do believe
that the notion of twofoldness, also in Wollheim, remains unclear in one essential
respect.
2.4 Seeing Something in Walls and Seeing Something
in Paintings
So the question is how do surface (seeing) and design (seeing) combine with seeing-
in (Wollheim) or with the immersed experience of the motif (Gombrich)?
We have just seen that even though Gombrich accepted the analytical distinction
between surface and design, to him this would still not have any import on the
phenomenology of aesthetic perception. When you want to find out how a given
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artist has pulled off his stunt (say, succeeded in representing water lilies in a pond),
you either get pigment on canvas (surface) or you get (sometimes incoherent)
aggregates of shapes (design); that is, you either get the object (surface, design)
or the motif. On the other hand, Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness embraces exactly
what Gombrich discards from aesthetic perception, and there is a good reason for
this. This is what Wollheim says:
So, for instance, I follow the famous advice of Leonardo da Vinci to an aspirant painter and
I look at a stained wall, or I let my eyes wander over a frosty pane of glass, and at one and
the same time I am visually aware of the wall, or of the glass, and I recognize a naked boy,
or dancers in mysterious gauze dresses, in front of [ : : : ] a darker ground. In virtue of this
experience I can be said to see the boy in the wall, the dancers in the frosty glass. (Wollheim
1987, p. 46)
Naturally, this makes sense. You see a stained wall and in that wall you recognize
the shape of something; your experience of seeing the figure is pervaded with your
experience of seeing the wall. What examples like this show is that the very material
support (wall, frosty pane, cloud) is an integrated feature of the phenomenology of
that perception. But here is the key issue: what happens if we transpose this state of
affairs to the perception of works of art, for instance the visual experience of some
dancers painted by Degas? In these circumstances we get the wrong description.
We are not seeing the dancers “in front of” the canvas (which is the immediate
counterpart to “wall” and “frosty pane” in the quotation above); and our experience
of seeing the dancers is not pervaded with our awareness of the canvas as canvas.
If figures, for example, appear on a dark background, then it is dark because the
wall and frosty panes appear dark; but upon perceiving a figure in a painting we
would not say that the canvas is gray or yellow, we would rather say that the
“floor” is gray or the “wall” is yellow. The reason for this is that seeing figures
in walls and frosty panes is a two-stratum business; it consists of material surfaces
and figures. Paintings, on the other hand, are three-strata affairs. They consist of
material surfaces that have been intentionally transformed into depicting surfaces in
virtue of which we see figures. Qualities in paintings specify the depicting surface,
not the material support.6
In other words, the twofoldness Wollheim mentions cannot be exhaustively
assimilated to the co-awareness of the physical support for depiction, the material
surface. This becomes obvious just one paragraph further on in Wollheim’s text,
where he tells more or less the same story as Gombrich with his Clark anecdote:
The twofoldness of seeing-in does not, of course, preclude one aspect of the complex
experience being emphasized at the expense of the other. In seeing a boy in a stained wall
I may very well concentrate on the stains, and how they are formed, and the materials
and colours they consist of, and how they encrust or obscure the original texture of the
wall, and I might in consequence lose all but a shadowy awareness of the boy. [ : : : ]
One aspect of the experience comes to the fore, the other recedes. And sometimes this
6This is also what Lopes notices with regard to the Clark anecdote in Gombrich: once you get too
close to the canvas, you get the canvas qua pure surface without any design properties (Lopes 2005,
p. 38).
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preference for one aspect of the experience gets carried to the point where the other aspect
evaporates. Twofoldness is lost, and then seeing-in succumbs to an altogether different kind
of experience. (Wollheim 1987, p. 47).
In Gombrich, there is no significant difference between the surface properties of
a picture and its design relative to the aesthetic experience (you can look at the way
Dora Maar’s face has been designed or try to capture the exact hue of the pigment
in virtue of which we see her lips, but in neither case can you perceive Dora Maar
proper). Wollheim, in contrast, marshals some variant of this distinction, since, on
the one hand, twofoldness requires awareness of the matter, the support in which the
object is perceived; while he seems to follow Gombrich in saying that this awareness
is not simply awareness of canvas, plain pigment, and so forth, because this would
block seeing-in proper. In his twofold perception, the surface the viewer is supposed
to integrate, along with the depicted object, is not simply the material support of
the representation; it is rather the latter as it has been modified by the artist into a
pictorial or depicting surface.
So here is the refinement of Wollheim’s theory that I propose: seeing-in (i.e. the
experience of seeing something in a painting) is doubled, not simply with awareness
of the object in which we see it, but with the co-perception of the depicting,
intentionally designed surface in virtue of which we see it. This distinction—
between material support and depicting surface—has, to my knowledge, not been
sufficiently brought to the fore, either by Wollheim himself or by his commentators.
2.4.1 Seeing-in and Awareness of the Depicting Surface
I shall return to what I mean by “awareness of object” compared to “co-perception
of the depicting surface,” but first I will give a simple example of what the latter
may comprise.
Consider the Annunciation by Piero della Francesca (Fig. 2). As in some of his
other paintings, the artist has chosen a non-generic vantage point7 from which the
represented space appears in a somewhat collapsed perspective, making the spatial
layout ambiguous and, for that reason, the depicting surface obtrusive. On the left
side of the painting, Gabriel clearly appears to be at the same level as the figure of
God painted on the wall in the background, whereas if you consider the lower part of
the picture, he is just as clearly placed in the foreground, at the same level as Mary.8
7A vantage point is non-generic when a remarkable constellation of figures (or lines) can be
achieved only from that point of view. There is, for example, only one highly unstable point of
view from which the Necker cube appears as a 2D hexagon (see Petitot 2009a, b and Bundgaard
2009, 2011).
8This is, of course, an elegant and powerful way of giving a purely pictorial representation of the
mediating function of angels and of the continuous transition from the divine to the earthly domain
which is taking place at that moment.
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Fig. 2 Piero della Francesca,
Annunciation, 1452–1458
Now, the conspicuous presence of the depicting surface (because of its relative
ambiguity) is of course not a property of the represented scene. Nor is it a property of
the canvas. It is not the material properties of the canvas, say, its two-dimensionality
and its “canvasness” as such, that pervade the visual experience of the scene. The
obtrusive presence of the surface is rather the result of an artful exploitation of the
canvas that yields a specific visual experience, both of the represented scene and
of the presentational design through which the scene appears with its characteristic
phenomenal properties.
In short, there is a difference between being aware of a pictorial surface such
as Piero della Francesca’s and being aware of the canvas as material support.
The former is a genuine element of the aesthetic perception of the picture. It is a
constitutive part of its phenomenology, whereas the latter is not.
More Seeing-in: Surface Seeing, Design Seeing, and Meaning Seeing in Pictures 177
2.5 Surface Perception and Design Perception
In order to better capture the phenomenology of aesthetic perception proper (i.e.
the perception of works of art independently of whether or not they are considered
good), I will consider how the two kinds of perception identified by Lopes (surface
or design perception) “double with” seeing-in, i.e. integrate the twofold character
of such an experience. There are two issues to address here. (1) Even the most
convinced Gombrichians would accept that nobody ever mistakes a picture for
reality (and if they did, their experience would not be one of picture seeing, but
a piece of illusory perception). So, from a Gombrichian perspective, picture seeing
must also be doubled with something, namely awareness of the ontological nature
of what one is looking at. What is this awareness and in what respect is this double
character of picture seeing different from twofoldness in Wollheim’s understanding?
(2) Pictures come in different types; they are distributed on a continuum with, at
one end, pictures with almost transparent design properties and, at the other end,
pictures with obtrusive design properties, i.e. pictures where the viewer’s conscious
awareness of the design properties is an integrated feature of the phenomenology
of that visual experience. How can the difference between the perceptions of these
kinds of pictures be characterized?
Lopes (2005) addresses both these issues in one simple conceptual framework.
To accommodate the diversity of picture types, he sets up a matrix with two sets of
parameters. The first is whether seeing-in is illusionistic or non-illusionistic (where
“illusionistic” means that seeing the object in the picture is indistinguishable from
seeing it face to face9), and the second is whether seeing-in is doubled with or
divided from design seeing. The point is then simply that each of these modes
of seeing-in corresponds to certain types of pictures, and that there are pictures
which could be considered “Gombrich paintings,” as it were, in that they, allegedly,
do not impose their design properties on the viewer’s perception, whereas other
paintings are more “Wollheimian” in that seeing-in here is clearly doubled with
design seeing. In short, such paintings occupy different slots in the matrix below
(here slightly simplified), the upper left being Gombrichian, and the bottom right
slot being Wollheimian (Table 1).
Here I will concentrate only on the right column (non-illusionistic seeing-in
divided from design seeing and non-illusionistic seeing-in doubled with design
seeing). The upper right slot plays a key role in Lopes’s complexification of
the initial standard opposition because it constitutes some sort of articulatory
9The only type of picture which instantiates this category is allegedly the trompe l’oeil. This
is fairly improbable—the category is in my view empty—but here is not the place to discuss
this. “Actualism” comprises cases where the design of the picture or of the pictorial/plastic
representation at large is what it represents. Lopes’s main or rather sole example here is Jasper
Johns’s target pictures, since seeing the picture is an experience which is indistinguishable from
seeing a target (and therefore illusionistic) and doubled with design seeing, because it is in virtue
of its design that the picture is a target; the picture could hardly be said to be a representation of a
target because it is exactly like targets out there.
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Table 1 Types of seeing and corresponding kinds of paintings
Seeing-in Illusionistic Non-illusionistic
Divided from design seeing Trompe l’oeil Naturalism
Doubled with design seeing “Actualism” Twofoldedness
Adapted from Lopes (2005, p. 40)
domain between Gombrich’s illusionism and Wollheim’s twofoldness: it comprises
paintings that divide seeing-in from design seeing but are not illusionistic as a
result. So we are dealing with paintings where the phenomenology of seeing-in
is clearly distinguishable from seeing the represented object face to face, but not
because the design as design forces itself upon our perception. Lopes calls that
category “naturalism,” and I believe it covers a wide, not explicitly demarcated
range of pictures that are “lifelike” or realistic in that the depicted object is readily
recognizable. Examples could be a portrait by Jan van Eyck, a natural scene by John
Constable, the annunciation by Antonello da Messina, or some interior by Vilhelm
Hammershøi. Now—and here we are back at the question I asked above—if these
paintings are not illusionistic, even though seeing-in does not double with design
seeing, then seeing-in must double with something else (otherwise we would have
the impression of seeing the depicted object face to face, as in trompe l’oeil). Lopes
proposes that it is surface seeing:
Naturalistic pictures are not illusionistic, since they always double with surface seeing and
so are apprehended as pictures. At the same time, they defeat twofold seeing-in—seeing the
depicted scene blocks seeing their designs (Lopes 2005, p. 40).
On the contrary, the kind of pictures dubbed “twofoldness” impose awareness
of their design in that the objects we see in them do not in any way resemble the
objects we see face to face (ibid.).
The perceptual correlate of the former kind of pictures is what has recently
been called “uninflected” seeing-in: the perception of represented objects without
awareness of the medium (design properties); whereas the perceptual correlate of the
latter type of pictures is called “inflected” seeing-in: perception of objects in pictures
accompanied by conscious awareness of their design properties, or perception which
is hindered by spontaneous recognitional immersion in the represented scene.10
There are apparently good reasons to establish this distinction. First, apparently it
captures a genuine ontological and phenomenological difference, i.e. the difference
between, on the one hand, pictures with obtrusive designs and pictures with
transparent designs and, on the other, the corresponding visual experiences. Second,
as Nanay (2010, pp. 185–186) observes, it may serve to unravel an ambiguity in
Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness, which can either be understood as (1) a visual
experience in which we are consciously aware of both the objects represented in
10This is not the place to develop the distinction between inflected and uninflected perception.
Nanay (2010) provides an instructive discussion of this issue.
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the surface and the surface (along with the design properties of the painting), or as
(2) a visual experience in which both of these are represented, but not necessarily
consciously attended to. Inflected seeing-in doubled with design seeing corresponds
to the former, while uninflected seeing-in divided from design seeing corresponds
to the latter.
However well it addresses the above concerns, this solution is nevertheless
infelicitous: it indeed creates new, quite arduous problems. I will mention a couple
of them here.
The matrix model and its combinatory logic seem to require that seeing-in
divided from design seeing but doubled with surface seeing, on the one hand, and
seeing-in doubled with design seeing, on the other, are two different categories
and can therefore be easily distinguished. To my knowledge, however, there are
no criteria for distinguishing naturalistic paintings from paintings that elicit design
seeing; and what is more, to my knowledge no one has ever tried to define standards
for establishing this categorial distinction. The present state of affairs thus begs the
question: When is seeing-in divided from design seeing and when is it doubled with
design seeing? The problem is not simply that there are no criteria for distinguishing
between the two—after all, categories can easily exist even if it is impossible to
consistently define the sufficient and necessary conditions for belonging to them.
What is worse is that it is difficult (to say the least) to point to examples that would
instantiate the categories in a clear-cut way.
Take Clark in the above-mentioned Gombrich anecdote. If at some point he felt
the urge to figure out how Velázquez had pulled off his stunt, is that not because
a specific design property had become obtrusive to him and thus a genuine part
of his seeing-in (even though the picture is perfectly naturalistic)? Or the other way
around: To Wollheim—for reasons which are proper to his notion of “naturalism”—
Picasso’s Dora Maar is as good an example of naturalism as any, and so are many
of Monet’s paintings, however obtrusive their design properties may be (Wollheim
1987, pp. 72–75).11
We can even consider this from the perspective of prototype theory (Rosch
1978), that is, place good examples of twofold paintings at one end of the
continuum, epitomes of naturalistic paintings at the other, and accept intermediary
types in-between. It will be difficult to maintain the distinction as long as we
do not establish or suggest what pictorial properties elicit design seeing along
with seeing-in. Imagine walking through the continuum from cubism, via expres-
11Wollheim’s point in his discussion of naturalism is that the “lifelikeness” or “realism” one
associates with naturalism is not a result of the “configurational” aspects of the painting (its surface
properties) receding in our perception and leaving the scene to its “recognitional” aspects in order
to trigger pure seeing-in. Instead, naturalism is a result of something he, with deliberate vagueness,
calls the “reciprocity” of the two aspects of picture seeing. It may of course be considered
disappointing that Wollheim assigns more or less ineffable properties to the relation of reciprocity
between configurational and recognitional aspects, which trigger a naturalistic effect. Now, this is
no less disappointing than the absence of firm criteria on which the distinction between naturalistic
and twofold paintings could be based. At least the vagueness is endorsed in his case.
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sionism, pointillism, impressionism—all fair examples of paintings which trigger
twofold perception—and on to naturalistic paintings such as Caillebotte’s Baigneur
s’apprêtant à plonger or Ingres’s portrait of Princess Albert de Broglie. Now
consider the Caillebotte. It is a painting that (according to the intuitive definition
proposed by Lopes, and endorsed by Nanay) should be considered a genuine piece
of naturalism. But what are we to make of the fact that two of the three bathers
are wearing exactly the same swimsuit? Would that not count as a remarkable or
significant design property (granted that this coincidence is rather improbable)? And
what about the fact that the three bathers occupy the three key stages of the depicted
event: one is just about to dive, another is in the water, and the third is just getting
out of the water? Is this not a remarkable or compositional design feature? And
what about the framing? Is it not a remarkable design feature that the right side of
the scene has been cut off? And if not, why not?
In short, each of these features—as well as, for example, the photorealistic
presence of Princess Albert de Broglie in Ingres’s portrait (cf. Livingstone 2002)—
is considered to be an authentic design feature (which it obviously is), and so the
proposed distinction is shallow. If the features are not considered design properties,
then design in paintings rarely has something to do with the tools and techniques
painters use to shape their meaning intentions and create specific visual experiences
of the scenes they depict. Yet this is exactly the function one should assign to design.
Another reason why Lopes’s distinction between surface and design seeing is
unsatisfactory is phenomenological in nature and easy to explain. Following a strict
definition of surface, surface comprises all the physical accidents on the painted
surface, without regard for whether they have a depicting function or not. This is
why I have said that surface properties, following this definition, are real parts of our
experience of a picture—something has to be there for it to be seen—but they are
not genuine features of the aesthetic experience. The orientation of the surface, the
contingent lighting conditions in ambient space, the cracks in the pigment, and so on
and so forth do affect my perception, but not picture seeing proper. However, if we
consider that naturalistic paintings elicit seeing-in doubled with surface seeing, then
surface seeing is an essential part or genuine feature of the phenomenology of that
experience. If this is true, surface as defined here is not the same thing as Lopes’s
definition of surface; in fact, it is indistinguishable from Wollheim’s definition of it
and it is therefore part of twofoldness.
2.6 Surface as Material Support vs. Surface as a Depicting
Plane
The above issues are relevant in the present context, because addressing them
may help us better sort out Wollheim’s ambiguous notion of surface, sometimes
defined as (1) material support of depiction, at other times as (2) a depicting plane
distinguishable from the physical canvas. The confusion I have just pointed to is
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probably due to the fact that, according to Lopes (2005), when seeing-in is doubled
with surface seeing, it is doubled with (2), whereas when he defines surface seeing,
surface is understood in terms of (1). Here is another of Wollheim’s definitions of
surface, now as a depicting plane:
The point that I must now clarify is that, in thinking of naturalism as lying in some kind
of reciprocity or match between the two aspects of seeing-in, we must be careful not to
equate awareness of the marked surface with attention to the brushwork. Attention to the
brushwork is just one form that awareness of the marked surface can take, and it is not
a form that, for historical reasons, it could have taken before 1500 or so, when the unit
mark or stroke came to be thematized. But, long before the stroke became a required object
of aesthetic scrutiny, there were plenty of other features of the marked surface that claimed
attention: contour, modulation, punch mark, aerial perspective, fineness of detail, as well as,
for that matter, smoothness of surface or invisibility of brushwork. (Wollheim 1987, p. 75)
Here surface is not simply canvas, that is, the material support of certain marks;
it is (as already mentioned) a transformed support, a pictorial surface endowed with
properties that material supports cannot have. Walls or canvases as such cannot
be said to have an aerial perspective, fineness of detail, or be characterized by
the invisible brushwork; but they can of course constitute the material support for
the surface that displays such properties. This is why, still according to Wollheim,
seeing naturalistic paintings, even the most naturalistic ones, is just another form of
twofold perception.
So here is the distinction, which should be clearly marked within the Woll-
heimian approach, between seeing things in walls, clouds, or any other form of
material support, and seeing things in paintings. In the former case, you recognize
an object and you are aware of surface properties that specify the objective support
(cloud, wall, frosty pane, etc.); in the latter case, you recognize an object and you
co-perceive surface properties that specify the depicting surface (not the material
support, of which you are only vaguely aware).
2.7 Object Awareness
I will now finally turn to what I referred to above as object awareness. As we have
already seen, Lopes (2005) explains the non-illusionistic character of naturalistic
pictures in terms of seeing-in doubled with surface seeing. However, according
to this account, surface seeing cannot be restricted to naturalistic paintings alone,
since no picture seeing is illusionistic in any relevant respect (pace trompe l’oeil).
Wollheimian or design obtrusive pictures of course also elicit surface seeing, not
simply because their design stands out, but also because we are aware of them as
objects.
Thus, Lopes’s use of surface seeing is infelicitous in two respects. First, surface
seeing comprises elements that are not genuine features of aesthetic perception
(seeing-in is doubled with the wrong kind of seeing); and second, this kind of seeing
cannot be restricted to one type of picture. However, there is a good reason why
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Lopes resorts to it, and that is the non-illusionistic character of picture seeing, as
even the most immersed perceptual experience of a painting is accompanied by the
awareness that this is a painting, not a window to some garden or a person seen
face to face. So seeing-in must be doubled with something, and if, for the reasons
advanced above, surface seeing is a bad candidate, something else must be recruited.
This something is what I call object awareness. It should be understood as
passive awareness of the reality status of the thing(s) we are dealing with, not as
a specific way of attending to an object. Object awareness is the general horizon
within which the visual experience takes place, not some specific way of seeing.
Consider, for instance, a museum: before I stand in front of a painting in order
to have an appropriate experience of it, I have approached it, identified it as a thing
pertaining to a certain category of things, and when I find myself standing in front of
it and start attending to it as a specific kind of object (a depicting object), this initial
awareness of its nature recedes, it is no longer the focus of my attention (as it was
when I oriented my movements toward it). But it does not disappear; it continuously
accompanies my visual experience. It is not something that seeing-in is doubled
with—i.e. it is not something that informs the content of my visual experience
(unlike the perspectival design properties of Piero della Francesca’s Annunciation,
for instance). Rather, it is something that serves as a general reality anchor for both
seeing-in at large and visual experience in general.12
This was, then, my simplification of the matrix presented in Lopes (2005). It
is a simplification that targets the phenomenology of aesthetic experience and is
motivated by two observations. First, there are no criteria for distinguishing pictures
that only elicit seeing-in doubled with surface seeing from pictures which also
double with design seeing. Second, surface seeing, as it is defined in the case of
“naturalistic” paintings, is the perception of a surface which has been designed to
be pictorial or expressive and is therefore different only in degree and not in nature
from design seeing proper, which is the awareness of the actual design through
which something is shaped on the surface or in the picture. It thus makes sense to
talk about degrees of twofoldness through all instances, from the most naturalistic
to the most design obtrusive ones.
3 Multiply Depicting Design and Semiotic Design
Now I would like to proceed with the other sense, namely toward a “complexifica-
tion” of our notion of design as an object. I intend to unfold this complexification
along two lines. First, I will point to a depicting property of design which, in my
view, is a distinctive property of pictures, that is to say, not something all pictures
instantiate, but something pictures can do and other objects cannot do, or something
12Object awareness of this sort is of course also a vague form of attention that accompanies even
the most immersed reading or movie experiences.
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some pictures do and other objects do not. Design in pictures can depict two (or, in
rare cases, more) fully consistent objects without the picture becoming ambiguous
or bi-stable. Along the second line, I will pose a couple of questions about what
counts as design. If I am right to consider the design level of a picture a genuine
platform of meaning making, then seeing-in doubled with design seeing occurs
every time lines and shapes do not only depict, but also mean something (in virtue
of their morphology and qualitative properties and in virtue of the relations between
them). This argument hinges, of course, on the possibility of bestowing meaning
upon spatial phenomena.
3.1 Design That Depicts Multiple Objects
Consider the lithography below (from 11 Configurations) by Jean Arp (Fig. 3). As
Arnheim (1954, pp. 234–235) remarks, it is at least amenable to five consistent
interpretations (of which the following three will suffice): (a) a small black patch on
top of a larger white patch, which in turn rests on a large black patch; (b) a white
patch with a hole resting on a large black patch; (c) a large ring-shaped black patch
with a small black patch in the middle resting on a white background.
These interpretations are based on different perceptual grouping processes. In the
pyramidal (a) interpretation, the white patch is believed to continue under the small
black patch, while the large black patch is believed to continue under the white
patch. This is a perfectly normal phenomenon; this is indeed the way perception
constantly operates in everyday life. What is less normal is that the object also
lends itself to interpretations (b) and (c), even though it is based on the very same
Fig. 3 Jean Arp, from 11
Configurations, 1943. © VG
Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2014
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perceptual grouping mechanisms. In everyday perception, our visual brain may, on
certain occasions, come up with two conflicting interpretations of an object; but one
of them would be wrong. But this is not what we are seeing here. Here all the above
interpretations are equally consistent.
So what kind of depicting object is this? It is tempting to consider it a duck-
rabbit kind of object, in that it is impossible to ultimately determine what it depicts:
all the above interpretations are equally possible. However, the duck-rabbit case has
been designed to be ambiguous, i.e. to elicit bi-stable perception. This is not the
case in Arp, where the picture has been designed to depict several objects without
eliciting any bi-stability: the picture can be reconfigured at will as depicting this or
that object.
I call this property of pictures “multiply depicting design.” It is a pervasive
phenomenon in art, richly instantiated and exploitable in countless ways. It is
nevertheless a phenomenon that has by and large been neglected, if not simply
ignored, in the philosophical discussions and debates on depiction or pictorial
representation.13 Note that multiply depicting design does not boil down to seeing-
in doubled with awareness of design (or style or any other expressive property of
the depicting surface); it is multiply depicting stricto sensu, and it is so in a manner
which may be considered even more spectacular than Arp’s configuration. Arp’s
depicting surface depicts many different objects, but they all appear in an (abstract)
represented space. In contradistinction to this, most multiply depicting designs give
access to objects represented in different spaces: recognizable objects in painted 3D
space (e.g. ships, flowers, buildings, trees, and so on), and abstract shapes in pictorial
2D space. Epitomes of multiply depicting designs are Monet’s late paintings, in
which lines and colors, on the one hand, give access to, for example, branches
and reflections of branches and leaves in the water and in a painted, represented
space; but, on the other, can be regrouped in the pictorial, presenting space as
abstract vertical green shapes on a blue background (see also Bundgaard 2002, 2004,
2009). Here is an example that (for purely aesthetic reasons) exploits the very same
property of depicting surfaces:
In Frank’s picture, it is relatively easy to identify the objects appearing in the
represented space: a newspaper and magazine stand, a street lamp, a building in the
background (however, due to vantage point and framing, it is actually difficult to
capture the exact spatial layout of the scene: what is the distance between objects in
the foreground and objects in the background? Is there a middle ground—say, the
rectangular blocks below and behind the street lamp?). At the same time, a salient
property of the picture is that it has been designed to make the visual brain group
the represented objects in one, abstract vertical figure appearing as a configuration
13Arnheim is a remarkable exception. The present argument comes close to his (1954, pp. 127–129)
acute double observation: (1) Based on its style, a picture occupies different positions between two
extremes, namely the total 2D flatness of its plane and the full-blown three-dimensionality of the
world it represents; (2) pictures can be composed in two ways: both with regards the arrangement
of figures in the represented space and with regards the arrangement of shapes on the plane.
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Fig. 4 Robert Frank, from
The Americans, 1959, picture
62: 23rd Street, NYC
of rectangles on an abstract background. In other words, this picture epitomizes
an essential property of a specific kind of depicting object: those which facilitate
double seeing-in: a recognitional one, which picks up the represented objects, and a
configurational one, which picks up the abstract structure of shapes (Fig. 4).
The depicting elements of such pictures have been designed (or possess a design)
to both tap into the grouping automatisms of low-level perception and thereby
present pure, organized shapes on a pictorial surface (across categorial differences)
and provide the higher order top-down-oriented levels of the visuo-cognitive system
with enough cues to allow it to recognize objects and natural sceneries in a
represented space. In short, in virtue of certain types of design, marks on a depicting
surface can both be configured as pure Gestalts standing out from a background and
reconfigured into represented objects in sceneries, landscapes, interiors, and so on.
Key to these kinds of design is that each depicted object level is consistent and
structured, and that these object levels do not share the same part-whole structure
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(the organization of the shapes as pure Gestalts runs counter to the organization of
the represented space and the things in it. They do not share the same contours;
what is separated in the representation of, say, a cityscape—buildings, magazine
stand—may be fused at the pure Gestalt level).14
As I have already mentioned, this design property is rarely commented upon
in the literature about depiction and seeing-in. This is probably because depiction
has been construed in a narrow sense: as that which enables a visual recognitional
experience of a represented object. It is nevertheless interesting, first and foremost
because it is a case of double depiction. The homogeneous shape made of
rectangular figures we may see in Frank’s photograph is depicted in virtue of the
design of the photograph. These figures, as well as the homogeneous shape, are
not the design. In other words, when I see this kind of abstract shape, I do not
see the design as design; I see a well-formed shape in virtue of the design. It is
interesting because it does not immediately fit into the categories of seeing-in—
even in Lopes’s pluralistic matrix—since none of them accommodate this general
phenomenon which we could dub “double seeing-in doubled with design seeing,”
that is, seeing a recognizable object in a picture and seeing a well-formed shape in
virtue of the same design, which therefore becomes obtrusive in perception.
Artists often detach the automatisms of perception from their primary and only
task in everyday perception, which is to further fast, smooth, and efficient object
recognition. They do so not to hinder such recognition or delay it (or whatever our
reward system, according to certain scholars, might find exciting; see Ramachandran
and Hirstein 1999 for a defense of this claim, and Bundgaard 2014 for a critique of
it), but simply to produce double organizations from one design: one for the eye
(pure shapes) and one for the mind (recognizable forms).
3.2 Design as a Platform for Meaning-Making
I will now turn to the second line of complexification. I would suggest that a
definition of design as the configuration of marks on a 2D surface in virtue of
which something is depicted seems, at first glance, quite broad. It may, nevertheless,
turn out to be too restrictive if we insist on describing design structure strictly as
that which is responsible for what we see. Or in other words, I would suggest that
design in pictures is also a part of what we understand in a picture, or the different
kinds of meaning with which a picture has been bestowed. This is probably far from
controversial; it may even seem trivial. It has consequences, however, because if this
is true, then twofoldness in Lopes’s strict sense of seeing-in doubled with design
seeing may be at work when we perceive even very straightforwardly naturalistic
paintings.
14See Bundgaard 2009 for a more detailed discussion of this.
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Before I explain why this is so, the following should be made clear. The point
we are dealing with here is different from the one I made when discussing the
relation between surface seeing and design seeing (from a Wollheimian point of
view, against Lopes as it were). From a Wollheimian point of view, picture seeing is
twofold in nature, as is the visual experience of a naturalistic painting, of course.
What I mean to say now is something else. Even in cases where the design of
a painting is not visually obtrusive, seeing-in may be doubled with design seeing
in Lopes’s strong understanding: those are cases where the design, albeit visually
unobtrusive, is semiotically salient, i.e. it enables a visual experience with a certain
meaning.
Why is this the case? Simply because phenomena like composition, perspective,
vantage point, or contrast are well-known tools for meaning making in art, and
because artists arguably resort to them in order to produce certain meaning effects in
their works—meaning effects that often depend not solely on the represented forms
as such, but on the relation between these forms, their color, the value which their
shape or orientation has been attributed locally, viewpoint, and so forth: things that
can be read off the surface by (at least trained) viewers. In many cases, the use of
such techniques and tools for meaning making is also visually salient (for instance in
Piero della Francesca’s Annunciation). In certain cases, however, this is less evident.
Let me illustrate what I mean. Consider Constable’s The Leaping Horse (Fig. 5).
This might be regarded as belonging to the group of naturalistic paintings in that
nothing conspicuous is going on in terms of brushstrokes, color, shape, or viewpoint.
However, if we compare it to the studies that preceded it, we can observe a series of
Fig. 5 John Constable, The Leaping Horse, 1825
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remarkable changes—not as regards the depicted objects and the scenery as such,
which all remain the same, but as regards their arrangement, their orientation, and
their shape or morphology. In these studies, the tree to the left of the leaping horse
is placed to the right of it (on the depicting surface, of course); it was bending to the
left; there were two boats to the left, both moving, one man was poling, and so on.
Whatever the meaning effects of these changes are, we have good reasons to believe
that they reflect the artist’s intentions. If it is sensible to assimilate arrangement and
shape of parts as an essential element of a picture’s design, Constable has aimed
at doubling seeing-in with seeing a design where the static verticality of the left
side of the painting is enhanced as a global contrast to the leaping horse’s dynamic
horizontality. It is in this sense that the design may be visually unobtrusive, but
semiotically salient. In such cases—and to use Lopes’s terms—seeing-in is divided
from visual design seeing, but doubled with semiotic design seeing. (The above
comments on Caillebotte suggest exactly the same thing.)
As suggested, this is a common aspect of paintings—the fact that they articulate
semantic values by means of composition or vantage point and perspective. I am
not sure, however, that design as a platform for meaning making, that is, as a tool
for shaping expressive meaning intentions, is considered just as primary as design
construed as a platform for depiction tout court. My contention is that the semiotic
function and the depicting function in painting are fused. The former is not simply
supervenient on the latter and it is not something that needs to be decoded or inferred
from the represented figures: in many cases meaning is right in the morphology of
figures, in their resemblance, in their color, in their relative size, in their position on
the surface or in the represented space. And in many cases, these phenomena tap
into what is meaningful for our visual brain.
If this is so, aesthetic experience is twofold in essence. We see things in pictures,
and we see them in a meaningful substrate, on a meaningful surface, that is to say,
on an intentionally designed expressive surface.
4 Conclusion
The main claim in this article is that a distinction should be made between surface
as the material support of a painting and surface as a depicting plane. The visual
experience of paintings is twofold in that seeing-in is doubled with co-awareness
of the depicting surface, either because its design is visually salient, or because the
design is semiotically salient, or both. The transformation of a material support into
a depicting surface upon which meaning has been bestowed (or which gives shape
to a meaning intention) is an essential (albeit not exclusive) property of paintings.
Correlatively, the perception of paintings is characterized by being an encounter
with visual meaning at large articulated in shapes, colors, strokes, and lines. An
important task still remains in determining what is meant by meaning in pictorial
art, i.e. to chart its different types of manifestation. This, however, was not the aim
of the present chapter.
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Depiction
John Hyman
Abstract In this article, I defend a qualified version of the so-called ‘resemblance’
theory of depiction: the theory that pictures differ from texts in resembling the
objects that they represent. Two related mistakes led philosophers to abandon
this theory. First, they mistakenly thought that resemblance is a relation. Second,
they commonly confused or amalgamated theories about the sense of pictures and
theories about their reference (e.g. Wollheim), or assumed that a theory of depiction
is first and foremost a theory of reference (e.g. Goodman)—as it were, a theory of
the portrait.
Keywords Depiction • Sense • Reference • Resemblance • Relation
Analytic philosophers interested in depiction have focused for the most part on two
problems: first, explaining how pictures represent; second, describing the distinctive
kinds of artistic value pictures can possess, or the distinctive ways in which they
can embody artistic values that extend more broadly across the arts. I shall discuss
the first problem here. The main concepts I shall be concerned with are depiction,
resemblance, sense and reference.
My main aim is to reassess the traditional idea that representation in painting
and sculpture depends on resemblances in form and color between works of art
and the objects they represent. The philosophical literature about representation
has been dominated for 50 years—to its detriment, I shall argue—by the view
that the traditional idea is wrong. I reject the so-called resemblance theory of
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representation, the theory that representational works of art are iconic signs, which
Nelson Goodman (1968) attacked with devastating effect in Languages of Art. But
there are other ways of making the traditional idea precise.
The question I shall consider first is whether resemblance is a relation. This may
seem remote from the interests of philosophers of art, especially since we cannot
expect to be able to answer it without first clarifying the idea of a relation itself. But
it is where I believe we must begin.
According to logicians, if two or more names in a true sentence are replaced
by variables, the term that results will normally express a relation, which obtains
between the bearers of the names. For example, if we start with the sentence ‘Reggie
and Ronnie are twins,’ and replace the names with variables we get the predicate ‘x
and y are twins,’ which expresses a relation that can obtain between two siblings.
Here are a couple more examples: ‘Paris is west of Moscow’ yields the predicate
‘x is west of y,’ which expresses a spatial relation; ‘Scott is the author of Waverley’
yields ‘x is the author of y,’ which expresses a causal relation.
However, the logical conception of a relation has two important limitations.
First, it is too broad. For there are cases where—as logicians generally agree—
following this procedure will not yield a predicate that expresses a relation. For
example, ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ reports an act, but acts should not be assimilated
to relations.1 And there are other cases that are controversial. For example, it is
controversial whether identity-statements, such as ‘the morning star is the evening
star’ and ‘Bronstein is Trotsky,’ are about an especially intimate relation in which
everything stands, and can only stand, to itself.
Second, the logical conception of a relation tells us where we can normally find
a term expressing a relation in a sentence—it is the part we are left with when we
delete the names—but it does not tell us anything more about what a relation is. This
is rather like explaining that a father is the kind of thing Russians refer to with their
middle names. If we want to know more than this, we need to refer to the traditional
conception of a relation, which preceded the development of formal logic.
According to this conception, which modern formal logic complements, but does
not supersede, a relation is a way in which one thing can stand to another thing,
or several things can stand to one another. As a matter of fact, the last clause is
untraditional, since the idea of a many-termed relation was only introduced in the
second half of the nineteenth century (Prior 1976, p. 29). But the definition in italics
captures a conception of a relation that stems originally from Aristotle’s Categories
and on which the logical conception I have described is based. Here, for example, is
Locke’s (1689) definition, which confines relations to two terms, and also precludes
things from standing in a relation to themselves:
The Nature of Relation consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another.
(2.25.5)
And here is the definition in the current edition of the OED:
1Kenny 1963, ch. 7.
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An attribute denoting or concept expressing a connection, correspondence, or contrast
between different things; a particular way in which one thing or idea is connected or
associated with another or others. (2a)
Like the definition in italics, the definition in the OED includes many-termed
relations, and it allows a man to stand in a relation to himself, for example, being
the one who shaves, or being the one who kills. For these are both ways in which
one thing can stand to another thing. But being the same man as is not a way in
which one thing can stand to another thing. Nor is it a way in which one thing is
connected or associated with another thing. So it is not a relation, according to these
definitions, whereas it looks like a relation according to the logical conception we
began with, as I pointed out earlier. I shall not attempt to adjudicate between these
views.
In the relation-stating sentences I mentioned earlier, the verb phrase that
expresses the relation is flanked by proper names referring to the objects it relates:
‘Paris is west of Moscow,’ ‘Scott is the author of Waverley.’ These names can
be replaced by descriptive terms such as ‘the capital of France’ or ‘the Laird of
Abbotsford.’ But, like proper names, these terms refer to particular places, people
or things. Even the sentence ‘John knows a fireman,’ which does not purport to
identify John’s acquaintance, implies that there is a particular fireman John knows,
since one cannot know a fireman, but not any fireman in particular.
What about statements of resemblance? Do the verb ‘resembles’ and the verb-
phrases ‘is like,’ ‘looks like,’ ‘sounds like,’ etc., express relations? The answer, I
suggest, is that sometimes they do and sometimes they do not. For example, in the
sentence ‘Darwin looks like Socrates’ the verb-phrase expresses a relation, whereas
in the sentence ‘Socrates looks like a satyr’ it does not.
Compare the verb ‘to be.’ It is an elementary fact about English grammar that
‘to be’ is used both to express identity, as in ‘Bronstein is Trotsky’ and ‘Cicero is
Tully,’ and as a copular verb, as in ‘Cicero is a statesman.’ As I mentioned earlier,
it is controversial whether identity is a relation: Wittgenstein says that it isn’t in
the Tractatus, whereas Kripke says that it is. But if we assume that Kripke is right,
that identity is a relation, the verb ‘is’ expresses a relation in the sentence ‘Cicero
is Tully’ and the sentence ‘The morning star is the evening star,’ whereas in the
sentences ‘Cicero is a statesman’ and ‘The morning star is a planet’ it does not.
The verbs ‘resembles,’ ‘is like’ and ‘looks like’ evidently have a similar dual use,
that is, they are used both to express relations and as copular verbs. ‘x is like y’ is a
regular two-place predicate, and if we replace the variables with names, the resulting
sentence relates the individuals concerned: for example, ‘SoHo is like Hampstead’
relates part of New York and part of London. But the sentence ‘SoHo is like a
village’ does not relate anything to anything. It is not comparable to ‘The morning
star is the evening star’ or ‘Cicero is Tully,’ but to ‘The morning star is a planet’
or ‘Cicero is a statesman,’ the only difference being that it characterizes the place
referred to by saying what it is like, rather than what it is. ‘SoHo looks like a village’
and ‘SoHo resembles a village’ are just the same.
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It follows that although ‘SoHo resembles a village’ and ‘John knows a fireman’
are syntactically similar, they are logically different. If I tell you that John knows a
fireman, you can ask me which fireman John knows, and if what I said is true, your
question has an answer, even if I do not know what it is. In other words, we can add a
namely-rider to the sentence ‘John knows a fireman,’ for example, ‘ : : : namely, the
fireman who lives on Church Lane,’ or ‘ : : : namely, Jim.’2 By contrast, if I tell you
that SoHo resemble a village, and you ask me ‘Which village?’, I can say that I did
not mean to imply that it resembles any village in particular, and there does not have
to be a namely-rider we can add to the sentence, in order to prove that what I said
was true. ‘SoHo resembles a village’ normally means that SoHo has some of the
salient characteristics of a village, without any village in particular being involved.
So, is resemblance a relation? If the idea is that the verb ‘resembles’ sometimes
expresses a relation, then it is true. If it is that ‘resembles’ always expresses a
relation, then it is false.
I shall turn now to the philosophy of art. According to Robert Hopkins (1998),
one of the principal objections to the view that pictures invariably resemble
the scenes or objects they depict is that resemblance is a relation between two
particulars, whereas depiction is not.
Resemblance is a relation between two particulars—one resembling the other. It is hard to
make sense of resemblance between a particular thing and some, but no particular, item of
a certain sort—a horse, say. [ : : : ] there can be no resemblance between a picture and such
a horse, and thus no prospect for understanding the depiction of a (no particular) horse in
terms of resemblance. (p. 10ff)
Hopkins’s entry on depiction in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
contains a similar argument, but he adds the requirement that for two things to
resemble one another both need to exist:
For resemblance to hold, two things must exist—the thing resembling and the thing
resembled. By contrast, depiction does not require there to be two things; one depicting,
the other depicted. The picture alone suffices, since it may depict what does not exist. For
example, it may depict a horse, but no horse in particular. (§1)
Catherine Abell (2009) follows Hopkins closely:
For one thing to resemble another, both must exist. However many pictures depict things
that do not exist. This is true of pictures [ : : : ] that depict objects of a certain type without
depicting any specific particulars of that type. (p. 186)
Interestingly, Hopkins does not appear to notice that his claim that ‘resemblance
is a relation between two particulars’ contradicts the familiar idea that resemblance
is a reflexive relation, which implies that true statements of resemblance may
compare an object with itself. Even if this familiar idea is wrong, a person or place
at one time can certainly resemble the same person or place at another time, and a
kind of stuff in one place can resemble the same kind of stuff in another place. For
example, the British Foreign Secretary William Hague famously looked the same at
2The phrase ‘namely-rider’ was coined by Ryle (1971, pp. 250–257).
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thirty-six as he looked at sixteen. Here we do not have two things, we have one thing
at two different times. Again, Guinness in Tel-Aviv tastes the same as Guinness in
Cork; and here we have one kind of stuff in two different places.
Neither Hopkins nor Abell says whether they believe that resemblances have to
be between particular things that exist because this is true of relations generally, or
whether they think it is something special about resemblance. Be that as it may, it is
not self-evident that when a statement of resemblance does relate two things, both
need to exist in order for the statement to be true. And besides, as we have seen, true
statements of resemblance do not always mention two particular things, to which
the existence requirement can apply. I shall enlarge on these two points in turn.
When a statement of resemblance relates two things, must they both exist in
order for the statement to be true? On the face of it, the answer is no. Reggie looks
like Ronnie, Levin is similar in various ways to Tolstoy, Widmerpool resembles
Malvolio, and Thor is like Zeus. At least these are things that we find it quite natural
to say. It appears that a statement of resemblance can be true whether both or one or
neither of the individuals concerned exists.
Here is a simple theory that explains this. The mark of a fictional character, as
the disclaimer that sometimes appears at the front of novels or at the end of movies
attests, is that any resemblance to any actual person is coincidental (at the time of
writing); it is not that none is possible or that none exists. (The qualification ‘at the
time of writing’ is needed for the reason Oscar Wilde famously pointed out: life can
imitate art.)
If this is right, we can still insist that someone who uses two names to make a
true statement of resemblance refers to something with each of the two names, as
long as we are prepared to acknowledge that it is possible to refer to things—such as
fictional characters—that do not exist.3 Arguably, what the referring use of a name
requires is that the speaker be able to identify whom or what she is referring to,
which is not ruled out where fictional characters are concerned. On the contrary,
fictional characters can be identified quite easily. For instance, Widmerpool is the
character in A Dance to the Music of Time who marries Pamela Flitton, and Malvolio
is the character in Twelfth Night who wears yellow stockings with cross gartering.
If this simple theory is right, when a statement of resemblance compares two
things, neither of them needs to exist in order for the statement to be true. Of course,
this theory is not universally accepted and statements of resemblance involving
fictional characters have been interpreted in various ways. But we should not assume
that the simple theory is false.
The second point I said I would enlarge on is that statements of resemblance
do not always mention two things, to which the existence requirement could apply.
The reason I gave is that while there are many statements of resemblance in which
two specific persons, places or things are mentioned, for example, ‘SoHo is like
Hampstead,’ there are just as many in which only one is, for example, ‘SoHo is like a
village.’ Equally, there are many in which none are, for example, ‘A kibbutz is like a
3On this topic, see Rundle 1979; Sainsbury 2005, ch. 2 and 6.
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village’ and ‘Margarine is like butter.’ It is puzzling that philosophers writing about
the resemblance theory of depiction uniformly ignore these kinds of statements, and
repeat the canard that resemblances are necessarily between particulars, or specific
things.
As we have seen, the supposed fact that resemblances are necessarily between
pairs of specific things, both of which exist, is thought to pose a problem for
resemblance theories of depiction, because a picture may depict a man or a horse
without depicting any man or horse in particular. Here is the passage from the
Routledge Encyclopedia again:
For resemblance to hold, two things must exist—the thing resembling and the thing
resembled. By contrast, depiction does not require there to be two things; one depicting,
the other depicted. The picture alone suffices, since it may depict what does not exist. For
example, it may depict a horse, but no horse in particular.
One thing that is puzzling about this remark is that if a picture depicts a horse,
but no horse in particular, it surely does not depict something that does not exist. On
the contrary, it depicts something, a kind of animal, that does exist, unlike a picture
of a centaur, for example. A kind of animal is not a particular animal, of course. But
the question whether the particular horse it depicts exists does not arise, since ex
hypothesis it does not depict any horse in particular. Stubbs’s portrait of Whistlejack
depicts a horse that exists, or existed when he painted it; whereas Rubens’s painting
Perseus and Andromeda depicts Pegasus, a mythical horse, which never existed. But
when a picture depicts a horse, but no horse in particular, there is no particular horse
about whose existence we can enquire. Hopkins appears to confuse pictures with
generic content and pictures with fictional content. I shall return to this confusion
later.
The passages by Hopkins I have quoted seems therefore to combine two errors:
first, the idea that resemblances are necessarily between pairs of specific things,
both of which exist; and second, the idea that genre pictures—by which I mean
pictures with generic content—invariably depict things that do not exist, that is,
they depict things that do not exist whether they depict centaurs (which do not exist)
or horses (which do). I have said more about the first error so far. But the second
error is equally important, because it illustrates a failure to think clearly about the
relationship between the concept of a picture with generic content and the concept
of a picture that portrays an individual, which is of fundamental importance in the
theory of art, as I shall argue in a moment.
Where does this leave the traditional idea that representation in the visual arts
in general, and depiction in particular, depends on resemblances in form and color
between works of art and the things they represent?
It is true that the verb ‘depicts’ is sometimes used to express a relation, and
sometimes not. For example, ‘It depicts a horse,’ ‘ : : : a bridge,’ ‘ : : : a river’ can be
read in either way. Read in the first, relation-involving way, the questions ‘Which
horse?’, ‘Which bridge?’, ‘Which river?’ have answers, even if we do not know
what they are, and the sentence can be continued with a namely-rider, ‘ : : : namely,
Whistlejack,’ ‘ : : : namely, the Rialto,’ ‘ : : : namely the Styx.’ Read in the second,
Depiction 197
non-relation-involving way, the question ‘Which : : : ?’ and the namely-rider are out
of place. It is useful to mark this distinction clearly in the language we use to talk
about pictures, and to a degree we do: the verb ‘portray’ is biased towards the
relation, whereas ‘depict’ is not.
But as we have seen, the verb ‘resembles’ has exactly the same dual use. Hence,
the statement that a picture (or part of one) resembles a horse does not imply that
there is a particular horse that it resembles, and the statement that it resembles a
satyr does not imply that satyrs exist. Satyrs have a distinctive appearance, which
it is easy to describe, and if something has the same appearance as a satyr, then it
resembles one. The fact that satyrs are mythical creatures does not prevent this from
occurring. In Plato’s Symposium, Alcibiades says that Socrates looks like a satyr.
This may have been unkind, but it was not absurd.
I said that the relationship between the concept of a picture with generic content
and the concept of a picture that portrays an individual is of fundamental importance
in the theory of depiction, but neither the phrase ‘picture with generic content’ nor
the word ‘portrays’ has exactly the right meaning. Perhaps the simplest way to
capture what I have in mind is to take a picture of a specific person, place or object,
whether fictional or real, and to consider what we can call, for want of a better
pair of terms, its reference and its sense. The words ‘reference’ and ‘sense’ are the
normal translations of the terms ‘Bedeutung’ and ‘Sinn,’ which Frege introduced to
distinguish between the object that an expression stands for or designates, and the
way in which the expression presents that object, the ‘mode of presentation’ as he
called it.
Frege (1980) introduced the distinction between sense and reference to explain
how identity statements can be informative, without being about words. Returning
to the example I mentioned earlier, ‘The morning star is the evening star’ is not a
statement about words, like the statement that phrases ‘the morning star’ and ‘the
evening star’ refer to the same object, because the first statement uses these two
phrases, whereas the second one mentions them. And it is not merely an instance
of a law of logic either, like the statement that the morning star is the morning
star. ‘The morning star is the evening star’ can state an astronomical discovery,
Frege explained, because the phrases ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ have
the same reference, but do not have the same sense. Here is another example.
The expressions ‘2  3’ and ‘4 C 2’ both designate the number six, but the first
expression presents it as the product of two and three, whereas the second presents
it as the sum of four and two. So again these expressions have the same reference,
but do not have the same sense.
Similarly, two portraits of the same individual may present him as dark-haired
and seated, wearing a black smock (Kramskoy’s 1873 portrait of Tolstoy), or as
grey-bearded and standing, wearing a white smock (Repin’s 1901 portrait). The
analogy between expressions in a language and pictures is not exact. But it is
helpful to think of one of these two portraits as designating, or standing for, the
same individual as the other, while differing in its ‘mode of presentation’—in other
words, as having the same reference, but a different sense. And we can use the same
distinction to think about two pictures of the same fictional person—for example,
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Michelangelo’s fresco of the creation of Adam on the Sistine Chapel ceiling and
Piero della Francesca’s fresco of the death of Adam in the church of San Francesco
in Arezzo—or the same place.
I said earlier that the verb ‘depicts’ is sometimes used to express a relation, and
sometimes not, and that sentences like ‘It depicts a horse f : : : a bridge / : : : a riverg’
can be read in either way. We can see now that this distinction corresponds to the
distinction between sense and reference. In the relation-involving use of the verb, the
use where the sentence can be continued with a namely-rider, depiction corresponds
to reference; whereas in the non-relation-involving use of the verb it corresponds
to sense. We can also see that the kind of picture Hopkins and Abell are concerned
about, a picture that depicts a horse, but no horse in particular, is a picture that
has a sense—as any intelligible figurative picture must—but no reference, like the
phrase ‘the greatest integer’ or ‘the present King of France.’ Henceforth, I shall
use subscripts to distinguish between these two ways of using the verb ‘depicts:’
‘depictsr’ for the use that corresponds to reference and ‘depictss’ for the use that
corresponds to sense.
Together with the muddle about resemblance, the most important mistake
philosophers have made about depiction is to confuse or amalgamate theories
about the sense of works of art and theories about their reference, or to assume
that a theory of depiction is first and foremost a theory of reference—as it were,
a theory of the portrait—and that a theory of sense can be developed from it,
rather as Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in the Tractatus was developed from
his conception of a name. Each of the two most influential theories of depiction
during the last 50 years, Richard Wollheim’s and Nelson Goodman’s, makes one of
these mistakes. Wollheim makes the first, while Goodman makes the second.
Wollheim (1990) argues that a picture is a marked surface, which is designed to
cause a distinctive kind of visual experience, which he calls ‘seeing-in.’ Seeing-in,
he explains, has two aspects or components:
I am visually aware of the surface I look at, and I discern something standing out in front
of, or (in certain cases) receding behind, something else. (p. 46)
But, he points out, this kind of experience is not caused by pictures alone. It
can also occur, for example, when we look at a damp-stained wall. The element
of intention or design, he claims, is what distinguishes pictures from other marked
surfaces that have the same kind of effect. Representation occurs when a standard
of correctness is imposed on the natural capacity of seeing-in, and the standard of
correctness is set by the artist’s intention. Thus a picture represents a specific person
or place, or an object of a given kind, if, and only if, the artist successfully intends
the view to see that person or place or that kind of object in its surface.
There are several well-known objections to this theory.4 What concerns us here is
that Wollheim ignores the distinction between the sense and reference of a picture.
He talks indifferently about seeing Henry VIII or Charles Laughton or a generic
4See Budd 2008, pp. 185–215; Hyman 2006, ch. 7.
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bison in a picture. But this is logically naïve. It is like failing to distinguish between
the sense and reference of a phrase such as ‘the morning star,’ as if the philosophy of
language could make do with a single idea of meaning or signification that includes
both.
One result of Wollheim’s failure to acknowledge this distinction is his claim
that the standard of correctness, which determines whether the viewer has correctly
perceived what a picture represents, is set by the intentions of the artist. This is
normally true of a picture’s reference, but not its sense. Thus, Wittgenstein (1969)
was surely right when he said in the Blue Book: “An obvious, and correct, answer
to the question ‘What makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so?’ is that it is the
intention.” (p. 32) This is comparable to the question: What determines the reference
of a proper name, in a particular instance of its use? For example, if I begin a letter
with the phrase ‘Dear George,’ what determines which of the myriad Georges in the
world I am addressing? The answer is surely my intention.
But we cannot answer the corresponding question about sense in the same way,
for there may be a difference between what a word or phrase I write or utter means
and what I meant to say. Similarly, a picture can depicts a man in the uniform of a
midshipman when the artist intended to depicts a man in the uniform of an ensign,
or it can depicts a spruce when the artist intended to depicts a larch. In both cases
there are more general terms that apply to the depicteds object and conform to the
artist’s intentions, such as ‘man’ and ‘tree.’ But the divergence between intention
and outcome remains, and this disproves the idea that an artist cannot produce a
picture with unintended sense. As one might expect, inexpert artists are especially
prone to do so. For example, most three-year-old children are just as capable of
painting a picture that depictsr their mothers as Rembrandt or Whistler was, but
drawings by three-year-olds tend to depicts arms growing out of heads.
Wollheim’s error about the role of the intention is a result of his failure to
distinguish between the sense and reference of a picture. He uses a single model
to explain both what determines the reference of a portrait and what determines
its sense or mode of presentation. But it is as elementary a mistake to overlook the
difference between these questions as it would be to overlook the difference between
the sense and reference of a descriptive phrase.
Goodman is a very different case. He does not overlook the distinction between
sense and reference: he rejects it. The distinction he draws between a picture of
a man and a man-picture is extensionally equivalent to the distinction between
a picture that depictsr a man and one that depictss a man, except that Goodman
excludes the referring use of empty names. But the extreme form of nominalism he
espouses reduces sense to reference, so we find the same failure to think about the
sense of a picture, as opposed to reference, in his work. Thus his principal claim
is that ‘denotation is the core of representation’—denotation being a variety of
reference—as if a portrait were the basic kind of picture.5
5Goodman op. cit., p. 5.
200 J. Hyman
Both of these approaches are disastrous, because representation by pictures
depends on a systematic relationship between the shapes and colors on the surface
of a picture and its sense that does not exist between the shapes and colors on the
surface of a picture and its reference. So if we amalgamate sense and reference, or if
we regard the question of how pictures refer as fundamental, we are bound to miss
the basic mechanism that explains how pictures represent.
Thus, it should be obvious that there isn’t a systematic relationship between
the shape and color of part of the surface of a portrait and the shape and color
of the individual it portrays. If we imagine hanging Whistler’s portrait of his mother
(Arrangement in Grey and Black No.1, 1871) next to a child’s portrait of its mother
drawn at the age of three—admittedly different artists and different mothers—the
point is clear. But if we turn from the reference of a picture to its sense, the situation
is quite different. The case of a free-standing sculpture is simpler but similar to the
case of a picture, so that is where I shall begin. (The qualification ‘free-standing’
will be omitted in the discussion that follows.)
Consider the part of Michelangelo’s Bruges Madonna that represents Jesus’s
head. What is the reference of this part of the sculpture, and what is its sense? Its
reference is Jesus’s head, and it presents it as having various features: thick locks
of hair, chubby cheeks, and so on. These features, we may say, comprise the sense
or mode of presentation of this part of the sculpture. But the sense or mode of
presentation of a sculpture expressed in the most general terms is simply an object
or arrangement of objects with a specific shape. And except in the unusual case of
an anamorphic sculpture, which is designed to be seen from an extremely eccentric
point of view, this shape is evidently the shape of the part of the carved block itself.
This applies to Michelangelo’s Rome Pietà in exactly the same way. The Rome Pietà
refers to the same two individuals as the Bruges Madonna, but the sense, or mode
of presentation, of Jesus’s head is different because the shape of the corresponding
part of the sculpture is different, and Jesus’s head is presented as an object with this
shape.
It follows that if we want to define the fundamental difference between repre-
sentation in sculpture and representation in words we need to think about sense, not
reference. The simple rule about sculpture is that what a sculpture represents has
the same shape as the sculpture itself. Another way of making the same point would
be to say that there is an exact resemblance in shape between a sculpture and what
it represents. But by the phrase ‘what it represents,’ I do not mean the sculpture’s
reference; I mean its sense. The rule does not relate two particulars, for example,
the sculpture and the historical individual Jesus; it concerns a single particular, the
sculpture, and its sense or mode of presentation. If resemblance were invariably a
relation between two particulars, the rule would be incoherent; but as we have seen,
this dogma about resemblance is a mistake.
The simple rule about sculpture should be obvious as soon as it is stated, so
obvious that it seems trite. But notice that the rule is not conditional on the artist’s
intention; it does not involve a system of rules correlating symbols with the objects
they refer to; it does not refer to any of the psychological states philosophers have
postulated to explain how painting and sculpture represent; and it applies in exactly
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the same way to a Greek bronze figure of a generic horse from the Geometric
period as it does to the Bruges Madonna or the Rome Pietà. The same is true of
the equivalent rule for pictures, as we shall see.
I shall add four further observations, before discussing the rule for pictures. First,
although the simple rule for sculpture can be stated in terms of resemblance it
need not be. It is not a restatement of the theory that paintings and sculptures are
iconic signs. That theory failed to distinguish between sense and reference, treated
resemblance as a relation and was not limited to shape.
Second, the simple rule does not imply that a sculpture that represents Jesus
resembles Jesus, or that a bronze figure of a horse resembles a horse. It says nothing
about the reference of a sculpture, and nothing about its sense beyond its shape. It
therefore combines naturally with the idea that reference is normally determined by
the artist’s intention, and with the idea that a viewer’s ability to identify the sense or
mode of presentation of a sculpture as a child’s head or as a horse depends on her
ability to recognize these kinds of objects by their shapes.
Third, the fact that the simple rule is not conditional on the artist’s intention does
not prevent the artist’s intention from playing any role in the theory of representation
apart from determining the reference of a work of art. The analogy with linguistic
meaning suggests that it does play such a role. For acknowledging that the meaning
of an utterance need not be the same as what the speaker meant to say is consistent
with the idea that an utterance means nothing unless the speaker means something
by the words he utters; and it is also consistent with the idea that a meaningful
utterances cannot occur except against a background that includes the custom of
making utterances with the intention of saying something. Both of these ideas can
be transferred to the case of painting and sculpture in a straightforward way; but
neither implies that an artist cannot produce a representational work of art with
unintended sense, as Wollheim’s theory implies.
Fourth, as I have indicated, the simple rule that what a sculpture represents
has the same shape as the sculpture itself combines naturally with various ideas
philosophers interested in representation have proposed. It combines easily with
John Kulvicki’s (2010) recent defence of the role of bare-bones content in the
theory of representation as well as claims about the role of recognition in explaining
how works of art represent, such as those advanced by Flint Schier (1986) in his
book Deeper into Pictures and Dominic Lopes (1996) in Understanding Pictures;
it is consistent with various ideas about the relationship between the concept of
representation and the concept of intention or design; and as we shall see, it suggests
that the concept of occlusion shape (outline shape) plays a central role in the theory
of depiction, as Robert Hopkins and the author of this article have both proposed.
The equivalent rule for pictures is less straightforward than the rule for sculpture,
because sculptures represent objects with the same number of dimensions as they
have themselves, whereas pictures normally represent three-dimensional objects on
a two-dimensional (i.e. flat) surface, or on a surface whose curvature is slight enough
to be ignored. But it is not difficult to see what the rule for pictures is, if we think
about how their two-dimensionality affects their sense.
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The principal point is that we cannot discover different aspects of an object
represented in a picture by moving around it and studying it from different angles, as
we can in the case of a free-standing sculpture. That is why Van Dyke sent Bernini
a triple portrait of Charles I: one referent, three modes of presentation. So whereas
the sense or mode of presentation of a sculpture, expressed in the most general
terms, is an object or arrangement of objects with a specific shape, the sense or
mode of presentation of a picture is an aspect or view of an object or arrangement
of objects—or several aspects or views, in unusual cases such as this one—relative
to a line (or lines) of sight.
Now if we want to formulate a shape-rule for pictures analogous to the simple
rule for sculpture discussed above, we shall need to identify a two-dimensional
shape-property that an aspect or view of an object represented in a picture invariably
includes, whether it is a shadow, a rainbow, part of the sea or sky, or a medium-sized
specimen of dry goods. It is not difficult to identify this property if we think about
an object with a simple shape, such as a coin. Consider a circular coin viewed along
an oblique line of sight. The coin will look circular to a viewer as long as she can see
its orientation. But the two-dimensional cross-section of the cone of light the coin
subtends to the viewer’s eye will be elliptical, and this is also a visible property of
the coin. It is especially salient when an object is backlit, and appears in silhouette.
It has been called a perspectival shape or outline shape or occlusion shape, it is two-
dimensional, and of course it is relative to a line of sight. It changes as the line of
sight changes. But relative does not mean subjective. The shape of a cross-section
of the cone of light an object subtends to the viewer’s eye is not merely a feature of
the viewer’s experience. It belongs to optics, not psychology.
I said a moment ago that the sense or mode of presentation of a picture is an
aspect or view of an object or arrangement of objects, relative to a line of sight.
This means that a picture invariably depictss the occlusion shapes of objects. So
suppose a picture depictss a circular coin with an elliptical occlusion shape. What
shape would the corresponding region of the picture’s surface have to be? With
the same exception as we noted in the case of sculpture—that is, an anamorphic
picture, designed to be seen from an extremely eccentric point of view—the answer
of course is that it would have to be elliptical, and the surface of the coin would be
foreshortened.
But it would be a mistake to think that the occlusion shape is only represented
when an object is foreshortened. For example, the shield in a painting on a kylix
attributed to the Foundry Painter (Munich 2640, ca. 490 BC) is among the earliest
examples of foreshortening in Greek art; whereas the hoop in a painting on a krater
attributed to the Berlin Painter (Louvre G175, ca. 500 BC) is not foreshortened. This
is not because the Berlin painter did not represent the hoop’s occlusion shape. It is
just that the line of sight in this case is perpendicular to the hoop, and the hoop’s
occlusion shape is therefore a circle. So whereas the simple rule for sculpture is that
what a sculpture represents has the same shape as the sculpture itself, the shape-
rule for pictures is that the shape of a region on a picture’s surface is the same
as the occlusion shape of the object it represents. In other words, there is an exact
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resemblance between these shapes. This applies to pictures of objects such as shields
and hoops, but it applies equally to pictures that represent a rainbow, the sea or the
sky.
It is reasonable to suppose that the simple rule for sculpture has always been
understood by sculptors and their public, even if it is too obvious to be stated or
written down. By contrast, the shape-rule for pictures has always been implicit in
artistic practice, but the concepts used to state it precisely and to explain the idea of
occlusion shape were first developed in Greek geometry and widely disseminated—
in Europe—only in the Renaissance.
I have defended the claim that the idea of occlusion shape plays a central role
in the theory of depiction and stated the shape rule for pictures in several earlier
publications, most fully in my book The Objective Eye. The approach I took there
contrasted subjectivist theories of depiction, which seek to explain how pictures
represent by defining the kind of experience they are designed to produce in viewers,
with objectivist theories, which proceed without attempting to define the experience.
(Objectivist theories stem from Plato, subjectivist theories from Descartes.) The
simple rule for sculpture and the shape-rule for pictures belong in the objectivist
camp.
The principal justification for subjectivism has always been the evident dissimi-
larity between a picture or sculpture and the objects it represents. This is the point
Descartes (1985) seizes on. He writes:
Although they make us think of countless different qualities in [the objects they represent],
it is only in respect of shape that there is any real resemblance. And even this resemblance
is very imperfect, since engravings represent to us bodies of varying relief and depth on a
surface which is entirely flat. Moreover, in accordance with the rules of perspective they
often represent circles by ovals better than by other circles, squares by rhombuses better
than by other squares, and similarly for other shapes. Thus it often happens that in order
to be more perfect as an image and to represent an object better, an engraving ought not to
resemble it. (p. 165)
The shape-rule for pictures addresses both of the arguments in this passage. The
first is that ‘engravings represent to us bodies of varying relief and depth on a surface
which is entirely flat.’ But the only shape properties the shape-rule refers to are the
occlusion shapes depicteds in a picture, and occlusion shapes are two-dimensional.
The second argument is that the rules of perspective may, for example, require an
artist to represent a circle by means of an oval. But as we have seen the circular
profile of a coin has an elliptical occlusion shape relative to an oblique line of sight.
The dissimilarity between the physical shape of a circular coin and shape of the
region on the surface of a picture that depictss a coin is consistent with the rule.
Another justification that is sometimes offered for subjectivism is that the
objectivist emphasis on resemblance embodies a bias in favor of realistic, literal or
accurate representation and a narrow and stultifying program for artistic work.6 But
this is confused. One might as well argue that regarding a language as a system of
6Podro 2010.
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semantic and syntactic conventions or rules embodies a bias in favor of conventional
literature, or literature that follows rules—a bias, say, in favor of Rupert Brooke over
T.S. Eliot or Arthur Conan Doyle over James Joyce. It should be obvious that this
would be a gross misunderstanding. The rule that the gerund in English ends in
‘-ing’ does not limit the inventiveness of English writers, and it applies to Donne
or Milton in exactly the same way as it does to lesser poets. Similarly, the simple
rule for sculpture applies in exactly the same way to a geometric bronze figure of a
horse, Donatello’s Gattamelata and Marino Marini’s L’angelo della Città, and the
shape-rule for pictures applies to pictures irrespective of the style or tradition they
belong to, their originality, or the artistic values they express. Both of these rules
identify basic mechanisms of representation in the visual arts; they do not dictate or
limit the forms artists create, the models they follow or the values they embody in
their work.
However, the subjectivist position is not entirely without merit. For although the
simple rule for sculpture and the shape-rule for pictures do not refer to viewers’
experiences, their competence is limited in two ways. First, as we have noted more
than once, the rules only provide an objective correlation—a correlation that is
independent of the viewer’s experience—between the shape of a sculpture or the
shapes on the surface of a picture and the shape or occlusion shape of each object
included in the sculpture’s or the picture’s sense. No specification of the sense
or mode of presentation of a work of art beyond this can be ‘read off’ its non-
representational properties in this way. Second, the parts of a picture that represent
discrete objects or parts of a scene need to be distinguished from each other, and
of course the rules cannot explain how this is done. Both of these limitations
indicate ways in which psychological factors are essentially involved in defining the
relationship between representational and non-representational properties of works
of art.
As we have seen, there is a third limitation on the competence of the two rules,
but in this case it does not provide a gap that subjectivist ideas can fill. It is that they
do not correlate the shape of a sculpture or the shapes on the surface of a picture
with its reference. Here, as in the case of language, intentions and contextual factors
are involved in complex ways that are difficult to summarize or survey. I shall not
attempt that task here.
I said earlier that it is sometimes alleged that philosophers who analyze the
concept of depiction in terms of resemblance or occlusion (outline) shape express
a bias in favor of realistic or literal representation and offer a stultifying program
for artistic work. Michael Podro makes this charge in his article ‘Literalism and
Truthfulness in Painting.’ These philosophers, he says, ‘treat depiction as a matter
of mere visual representation,’ they pursue ‘the project of approximating depiction
to an abbreviated equivalence of ordinary environmental perception,’ and ignore the
ways in which pictures can ‘transform our experience of the subject.’ ‘We need,’
he adds, ‘to see how painting elaborates upon its underlying conditions as poetry
elaborates on those of language.’7
7Ibid., pp. 457 ff.
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This is partly right and partly wrong. It is right to point out that defining the
‘underlying conditions’ is only part of the theory of art. The foundations are part of
the structure, not the whole of it. Artists exploit the communicative possibilities
inherent in the medium as such (i.e. its ‘underlying conditions’) with specific
materials, tools and techniques, to communicate thoughts, feelings and perceptions
in a work of art. Understanding art means understanding all three aspects of artistic
activity, both in themselves and in relation to each other. But it is wrong to think
that philosophical theories of depiction treat all pictures ‘as a mere matter of visual
representation,’ just as it would be wrong to think that linguistics treats literature as
a mere litany of facts. In fact it is doubly wrong. It is wrong because philosophers
need not mistake the part for the whole—and to my knowledge they have not done
so. And it is also wrong because we cannot expect to understand how painting
‘elaborates upon its underlying conditions’ unless we know what these ‘underlying
conditions’ are.
For example, I said earlier that expressed in the most general terms, the sense or
mode of presentation of a picture is an aspect or view of an object or arrangement
of objects, relative to a line (or lines) of sight. Several significant developments
in the history of painting ‘elaborate upon this underlying condition’ in ingenious
ways. First, novel views of objects—views associated with novel lines of sight—can
be introduced by combining views along established lines of sight. For example,
quasi-frontal views were composed at different times in the history of painting
by combining two profiles or oblique views, so that the composite image divides
along a vertical axis. This is how the Andokides Painter produced a frontal view
of a wrestler’s face around 515 BC (Berlin F2159), with his oddly pointed head,
projecting ears and thick neck; and it is how Giotto produced a frontal view of
a mourner in his Dormition of the Virgin (ca. 1310, Staatliche Museen zuBerlin,
Gemaldegalerie), with his broad shoulders (Figs. 1 and 2).
Fig. 1 Andokides Painter,
Amphora, ca. 515 BC, detail
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Fig. 2 Giotto, Dormition of
the Virgin, ca. 1310, detail
Second, the lines of sight associated with distinct parts of a depicted scene
can be coordinated or played off against each other. Thus, in an orthodox use of
Renaissance perspective, the lines of sight associated with each part of the depicted
scene are made to intersect, so that the entire scene is coordinated in relation to this
implicit point of view. By contrast, in Masaccio’s fresco of The Trinity (1425, S.
Maria Novella, Florence), the architecture and the supporting figures are depicted
as if seen from below, but the figures of the Father and the Son are depicted frontally,
without any foreshortening at all.8
Third, the implicit line of sight can be associated with an implicit spectator. The
idea of an implicit spectator was first used as a theoretical tool by Alois Riegl, in
his analysis of Rembrandt’s The Staalmeesters (1662, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam).
(Riegl [1999] credits the idea to Thoré-Bürger, who ‘correctly presumed the
presence of an unseen party in the space of the viewer, with whom the syndics
are negotiating.’ [p. 285]) But the earliest examples are self-portraits, because here
an implicit spectator can be introduced by accident, without being intended as
a narrative device. For example, Dürer’s drawing known as Self-Portrait with a
Cushion (1493, Robert Lehman collection, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York)
shows the artist absorbed in the act of drawing himself, and so the view of the young
man it depicts is necessarily represented as his own.
Of course other equally significant developments in the history of painting
depend on other factors, and failing to understand in general terms how pictures
represent is unlikely to impede the work of art historians interested in the impact
of the Council of Trent or the supply of paint in tubes. But the inventions I
have mentioned involve more abstract concepts, and cost of misunderstanding
them can be high. The theoretical debates about Renaissance perspective in the
8There is a good discussion of the use of single and multiple vanishing-points as organizing
principles in fifteenth-century painting in White 1967, pp. 196 ff.
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twentieth century are an embarrassing episode in art history for precisely this reason.
Everyone understood that perspective is a geometrical system that enables artists to
control the occlusion (outline) shapes and relative occlusion sizes of the objects
represented in a picture, but misunderstandings about these properties inherited
from philosophy and optics led art historians from Panofsky onwards into pointless
controversy and needless confusion.9
In summary, the simple rule for sculpture and the shape-rule for pictures define
part of the basic mechanism on which representation in the visual arts relies. (I
have not discussed color here. In The Objective Eye, I argue that analogous rules
for color can also be defined without referring to the experiences sculptures and
paintings cause in viewers.) Alongside these rules, a comprehensive theory of
representation in art will also refer to psychological factors, to the artist’s intentions,
to customs and conventions, and to other factors. But if we wish to adjudicate
between the traditional view that representation in the visual arts depends on
resemblances between works of art and the objects they represent and the theories of
representation defended by Goodman and Wollheim and their followers, who reject
this view, we are, I believe, bound to conclude that the traditional view is right. It was
not eclipsed for 50 years because it is philosophically naïve or artistically stultifying,
but because some exceedingly simple and well understood ideas in logic have been
misunderstood or routinely ignored: first, resemblance is not invariably a relation
between particulars; second, we need to unpack the general idea of representation
and distinguish between sense and reference in order to understand how pictures
represent.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Green War Banners in Central Copenhagen:
A Recent Political Struggle Over
Interpretation—And Some Implications
for Art Interpretation as Such
Frederik Stjernfelt
Abstract This paper addresses the issue of the role of Quasi-Urteile—Quasi-
Propositions—in the arts. Stemming from Ingarden’s Aesthetics, the notion of
Quasi-Propositions addresses the idea that artworks employ proposition-like struc-
tures even if their reference deviates—to larger or lesser degrees—from that
of propositions in non-arts contexts. Here, the Peircean doctrine of Dicisigns—
propositions—is introduced, with a much wider range of sign vehicle types able
to instantiate propositional content, such as signs involving pictures, diagrams,
gestures, etc. Taking a particular Danish controversy—that of a military “cartouche”
at a Copenhagen barracks—as an analytical example, the chapter argues that filling-
in is constrained by context, genre as well as aspects of the work itself, making it
possible to categorize certain filling-ins as wrong, going against the potentialities of
the work. The case, simultaneously, makes necessary a softening up of Ingarden’s
rigid distinction between fictions and non-fictions.
Keywords Semiotics • Art • Indeterminacy • Quasi-propositions • Filling-out •
Cartouche
A classic stance in the philosophy of art and fiction is that fictional artworks take
the character of quasi-propositions. That terminology is due to Roman Ingarden’s
influential Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931)—his notion of “Quasi-Urteile.”1
1Peirce also uses the term “quasi-proposition,” albeit for quite another purpose also relevant for
this paper. In him, quasi-propositions are propositions simpler than full, symbolic propositions;
his examples include fossils, weathercocks, and paintings with legends, and many cross-over
propositions mixing different means of expression. The upshot is that the range of signs able to
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Being a philosophical realist (cf. Ingarden 1955–1974), he took a strong interest in
distinguishing real objects from fictive objects, and, consequently, real propositions
from quasi-propositions. The work of fiction includes seeming propositions that,
however, only have the status of make-believe as both author and reader realize they
do not directly refer to the real world nor to facts in any more restricted universe
of discourse subset of that world. This does not imply, however, that fictions may
not involve real propositions as well, referring, e.g. to established knowledge about
the topography, period, persons of the universe of discourse etc. where the fictional
narrative takes place. It also does not imply, moreover, that artworks in general are
fictions; many artworks, poetry, essays, paintings, photographs, movies, etc. involve
propositions in the literal, non-quasi sense of the word, and need not involve any
fictional propositions at all.
An orthogonal, independent issue in Ingarden’s aesthetics and linguistics is that
of filling-out, of concretization. Propositions, in art as elsewhere, are schematic and
involve ideal elements—in Ingarden’s terminology: “Unbestimmtkeitsstellen,” loci
of indeterminacy. That implies that art—as human representations at large—consists
of schematic, general (that is, underdetermined) expressions to various degrees. In
consuming an artwork, however, the observer to some degree fills in these gaps, as
it were, with the result that his or her experience may approach that of real-world
perception. Not any old filling-out is appropriate, however; some may go against the
genre, against real-world information, against information or hints already given by
the artwork, while others are free for the reader to specify while still others filling-
outs are motivated or supported in more or less explicit ways by the genre or artwork
itself—realizing “schematized aspects” which are contained, as potentialities, in
the work itself. Beginning his investigation with the literary work of art in his
eponymous classic of 1931, Ingarden continued to generalize these insights to arts as
such, and, late in life, concisely summed up these groundbreaking ideas as follows:
Every work of art of whatever kind has the distinguishing feature that it is not the sort
of thing which is completely determined in every respect by the primary level varieties
of its qualities, in other words it contains within itself characteristic lacunae in definition,
areas of indeterminateness: it is a schematic creation. Furthermore not all its determinants,
components or qualities are in a state of actuality, but some of them are potential only.
In consequence of this a work of art requires an agent existing outside itself, that is an
observer, in order—as I express it—to render it concrete. Through his co-creative activity
in appreciation the observer sets himself as is commonly said to ‘interpret’ the work or, as
I prefer to say, to reconstruct it in its effective characteristics, and in doing this as it were
under the influence of suggestions coming from the work itself he fills out its schematic
structure, plenishing at least in part the areas of indeterminacy and actualizing various
elements which are as yet only in a state of potentiality. In this way there comes about
what I have called a ‘concretion’ of the work of art. (Ingarden 1964, p. 199)
express truth—definitory for Peircean propositions, called Dicisigns—is much broader than the
mainstream idea that the expression of proposition is confined to human language (see Peirce
1998, Chap. 20; Stjernfelt 2014). With its mixed-media combination of sculpture and symbols
(monogram, dates), the cartouche forms a quasi-proposition in this sense.
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In this paper, I shall discuss central issues in this field indicated by (quasi-)
propositions, real propositions, filling-out, and work potentialities with outset in
a small case-study of a particular work of art and an interpretation feud evolving
around it. In 2008, a minor political and aesthetic media fuss broke out in Denmark,
prompted by the public presentation of a classic, standard piece of military art in
Copenhagen. It concerned the unveiling on June 30th, 2008 of a bronze monument
at a barracks in Rosenborg Gardens, located in central Copenhagen as part of
the architectural complex around the 1606 royal castle of Rosenborg, during the
celebration events of the 350th anniversary of the Danish queen’s household
regiment—The Royal Life Guard; in Danish: “Dronningens Livregiment.” The
artwork presented to the public was a so-called “cartouche” in cast bronze, created
by Sven Erik Sjøtlow and gilded by Evelyn Iversen, donated to the barracks for the
occasion by the Association of Guardsmen, and presented, at the celebration event,
by the queen herself (Figs. 1 and 2).
Already before the unveiling ceremony, however, a protracted game of protest
had been taking place over years. In March 2008, a retired officer, Peter Horsten
of the Royal Life Guard, filed a protest against the donation and the mounting of
the cartouche on the barracks roof. Horsten claimed that the cartouche “celebrated
Islam” and thus constituted an “insult” to Danish troops at the time serving in Iraq
and Afghanistan.2 This was not Horsten’s first appearance with this claim. Horsten,
in fact, had protested to a variegated range of authorities ever since the first airings
of the plans pertaining to the cartouche—as early as 5 years before, in 2003. He
claimed that the bronze flags of the monument would, over the years, turn green with
age and thus come to represent the standards of victorious Islamist armies rather
than flags associated with the Royal Life Guard. His protests, however, had not
gained much support, despite being aimed at several Danish Ministers of Defense
and even sent to the queen herself. Only now, in 2008, his protests finally gained
momentum. Horsten explained that “All of the time I have found that it looked
hideous. But the worst thing is that I discovered, with horror, that the casting has
the green color of Islam.”3 Then the Danish MP Søren Krarup of the right-wing
“Danish People’s Party” entered the picture. Krarup is a local celebrity, a nationalist
right-wing Lutheran theologian, clergyman, and author, a leading proponent of a
Barthist theological movement known as “Tidehverv” (meaning roughly “Epoch”).
Krarup took up the protest of Horsten and filed, in Parliament, an official inquiry to
the Minister of Defence Søren Gade of the governing Danish liberal party Venstre.
His analysis of the cartouche was as follows: “It would rouse disgust in me. It is
ugly, and it could not avoid appearing as an Islamic symbol with the green color of
2http://www.avisen.dk/pensioneret-garder-anklager-livgarden-hylder-islam_8694.aspx
3“Jeg har hele tiden syntes, at den så hæslig ud. Men det værste er, at jeg til min store




Figs. 1 and 2 The cartouche on the roof of the Rosenborg barracks, in two different stages of
patination (Fig. 1 copyright Evelyn Iversen)
the banners,”4 he told the press. Instead, Krarup claimed, the traditional red-white
colors of the Danish national flag ought to dominate the cartouche. The Minister
of Defence, however, evaded the question in the Danish Parliament, but Krarup’s
intervention proved important in terms of media coverage. Thus, the interpretation
of an artwork became an official parliamentary issue and turned into a minor press
scandal covered in many Danish media.
4“Det ville vække afsky hos mig. Den er grim, og den kan ikke undgå at fremstå som et islamisk
symbol med de der grønne farver på fanerne” (my translation to English; Ritzau 2008), http://
politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE487301/df-til-kamp-mod-groenne-faner/, 26 March 2008.
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Fig. 3 Cartouche of
Thutmosis III, from a glazed
steatite scarab (between 1479





Semiotics also entered the picture. As a newly appointed professor at the Center
for Semiotics at the University of Aarhus, I was summoned to the national radio
network “Danmarks Radio” in order to analyze the cartouche. I said, of course,
that in bronze sculpture, metal color is generally not a carrier of meaning and,
consequently, the protesting officer and, with him, his political supporter, were in
the wrong. They argued against the potentialities indicated by the work itself (the
monogram of the Danish Queen) as well as by its context (a centrally located,
historical Danish barracks)—both of them pointing to the banners of the cartouche
representing, in fact, Danish national flags. The protests, so I claimed, formed an
example of overinterpretation on the part of the enraged officer, as it were. Or
perhaps a “creative” interpretation; a “strong” interpretation as Nietzscheans used
to say? In any case, his claim formed a filling-out going against the potentialities
indicated by the schematic artwork itself. Of course, I only had few minutes to
explain myself on the radio, so let me elaborate my argument a bit.
What is a cartouche, in the first place? Actually, its history goes back to
Ancient Egypt where hieroglyphic practice was to indicate divine or royal names
by inscribing them in an ovaline figurine closed by a tangent line at the bottom or at
the side (Fig. 3).
In hieroglyphic writing, thus, the cartouche depicts a rope encircling the names
elevated. The rope is said, in turn, to represent the circle of eternity, the so-called
“shen ring.” The use of the cartouche to highlight divine or royal names proved
important for Champollion’s famous interpretation of the hieroglyphs based on the
three-language Rosetta stone, making it possible for him to locate the same names in
the stone’s parallel texts in Hieroglyphic, Greek, and Demotic writing. Thus, a long
western tradition of a more or less ornamented frame used to sacralize or celebrate
a set of symbols, stylized icons, or letters took its beginning in Egyptian Antiquity.
From the Egyptian cartouche use, thus, a carved or cast ornamental tablet or panel
in the form of a scroll or frame enclosing an inscription or symbol came to indicate
the deification or holding in solemnity the reference objects of those signs. In ancient
214 F. Stjernfelt
Rome or Greece, the Egyptian custom of adorning graves and coffins with names
of the deceased in a cartouche, so as to eternalize the deceased, was inherited and
developed, now often in the shape of rectangular cartouches, losing their original
motivation of depicting a sacred rope. Instead, the cutout, framed field came rather
to be interpreted as a military shield. Already in the Roman army, the decoration
of shields functioned as cartouches identifying the military unit wearing that shield.
Later, in medieval Europe, shield cartouches were generalized to celebrate nobility
and royal dynasties (in the European tradition of heraldry, originating in the time of
Charlemagne and strongly developing after the tenth century), buildings, churches,
etc. The heraldry of royal and noble families on the one side and military insignia
on the other thus share a common point of origin in the attempts of medieval
knights to distinguish themselves visually in the battle field—and, more peacefully,
in tournaments. The military use of cartouches developed into formal insignia
for military units on different levels, thus serving as visual predicates identifying
them. The use of the word “cartouche” for such signs may have originated with
Napoleon’s troops in Egypt where the visual similarity of the shape of hieroglyphic
sign with that of paper cartridges (French: cartouches) may have prompted the name,
first in French, later in English. The appearance of a cartouche on a soldier thus
identifies him (or a weapon, a barracks, a vehicle, etc.) as belonging to a particular
military unit, in effect serving as a proposition—a Peircean Dicisign—expressing
a claim, e.g.: “This is a soldier of Edward VII’s Indian Army, Supply & Transport
Regiment:”5
Correspondingly, cartouche insignia often appear on signs of military honor such
as medals, decorations, etc. This long and complicated history of the cartouche,
however, is not our main concern here; suffice it to say that the cartouche is an old
genre with certain stable characteristics. It aims at identifying some person, group
of persons, item, building, etc. as having a certain proper name or belonging to
5http://www.victorianwars.com/viewtopic.php?f=19&t=1896. A cartouche pouch in itself contains
cartridges, that is, cartouches. Peirce’s broad notion of propositions is functionally defined and
thus transgresses linguistically expressed propositions, involving signs which make truth claims
using pictures, diagrams, gestures, etc.—like the cartouche serving as a predicate in a proposition
involving as its subject the soldier wearing it, cf. Stjernfelt (2014).
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a certain unit, stock, or institution, often additionally describing the entity defined
and granting the relevant entity some authority, sacrality, or other elevated status. As
such, the cartouche is intrinsically propositional (or quasi-propositional in Peirce’s
sense of the word)—it forms a syntactical unit whose function is to claim that the
entity to which it is attached is, in fact, the one indicated by the name indicated,
given by a linguistic or pictorial index presented inside the framework of the
cartouche.6 Simultaneously, the cartouche celebrates the entity given that name—
the very application of the cartouche serves to ennoble the bearer of the name of
the cartouche, supported by the artful, aesthetic elaboration of the cartouche and
in many cases by the use of expensive materials. Thus, the cartouche is explicitly
propositional rather than quasi-propositional in the Ingardenian sense of the word—
of course, fictional cartouches can be made and have indeed been made but the
prototypical, traditional cartouche actually does function as an artwork that is
simultaneously a proposition with a real reference—it refers to, identifies, and to
some degree celebrates its bearer.
To return to the particular Danish Rosenborg Barracks cartouche, it thus func-
tions as piece of applied art claiming a proposition. The structure of the cartouche
as a whole contains three elements: a basic plinth with the time indication of “1658–
2008;” the central cartouche shield endowed with the queen’s monogram, headed by
the iconic crown of the Danish royal house7; surrounded by ten standards protruding
from behind the shield, five pointing obliquely fan-like upwards to each side. This is
a common structure for military cartouches—and not far from some of the heraldic
traditions also possessing a central shield with various codified support structures
around, behind and over it. The overall appearance of the cartouche is bronze; three
partial components of the cartouche, however, are emphasized, gilded with gold
leaf: the queen’s monogram, the crown over the shield, and the detailed, individual
tips of the ten banners identifying them as referring to the ten standards which the
Guard has received as gifts from different Danish monarchs during its existence.8
The proposition held forward by the cartouche thus refers to several entities,
explicitly and implicitly. It explicitly makes reference (1) to the present Danish
queen Margrethe II whose monogram appears centrally in the cartouche, just like
(2) the timespan 1658–2008 is explicitly presented on the cartouche, and (3) ten
existing flags in the ownership of the Guard, indicated by means of the individual
banner tips, identifying which regent donated the single flag.
6The proposition involving the cartouche and the object or person to which it is attached is thus
not a proposition primarily describing that entity, but rather one naming it. To that extent the
proposition is of the type that Peirce called “Dicent Indexical Legisign” to distinguish it from
proper propositions with a general, descriptive predicate; see Stjernfelt (2014, ch. 3).
7This crown, in turn, is a stylized version of a real, Danish crown: that of Christian V, forged
1670–1671 and subsequently used by absolutist Danish monarchs—currently on display in the
Rosenborg Castle close to the barracks.
8Thanks to Svend Erik Sjøtlow for information as to the banner tips.
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Implicitly, moreover, the cartouche refers to (1) the building upon which it is
placed—he Rosenborg barracks—and (2) by metonymy, to the institution housed
in that building: the queen’s household troops (regularly marching the streets of
Copenhagen, a sight sought by some tourists). It may surprise that the military entity
celebrated by the cartouche—the queen’s life guard—is not itself named and only
indirectly referred to in the cartouche by means of the banner tips which are scarcely
identifiable from below; it is primarily contextually indicated by the placement of
the cartouche on the building (a barracks, however, that is widely known to be the
base of exactly this military unit). All of these references are not quasi-propositions
in Ingarden’s sense—they refer to real entities. So, the cartouche as a whole is a
complex proposition which might be linguistically paraphrased as follows: “These
are the barracks of the Danish Royal Life Guard which came into being 1658,
received royal celebration at ten occasions over centuries in the shape of particular
flags and was celebrated in the year 2008 in the reign of Margrethe 2nd.” This is
not to say there are no Ingardenian quasi-propositions involved—the shield itself
does not refer to any existing entity, but rather has a general, fictive status. The same
goes for the arrangement as a whole—it does not refer to an existing shield behind
which the ten flags have actually been so positioned. The flags thus involve both real
reference—to the ten standards in the ownership of the Guard, several of them still
in daily use—and quasi-reference, namely to their arrangement. Thus, the reference
to those flags is made in a general way, involving spots of indeterminacy. The tips
of the banners are gilded, thus actually depicting the color of the real tips while the
flags themselves are left in bronze without such explicit reference. It was exactly the
closer interpretation of some of these Unbestimmtkeitsstellen—those presented by
the flags—which became the focus of the bitter strife over the monument.
The public conflict over the cartouche addresses the content of these slots of
indeterminacy. The protesting officer and his parliamentary support claimed that
the (supposedly) increasingly green color of those flags due to the corrosion of
bronze constituted an emerging meaning, running counter to the intended, patriotic
celebration of the Royal Guard in the monument. The green color, so they argued,
would appear, over time, as that of Islamic flags, celebrating victorious Muslim
armies—thus implicitly attacking Danish troops at the time serving in Afghanistan
and Iraq by giving the victory to their enemies, stabbing the Danish army in the
back, even at a central and symbolic location in Copenhagen. This interpretation
builds, it is true, on potentialities implicit in the genre of the artwork: the cartouche
as a celebration of particular military units. In the absence of any direct reference to
the Danish royal guard—so it seems—the empty slot of reference would instead by
occupied by Islamist forces via the green color sometimes displayed in the banners
of such forces (black being another color often used by Islamic armies).
Why, however, is such an interpretation wrong? It has several reasons, one
of which is very general, going beyond genre rules of cartouches, pertaining
to conventions for interpreting bronze sculpture as such. The greenish or light
turquoise colors of bronze or copper statues, sculptures, figurines, artwork, jewelry,
etc. are generally not interpreted as referring to the colors of the objects depicted
by those artworks. This, of course, is conspicuously evident in many bronze statues
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depicting persons, real or imagined. Take as an example the iconic Statue of Liberty,
originally French and mostly known for the large copy in the harbor of New
York, presented to the US by France at the centenary celebration of the American
Revolution in 18769:
Here, it would seem pretty strange to assume that the light green-bluish color
of the exposed body parts of this female deity should be taken to depict her actual
skin color. If we should not assume she was a Martian, that she suffered from a
severe hangover or indulged in body paint, we have no reason to assume that her
complexion is green, and she is generally not interpreted in such a way. This holds,
in general, for bronze artworks. The gradual green verdigris (literally: “green-gray”)
corrosion color assumed by bronze objects exposed to changing weather, covering
the bronze surface by a thin layer of copper carbonates and other copper salts,10
does not pertain to the color of the object portrayed. This is an example of the very
general regularity that certain parts or aspects of the artwork as a material object may
enter into the (quasi-)propositions that it claims to hold about certain indicated and
depicted objects—while other parts or aspects of the art object do not so participate.
As noted, this distinction, in the single case, has several sources—one is the very
genre of the artwork, another is indications provided by the particular artwork itself.
9Originally titled La Liberté éclairant le monde, designed by Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi who also
made a smaller copy at the Pont de Quenelle in Paris 1875. The large New York version was
inaugurated in 1886.
10Pure water supposedly results in copper carbonate making up the main part of the chemical
substance of patination; dependent upon the character and pollution of rain, copper sulfides,
chlorides, etc. may add to the corrosion, sulphur giving a more brownish hue while chlorides will
result in a more green hue.
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As to the former source, we already indicated how bronze sculpture is not
generally supposed to refer to green or greenish objects. This, however, is not a
law but rather a rule-of-thumb convention of tradition. Bronze artworks do exist
which make special use of the green corrosion color for (quasi-)proposition aims.
Take, e.g., a set of earrings such as those below, the accompanying sales text making
this proposal to the potential customer: “Let your inner and outer beauty blossom
by adding these fetching Apple Green Patinated Lily Pad Earrings to your look.”11
The leaf-shaped trinkets evidently, in a general way refer to foliage (the text
proposes lily pad, other internet texts propose geranium), the green color here
assuming part of the work’s quasi-proposition, contrary to the general interpretation
of bronzes and supported by the organic-looking shape of the objects.12 The
anti-cartouche protesters, however, did not go into such arguments—they simply
assumed that green in the artwork immediately refers to green in the world.
There are, however, further constraints on the filling-out interpretation of art-
works, those of indications given in the work itself or its immediate context, that
which Ingarden calls “schematic aspects held-in-readiness.” The sources of such
schematic aspects are several. Let us take such potentialities of the work one by
one. A first observation here is that the green shade assumed over the years by
bronze exposed to weather conditions is a very light, slightly bluish green—rather
11Earrings by John S. Brana, http://www.handcrafted-earrings.com/apple-green-patinated-lily-
pad-handmade-earrings-small.
12The character of the patination in the earrings is not indicated. The darker green seems to indicate
patination may have involved ferric salts sometimes used for such effects.
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far from the heraldic focal green used by some Muslim flags (e.g. the Saudi Arabian
national flag depicting the prophet’s sword and the Islamic declaration in white on
green). So even in the case that the color of the bronze flags of the cartouche were
in fact taken to form part of the artwork’s proposition, it is by no means evident that
these banners would resemble nor represent Islamic standards. This is connected to
the cartouche forming a subgenre of heraldry. All of the world’s official flags, in
fact, use a rather small, selected amount of focal colors evolved out of the European
heraldic tradition,13 and both the green and the blue allowed by that system lie far
from the corrosion colors of copper and bronze. So the formal, heraldic character
of the cartouche forms a genre constraint implying, as potentialities inherent in
the artwork, only that small palette of focal colors, effectively ruling out the
interpretation of the bronze verdigris hue as an actual flag coloring. This potentiality
of the work, then, originates from its genre as a piece of heraldry.
Another potentiality stems from the fact that, in the work itself, clear indications
are given of the Danish, patriotic character of the work—most conspicuously, of
course, by the monogram of the Danish queen which firmly anchors the reference
as the Danish royal dynasty and, by metonymy, its associated military units. This
potentiality thus stems from the work read as involving a real proposition referring
to the Danish queen. Such an object reference, then, involves the potentiality of
the flags being filled-in as Danish national flags. For the militarily knowledgeable
observer, furthermore, the individual tips of the ten banners form references to
the ten royal banners owned by the Guard, in an even stronger way indicating the
potentiality of them being Danish banners to be filled in with red and white.14
In the immediate context, finally, the very mounting of the cartouche on the
roof of a centrally located and historically significant Danish barracks involves a
potentiality pointing in the same direction: this artwork celebrates a specific Danish
military regiment housed in that building, closely connected to the royal dynasty of
Denmark.
All these aspects of the work thus perform the role of “aspects held-in-readiness”
indicated by Ingarden. Moreover, all three point in the same direction: they clearly
lead the observer in the direction of making a filling-out interpretation of the
standards in the cartouche as Danish flags rather than Muslim war banners.
13The standard colors of European heraldry fall in two groups, so-called metals, named or and
argent (yellow and white) and colours, comprising azure, gules, purpure, sable, and vert (blue, red,
purple, black, and green), sometimes adding tawny (orange). The particular value of those colors
are close to the focal colors (as prototypical or best examples of each linguistic color category) and
have a large degree of universality, cf. Berlin and Kay (1969). Most world, state, regional, military,
etc. flags obey variants of this color code, effectively ruling out the hue of verdigris as a possible
flag shade.
14For the average observer standing on the ground, however, the detail of the ten banner tips is
hardly visible to the degree that they can be individually identified as referring to really existing
flags—despite the fact that the gilt of the tips draws attention to them. Furthermore, the expert
knowledge of the banner tips is not immediately available to most average observers. Still, the
other potentialities of the work should more than suffice to prevent the interpretation of them as
islamist war banners.
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Of course, expression is free, and nobody should be in a position to prevent the
protesting officer and his political aide from freely associating the greenish-gray
banners with whatever they may fancy. But simultaneously, structures both of the
general genre character of the work, the particular qualities of it and references
made by it, and its very contextual placement allow us to argue for an interpretation
that is simply correct because in conformity with both conventions about bronzes,
genre regularities—and in conformity with central aspects of the work itself. There
is little doubt, however, that the claims of the enraged guardsman and his political
supporter correspond to real psychological experiences with the artwork. This case
then also goes to show the relativist dangers of psychologistic theories of art.15 For
how could we argue against their—or any other—interpretation if psychology was
really the last key to interpretation?
This particular case thus served to display the less than sensational lack of
elementary aesthetic capability and sensibility in an ex-life guard officer and
a prominent parliamentarian—but apart from that, the struggle also served to
make publicly known an artwork that would, in all probability, have remained in
comparative oblivion in the world outside particular military circles without the
protest. Probably few if any would have wondered, at all, what were the more precise
meanings of this pretty traditional piece of art.
This is exactly the reason why it may throw some light upon the interpretation of
artworks also on a broader scale. The very traditional and non-spectacular character
of the cartouche makes it clear what an elementary thing it is for an artwork to
perform not only quasi-propositional but also ordinary propositional tasks proper,
in a very unproblematic, even trivial way. The funny thing is that this seems to lie
beyond—or below—the grasp of much contemporary theory of art to which it may
seem to be decidedly below the dignity of art to perform simple, propositional acts
of reference. But the cartouche case may make it obvious that for large parts of
art history—and in most other sectors of society besides modern art, institutionally
speaking—the combination of aesthetic elaboration and propositional reference is
the rule rather than the exception.
It certainly seems to be a very basic issue in the filling-out in artworks that
the saturation of fictive quasi-propositions goes hand in hand with that of real
propositions. In Paul Auster’s New York Trilogy, the frequent references to actual
existing New York landmarks, structures, and streets afford the filling-out with
actual or mediated impressions of those cityscapes, and they form, in turn, the
frame for the filling-out of quasi-propositions pertaining to the fictive characters
of the work. In Peirce’s theory of propositions, much emphasis is placed on what he
calls collateral information or collateral observation. This concept refers to the fact
that, in order to understand any proposition, the interpreter must have an already
established source of reference to the object referred to by the proposition—for
the Kantian reason that no description suffices to identify an object definitely. The
15I argue against the current renaissance of psychologism in ch. 2 of Stjernfelt (2014). Already in
1937, (Ingarden 1974) eloquently did the same thing with reference to aesthetics in particular.
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subject term of a proposition refers to some object, but in order to identify that
object, the interpreter must be able to refer that object to an already-known frame of
reference independent of the proposition. If that were not the case, the proposition
would not refer and hence degenerate to a mere predicate. Peirce:
Two men meet on a country road. One says to the other, “that house is on fire.” “What
house?” “Why, the house about a mile to my right.” Let this speech be taken down and
shown to anybody in the neighboring village, and it will appear that the language by
itself does not fix the house. But the person addressed sees where the speaker is standing,
recognises his right hand side (a word having a most singular mode of signification)
estimates a mile (a length having no geometrical properties different from other lengths),
and looking there, sees a house. It is not the language alone, with its mere associations
of similarity, but the language taken in connection with the auditor’s own experiential
associations of contiguity, which determines for him what house is meant. It is requisite
then, in order to show what we are talking or writing about, to put the hearer’s or reader’s
mind into real, active connection with the concatenation of experience or of fiction with
which we are dealing, and, further, to draw his attention to, and identify, a certain number
of particular points in such concatenation. (“The Critic of Arguments,” 1892, 3.418)
So, in understanding an Ingardenian quasi-proposition, we must be able to
identify the fictive object to which it refers by the reference to some ordinary
proposition given by the work, ultimately locating the fictive events in some
connection to reality. It may be, indeed, in very general or vague terms (“Once
upon a time in a land far away : : : ”), or it may be in very particular, precise terms,
indicating precise real world time and place-coordinates in relation to which the
fictive object is located. This might not be so surprising; more important is it that
those real propositions simultaneously and importantly contribute to the aspects-
held-in-readiness which permit the interpreter, in many cases very easily, even
automatically, to perform the filling-out of the spots of indeterminacy of the work,
be they presented in quasi- or real propositions. As when the real propositions in the
cartouche example pertaining to the Danish queen and Copenhagen barracks allows
us to abduct that the standards involved are indeed Danish flags rather than Islamist
war banners.
This, however, does not seem to lie in Ingarden’s original theory. Just like his
theory suffers from a too sharp, dualist distinction between fully determinate per-
ceptions and partially indeterminate artworks,16 his very sharp distinction between
works consisting of quasi-propositions and those of real propositions must be
softened up by a more continuous relation between the realms of the quasi and
the real. Ingarden, when dealing with the literary work, actually did take a step in
that direction by distinguishing between degrees of quasi-propositions. Thus, in The
Literary Work of Art, he distinguished between three levels of quasi-propositions:
(1) “in works which in no sense claim to be historical” (pp. 167–168), characterized
by the “total absence of the intention of an exact matching” (p. 168); (2) works in
16In Stjernfelt (2007), I argued that perception is more schematic than assumed in Ingarden—
making it more understandable how schematic filling-out of indeterminacy spots may achieve
quasi-experience effects.
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which “the represented objectivities refer in a totally different, and at the same time,
if one may put it so, narrower manner to the real world” (p. 170) where the beginning
“of the matching is already present” (ibid.), but aimed only towards “a general type
of states of affairs and objects that would be ‘possible’ in a given time and milieu”
(ibid.); and finally (3) works where the matching intention extends to “the strictly
individual” as opposed to the general type, taken to be closest to genuine judicative
propositions (Ingarden’s term for ordinary propositions with full truth claims). So:
fictions involving no reality reference, general such reference, and individual such
reference, respectively. Even in the latter case, however, propositions identical to
real propositions will assume a different character as “simulating” or “duplicating”
the real objectivities, which would be referred to by the very same proposition
occurring in a scientific work, Ingarden maintains.17 The plastic ladder of quasi-
propositions developed here suffers, from our point of view, from being based on
the reference to the character of whole artworks such that it is taken to be the genre
definition of the work that determines the reference of each of its sentences through
and through. In an era of docu-drama and autofiction, such an insistence on the
absolute generic difference between fiction and non-fiction appears as quite too
rigid.18 This rigidity probably comes from the empirical bases of Ingarden’s theory
being literature in the classic sense of belles-lettres, at the time safely conceived to
be worlds apart from factual and non-fiction prose. In artworks like paintings and
sculpture, however, very often used to celebrate and refer to real-life characters or
objectivities, freely mixing or adorning these with fictitious figures and motifs, the
general artistic possibility of blending propositions and quasi-propositions appears
as a much more obvious possibility.
Moreover, this gives us another central source of aspect potentialities kept-
in-readiness—those indicated by real propositions partaking in the work, as the
example of the direct reference to the Danish queen in the Rosenborg cartouche.
It is that very same reference that appears as one of the main potentialities of the
17This issue must be kept apart, again, from two different possible attitudes to the same work of
art, the aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic:
There are two possible ways in which a work of art may be perceived. The act of perception
may occur within the context of the aesthetic attitude in the pursuit of aesthetic experience
or it may be performed in the service of some extraaesthetic preoccupation such as that
of scientific research or a simple consumer’s concern, either with the object of obtaining
the maximum of pleasure from commerce with the work or—as frequently happens in the
reading of literature—with the object of informing oneself about the vicissitudes of the
characters depicted in the work or some other matter of extra-literary fact about which a
reader can obtain information on the basis of the work of art (as for example by reading
Homer classical scholars seek to inform themselves about the life of the ancient Greeks,
their customs, dress, etc.). (Ingarden 1964, p. 200)
Our focus here is how ordinary, real propositions, part of the artwork, may participate in
yielding potentialities directing the filling-out concretizing the artwork into an aesthetic object.
18This is probably the reason why such potentialities are not considered in Ingarden’s account of
the aesthetic cognition process (Ingarden 1968/1973a).
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work, granting that the banners behind the royal monogram should not be interpreted
after their metal surface—and that victorious Islamist standards do not wave over
Copenhagen.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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The Appropriation of the Work of Art as
a Semiotic Act
Francis Édeline and Jean-Marie Klinkenberg
Abstract A work of art can be defined as a section of space (visual, auditory, tactile,
etc.) that has been assigned a particular status. It is not our intention to define
this status—philosophical aesthetics has been addressing this issue for centuries.
Rather, we aim to pinpoint the mechanisms in virtue of which this section of space
is isolated and bestowed with the status in question. Such a move requires the action
of a certain instance—hence the emphasis we put on the interactive character of the
process. We shall pay particular attention to the type of sign called ‘index,’ which
plays a pivotal role in this affair.
Keywords Index • Visual perception • Expectations pragmatics • Catasemiosis
1 Two Methodological (or Epistemological) Preconditions
1.1 The Appropriation of Statements as a Semiotic Practice
With undeniable methodological relevance, the structuralist thought affirmed to
raise a true wall dividing on one side, semiotic systems and, on the other side, the
world with its performing actors. This is the principle of immanence. It was a purely
methodological and temporary separation: its purpose was to eliminate ontological
presuppositions, common psychologism, and reckon on elements that, since they are
closed in on themselves, are controllable. The profitability of that separation turned
out to be spectacular and allowed the development of highly sophisticated descrip-
tive instruments. However, semiotics does not have the vocation to indefinitely put
off the moment to question the relation between the world and meaning (cf. Groupe
 2011, 2015).
Unfortunately, recent developments in semiotics have hardly broken up with
the immanentist doctrine and keep setting aside the question of the contact point
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between the world and the languages, regarding both the origin of these languages
and the active part they play within society.
We will note that, for instance, “the semiotics of practices,” which emerged
recently, is still full of a glossocentrism already defended by Barthes. As Fontanille
explains, “If practices can be described as semiotic, it must be possible to assimilate
them to a language” (2010, p. 10). However, he also says that the units of the
expression plan of practices are not accessible but through diverse episemiotic
manifestations (first and foremost verbal—but also gestural and physiognomic : : : ).
Indeed, these units could not be “deduced retrospectively from a transformation
observed in the end” for the reason that a practice would be “an open process,
both as regards its starting and its end point, which therefore would not provide
a basis for a confrontation between an initial and a final situation” (ibid.), “unlike
a textualized action” (Fontanille 2011, p. 132). Hence the decision not to study
the practices in action but instead to seize them from the statements that describe
them. But the argument is debatable: linguistic statements are as open as factual
processes. And their closure is not given from the outset but instead is the product of
the methodological decision made by the linguistic discipline. Now, such a decision
can also be made in the case of processes.
Visual semiotics—to which we will give priority here, in the wake of our previous
contributions (Groupe  1992)—still suffers from these orientations and, until
recent years, has largely neglected the stock of rules that preside over the social,
pragmatic use of visual statements. Traditionally, it gives priority to an immanent
point of view: the observation of phenomena is done in such a way that, in order
to describe them, it is not necessary to resort to elements outside the system. The
most important thing is that the description of the system can make do with its own
internal consistency, which makes the description appropriate for its object.
We intend to break up with this point of view: the problem of the appropriation
of the work of art will be here considered as a practice.
If semioticians such as O. Le Guern (e.g. 2005, 2009, 2011) and A. Beyaert
“have studied images or art installations taking into account the types of showrooms
inside of which there is a painting or a series of paintings [ : : : ] the purpose of those
studies was never to study the way the museum institution approves and valorizes
the images by making them, precisely, artistic” (Maria-Giulia Dondero, unpublished
quotation). Since we are keen to describe this validation and practice—which we
already started to do in a previous work (Groupe  2002)—that appropriation will
be described:
(a) in terms of actualization: every user mobilizes a semiotics in an individual
act, and within that semiotics, every unit undergoes a concrete actualization
performed by the user at a given time and in a given place;
(b) in cultural terms: any semiotics is a collective, intersubjective reality that can
be defined as a set of rules in effect within a community of users;
The Appropriation of the Work of Art as a Semiotic Act 227
(c) in terms of pluricodical utterances (cf. Klinkenberg 2000): the appropriation of
the work involves not only the modalities of reading of that work,1 but also the
rules regarding the use of the space it is part of;
(d) in terms of action: the appropriation is a dynamic act, unfolding in time and
causing multiple effects.2
Of course, such a program could not be entirely covered in the following paper.
We will content ourselves with the outline of some of these various issues.
1.2 Genetic Aesthetics and Instituted Aesthetics
The presentation that follows could be unfolded in two ways:
– According to a both logical and physiognomic scheme. Logical because of a
growing complexity: going, for instance, from the description of the perceptual
contrasts underpinning the bestowal of meaning upon the world to the aesthetic
judgment that results from this. As its complexity increases, the artistic speci-
ficity of this schema will increase accordingly. Indeed, at the bottom of this
scale, the described phenomena (contrasts, to keep our example) have no artistic
specificity.
– According to a chronological scheme that would follow the steps of the appro-
priation of the work. If, for example, I decide to go in a museum, I consider the
existence of truly artistic artifacts and look for them. Here, expectation comes
first, which orients and assigns a goal to perception. It is, for instance, directed
toward what we will call hereinafter the indexes designating the work, such as the
frame; it leads one to give priority to the content of the frame, the other objects
of perception being set aside as irrelevant (the electric plug of the showroom, its
custodian); scrutiny and meaning attribution come afterwards.
None of the branches of that alternative can be favored. If the question of
artistic specificity may be more easily addressed within the second scheme, the
latter bypasses some of the non-specifically artistic phenomena described in the
first; yet these phenomena cannot be eliminated from the presentation because their
role is crucial for the perception of the work. Moreover, the second scheme leads to
consider the artistic world as an already established world: we appropriate a work
of art that is already there, with its institutionalized status. In contradistinction to
this, the first scheme has a generative character: the artistic appropriation took place
when we decided to direct our gaze toward certain sectors of the perceptive field
and, during the anasemiotic process (cf. Groupe  2011), to assign a specific status
1That might be very open, as we know. For the cases of extreme openness, those Eco calls ratio
difficilis, the principle can be formulated as follows: the work creates its own code.
2This is what we call catasemiosis (Groupe  2013, in press A).
228 F. Édeline and J.-M. Klinkenberg
Table 1 Aesthetic semiogenesis
Operations Results of the operations
Selection and discretization Contrasts and closure
Scrutiny Barysemiotization
Mobilization of expectations Semiotization 1
Attribution of status and interpretation Semiotization 2
to them—thus constituting a segment of reality as a work of art. In the present
case, it consists in identifying a domain in which the utterances can be categorized.
This decision can be described as a conquest and part of aesthetic pleasure may be
linked to that expansion of the semiotic field. It suggests that there must be a genetic
aesthetics, just as there is a genetic epistemology for Piaget.
Therefore, we will reconcile both approaches, while focusing our attention on
the first one and saving the second one for later works, according to the following
table (Table 1):
2 The Functional Space of the Work
The process of appropriation of the work is based on two significant phenomena: (a)
a section of the global visible space captures the viewer’s attention and is thus both
assigned salience and semiotic prominence (this is what we will term ‘barysemy’),
and (b) the demarcated section is attributed a specific cultural status.
Capturing the attention is a phenomenon that occurs several times in the global
process, therefore the above scheme can decidedly not be chronological.
2.1 Focusing the Attention
2.1.1 Sensory Contrasts and Barysemy
The process of selection is based on a fundamental property of all visual utterances
that derives from the very mechanisms of perception: a division in both the
perceptual and the intelligible field that produces the paradigms of the units of both
the expression plane and the content plane (cf. Groupe  1992, 1998). This division
goes hand-in-hand with a differentiation. In terms of space, this differentiation
designates a central space and a peripheral space separated by a boundary (which
may be fictional), i.e., it established an opposition between inside and outside. We
have already showed in other works (Édeline 1991; Groupe  1992, 2011) that this
selection was equivalent to what we called “elementary visual knowledge,” that is
The Appropriation of the Work of Art as a Semiotic Act 229
to say, the possibility to distinguish within a field between two different translocal
qualities, separated by a discontinuity.3
That opposition can of course be semanticized in a host of ways by specific norms
(as it is showed by the examples of family space or national space). Besides, the
manifestation of the separation might have various degrees.
Naturally, a work of art will not only present one but a plurality of translocal
qualities. But this mere word (translocal) immediately designates a certain rate of
homogeneity of the considered sub-space. The discontinuity—which René Thom
calls a catastrophe, and which is enhanced by the perceptual system—divides the
field into two entities and itself displays a shape. The functioning of perception
is such that this shape is not considered to have an independent existence but is
assigned either to one of the entities or the other—or, exceptionally, to both.
Here, the important thing is that the perceived areas are organized into a
hierarchy: we are dealing with the classical dialectics of figure and ground. Now, this
organization into a hierarchical structure is not self-evident. Why is privilege given
to the inside? In a museum, why do we not focus our attention on the thermostats as
much as on the statues? The phenomenon is complex, and can only be clarified by
the use of our concept of index, which will be developed further on (cf. Sect. 2.2). At
this place, let us simply underline the physiological basis of the mechanism. Faithful
to our assumption of naturalization, we will suggest (cf. Groupe  1989, 1992) that
the reason is the reproduction of the organization of the retina: the fovea, the only
area with a lot of cones where vision is clear, is located in its center. Here we are
dealing with the production of a barysemy, or semiotic densification of the central
area.
The fact that meaning results from grouping information (cf. Groupe  2011)
suggests that the level of concentration of that meaning may vary in time or
space. Goodman had already noticed it, talking about the “semantically dense” and
“syntactically dense” character of the work of art (1968). However, it is possible to
give a rigorous content to what was only a concetto for Goodman4 and, particularly,
provide a good explanation for it.
The variation of density of meaning is indeed determined by two series of
phenomena, some of which are natural while others are cultural. The latter—in the
forefront of which stands the index—will be analyzed in Sect. 2.2.1. But, as we are
about to see in a moment, the distinction between natural and cultural phenomena
is not always so clear.
3One may imagine counterexamples to this. Take a Diego Rivera-like mural fresco in the middle
of which a window opens allowing an inside to be seen. Such examples do not disprove the rule,
however: either the inside is considered as a noise, and does not take part in the appropriation of
the work, or it is semanticized and takes part, and is therefore interpreted as an inside within an
inside.
4Goodman does not give any definition of the notion of density, which remains a metaphor here;
he generalizes the phenomenon so that it embraces the whole work even though the density areas
vary (sometimes they are central, sometimes they are peripheral); moreover he seems to impart an
intrinsic aesthetic value to density.
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Here, let us concentrate on the first type of factors, which are not mentioned by
Goodman. The areas where meaning gets denser are constructions where two sub-
factors take action: the properties of the organs of perception and those of the object
of that perception.
(a) First sub-factor: the properties of the organs of perception.
Once again, we will use human vision to illustrate the first sub-factor. We
know that vision does not uniformly grasp the characteristics of the field it is
applied to. The resolving power of the eye, or the solid angle corresponding
to the light rays hitting only one receptor cell of the retina, is worth 200 s of
arc in the fovea (that is to say 1 m seen at 1 km); the resolution is better in
the center of the retina but the beam of attention is approximately 1ı of angle
and determines the central area of the visual field, the only sector in which
maximum details are perceived. Thus, we cannot talk about a barysemiotizing
area.5 However, in fact, that zone goes beyond 5ı of angle thanks to a very
efficient double process which consists in endlessly moving the point of scrutiny
over the surface to explore. That mechanism has two variants. In the first one,
the numerous rapid movements performed by the eye (the so-called REM, rapid
eye movements) scan the area randomly. But in the other one, the eye is guided
by voluntary movements in a chosen direction.6 These decisions made possible
thanks to the mobility of the organ are passed on by other decisions. They are
enabled by the mobility of the whole body and can take place within strategies
of barysemiotization (for example, getting closer to the work of art or stepping
away from it). As can be seen, we have gradually moved from physiological to
cultural phenomena.
(b) Second sub-factor: the properties of the objects of perception.
The second natural sub-factor is the structure of the perceived field: we are
entitled to surmise that meaning concentrates around catastrophes, i.e., around
discontinuities which themselves are opposed to areas of continuity, according
to the fundamental dipole principle (cf. Groupe  2015). In our Traité du signe
visuel (1992), we highlighted that in a line drawing, the area of barysemy is
the contour, a place that separates two areas less rich in information; that is to
say, once again, separated into dipoles. We can represent the correspondence
between two visual segments (for example, an impressionist painting and its
corresponding line drawing) by means of a transformation that can be modeled
as a double differentiation: instead of being diluted on all the perceived surface,
the meaning concentrates at the exact point where the value of the signal
changes. What we have described in the visual field can similarly be found in the
5As to the vast peripheral area, it is specialized in the perception of the global environment and
movement. This area has rarely been exploited by artists (for an example of such an exploitation,
cf. Klinkenberg 2004).
6When it comes to neural wiring, the nerve cells are interconnected laterally in order to create
receptive fields that contain a center and a periphery with antagonistic responses.
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linguistic field, where the signal engineers clearly showed that a barysemiotical
core is to be found at the initials of words.
It is important to highlight that none of these factors can found barysemy on their
own: in compliance with our basic thesis (cf. Groupe  2011, 2015), meaning—and
thus the density of that meaning—is the product of the interaction of these two
factors.7
In the case of the perception of a work of art, the hedge effect is one of
focusing one’s attention whose immediate corollary is, once again, the production
of a barysemy. The viewer is obliged to produce meaning on the spot: museum,
gallery, private wall covered with drafts, public wall with graffiti. In return,
the delimitation ensures or enhances a perceptual, intellectual, and psychological
“comfort.” Importantly, the perturbing interferences with the environment outside
the index are inhibited.
As we will discuss below (Sects. 2.4 and 5), part of the artistic techniques
developed by human beings will precisely consist in playing with the closure effects.
2.1.2 Expectations and Semiotization
Expectation has indissolubly linked rational and emotional aspects.
It is misleading to present the viewer (and his/her organs of perception) as a blank
photographic plate. As first, Gestalt psychology and then cognitive psychology
and semiotics have showed that the act of looking is a dialectic in which pre-
existing codes are confronted with external stimuli. Therefore, there is an interaction
between the stimuli and the patterns. This suggests a double movement, going
from the world to a semiotic subject and vice versa. In one direction, the stimuli
are assessed in the light of a model available to us. Along the other direction,
the model is modified by the data provided by perception and observation. This
double movement, of course, reminds us of the assimilation-accommodation couple
in genetic psychology, and it is crucial to understand the attribution of meaning.
When inspecting a painting, the viewer takes interest in the manner of expression
adopted by the painter. For example, the viewer may try to capture information
about the painter and his personality instead of information about the motif (what
distinguishes a woman painted by, say, Botticelli from one painted by Raphael,
Klimt, Modigliani, or Schiele).
When they take pragmatic decisions, the viewers are driven by their idiosyncrasy.
Besides, they already are so at the mere level of perception (perception has different
7All of this indicates that barysemy is measurable: in the visual field, the density of meaning is the
number of dipoles perceptible for a surface unit. Of course, we can also measure the variation of
density in time, taking into account the evolution of the number of dipoles or that of the surface.
We can symmetrically consider barysemy as the opposite of repetition, which brings it also into
the scope of the calculable (at least theoretically).
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styles). But they are also driven by the knowledge they have about the environment
and the indexical codes valid in this environment, as we will discuss in Sect. 2.2.2.
2.2 Artifacts
Some artifacts enhance the specificities of both areas: center and periphery. This is
especially the case for the indexes, on which we will elaborate below, and which
will eventually allow us to address the specificity of artistic receiving.
2.2.1 A General Theory of the Index8
The Peircian terminology has only one term for two very different phenomena that
should be carefully distinguished. We will note them indexa (arbitrary) and indexm
(motivated) respectively. The indexm is based on a “natural” contiguity relation not
provoked by man, whereas the indexa is a cultural and conventional sign. In the
following, we are only concerned with indexesa.
The indexa is a semiotic device with a double property. (i) It focuses the attention
of the receiver of the indexical act on a determined portion of space (and, more
particularly, it detaches an object within that space) that therefore becomes the
indexed. (ii) It attributes a certain status to that indexed. A familiar example: a
pointed finger; but the label, the cover page, the stage, the pulpit, etc. exert the
same effect.
That device mostly unfolds in the longest semioses and is subject to a significant
cultural investment: the type of reference it elicits is eminently conventional.
Focusing the attention on a determined portion of space is nothing but con-
tributing to the discontinuity that segments the perceptive field, or establishing
that segmentation. In any event, the index takes part in shaping the segmentation
we discussed in Sect. 2.1.1. In the case of works of art, that form assumes a
true but limited importance, that of “formats:” portrait, landscape, marine, tondo,
lockets : : : 9
The index only works in the presence of the designated portion of space, in such
a way that its definition activates the idea of contiguity, or rather of neighborhood,
a word borrowed from topology, which therefore is neutral as to the actual physical
8Cf. Groupe  in press B.
9The format is the product of two determinations: that of the organs of perception (binocularity
explains the relative universality of the horizontal format and that of the shapes of the theme and
thus of the indexed (a standing subject will be treated according to the vertical axis).
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Table 2 Structure of the index
Indexation
Indexing ! Indexed
pointed finger a) focalization object
pointer b) attribution of status (ex.: work of art, social function : : : ) exit door
label sculpture
badge individual
cover : : : book : : :
distance between what will be defined hereinafter as the indexer and the indexed.10
The nature of the objects destined to become indexes is very variable. They may
be linguistic, for example, with shifters and connectors.11 The writing, the spatial
manifestation of language, frequently has an indexical function too.12 There are
other explicit indexes, such as the /dash/, indicating the equivalence of the linguistic
portion of a statement and of its iconic portion, the /tail of the speech balloon/, or
the frame. However, the index may not be manifested through a specialized sign:
the indexical function is thus assumed simply by spatial proximity.
Founded on contiguity, the index always mobilizes three elements: (i) the actual
indexical sign (/pointed finger/, /label/ : : : ) or indexer, (ii) the designated portion
of space, or indexed, and (iii) the relation to the latter that the former institutes (by
designating it, giving it such and such status, etc.) or indexation. The index therefore
presupposes a semiotics of space: in order for the indexer to designate a portion of
space, that indexed space must be perceived as a homogeneous unity, distinct from
its surroundings: for example, a building or object, even a fuzzy set of trees or clouds
(Table 2).
This semantics of the indexed is determined by three series of factors.
(i) The above-mentioned perceptual factors.
10That explains why indexesa often get mixed up with indexesm (cf. Klinkenberg 2000), especially
for the followers of the Peircian tradition. But the space neighborhood that is applied here is not
the same as in the indication, where it is causal.
11The referent of the shifters varies according to three series of variables: (1) the couple
enunciator/enunciatee, (2) the time of the enunciation, (3) the place of the enunciation. The
term “connector,” which has been controversial, globally designates linguistic tools expressing
syntactic, logical, semantic links between two portions of statements. One of the linguistic
properties of the connectors is that some of them may sometimes link portions of statement,
sometimes a statement and its enunciation (external connection).
12Cf. Klinkenberg 2008; Groupe  1995. Examples: /store fronts/, /titles/ of books or pictorial
works, /names/ of museum halls, of classrooms, or of congress, /badges/ of staff or participants of
these congresses, /names/ of a television presenter appearing at the bottom of the screen, /labels/ of
cans, /names/ of deceased people on graves : : : If we find the mention /“museum”/ on an edifice, the
index connects the linguistic signified “museum” and the whole structured space volume located
in the background where figures the expression and designates the quality (“museum”) attributed
to that portion of space.
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(ii) Different types of sectorial semantics but still founded on the semiotization of
space (architectural semantics, landscape semantics, etc.). We mentioned that
the designated space had to be perceived as homogeneous; yet the knowledge
of that homogeneity is itself provided by cultural rules: delimited aspect of
volumes or surfaces, etc. That semiotics of space is still insufficient right now
in spite of Édeline’s suggestions (2013). We can claim that there are two
categories of places:
(a) strictly delimited places: either they are enclosed—the museum, the
gallery, the performance hall, but also the library, the classroom, the
church—or they are open but resting on strict semantics (the pedestal, the
stage);
(b) vaguely delimited places: in this way, without the need to enclose, Finlay
sanctifies the whole space around which is its Great Turf ; the space
surrounding a museum is vague, but it itself makes a living statue close
to its entrance count as a piece of body art.
(iii) Social praxes: reading a book, visiting a museum, visiting a sacred place.
2.2.2 Index and Appropriation
When it comes to praxes, one should take this into account:
– The index, which creates (or triggers) an utterance, is an utterance itself. And
as an utterance, it has an enunciatee and an enunciator. While being a device
producing enunciation, it has itself been enunciated.
– The index is a performative utterance; it has an illocutionary force. It has been
defined as follows: it is “an order to focus one’s attention to a given space sector.”
– The enunciator has therefore a performative purpose, the enunciatee has his
expectancies, and one or the other might be a person (or people) or an institution
(the artistic institution, for instance).
Without that being a general rule, indexation often has the effect of giving a
status of sign to the indexed. This is why it is so important for the problem we
are addressing here. In that specific case, its role consists in triggering the semiotic
decision. To do so, it disqualifies the indexed object as an object and re-qualifies it
as an utterance belonging to a certain type of speech. For instance, some indexing
objects such as the label, the pedestal, or the beam of a lamp in a museum can turn
any indexed object into a work of art; the same lamp at the theatre, the stage, the
circle constituted by the audience in the street arts make a show out of what attention
is focused on; the store front disqualifies the exposed object—for example, the bottle
of perfume in a store front is disqualified as a bottle whose content can be used—
to re-qualify it as a sample of a category of commercial goods. In each case, the
indexed has been given the status of icon: the item in the store front is there for all
the items that can be found in the store which it may validly represent as an icon.
Globally, all the indexed objects that are awarded the status of sign are subjected
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to a disqualification-requalification process.13 The precise direction taken by the
requalification movement depends on grids governing indexation—the store front
of an art museum imparts the status of unique object at a piece of work; the store
front of the Natural History Museum imparts the status of sample; the store front
of a shop imparts the status of commercial sample or of unique precious object—in
compliance with rules that may be flexible and complex.14
It is easily observed that the indexes, in their first function consisting in centering,
simply parallel the perceptive factors: they create an effect of closure and barysemy,
both at an overarching level (the space through which the viewer moves) and at a
subordinate level (the space the viewer has visually access to). The separation of
space that they produce reinforces the aspects of the two areas: on the one hand,
centrality, and peripherality on the other. We have thus been able to demonstrate
that a specific type of index—the frame (cf. Groupe  1989, 1992)—functions
as a counterpart to visual perception whose mechanism was described above
(Sect. 2.1.1.), playing, as the latter, on the division between the central vision area
and peripheral areas. And that also applies to any other indexicalized space.
The viewer is driven, as we described in Sect. 2.1.2., by his/her knowledge
about the environment and the prevailing indexical codes in vigor, a knowledge
that is clearly socially stratified. Knowing that we are in the house of an art lover
or in a museum triggers evidently specific attitudes, for instance, a very precise
direction for the semiotic decision. These reactions may be actions (as we will see
it hereinafter). In that quest for meaning, the viewer is equipped with pre-existing
types that he/she projects on the stimuli.
It is the factor of social praxis that implies that if we take a walk in a non-strictly
delimited space, we can still identify a work of art, even though there is no index as
strictly socialized as a label or a frame. This is the case with Finlay (where the only
index is not the presence of a label but a simple stone carrying Dürer’s monogram),
or Giuseppe Penone’s Vowel Tree in the Tuileries Garden. All of this clearly shows
the relevance of cultural and social competences, which determine the expectations.
2.3 Contextualization
If the index can mobilize motivated signs, as in the evoked examples of icons, the
fact remains that it is in itself an arbitrary sign: the type of reference it arouses is
purely conventional, presupposing the semiotics of space.
13Here, Duchamp’s ready-made can satisfy our need for example.
14The /green XL-sweater of a certain design/ in a storefront can mean that, within the store, we
will find “green sweaters of that particular design in all sizes,” “sweaters with that design and
size but in other colors,” “some sweaters,” even “some clothes.” Of course, these codes can be
badly implemented, ignored, or even suspended. In the latter cases, disqualification ends: that’s the
example of the storekeeper who sells his/her item in storefront dispossessing it of its iconic status.
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Needless to say that these spaces can be articulated both in a centripetal and
centrifugal way: let us think about the museum sequence, wing or floor, hall, wall,
frame : : : Relations of subordination, superordination, and coordination between
these spaces are established. They are the three syntactic relations that we can
distinguish in visual semiotics:
– Subordination: the museum hall, subordinated to museum-building;
– Superordination: the museum-building, superordinated to the hall;
– Coordination: the halls, coordinated between one another.
The articulation of the homogeneous spaces (i.e., experienced as homogeneous)
and thus the working as so many units within vaster complexes follows cultural
rules, too. This is the reason why the indexical inscription /museum/ can appear not
only on the building but also on a flagpole located several meters from the building.
The relation between this semiotics of space and its functionalization through
indexes also meets another cultural code: it is one thing to identify a space as
homogeneous, and possibly articulate it in sub-spaces; it is another to give, thanks
to calculation, a specific value to both that space and the indexical sign itself.
That sign can have a synecdochic value, and can therefore be an ostensive sign15:
this is the case for a frame making up the logo of a gallery or a museum, a painting
by a particular painter, or a sample of his/her stylistic specificities (for example, a
drawing taken from Miro’s work to announce an exhibition about him).
The articulations and relations we have just discussed give every element of the
spatial utterance, indexical or not, some specific signified. In the case of indexical
signs, consider the widely different examples of a poster announcing an exhibition
and the entrance of the hall where it takes place. In the spatial articulations
mentioned above, every stage can have its own signified. The /museum/ refers to
the general signified “works of art,” the /wing/ or /floor/ may invoke the “century”
or “school” of the considered type of art, the /hall/ may invoke the “individuality”
of that century or school, the /wall/ a “production period” of that individuality,
the /frame/ the particular utterance made by that “production period.” Thus we are
clearly dealing with pluricodical utterances, where the purpose of the pluricodical
aspect is to ventilate the identified elements between different semiotic categories.16
15As its name suggests, the ostensive sign “shows.” But not in the way the index does, which is in
a relation of neighborhood with the showed object: here, the signifier is the shown object itself (or
its icon). The ostensive sign is therefore an element highlighted to synecdochically represent one
or several members of the category to which it belongs. In simple terms, it is a sample.
16In that complex, one empirical object can be included in the composition of many signs as
stimulus, and can therefore be sometimes an object to be emphasized, sometimes an indexical
sign—only when it does not share both status at the same time. Let us consider the frame, which
often has an indexical status, but which may sometimes be seen as a fraction of the work itself,
even as a work of art in its own right (see the numerous examples studied in our rhetoric of frame:
Groupe  1989, 1992).
The Appropriation of the Work of Art as a Semiotic Act 237
2.4 Stylistic and Rhetoric of the Indexation
In Sect. 2.1.1, we saw that the index produced a barysemy and a perceptive comfort
which is nothing but a saturation of the enunciatee’s expectations.
Yet part of the artistic techniques developed by humanity consists in playing
with these norms. Those techniques can sometimes head towards the extreme
reinforcement of the closure effect produced by the index and sometimes towards
its annihilation. An example of the first case is given by the Druidic Triple Precinct
studied by Guénon, and an example of the second one is given by Finlay and his
Great Turf.17
The observations that have been made concerning the perceptive comfort of the
viewer are illustrated a contrario by certain approaches. Mondrian wanted to use
the painting simply as an “element of division of the wall” (Pleynet 1977, p. 138),
that is to say that instead of isolating it in its frame, he wanted to take it out from it.
One may also remember the memorable example from the Documenta of Kassel in
2002, where a huge empty frame was erected outside, facing the landscape. We can
also think about the confusion caused by the apparition of the circle theatre, which
modified and diminished the separation between the actors and the audience.
3 Strategies of Positioning: Four Configurations
Another step of the appropriation process consists, for a viewer, in looking for the
optimal place to examine the selected piece of work and move on to the anasemiosis
that he/she judges appropriate. Centering, which was discussed above, is already a
positioning. But here, we are considering more precisely the strategies that result
from the evoked social praxes.
For a start, it is interesting to notice that the optimal place has mostly been
predetermined by the enunciator in an extremely precise way. Some famous frescoes
painted on church domes have such anamorphoses that only one location allows a
satisfying view (example: Trionfo del nome di Gesù, on the ceiling of the Gesù
Church, by Il Baciccio); and the geometric perspective of Brunelleschi and Alberti
requires a unique viewpoint, although the perceptual mechanisms of compensation
and constancy allow, to a certain extent, some distancing from that optocenter.
Conversely, Byzantine mosaics played on a shimmer, a scintillation of the golden
tesserae, in such a way that the appropriate view suggested a moving viewer.
17“Environmental art is another form of protest which inserts the piece of work within the
environment by deleting the frame surrounding it (thus, its separation) and, consequently, makes
it unlimited. Dürer’s Great Piece of Turf is encircled by a frame which delimits its influence to
its immediate surroundings. However, it is impossible to precise where the reconstitution of that
Great Turf in Ian Hamilton Finlay’s garden ends” (Édeline 2005, p. 33).
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Beside the Fixity vs. Movement dichotomy, there is another fundamental struc-
ture: Frontality vs. Laterality. The front view seems more or less to be the general
rule, but it also has specific modalities. El Greco’s elongated figures, that some
assign to the “ecstatic lens” (Eisenstein 1980), may also be interpreted simply as
taking into account how things appear when you perceive them from below.
The distance between the eye and the piece of work is a third critical factor, in
such a way that a third axis must be taken into account: Remoteness vs. Closeness.
That distance of perception does not correspond at all with the positioning of the
painter during his/her work, the painter having to either move or imagine the effect
of a remote contemplation. Pissaro is credited with the rule that places the optimal
position at three times the diagonal of the work. However, such rigidity is not
appropriate for all utterances. For example, Rothko’s huge paintings require the
construction of halls of adequate height and perspective (cf. Groupe  1994).
That alleged norm is particularly irrelevant in the case of bistable utterances,
which require both proximal and distal vision at the same time, a technique
epitomized by the Impressionists. We can certainly examine their stains or dotted
lines very closely, but such proximal vision generally does not elicit any iconic
content: that content is exclusively plastic. But a recomposed vision is obtained
when the viewing distance becomes such that the solid angle that subtends two or
several adjacent stains is inferior to the minimum angle of discrimination. The latter
is the function of the eye optics and of the dimension of the colored receptors: it
measures 0.017ı. Then, we can calculate that if the stains of the painter have a
2 mm diameter (such as in Signac’s Breakfast), one has to place oneself at at least
1.8 m to obtain the effects of luster or recomposition by additive color sought by the
artist, while Pissaro’s rule would require 4.4 m. An appropriate distancing allows
for the perception of two levels, a plastic one and an iconic one, fully permitting
the exploitation of the icono-plastic interaction (cf. Groupe  1992; Parret 2008).18
Thus the Remoteness vs. Closeness axis determines three segments: the plastic zone,
the icono-plastic zone and the iconic zone.
A fourth and less evident structure also plays a role: the Tandem vs. Mirror
opposition. The spatial relations between a viewer and the objects of the world are
indeed influenced by the intrinsic orientation of these objects (cf. Vandeloise 1986).
An object with such an orientation presents a front and a back in such a way that
we have the feeling we are in front of it or at its back, depending on which face
it presents. We will say that we have either a mirror or a tandem perception. The
intrinsic orientation of objects informs their representations. Besides, a painting—
unlike a window, for instance—is also an oriented object which faces us: we
18It is a different story for some quite marginal pieces of work, where two iconic readings are
possible and without any immediate relation between one another. Apart from the famous case of
anomorphosis in Holbein’s Ambassadors, which suggests two viewpoints laterally isolated, there
are also Arcimboldo’s Baroque compositions, where fruits, fishes, vegetables, etc. are put together
to compose a head when you take a global view. Between 1937 and 1939, Dali painted many
paintings of that type, among which we can name Face of Mae West Which May Be Used as an
Apartment.
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stand in front of it as in front of a mirror. In some cases, the painter struggles
against that orientation by representing a character from behind (i.e., Caspar David
Friedrich’s famous Rückenfigur), which elicits in us a tandem attitude. Landscapes
are ambiguous as regards this parameter.
These examples show that the viewer’s positioning is important, and that the
artist implicitly expects the viewer to be placed in the expected location. This
is a true power of the utterance because it triggers a complex motor activity,
cybernetically regulated by vision. Now, we must look deeper into that power.
4 Appropriation and Catasemiosis
Saussure also defined semiotics as the “discipline that studies the life of signs within
social life.” But if the sign is a condition for communication, it is not sufficient to
place it upstream from that communication. One must also remark that it extends its
action beyond the communicative act itself. Signs do have a use. They further action.
In this way, if meaning emerges from experience, it also leads to experience. This
is its double corporeality. Taking this corporeality and the processes of enunciation
that reflect this property seriously implies that one ceases to consider utterances as
pure meanings.
The piece of work does not escape the rule: whether it is an utterance or piece
of discourse, it certainly manifests an ethos, aptly laid bare by the analysis of styles
(cf. Groupe  1995), but it is also a means to act upon the world and others. We
therefore cannot study the appropriation of the work without adding a pragmatic
aspect to that study, pragmatics being the part of semiotics that considers the sign as
an act. This is what we call catasemiosis, a counterpart to anasemiosis (cf. Groupe
 in press A, 2015).
By presenting signs not only as the product of fixed relations between signifiers
and signified within a closed system, but also as the product of constantly revived
relations between objects, utterances, and enunciative instances, and by admitting
the actions and habits within these interpretants, the pragmatic approach acknowl-
edges the interpreter and his/her action on the world, just like the action of the sign
on the interpreter.
It would take too long to discuss the necessary condition of both these actions
here, namely interpretation. That approach can be formalized in a tripartite dia-
gram which accommodates the structure of the interpreted utterance, the grid of
interpretation, and the interpreting instance, a schema that we have exposed at the
Paris colloquium on The Adventures of interpretation (Groupe  2008). To conclude
here, we will place ourselves after the interpretation. Like any semiotic utterance,
the artwork has an illocutionary function, and it tends to cash out in an action. While
talking about the functional space of the artwork in terms of an obligation to produce
meaning, we were indeed insisting on such an illocutionary force.
We would like to make clear that the codes implemented here are stratified. For
one social group, the identification of a /museum door/ will represent an “invitation
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to come in,” even a “moral imperative;” for others, it will represent an “interdiction
to come in.” There are many other catasemiotic examples: purchase or resale of
works, purchase of reproductions, by-products or catalogues; laceration of works or
other manifestations of bad mood; writing articles of artistic criticism, scholarly
studies or treaties on visual semiotics; copies, attempts to imitate or improve
previous works; reveries, ecstasies, nervous breakdowns, depressions or altered
states of mind; excitement, militancy and conversation; religious conversion and
other drastic changes of life : : :
Among all these effects, studied typically by sociology but which can also be
approached by semiotics, we may detach the following one: the artwork, just like
any other utterance, is a means to modify its partakers’ representations and modes of
action. In its rhetorical aspect, it proceeds to a reorganization of categories coming
from experience by suggesting new ways of carving up what is conceivable; it
makes the system evolve through the production of new relations between units
and therefore through the production of new units. As an utterance that modifies the
rules of the grids on which it is based, it serves a powerful heuristic function (cf.
Groupe  1994; Klinkenberg 2000).
5 Conclusion: From Semiotics to Aesthetics?
We are aware that our remarks, even though they were formulated within the context
of a largely conceived semiotics, do not go into the heart of the matter: the specificity
of the work of art. We only touch upon very general conditions of the appropriation
of that piece of art.
Have we reached the limits of our discipline? Semiotics as it exists for now seems
quite unable to grasp the aesthetic specificity. It allows one to reach a certain point;
a point much farther than classic semiotics allowed, which essentially developed
descriptive devices. The essential part of it is still to be finished. By the way, it
is a problem we already encountered with literature and that we discussed in our
Rhétorique de la poésie (Groupe  1977): rhetorics, that was born in the wake of
structuralism was, without question, a significant contribution to poetics, insofar as
it could describe some of the required conditions for a given text to be considered as
literary; but it still could not manage to lay down the sufficient conditions for this,
in other words it was incapable of grasping the literary specificity. Our answer to
this was the Triadic Model. The latter was certainly a semiotic device, just as the
cardinal notion of mediation, which implies that we have somewhat re-incorporated
the artistic into semiotics. Decisive achievements in that discipline must be sought
somewhere else.
On the other hand, the legitimacy of a project consisting in developing a
phenomenology of the work of art could be called into question. And, as a
consequence, the very concept of “artwork” could itself be rejected: why should
there be an artwork? It cannot be denied that the work of art has a status and a
function: its purpose is to arouse feelings, impressions, produce knowledge, create
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communion, guide the action or be an action. Its identification, however, still rests
upon an autonomisation process (to which semiotic processes such as indexation
contribute), and that autonomisation deserves to be questioned for it is a product
and is not self-evident.
Indeed, there is an aesthetic apprehension of the world, or a beauty of nature. The
latter must certainly be correlated to the aesthetic apprehension of the work of art in
the context of a general aesthetic apprehension. From an evolutionary perspective,
what we call beautiful today might have been caused by the immemorial habit of
looking at a world where the sky is blue and blood is red, by the urge that we have
to counter the effects of time, and many other such determinants, constituting in
the end an intersubjective framework of apprehension. Our feeling of beauty could
reflect our adaptation to these universal constraints and be tuned to them. A whole
research program in semioaesthetics is therefore launched, which applies not only
to works of art but to the world as well. In the context of the present research, the
problem is to track down the specificity of the work; in other words, it is to trace the
limit between plain anasemiosis and artistic anasemiosis.
A major part of contemporary artistic practices questions that limit which has
simultaneously a phenomenological and institutional aspect. What happens if we
abolish that limit? On one side, there is Finlay’s Great Turf, which extended art
to the dimensions of the world, where the Sacred Grove imparts the sacred aspect
to the entire world. On the other side, conceptual art does exactly the opposite:
it introduces the limit in a place where we do not expect it to be, by introducing a
urinal in a museum19 or a simple string in a gallery. In both categories, our categories
themselves are questioned.
Indeed, the categories have been developed in order to organize the raw data of
experience and to canalize its infinite variation, various stabilizations ensuring their
permanency while guaranteeing their plasticity. However, in spite of that solidity,
categories can still fail to account for certain experiences. Such experiences are
then said to be new, like the categories whose refinement they ignite. These re-
categorizations can be described as moments in a series of cycles of balance and
un-balance. In semiotic words, one of the functions of art is certainly to contribute—
like science does, but in the context of another praxis—to that constant game of
re-categorization.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
19Duchamp was illustrating conceptual art avant la lettre, with a clear conscience of what he was
doing. His declarations leave no doubt about that (Jouffroy 1974, p. 24 sq).
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Sculpture, Diagram, and Language in the
Artwork of Joseph Beuys
Wolfgang Wildgen
Abstract The artwork of Joseph Beuys was provocative in his time. Although he
was very successful on the international art scene and on the art market, the larger
public is still bewildered by his Fat Chair or his installations and his performances.
The article shows the evolution of his artwork from classical materials (stone, steel)
to soft materials (animals, products of animals) and further to his concept of “social
sculpture” and to programmatic diagrams (with words and graphics). A special
point of interest is the transition towards language (phonic and conceptual), the
philosophy of art exposed in his drawings, and diagrams and the relation between
art and science in his artwork.
Keywords (Beuys) • Language • Diagram • Performance • Politics • Social
sculpture
1 Introduction
Aesthetic norms and values have two faces: an individual and a social (collective)
face. The collective face may be highly ordered and symmetric as art and public
displays in totalitarian states demonstrate, but it can very suddenly break down
into chaotic modes. The destroyed towns of Germany and Japan after 1945
are the counter-image to the ordered troop parades in totalitarian regimes. The
individual face gains its value from the opposition to established norms, habits, and
conventionalized shapes; it displays local beauty under specific perspectives. It lives
from surprise, provocation, deviance, and lack of conventionalized contents. In the
case of language, grammars and lexicons of a standard language show the collective
face of signs; slam poetry or spontaneous wit, the individual one. In the case of
visual art, academic art (mainly before 1850) is akin to standard language whereas
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avant-garde artists after 1912 elaborated the individual face. In the period after
1945, with the breakdown of fascist regimes (later of the Stalinist analogues), the
individualistic mode in art, which had survived in non-totalitarian countries and in
emigration, became dominant again. Major philosophical aspects of the opposition
are treated by Simmel’s (1896) book Soziologische Ästhetik, which sees aesthetic
principles at work in the construction and preference for political and social types
of organization. A common feature of socialistic utopias is: “that society as a
whole should become an artwork” (“Daß die Gesellschaft als Ganzes ein Kunstwerk
werde,” Simmel 1896/2008, p. 147).
In the following, I shall concentrate on Joseph Beuys, whose career had
only begun in the late fifties when Germany reappeared as a global player in
the international political and cultural scene. Contrary to another prominent and
provocative modern artist, Jackson Pollock (1912–1956; cf. Wildgen 2010b, 2013,
ch. 4.4), Beuys was himself a theoretician of art engaged in cultural politics and a
protagonist of the rapidly changing scene of avant-garde art in Europe and America
in the sixties and seventies.
2 Context and Development of Beuys’ Artwork
Joseph Beuys was born in 1921 in Germany. Immediately after high school in 1940,
he became a soldier (a radioman in an aircraft, later a pilot until 1945). After a
period in prisoner camps (1947), he studied at the Art Academy in Düsseldorf
(mainly sculpture). Beuys’ motivation for art was different from that of most of his
teachers and co-students. He combined a strong interest in biology (and other natural
sciences) and philosophy (with a specific preference for the lineage: Goethe –
Humboldt – Steiner) with interests in art (Beuys mentions the sculpture of Wilhelm
Lehmbruck as his basic impulse). This basic reorientation explains why his art
transports more complex messages that are not just meant for aesthetic pleasure.
In 1961, he was appointed professor of monumental sculpture at the Academy of
Düsseldorf. After 1962, he joined the “Fluxus” movement for some time, which,
following the tradition from Dadaism, aimed at an art based on performance
and multi-mediality (music played a central role). In 1963, he organized the
“International Festum Fluxus Fluxorum.” The eminent conceptual level of Beuys’
artwork was developed beyond the Fluxus-movement, when Beuys included politics
in his artistic program and applied his political ideas to decisions in the Art Academy
in Düsseldorf where he was teaching. Eventually, he decided to accept all students
who had applied and to ignore the “numerus clausus” imposed by the Minister of
Education. This led to a conflict with the minister, Johannes Rau (who became
later Federal President of Germany). In 1969, Rau fired Beuys because he and his
students had occupied the office of student inscriptions (Beuys argued that they
had just gone there in order to get all of them enrolled). After several years of
struggles in court, his sudden dismissal was cancelled (1978), but as he did not
have tenure, his contract had ended anyway. He later got the right to use a room
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at the Academy and work there (without becoming a member of the staff). Beuys
stopped teaching (although he had the opportunity to continue his educational work
in Vienna) and concentrated his energies on expositions, actions, and his artwork,
e.g., his repeated participation in the Documenta in Kassel, the foundation of an
International University for Creativity and Interdisciplinary Research, and events of
performance art in New York, Edinburgh, Basel, and many other places. Beuys died
in Düsseldorf in 1986.
He is surely an intriguing figure in modern art and many visitors to museums
remain bewildered when they experience his artworks. Nevertheless, his long-
lasting international success shows that his art triggered many significant reactions
and contained a message to his public that was understood by many colleagues,
collectors, and critics of art (he also had some famous pupils). If the general public
is rather reluctant in appreciating such art, this seems to be a general characteristic
of avant-garde art. But what is the message of Beuys’ artwork? Is the kind of very
complex, abstract, and performance-oriented artwork an expression of new aesthetic
norms or are aesthetic norms part of the traditions that are negated?
In the following, I shall consider innovative art insofar as it explores the means
and channels of possible signs (including their limits) in the human world. It
may help us understand how human communication and signs work. I shall begin
considering the visual materials used by Beuys in the development of his art.
3 Materials and Techniques in Beuys’ Artwork
When Beuys studied at the Academy of Art in Düsseldorf, he had as his major
teacher the sculptor Mataré (1885–1962). As Mataré’s master student, he mainly
produced sculptures in stone and iron (sepulchral and religious art). In 1952, he
created a fountain in steel commissioned but not accepted by a steel company in
Krefeld. It became in 1984 part of the installation “Barraque D’Dull Doddle.” Very
soon, he added organic material (plants and animals): deer, elks, sheep, hares, bees;
and animal matter: wax, honey, grease (derived from animal fat), and felt (derived
from the fur and hair of sheep). In the further course of his artistic development,
the materials became more numerous (complex) and more dynamic. Performances
became the center of his activities. Major examples are:
• In 1965, Beuys explained his drawing to a dead hare; his head was covered with
honey and then with 50 dollars worth of gold leaf.
The gallery was closed to the public and Beuys’ action was witnessed only by the
photographer Ute Klophus and a television crew. Beuys sat on a chair in one corner
of the gallery, next to the entrance. He had poured honey over his head, to which he had
then affixed fifty dollars worth of gold leaf. In his arms he cradled a dead hare, which he
looked at steadfastly. Then he stood up, walked around the room holding the dead hare
in his arms, and held it up close to the pictures on the walls; he seemed to be talking to
it. Sometimes he broke off his tour and, still holding the dead creature, stepped over a
withered fir tree that lay in the middle of the gallery. All this was done with indescribable
tenderness and great concentration. (Stachelhaus 1987, p. 13).
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For pictures of this action see: http://uploads3.wikipaintings.org/images/
joseph-beuys/how-to-explain-pictures-to-a-dead-hare.jpg
• In 1974, he lived 3 days on stage in a New York gallery together with a coyote.
• In 1982, he began to plant 7,000 oak tress in Kassel, each one accompanied by a
basalt stone.
Some halting marks of his sculptural work (first in the traditional sense as three-
dimensional objects made by an artist) are: Kreuzigung (crucifixion) 1962/1963;
Staatsgalerie Stuttgart (cf. for a picture in the net: http://www.staatsgalerie.de/
media/malereiundplastik/bis1980_beuys_l.jpg) and “Fettstuhl” (Fat Chair, 1963,
Hessisches Landesmuseum Darmstadt; cf. for material in the net, e.g. http://
kitchentalkblog.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/beuys-fettstuhl.jpg).
In a classical iconographic analysis, the first sculpture reproduces the crucifixion
scene with John and Mary contemplating Jesus on the cross (cf. the title of Beuys
artwork). The bottles were containers of blood and stand for living bodies, the Red
Cross stands for Jesus and his service for humanity. The materials are poor; without
material value and thus fulfill criteria of minimal art. However, basic meanings and
references to cultural values have been conserved. Nevertheless, one cannot imagine
that this artwork could function in the context of Christian ceremonies. In this sense,
it negates the contextual value given to religious art (cf. Wildgen 2010a, 2013, ch.
3.1.7 for the transformation of the topic “Last supper” in modern art).
The chair is a classical design object (cf. Beyaert 2012), but the chair chosen by
Beuys is a very simple and poor token; the mass of fat “sitting” on the chair may
stand for the human being reduced to the energy reserve of his body (fat). The human
body is geometrically abstracted to the half of a cube (itself a platonic solid), with a
smooth quadratic surface and a coarse triangular side. Solids of fat were a frequent
form in Beuys’ sculptures. Their contrary parts are basalt cylinders or columns such
as those used in the installation “7,000 oaks.”
In the sixties (first in 1967, as a professor in Düsseldorf) and in the seventies,
Beuys began to enlarge and redefine his concept of sculpture and art and created
the concept of “social sculpture” (‘soziale Plastik’). The materials are not only of
organic and animal origin, but they are also social and political (society, humanity).
Thus, Beuys expanded the type of materials for “sculpture”:
• From stone and steel to “warm” materials (wax, honey, grease, animals).
• From sign-using individuals (animals, humans) to social and political entities and
even to humanity as a whole.
As a consequence, he sketched the program of a new political movement that,
together with other currents, contributed to the foundation of the “Green Party”
in Germany and Beuys even stood on the list for the first elections in which they
participated. After his dismissal as professor at the Academy of Art, he also initiated
a program for alternative universities. Thus the “Free International University of
Creativity and Interdisciplinary Research,” first conceived in a German context
(1974; together with e.g. Heinrich Böll), was realized in Ireland (Dublin, Belfast,
and Derry).
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Beuys’ political activities and their relation to his artwork are difficult to
appreciate. Some critics considered Beuys’ political ideas as conservative or even
reactionary. In the intellectual and political context after the war in Germany, it
is rather obvious that Beuys tries to find a third way, leading out of the disaster
of ideological dualities such as fascism versus communism. The innovative power
of art was meant to find a new perspective beyond politically and intellectually
proposed alternatives. Science and philosophy had been put to service by both
regimes and art was thought to take over the moral and intellectual guidance lost
in this process. The fact that both regimes had made modern art one of their
major enemies left to art the duty to create new alternatives beyond traditional
ideals and projects. A basic element of his program is the opposition against
fixed or philosophical ideas, purporting dogmatic messages, or claiming a kind
of intellectual leadership associated with manipulation, lying, and fraud given the
experience of the war generation. Symbolic messages should avoid such deceptive
strategies; they should instead be non-directive, bodily rooted, in continuity with
natural signs and symbols. As a consequence, the new type of art had to deceive
the expectation of the larger public socialized by the war regimes and still unable
to free itself from the false securities implied by clear-cut programs and populist
argumentation. In this sense, Beuys’ art is a very natural outcome of post-war
German progressive intellectualism.
Beuys shares the view of many poets and intellectuals that even language had
been devaluated as a means of social communication by the totalitarian regimes. The
late work of Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (1946), describes how the official
misuse of linguistic propaganda and the control of literature, science, and public
utterances had corrupted the normality of language use such that, as an emigrant
in the States, he had the impression that the German language used by the fascist
regime had changed its basic function and, although phonetically similar, had lost its
major signifying and communicative capacity. It thus became opaque to people like
Cassirer who had left Germany in 1933. The writer (and insofar as the visual artist
operates with linguistically transmitted concepts, also the painter and sculptor) had
to change this basic semiotic medium underlying all other symbolic media in order
to repair its malfunction, heal the symbolic diseases created by totalitarian regimes,
the war and the crimes of deportation and mass executions during holocaust.
4 Visual Artwork and Language
With the emergence of abstract art (Duchamp 1911; Kandinsky 1913), reflective
processes gained prominence in art, particularly in the artwork and writings of
Paul Klee (1879–1940). Later gestures and movements/performances (possibly
documented in film and video) came to the foreground; this is also characteristic
for the work of Pollock after 1945 (cf. Wildgen 2010b). Complementary to the
vanishing relevance of figurative art and the preponderance of reflective processes
and a minimalist attitude (cf. Arte Povera; Art Informel; Minimal Art), this trend
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found many admirers and influenced active artists. As a general consequence, the
conceptual background of art gained dominance over artistic (technical) perfor-
mance. This line of development brought visual artwork into the neighborhood of
linguistic thinking, because concepts and the underlying abstractions are typical
linguistic achievements. Beuys said in an interview 1985:
My way was going through language, although this seems strange, it did not start from so
called figural experiences.1
For Beuys, speaking corresponds to a kind of shaping of ideas and thus is akin
to sculpture. Language as art is for Beuys primarily the play with language sounds
and underlying concepts. Its primary goal is the creation of new social meaning.
Rigid rules of syntax could be violated; the established items in a lexicon could be
changed, filled with new meanings and functions. Art became, in this line of thought,
a conceptual procedure (an operation with concrete forms, visual or spoken) and
gave access to a non-visual space. The techniques of visual artwork focused on
conceptual innovation were multiple:
• Graphical signs on surfaces.
• Diagrams (cf. next section).
• Sculptures (including interiors, installations).
• Actions with gestures, happenings with video documentation (accompanied by
music).
Beuys’ notion of language is nearer to its use in Dada poetry than in linguistics.
The realm of different articulations is demonstrated in an 11 min presentation where
Beuys repeats the words “Ja, Ja, Ja, Ne, Ne, Ne” (yes and no) in many tonal variants
(cf. Beuys 1968). In his use of words and the associated concepts, he applies two
techniques of innovation:
• Empty the meaning space either by reducing words to sounds (cf. Dada poetry)
or by speaking to a dead animal (non audible to the public).
• “Play rock and roll” with words, throwing them around.
In one respect, Beuys sees language as a natural emanation of the human body;
the human voice is a kind of artwork in itself (not dependent on the referential
function it can have). In another respect, it is the manifestation of human thought
and in this respect, it is instrumental, i.e. thought is the main feature; its expression
through language is just a technique of enunciation (a channel of communication).
Therefore the conventional architecture of language is rather a barrier, a filter
that has to be overthrown, transgressed. The rigidness of the lexicon must be
deconstructed in order to let new meanings emerge in context.2
1“Mein Weg ging durch die Sprache, so sonderbar es ist, er ging nicht von der sogenannten
bildnerischen Erfahrung aus,” Beuys at the Munich ,Kammerspiele,“ 20th of November 1985;
cited in: Blume and Nichols 2008, p. 64.
2This is rather common view in experimental poetry. Heidegger and (later in the same vein) Derrida
have made a philosophical method out of this concept. Beuys is clearly related to experimental
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5 Language as a Topic in His Visual Art
Language is a major topic in Beuys’ drawings and diagrams. Spoken language is
like smoke from the chimney of a factory (Bodentafel II 1970, in Edinburgh, since
1984 in Schaffhausen, Hallen für neue Kunst). One could say it is the by-product
of an industry of thinking, feeling, and other human bodily activities. Language is
also a vocal gesture that we can observe either in lip-reading or in the X-ray film of
a speaking person. At the Experimenta 3, in Frankfurt 1969, Beuys recited parts of
the play Titus and Iphigenie, handled musical instruments and pointed at diagrams
that described the movements of the human tongue that utters the word IPHIGENIE.
Language is understood as a sound sculpture accompanied by gestures. In a drawing,
Beuys associates diagrams of speech articulators with drinking from a jug; cf. Fig. 1.
The system of articulators is situated at a point of bifurcation in a more
general dynamic field encompassing human will, human motion, and consciousness
(“bewusstes Seelenleben”) (cf. Blume and Nichols 2008, p. 55). In a diagram, he
describes his concept of language:
At the bottom, human volition (“Wille”) is the source domain. At the level of
the glottis (the bifurcation point in the diagram above), the unspecified stream of air
is formed thanks to the elasticity of the cords and the plasticity of the vocal tract
(above the diagram, Beuys mentions the different speech organs). It receives its
specific content by the conscious soul and is finally converted into an utterance. The
creativity of language may stand for artistic creativity in general or for the symbolic
skills of man, which has an organic aspect related to the speech organs in the case
Fig. 1 Redrawn detail (W.W.) from Beuys’ Iphigenie-Set, 1974, John Gibson Gallery, New York;
cf. for a reproduction Blume and Nichols (2008, p. 55), and translation of the main concepts in
a diagram (1960–1964, pencil on paper, DAS KAPITAL RAUM, 1970–1977, Hallen für Neue
Kunst, Schaffhausen; cf. for a reproduction: Blume and Nichols [2008, p. 62])
poetry but no connection to Heidegger or Derrida can be established on the basis of his writings or
talks (cf. Holzherr 2013).
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of language and to the hands of the sculptor in the case of the artist. The creation of
forms is the expression of the force Beuys called “bewusstes Seelenleben.”
After his dismissal from the academy in Düsseldorf (1969), written words
on paper or blackboard accompanied by schemata and sketches became a major
element in his actions on stage. I will comment some examples of his diagrammatic
style in the next section.
6 Diagrammatic Style in Beuys’ Political Art
Plain art objects, e.g. sculptures or paintings and even configurations of many
objects as well as technical installations (cf. Beuys’ honey pump) were not on a par
with Beuys’ pedagogical and political ambitions. To meet his own requirements, he
began to devise utopian political programs, and organized international meetings.
In his diagrams performed on blackboards or on the floor, he combined figurative
drawings with graphical symbols (lines, circles, arrows) and written words. He
relates this style to Leonardo’s codices (cf.: Blume and Nichols 2008, p. 230); a
corresponding drawing was shown by Beuys in 1975: Hearing, Seeing, Feeling (cf.
ibid., p. 231).
In Beuys’ drawing from 1975, diagrammatic elements point to processes like:
listening, seeing (e.g. the “channels” leading to the eyes and to the right ear) and
feeling (e.g. the arrows from the waist to the head). In this example, the pictorial
aspects still dominate the diagrammatic ones. In another artwork, Beuys returns
to the technical use of diagrams: here, the chart paper for medical measurements
or, as the title indicates, for the measurement of earthquakes. In these cases,
diagrams function without further pictorial or linguistic specifications (Diagramma
Terramoto, pencil on a cardiographic millimetre paper, shown by Ackermann and
Malz [2010, p. 274] and, in several instances, on the net: http://www.exibart.com/
foto/55724.jpg).
The main class of diagrams produced by Beuys combined pictorial and linguistic
features and comes near to typical black board structures produced in the classroom
and with a pedagogical aim. In a diagram from the same period (1972), he used
logical oppositions written on paper or on a blackboard and combined with arrows,
lines, and simple pictures. We find specific scales of concepts:
• Chaos – order; birth – death; cold – warmth; volition – feeling – thinking
(Chaos – Ordnung; Geburt – Tod; Wärme – Kälte; Willen – Gefühl – Denken).
In these scales with two or three values, one could be tempted to recognize the
“semiotic square” introduced in Greimas (1970); but Beuys refers only to the
classical Aristotelian technique of contraries.
• Order and form are depicted by crystals (regular solids). This is a classical
topic since Plato’s dialogue “Timaeus.” Leonardo, Dürer, Kepler, Goethe, and
many others in the Platonic tradition referred to regular solids and crystals to
explain regularity in nature. The opposite – chaos, turbulence – is represented
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Fig. 2 Selectively redrawn diagram (W.W.), Beuys, Untitled, 1972, Sammlung Klüser, München
(cf. for a reproduction of the original: Ackermann and Malz [2010, p. 261])
by spirals and quasi-chaos attractors. In Fig. 2, we recognize a human body
lying on the floor. At its basis, the level of the feet, we see a cloud of ellipses
(with the associated concepts [in German]: Energie; Chaos) and a spiral (with
the associated concept: Embryonen) and under the body a scale: birth (Geburt)
to death (Tod). The body has in place of the head a crystal (Kristall) accompanied
by a cube (below) and a pyramid (above). The area between is one of mediation
(Vermittlung) and is called the area of creativity (Kreativität). In a broadcasted
discussion (Club2 1983; cf. internet sources) with György Ligeti and others,
Beuys insisted that the totality of human capacities, i.e. intuition, imagination and
logical thinking must be involved in art and he does not accept the reduction of art
to simply imagination and intuition (which would exclude logical and scientific
thinking).
Different drawings/diagrams allude to mathematical forms in nature and art and
to concepts in the natural sciences:
• Regular solids (in the vein of Leonardo da Vinci and Dürer).
• Crystallization as an inorganic process (which produces regular shapes).
• Embryology (cf. René Thom’s morphogenetic models; cf. Thom [1972]),
• Energy flow (warmth) and thermodynamics (cf. Prigogine’s “non-equilibrium
processes and dissipative structures,” e.g. in Prigogine [1980, ch. V–VI]).
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Fig. 3 Selectively redrawn diagram (W.W.), Beuys, Untitled (Evolution), 1974 (private collection;
cf. for a reproduction Blume and Nichols [2008, p. 313])
In fact, most diagrams are rather an accumulation of many diagrams with similar
topics in one drawing or complex schema. Figure 3 is an example of such a complex
arrangement, which combines drawings, diagrams and words.
The diagram named “Evolution” combines very different categories:
• A human body, a deer, plants, crystals, water, the sun.
• Social entities and phenomena: citizen – artist – worker; intellectual life –
juridical life – economic life (Bürger – Künstler – Arbeiter; Geistesleben –
Rechtsleben – Wirtschaftsleben).
• Names of philosophers on a historical scale: Plato/Aristotle, Newton/Kant/Helmholtz,
Marx. At the extremes of the horizontal time scale stands Christ.
• The dominating drawing at the right is based on the sun and its rays (warmth)
and supports pictures of the human body, the structure of a plant (cf. Goethe)
and the deer (symbol of the light, the sun and the soul). Beuys had his own
theory of (social) warmth, which may be associated with Peirce’s agapism (end
of the nineteenth century) and social theories opposed to social Darwinism,
which dominated many economic and political ideologies at the beginning of
the twentieth century.
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7 Beuys’ Diagrams and Peirce’s Theory of Diagrams
Beuys refers several times to Leonardo da Vinci and Dürer in his work; both stand
for the integration of contemporary science (and philosophy) in art (cf. Wildgen
2004, 2010a). In relation to modern art, Beuys’ diagrammatic art points back to
the Bauhaus tradition (and similar European traditions), more specifically to Paul
Klee (1879–1940), who used diagrams in his teaching at the Bauhaus after 1920
(cf. Klee 1925). As the Bauhaus tradition stands for the integration of technical art
(architecture), design, and visual art, it continues the Renaissance tradition initiated
by Leonardo da Vinci and Dürer. In a philosophical perspective, one can even
compare Beuys’ diagrammatic style with the use of diagrams and visualization in
the computerized world of contemporary natural sciences. I shall only give some
hints, which can be discussed more thoroughly in the context of the semiotics
of diagrams (cf. Stjernfelt 2007). The starting line is Charles Sanders Peirce’s
diagrammatic logic.
Peirce’s diagrammatic logic and Beuys’ diagrams only share the appeal to vision
and visual cognition. The deductive power of Peirce’s diagrammatic logic has no
parallel in Beuys’ diagrams; they are mainly suggestive or metaphorical devices. In
an article on Kepler, Peirce distinguishes Kepler’s imagination, which enables “a
mental diagram of a complicated state of facts,” from a poet’s imagination, which
“riots in ornaments and accessories” (Peirce 1958, p. 255). Kepler looks at the
world “with an eye of sadness, without tears, yet without illusion.” Beuys’ diagrams
correspond to a poet’s imagination; they are optimistic and represent the result
of a consideration of many relevant forces. The transition from one diagrammatic
project to the other could be smooth, but the characters of the agents are different.
Beuys is rather a utopian optimist; Peirce prefers the cool vision of Kepler and other
naturalists.
It is evident that Beuys is not a scientist and that his conceptualizations are not
a pathway towards a scientific model in the strict sense (they may be the sketch of
a theory in the humanities, however). On the other hand, innovative science has
to start from theoretical intuitions which can be sketched diagrammatically and
later lead to exact theories if a proper mathematical formulation is found and if
the predictions of such a model are checked in experiments or evaluated in relation
to given observations (in qualitative models).
In his dictum “Kapital D erweiterter Kunstbegriff” (Capital D enlarged notion of
art), Beuys refers first to the human creative (artistic) capacity, which is a capital
for humanity. Next (in relation to Marx), he says that the products themselves, if
exchanged for money, may become a kind of generalized goods of exchange; the
artists in a society are then “means of production,” a “Capital,” which is owned only
by the artists themselves. If the (industrial) products become more or less media of
identity and social communication and are embedded in a circulation and flow of
money, they function like artwork. They become a means of communication and are
embedded in the economic flow of money, here conceived as the overarching level
of economic reality.
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As a corollary, Beuys may argue that the inability of scientific theories of the
market (and the economic engineering applying these theories) to bring about a
global change and to avoid imminent catastrophes leaves the artist with the duty
to shape the future society (as a social sculpture). Art becomes a kind of political
planning and experimental economy. This was certainly a utopia in the seventies and
eighties, but only future will show if art can at least partially fulfill such a political
and economic task.
Beuys became one the best paid artists in the world at the end of his life. His
art and that of other successful artists in our time (behind whom stand an army of
artists without any access to economic values) are used on a par with actions, gold,
real estate and other assets.
8 The Aesthetic “Value” of Beuys’ Art
My answer to the question of evaluation of art and specifically the art of Beuys
can only be a preliminary one because the process of evaluation and re-evaluation
is still going on three decades after his death. The concepts of art evaluation have
been explicitly discussed by Ingarden (1969, papers VI–XI) who tries to propose
a lexicon of evaluative adjectives ordered on different scales (material moments,
formal moments, variations of specific qualities, etc.). I shall just propose some
aspects relative to which Beuys’ art may be evaluated:
1. As in other pieces of modern art, the material value is often low (simple, cheap
materials are used). The value of the materials cannot stand for the value of art
(in the same sense the value of paper used for a 50$ bill cannot stand for the
exchange value of the bank bill).
2. The temporal scope of the artwork is rather limited, i.e. the evaluation concerns
an artwork in its execution, in a specific situation, or in a restricted period of
its existence (e.g. the 2 months of the Biennale in Venice for Beuys’ “tramway
station”). The resulting pieces stocked in a museum or sold as multiples in art
auctions cannot be the primary object of aesthetic evaluation although they define
the economic value (the price) of the artwork.
3. Many of his artworks have biographical memory values. The question is then: do
these biographical memory values (concerning situations in Beuys’ life) have an
aesthetic value for the larger public, which does not share these memories?
4. Beuys’ art typically reflects a “Zeitgeist,” i.e. it has a value for some community
(e.g., Germany or Europe) in a specific period (e.g., the sixties and seventies)
insofar as it captures this “Zeitgeist.” How does this value evolve over time? Is it
likely to fade away? This is also a criterion for the evaluation of his artwork
as “social sculpture.” Did the “sculpture” influence political reality? Was it
understood by the political rulers or by the population? Did it change the votes
or the architecture of political parties or at least the intellectual atmosphere in
political discourse?
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5. Finally, the investment of personal life in the artwork is a criterion. The value
of Beuys’ installations and performances depended essentially on his bodily
presence (including the hat he was permanently wearing in public). How did
this value change after his death?
The criteria are certainly important for the evaluation of Beuys’ artwork. The
important questions are: How can they be computed to an overall judgment? Is such
integration possible (in light of the heterogeneity of the criteria involved) and, if
so, is the product stable over time (and in the population of collectors, art critiques,
and the community interested in art)? Strangely enough, it seems that the value
of artworks is very stable, although many political revolutions have shown sudden
breakdowns or the destruction of artworks for religious reasons.
9 Conclusion
In this case study centered in the artwork of Joseph Beuys, it became clear that
the ontological (substantial, material) nature of artwork was reduced or radically
changed from stable, expensive and technically difficult materials and techniques of
production to simple, almost worthless materials and to performances only existing
for a short period of time and in restricted contexts (cf. Beuys explaining his
drawings to a dead hare in a room without a public apart from the photographer
and a television crew). What is left from the phenomenology of classical art
experience? Are there specific “brain states or neural dynamics that correspond to
that phenomenology” (cf. the statement in the introduction to this book)?
The traditional art recipient or the visitor in art museums may conclude that this
is not art (as did the American president in 1913 in New York viewing modern
European art and as did Hitler when he decided to destroy modern artworks after
1938). One century after the Armory show in New York that scandalized Roosevelt,
we know that modern art took the path of innovation and avant-garde and continued
it until today, and that a steadily increasing public has been able to follow this path.
This means that the human brain is able to adapt to changing modes in art and that
avant-garde artists are able to impose their experimental innovations on a larger
public. This is the first observation we can make after a century of scandals caused
by modern art. If we look closer, we may see that, beyond a few trends which have
been accepted, a myriad of artistic experiments were made which had no impact
on the public and that those which were successful needed assistance from other
forces: either organized groups, the media, or the economical and political influence
of sponsors, collectors, and art experts. Some, like Picasso, Dali, and, to a lesser
extent, Beuys, were also very successful by themselves in gaining public attention
and imposing their style on the market and among art experts. They intuitively or
rationally used modern means of propaganda: Picasso and his women portrayed in
many pieces of art; Dali and his eccentric behavior in public, Beuys in his special
dress with his hat on.
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On a more general level, the lesson taught by modern art says that human
experience of art is, on one side, very open and can be adapted to new experiences.
On the other side, it is guided by social processes, be they local such as groups or
centers of art (cf. the role of art communities in Paris or in New York) or global
such as the cultural changes after the wars (1919 and 1946). In the work of Beuys,
the dimension of reflective processes, art theories, and art politics (even of a utopia
where artists shape society or humanity) became a prominent factor. Meanwhile,
this trend may have lost its fascination but it can be expected that it will show up
again under specific conditions. Permanent change seems to be the distinctive mark
of art in the modern world.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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